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Abstract 
This thesis aims to investigate the relationship between the media and economic 
change in Korea. The main claim is that the press played an important role in creating the 
economic crisis. The Korean press's excessive swing to the right contributed remarkably 
to positioning neo-liberalism as the mainstream ideology of the society. In particular, their 
discourse practices for `Globalisation' accelerated the trend of `retreating state and 
expanding market'. They hampered rational public debates, distorted economic policies 
and ultimately led to the crisis. 
The Korean press neglected to watch the problems of the chaebol (Korean 
conglomerates) and even encouraged the chaebol's over-investment. They failed to warn 
against the imminent currency crisis, partly due to their patriotic stance. By contrast, some 
influential members of the foreign press, particularly based on Wall Street, carried many 
critical reports reflecting the interests of international financial capitals. Their exaggerated 
reports enabled them to exert self-fulfilling effects. When the currency crisis arrived in 
Korea, both the domestic and foreign press played a considerable role in aggravating and 
transforming it into a chronic economic crisis, by supporting the IMF's mistaken 
prescriptions such as belt-tightening policies and selling companies abroad. 
The Korean case suggests that when the media abandon their obligation as a warning 
system and offer misleading views on socio-economic realities, the public sphere can be 
damaged. In a severely damaged `public sphere', it was very difficult for many important 
decisions such as company decisions, government policies and IMF prescriptions to 
secure rationality. In short, the Korean case shows that the media can deform the public 
sphere and thereby have negative effects on the economy, contributing to a crisis. From 
this perspective, two traditions of media studies - the public sphere and media influence - 
can be combined. The existing studies on media influence tend to favour a rather limited 
model of influence. However, given that the deformation of public sphere is one form of 
media influence, the limitation of this model is clear. 
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1 
Introduction 
Almost no country has attracted as much interest in its spectacular economic growth 
as South Korea. In a report published in 1993, the World Bank noted that the eight 
countries' in East Asia have achieved impressive economic growth rates during 
19651990. In particular, a great deal of praise was showered upon South Korea, which 
had continued to record annual economic growth rates of about 9% for 30 years (IBRD 
1993). 2 Four years later, the Korean economy attracted the attention of the world once 
again, but for the opposite reason. What used to be the showcase of economic success was 
now meeting with the crisis of total insolvency. What was wrong? 
When the financial crisis hit Asia in 1997, economists busied themselves with high- 
profile activities in diagnosing problems and offering numerous prescriptions. However, 
such an impressive move was in sharp contrast with the marked lack of analysis of non- 
economic factors. Particularly in terms of communication, hardly anyone was 
investigating why such activities by economists had not been carried out before the crisis, 
why critical public debates on single-minded neo-liberal economic policies had been so 
sparse. 
According to normative media models, the media are expected to detect new 
problems in a society and to invite or organise public debate. Economic problems cannot 
be an exception to this. If the media contribute to hiding the economic reality rather than 
investigating the problems, and distorting economic policies, a big national economic loss 
would be incurred. In light of this, economic news reports in Korea for about ten years 
before and after the economic crisis of 1997 provide one of the most striking examples. 
However, hardly anyone has discussed the media's share in causing and aggravating the 
crisis in Korea. Economists have devoted little attention to the role of the media as an 
institution that can have an impact on the economy. Media specialists too have left this 
I The eight countries refer to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan. Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia. They were known as HPAEs (High Performing Asian Economies). 
The GDP annual growth rates for Korea were 8.6% in 1960-70,9.5% in 1970-80 and 9.4% in 1980-90, 
often recording the highest rate in the world (Source: IBRD 1993). 
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area largely unexamined. 
The main objective of this research is to investigate the relation between the media 
and economic change, focusing on how the press has contributed to the precipitation of the 
Korean economic crisis. In order to do so, the real causes of the economic crisis and the 
problems within the media system in Korea will be analysed and the interactions between 
these two will be explained. 
The key word underlying this interdisciplinary research which covers both 
economics and media studies is `neo-liberalism'. In this research how neo-liberalism in 
Korea functioned as the ideology that not only brought about the economic crisis but also 
crucially influenced the behaviour of the press will be examined. It has been widely 
observed that neo-liberal ideology drove the state to dismantle its institutional role as the 
`guardian' of a developing state. The `free market', occupied by the chaebol3 - all- 
powerful Korean conglomerates - also could not properly function as a coordinating 
mechanism. 
The state and the market, however, were not the only suspect institutions on the 
scene. The press is another institution of equal importance. To substantiate this point, this 
thesis will scrutinise what role the Korean press played in propagating the neo-liberal 
ideology. The analysis of press practices concerning ruling discourses at that time will be 
essential in understanding how neo-liberalism was disseminated and gained `citizenship' 
in Korean society. The most conspicuous example was the discourse of `Globalisation', 
which played a role as a catchall phrase in introducing a number of neo-liberal policies. 
Through analysing the texts of the media, the distortion of language will be revealed. 
It is often said that the media, which are left to the free market, can never be free. In 
Korea where `economic power' exerts an extraordinary influence on `media power' as 
well as `political power', the events leading to the economic crisis offer a vivid case. It is 
not realistic to expect the press in Korea to reveal this collusive relationship as they are 
fully aware of its self-destructive consequences. Therefore the symbiosis between the 
press and the chaebol needs to be scrutinised through the pursuance of studies, especially 
concerning issues of how market forces can distort the roles of the press and how the press 
The term of 'chaebol' is included in the Oxford Dictionary of English (2003,2nd edition by Catherine 
Soanes and Angus Stevenson). The `chaebol' came from the pre-war Japanese term for a conglomerate. 
`zaibatsu'. The `chaebol' has a rather negative connotation. A Korean `chaebol' is usually controlled by 
the chairman's family, not by professional management. The word of `chaebol' is universally used as a 
singular noun or a collective noun in Korea. In this thesis, the `chaebol' refers to both singular and plural. 
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can help the chaebol to increase their dominance in an already distorted market. 
This study aims to contribute to filling a gaping hole in media studies and 
economics. This is also a trial to revive the `public sphere' in Korea - which is regarded as 
being traditionally undermined by the government and, in recent years, savagely mangled 
by conglomerates of an unusual kind, and ultimately, by the media themselves. This study 
examines how the media, which is aligned with `economic power', damaged the public 
sphere. Also, it will investigate why, in a damaged public sphere, the rationality of 
economic policies is difficult to secure and the possibility of policy failures - even 
economic crisis - is higher. By doing so, this thesis carries out a comprehensive inquiry 
into the causes of the crisis and then reviews the relevance of existing debates on media 
influence. Although most media academics support a rather limited model of influence, 
this popular model will be re-examined by assessing the media influence in terms of 
deformation of the public sphere. 
This chapter4 will critically review, for a start, Korean literature concerning media 
influence on economic change. Then it will move to the issues of professionalism and 
autonomy in economic journalism, which will be followed by an evaluation of the 
Habermasian public sphere and communication theory, and debates on the media 
influence, in relation to economic change. Based on these reviews, this chapter will put 
forward a revisionist hypothesis that provides a perspective of media studies on the causes 
of economic crisis. 
Chapter 2 will examine the relationships among market-state-media, and the role of 
neo-liberalism in shaping such relationships. With regard to the causes of the economic 
crisis in Korea, debates among economic academics, which are based largely on different 
views of the roles of the market and the state, will also be reviewed. 
Chapter 3 will in turn investigate what kinds of role the media have played in 
disseminating neo-liberalism as the mainstream ideology in Korean society. This will be 
done through analysing discursive discourse practices. 
Chapters 4,5 and 6 will move to look at more concrete examples that show the 
relationship between economic journalism and economic change. Various cases in which 
the media actually exercised their influence over economic policies will be examined. 
4 
As this study adopts comprehensive and multi-dimensional approaches to identify the causes of economic 
crisis, it is inevitable that various theories and methodologies will be examined. This chapter is an overall 
review, while leaving specific concerns (including conceptual definitions) to individual chapters. 
3 
Chapter 4 will show what types of relationship the media have developed and maintained 
with the chaebol, which are, in fact, important news resources as well. This chapter will 
also investigate how industrial policies have been distorted due to such particular 
relationships between the media and the chaebol. 
Chapter 5 will analyse the ways in which the media dealt with a series of events 
leading to the financial crisis (e. g. early entry into OECD and financial liberalisation) and 
how the domestic and foreign media, which tended to show conflicting views regarding 
the imminent economic crisis, contributed to making the crisis even worse. 
Chapter 6 will examine the reporting patterns of the media at the time of the 
negotiation over the IMF bail-out programme. As will be shown, the new government that 
was elected just after the outbreak of the economic crisis missed a good opportunity to 
reform the overall economic system and thereby made the financial crisis a chronic one. 
The role of the media in this process will also be scrutinised. Chapter 7 will summarise 
and conclude. 
Leanings of Media Studies in Korea 
It is not easy to find theses which look at the relationship between the media and 
economic change from the perspective of critical communication research, particularly 
with regard to the question of, beyond how capitals influence the media, how the media 
contributes to causing economic crises. The paucity of such research in Korea is striking 
given the fact that debates on economic crisis have been under way since the financial 
crisis of 1997. How can we explain the lack of interest in such an important issue? In 
order to address this question, we need to pay attention to the Korean tradition of media 
studies. 
Like other academic disciplines in Korea, media studies have been strongly 
influenced by the US. The critical communication research or political economic approach, 
which has been particularly strong in Europe, could not be openly attempted until the early 
1980's when the military political regime displayed their almighty power. ' Even after 
Park Chunghee seized power through a coup d'etat in 1961 and maintained a developmental dictatorship 
4 
then, this line of research has largely remained non-mainstream. 
This situation can be also attributed to the conservative tradition of Korean media 
studies. In addition, it is noteworthy that media-related academic institutes in Korea have 
been occupied mainly by those scholars who were trained in the US where, as Robert 
McChesney worryingly noted, the political economic approach to media studies is 
apparently lacking. 6 
However, critical communication studies attracted a wider audience behind closed 
doors as authoritarian control and press oppression by the military regime was 
strengthened. This is because the positivism and value-neutrality of mainstream media 
studies was seen to contribute to `justifying the unacceptable harsh reality' and 
`maintaining the current political system'. The mid-1980's and the early 1990's witnessed 
increasing interest in European theories. 7 The number of interested researchers increased 
and new academic courses covering these studies were started (Kim and Lee 1991: 11; Im 
1993: 110; Kang 1993: 131). 
Reflecting the growing interest in critical research, the Korean Society for 
Journalism and Communication Studies (KSJCS) organised a workshop on `Issues and 
Direction in Korean Media Studies' in 1991 and another on `Exploring New Directions in 
Media Studies' in 1992. However, the discussions between the two different approaches in 
two consecutive workshops were characterised by `opposition and hostility' and `forcing 
and imposing their views' (Kang 1993: 122), and ended up with a `compromise' of 
`peaceful coexistence of different paradigms' (124). The Korean paradigm controversies, 
particularly in 1992, had the unexpected effect of dwindling critical communication 
research by reaching an easy compromise rather than deepening their understanding of 
alternative approaches. 8 
This overall atmosphere was in line with the collapse of socialist regimes in East 
6 
7 
a 
for 18 years until his assassination by the then Head of the KCIA in 1979. However, General Chun 
Doohwan, Park's right hand man, came to power through a counter-coup. 
McChesney noted `If one is a scholar of communication, it strikes me as highly questionable not to have a 
working knowledge of political economy, in order to understand how capitalism works. To approach 
communication without political economy is similar to playing the piano wearing mittens' (2000: 115). 
See, for example, Lee, Sanghee (1983) (ed. ) Communication and Ideology; Kang, Sangho and Lee, 
Wonrak (1986) (eds) Modern Capitalism and Mass Media; Park, Myung j in (1989) Outcomes and Issues 
of Critical Communication Research; Kim, Seunghyun (1990) (ed. ) Political Economy in Information 
Society. 
As regards the premature retreat of the paradigm controversies, Kang Sanghyun noted that `the debates in 
the official platform became a drollery where they were extinguished as soon as they were ignited (1993: 
145). 
European countries and the resurgence of neo-conservatism. At that time in Korea, the 
political economic approaches in the social sciences were on the defensive, as the `post 
syndrome' such as post-Marxism and post-history commanded great interest. `New 
revisionism', 9 which can be seen as evolving out of the critical research tradition, was 
often interpreted by Korean liberal-pluralists as `surrender'. 10 
Quite often, the critical research camp in Korea `borrowed' political economy as a 
tool for `criticising' the government or the opposition camp, not as a `discipline'. For Karl 
Marx, as most of his works have `critique' in the title, the term `critique' means both 
`critique' and 'science'. II 
There are different schools within the same tradition of critical research, and each 
one has its own merits and disadvantages. However, some Korean critical academics 
pretended to represent the tradition of critical research, but neglected their academic duty 
to inspect the relevance of such theories in the Korean context. Not surprisingly, this 
invited criticism from the left as well as liberal-pluralists. For example, with regard to 
`political economy of the media' 12 Chung Jinhong made the severe criticism that `the 
analysis of balance sheets of newspaper companies, which obviously deviates from the 
core of political economy, is now presented as political economy in the Korean 
communication academic circle' (Chung 1991: 324). 
While there have been numerous debates about the nature of Korean society, it is 
widely agreed that since the mid 1980's, namely after the two-decade long `development 
dictatorship', Korean society has moved to a new era where economic power is able to 
control political power. However, the communication academics were largely 
disconnected from these debates, and media studies tended to concentrate on the 
relationship between the state (or political power) and the media rather than that between 
9 James Curran, in his book Media and Power, proposed a revised list of characteristics of new revisionism 
as follows: `a general shift away from the totalizing, explanatory frameworks of Marxism; a 
reconceptualisation of the media audience as creative and active; a spate of `redemptive' studies of 
popular media; and a new emphasis on the media as a source of pleasure' (2002: 125). 
10 For example, Yang Seungmok argued that `revisionism denies large part of the core of the critical 
paradigm and accepts empiricist perspectives based on pluralism' (1992: 253). 
Kant, in his book Critique of Pure Reason, defined the `critic' as follows: `1 do not mean by this a critique 
of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it 
may strive independently of all experience' (Kant 1963: 9). 
1' The political economy of the media initiated by Murdock and Golding takes advantage of Marx's political 
economic perspectives on social relation of production and attempts to undertake an industry analysis 
focussing on issues such as ownership in the media industry. However, the term `political economy' in 
this thesis has much broader meaning, not being confined to their usage. 
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capital and the media. Even when political economic studies were in fashion in Korea, 
most media studies, inspired by Marxist economism, were mainly interested in how 
dependent media organisations are on the state and capital and how this is reflected in 
their discourses and reporting patterns. 
Such a research tradition largely explains why there are few studies about how 
media reports have affected economic changes in Korea. Although research about the 
relationship between media and economic crisis is scant, there have been notable research 
efforts to apply critical approaches. For example, Kang Myunggu applied Stuart Hall's 
`theory of hegemonic articulation' to the Korean economy and attempted to explain how 
the structural problem of `economic crisis' was articulated with public ethics. He found 
that the cause of the economic crisis tended to be shifted to consumers and workers when 
the discourse of `economic crisis' was articulated with discourses concerning `over- 
consumption' and `industrial disputes' (Kang 1994). In another paper co-authored with 
Park Sanghoon, Kang analysed how political power utilised political symbols and what 
roles the media played in this process (Kang and Park 1997). 
These papers can be considered as pioneering researches in textual analysis of 
discourse practices by Korean ruling bloc including the media, as they show how the 
ruling bloc secures public consent and maintains their dominance through discursive 
activities. Yet their shortcomings are also somewhat notable. Above all, as their papers 
carried out a qualitative textual analysis on one nationwide newspaper while ignoring 
another 15 newspapers, 13 it was difficult to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
Korean ruling structure. Moreover, these papers were written before the financial crisis in 
the winter of 1997, and the question of how the media contributed to economic crisis was 
beyond their interest. 
In 1996, a three-day long seminar concerning economic journalism was held for the 
first time in Korea. Media and economic academics, economic editors of the press, and the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry were invited to discuss the desirable directions of 
economic news reports and commentaries. This type of seminar, which was held ten times 
up until 2004 thanks to financial support from the Samsung Press Foundation, was 
The target of qualitative analysis was Chosun, the most conservative newspaper in Korea, and it is hard to 
say that their analysis gives a representative picture. In addition, they did not pay attention to JoongAng, a 
chaebol-affiliated newspaper, which had to be taken seriously when discussing the relationship between 
political and economic power in the context of `withering state, expanding market'. 
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extended to include industrial editors and editorial writers after the 1997 financial crisis. 
Thus, discussions in a series of seminar gave useful insights on what problems were 
perceived as particularly problematic in economic reports in Korea. 
In the first seminar entitled `Economic News and Economic Realities' 14 in 1996, 
Kim Kyun pointed out various problems with economic news reports including logical 
flaws of the `economic crisis thesis' that had been put forward in some newspapers. 15 Na 
Sunglin and Lee Jaekyung, in their papers, enumerated the lack of expertise, impartiality, 
consistence, accountability and economic philosophy. They also identified sensationalism, 
encouraging speculation, confusions over reports and publicity, one-dimensional reports, 
and chauvinist reports (Kim, K. 1997; Na 1997; Lee, J. 1997). 
With regard to the `desirable' directions of economic news reports, Na Sunglin 
proposed promoting multi-dimensional reports, maintaining consistency, enhancing 
expertise and taking a national economic perspective (Na 1997). The view that economic 
journalists needed training to enhance their expertise in economic affairs was shared by 
other participants. Considering the complexity of economic affairs, economic reports 
require more enhanced expertise or professionalism. Also, given the practice of job 
rotation in Korean media organisations, these proposals have considerable relevance. 
However, over-emphasis on the `lack of expertise' needs to be reviewed. The 
`expertise thesis' had been continuously emphasised in Samsung-sponsored seminars even 
after the outbreak of the financial crisis (Kim, T. 1998; Kim, K. 1998), and this problem 
was sometimes exaggerated as a key factor of economic crisis, along with `government 
regulation of the market'. In addition, the review of many discussion papers presented in 
these seminars reveals some common tendency, which to some extent reflects the interest 
of the sponsor, the Samsung Press Foundation. As regards economic crisis, most papers 
did not address the issues related to the chaebol and their responsibility for the 
unprecedented economic crisis, but stressed the role of the government as stipulating `the 
rules of the game' (Yoo, J. 1998: 408-414) and the liberalist idea that `social development 
can be achieved only through establishing a competitive market system' (Lee, T. 
14 Shim Jaechul proposed a communication model concerning risk perception and impersonal effect and 
called for empirical studies in order to understand the social effects of economic news reports (Shim 
1997: 15-26). 
Kim Kyun concluded that the `economic crisis thesis' was exaggerated and tended to shift all the blame to 
high wages, thereby contributing to wage freezes. 
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1998: 445). 16 
Many other papers (Lee, M. 1999; Seo, J. 1999; Lee, H. 1999; Kim, S. 2000; Yang, 
Y. 2003) and articles (Kang C. 2001 among many others) pouring out after the outbreak of 
the crisis also put emphasis on `expertise enhancement' as the most important reform 
measure for economic news reports. 
In media studies around the world, `enhancement of professionalism' (including 
expertise) is indeed one of the customary prescriptions proposed by liberal pluralists to 
address various problems with news reports. This illustrates the innate bias in media 
studies in Korea. Moreover, a remarkable thing in Korea is that there is a tendency to 
emphasise the notion of `expertise' rather than that of `professionalism'. The notion of 
`professionalism', in Korean, has several components such as `expertise', `professional 
spirit' and `propensity to resist external interference'. In this context, we can see that 
`professional spirit' or `propensity to resist external interference' has been less emphasised. 
One fundamental question, which needs to be asked here, is whether, and to what 
extent, improved expertise will address problems with economic news reports and 
contribute to prevent (rather than cause) economic crisis. It is entirely plausible that, when 
the media is biased toward particular views or ideology, their great expertise will simply 
be a `dangerous weapon' at their disposal. At the same time, if the autonomy of the media 
and journalists were extremely limited, there would be very little room for improvement 
through greater expertise. This is why any discussions about media reports should go 
beyond the narrow territory of expertise to look at a broader media environment such as 
ideology and political-economic power relations. 
16 Lee Kyung, one of the panellists, criticised these views, saying that `it is highly likely that the rules of the 
game can be set in favour of capital' and `in establishing the rules of the game the voice of workers and 
civil society should be properly reflected'. 
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Professionalism and Press Environment 
Autonomy vs. Economy 
News organisations interact with their environment by, on one hand, contributing to 
maintaining or changing the larger social system and, on the other hand, gathering news 
items from and offering them back to the larger system. Their survival depends on these 
activities that secure them financial returns. The problem, however, is that news 
organisations have a tendency to take greater account of their own interests or the interests 
of the powerful organisations affecting their survival rather than the interests of the wider 
public. A body of research that concerns countervailing powers against this trend has been 
undertaken with a focus on the autonomy of media organisations and journalists. 
There exist divergent views between the two traditions of media studies concerning 
this issue. Marxists `regard media institutions as at best relatively and marginally 
autonomous', whereas liberal pluralists `tend to emphasize the mutual dependence 
between media professionals and the representatives or spokesmen for other institutions' 
(Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott 1995: 21). 
Many revisionist Marxists such as Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, and Raymond 
Williams criticised the economic determinism underlying Marx's theory and recognized 
`relative autonomy'. However, when the media as part of the superstructure is argued to 
play a key role in establishing a dominant hegemony (Gramsci 1971)" or ideological 
state apparatus (Althusser 1971,1976), the meaning of autonomy should be clarified. The 
relative autonomy of a media organization does not necessarily mean that people within 
the organization secure individual autonomy. For example, if a media organization is 
enthusiastically pursuing an ideological goal, its employees are faced with the option of 
`conform' or `leave'. 
According to Gramsci, people unconsciously conform to dominant social values and 
behavioural patterns by internalising dominant ideologies. As this certainly is the case for 
journalists, such a situation cannot be called `autonomy'. Even if journalists feel they have 
secured autonomy, mostly, it may be the case that they have unconsciously considered the 
17 
Gramsci criticized the media as contributing to consolidating a dominant hegemony for the ruling classes, 
but also called for the media to serve a `fortress' for `resistance hegemony'. 
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requirements of organisational norms (Tunstall 1971) or `self-censorship' has operated 
(Gans 1980: 251-253). This type of autonomy is in fact no more than what Curran calls 
`licensed autonomy' (Curran 1990: 120). 
Stuart Hall and associates point out that the representatives of the `state apparatus' 
and `well organized interests groups' play `the primary definers of topics' in the 
`routinised activity of news production' (Hall, Critchner, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts 
1978: 58). Therefore, the media `play a secondary role in reproducing the definitions of 
those who have privileged access, as of right, to the media as accredited sources' (1978: 
59). However, there are several weaknesses in Hall's theory: it does not consider 
`inequalities of access' to media and `contention between official sources' concerning how 
to interpret news; it also overstates the passivity of the media without taking into account 
its capability to challenge the so-called primary definers (Schlesinger 1990: 66-67); it did 
not pay attention to `hierarchical controls within media organizations' (Curran 1990: 127). 
In short, primary definers play an important role as news sources but do not always serve 
to secure hegemony for the powerful. 
As revisionist Marxists exclude `economy' from their analytical framework, their 
views on the nature of late capitalist society are insufficient and limited. On the other 
hand, instrumentalists attempt to explain how dominant powers, including economic 
power, take advantage of the media. According to the `propaganda model', the news 
organisations are no more than `instruments' of propaganda and there is no room for 
journalistic autonomy. 18 They claim that the owners of the news organisations, 
advertisers and key political figures use these organisations as instruments of class 
domination through selective advertising support and other means. 
The propaganda model is also not free from criticism. While Golding and Murdock 
concede that the model is `partly right', they argue that `by focusing on these kinds of 
strategic interventions Herman and Chomsky overlook the contradiction in the system'. It 
is further explained that the powerful groups cannot always manipulate the news 
organisations as they want (Golding and Murdock 2000: 73-74). Works which have been 
done from the perspective of political economy go as far as referring to `economic 
x The point is vividly made by Herman and Chomsky: If the powerful are able to fix the premises of 
discourse, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear and think about, and to manage 
public opinion by regular propaganda campaigns, the standard view of how the system works is at serious 
odds with reality (1988: xi). 
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determinism' in explaining the mechanism through which the content of messages is 
decided. Structualist views such as economic determinism, needless to say, were severely 
criticised by liberal pluralists who held the view of `considerable autonomy'. 
However, the relevance of past arguments relating to autonomy should be re- 
examined, taking into account the fact that economic power with a greater strength and 
influence can be a major obstacle against autonomy. In the so-called `age of economy', the 
`considerable autonomy thesis' sounds void, particularly in the field of economic 
journalism. Although revisionist Marxists make circumstantial judgements concerning 
`relative autonomy' in a rather convenient term `relative', the meaning of `relative' should 
be interpreted in a more restrictive way. If the expansion of economic powers leads to a 
reduction in the autonomy of journalism, which in turn contributes to the further 
expansion of economic powers, such a relationship will provide an important clue in 
exploring the relationship between media and economic changes. 
The Myth of the 'Expertise' 
In contrast to those critical approaches, liberal pluralists generally believe that the 
media enjoy a high degree of freedom. Journalists within media organisations have a 
tendency and will to represent the consensus19 and core values based on their professional 
power and consciousness (Gans 1980) or an instinctive rapport with their audience (King 
1967). Therefore, in the liberal tradition, the major method of media reform is to enhance 
`professional responsibility' (Stepp 1990), or to establish `professional rules of balance' 
(O'Neill 1990). As remarked by Curran, it is `no coincidence' that both the Hutchins 
Commission (1947) in the United States and the Royal Commission on the Press (1949) in 
the United Kingdom proposed `media professionalism' as the way forward to resolve a 
variety of problems facing the press (Curran 1996: 99). 
However, a series of studies about American journalists show a substantial decline in 
job satisfaction, which is interpreted as reflecting diminished autonomy. Weaver and 
Wilhoit have for a long time monitored the backgrounds, professional values and ethics of 
Stuart Hall pointed out the practice of the media no longer as the institutions which merely reflected and 
sustained the consensus, but as the institutions which helped to produce consensus and which 
manufactured consent' (1995: 86). 
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journalists in the United States. They concluded that `the professional culture of 
journalism remains quite weak compared to the more established professions of law and 
medicine' (1991: 143). Hallin wrote that `many journalists would characterize their job as 
a craft rather than a profession' (2000: 220). 20 There are many other studies that show the 
decay of professional power in the media organisations (e. g. McManus 1994). 
Why has professional power weakened despite its alleged importance in relation to 
press independence or journalist autonomy? Numerous reasons for this have been 
suggested, but this thesis concentrates on economic powers that have expanded 
considerably. Along with the question of how the media influence economic changes, the 
influence of the economic powers on the media constitutes key pillars of this thesis. In 
later capitalist society, the media and economic powers have been seeking to increase their 
influence in an unhealthy symbiotic relationship and demonstrating their greater power 
over other social spheres. 
Ownership and the market primarily concern the political economy of the media. 
Economic powers can exercise their influence over the media through owning media 
companies or intervening in the media market where news and advertisements are traded. 
Many studies have been undertaken on this issue21 and those on economic powers as 
news sources are of particular importance to this thesis. This topic needs to be discussed in 
relation to professional power or its autonomy as a countervailing power to economic 
powers. While Gans described source journalist relationship as `a tug-of-war' (1980: 117), 
such tension also exists between economic powers as sources and economic journalists. 
When Paul Manning examined what role news sources play in producing general 
news, he argued that some powerful news sources `can exert effective control over the 
flow of information entering particular arenas of the public sphere' (2001: 147). Today, 
such news sources are in fact economic news, and key players in the field are large 
conglomerates. The pursuits of commercial enterprises overlap with those of the news 
organisations in the sense that they both seek to gather, produce and disseminate economic 
information. Some larger conglomerates have a better ability to gather economic 
information than many news organisations. Global conglomerates, which are the 
21 
However, Hallin noticed that journalistic professionalism itself, for one thing, is far from dead, and in 
certain ways is stronger than ever' (Hallin 2000: 229). 
For example, James Curran examined how the Sunday Times had changed its tone with changes in the 
ownership (1990: 132), and Colin Sparks investigated how advertising had distorted the structure of the 
press (1999). 
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favourites of the globalisation era, often have more information than nation states or 
domestic media, even controlling the flow of information. Their ability is derived mainly 
from the economy of scale. Their control over the advertisement market also increases 
their voice as news sources. 
As economic issues increasingly occupy the agenda, commercial enterprises have 
greater power to influence the agenda-setting process. Meeting the expenses of the 
production and diffusion of the news, commercial firms can have direct or indirect 
influence on the agenda setting. Parsons notes that `such developments have proved a 
subtle form of distorting economic news values and the economic agenda itself' 1989: 
209). Curran also points out that `sponsorship helps to set the editorial agenda of 
sponsored features and, perhaps more important, to define their intended audiences' 
(1978: 240). 
As the world is being integrated into one economic bloc, economic agendas tend to 
go beyond nation states and show a trend toward uniformity. The scope for independent 
national decisions by the state is now much more limited, because refusing to accept 
global standards would result in the `exodus' of global capitals. As a consequence, the 
autonomy of the domestic media and journalists can be considerably reduced in economic 
news reporting. The most daunting force which threats autonomy would be research 
institutes that have continued to create the logic of globalisation and monitor world 
economy from the perspective of neo-liberalism. 
For example, it is almost impossible for an individual journalist, who is always 
under time pressure, to reverse the research findings of `authoritative' institutes such as 
the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), which can mobilize 
hundreds of researchers for an extensive period of time. Even though it is suspected that 
the main goals of IMD annual reports such as the `World Competitiveness Yearbook' are 
to promote international competition for economic advantages and to encourage 
deregulation, all individual journalists can do is often no more than deliver press releases. 
The World Economic Forum, which is organized in Davos in Switzerland by IMD every 
year, provides a platform for high-level government officials to compete for the attention 
of CEOs, and the economic issues mentioned in this competition always attract the media 
spotlight. 
Financial experts have recently increased their voice at the expense of the declining 
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influence of the professional power of economic journalists. This reflects the fact that the 
influence of global financial capitals is ever growing and financial techniques are 
increasingly complex. In the late 1980's, some observers such as Roberts, Johnson and 
Parsons have noted the growing involvement of employees of Wall Street or the City in the 
production of news and comments. Roberts and Johnson mentioned that `the news side of 
financial journalism is being controlled by the news producers rather than journalists' 
(1987: 79). In the case of the financial press, Parsons thus warns that they `may become 
more participants and puffers than observers and more extensions of PR companies than 
independent commentators and reporters' (1989: 213). 
In the mid 1990's, Doug Underwood pointed out that, as market-oriented or reader- 
driven news productions became common, `marketing-minded editors... are cheerfully 
participating in the corporate reshaping of the news' (Underwood 1993: 147). 
In the early 2000's, however, Aeron Davis confidently insisted that `business news 
has been captured by financial elites', quoting a public relations practitioner's assertion 
that `the national financial press are written for the City by the City' (2002: 76). For the 
last 15 years, during which the intervention of news sources in economic and financial 
news became more serious, the tones of scholars also became more critical, from 
`involvement' to `corporate reshaping' and then to `capture '. 
In this regard, caveats should be made to the proposal that outside experts should be 
invited to contribute their articles or give technical advice to enhance expertise in 
economic reports. Considering that research institutes and economic experts tend to take a 
neo-liberal view, it may not be easy to ensure the impartiality of professional advice. 
Even without the above explicit considerations of economic news, the market-driven 
trend in journalism is thought to have produced `a considerable tension between the 
culture of journalism and marketing'. Pushed by the demands of the market, newspapers 
tend to discard their traditional agenda of `public affairs' and move toward `lifestyle 
features' and `news you can use' (Hallin 2000: 221). 
Only with such changes in the media environment will the issue of professionalism 
mentioned above have substantive grounds. For example, when expertise in economic 
matters is demonstrated within the so-called `licensed autonomy', the effects of enhanced 
expertise would be rather limited. Similarly, if a particular ideology dominates the media, 
expertise might simply be used to disseminate and strengthen it. In short, what matters is 
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`expertise for what' or `directions of news reports'. 
While some studies suggest that expertise in economic news reporting is not low in 
Korea (Shim 1999), such an ideological mechanism may be working behind the discourses 
about expertise. In fact, in a seminar for economic editors, Chang Hyun-Joon22 stressed 
that `economic journalists of high quality should have a solid understanding of 
fundamental principles of market economy' (Chang 1998a: 25,1998b: 19). This is 
consistent with the views of Walter Eucken, which imply that the argument of expertise 
enhancement is based on liberalism. 23 If news reports that are loyal to market principles 
are considered as displaying high expertise, the Samsung-affiliated JoongAng24 would be 
the best newspaper in Korea. 25 Lee In-Kwon of the Samsung Economic Research Institute 
argued that `the media should put greater emphasis on promotional activities so as to 
enlighten the public to understand that all economic problems and interests should be 
addressed not based on political logics or state power but basically through market forces' 
(Lee, I. 1998). 
In fact, over-emphasis on professionalism may intensify the economic and 
ideological `monopoly control of the marketplace' because it is used to boost audience 
trust in the commercial press (Soloski 1997: 311-312; Sammut 2004: 11-12). As the 
professionalized press (so-called `quality papers') try to attract the intellectual or wealthy 
class as their main readership and are in turn supported by that class, the division of the 
news audience will be rapidly advanced. If so, it may result in, as Hallin pointed out, `a 
kind of differentiation that reinforces social barriers, in effect excluding working-class 
audiences from information about public affairs' (Hallin 2000: 234). 
Given the ideological orientations and potentially negative functions of 
`professionalism', where can we find a norm for desirable economic reports? In 
addressing this question, it is useful to revisit the Habermasian public sphere and 
communication theory as well as the revisionists' media models. 
22 
Chang Hyun-Joon was a neo-liberalist economist and editorialist at JoongAng. He proposed that the 
former British Prime Minister, M. Thatcher, should be invited to become a presidential advisor to assist in 
overcoming the economic crisis. 
Eucken, the founder of Order Liberalism, argued that high-quality journalists are a necessary condition 
for a high-quality market economy (cited in Chang 1998b). 
One of JoongAng's company slogans was `creating market economy'. 
This point will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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The Public Sphere and Economy 
The Public Sphere and Economic Change 
The environment in which the press operates nowadays can be characterised by the 
rise of neo-liberalism and de-regulation, which allow greater power to the enterprises, and 
the waning of the nation state ideology. The press accordingly takes the path of greater 
concentration through mergers, globalisation and commercialisation, and becomes less 
and less political. Against the backdrop of this trend, the concept of `public sphere' 
proposed by Jürgen Habermas gains a greater relevance. 
The liberal theory of the free press, as Nicholas Garnham criticised, `has simply 
assumed that the market will provide appropriate institutions and processes of public 
communication to support a democratic polity' (Garnham 1992: 363). However, such an 
`assumption' about a free press has turned out to be a `myth', as the popularity of the very 
notion has also revealed undesirable aspects of `freedom' which often threaten public 
communication, rather than facilitate it. 
The concept of the Habermasian public sphere is closely connected to economic 
changes. His explanation of the `transformation' of the public sphere is firmly anchored 
upon economic grounds. Between the 17th and 19th centuries, he argues, the `bourgeois 
public sphere' had been responsible for creating public opinion and monitoring the 
government. Habermas sees it as located between the state and the private domain. As the 
state expanded and economic interests organised themselves, the public sphere began to be 
controlled by them. The interests of those who thus managed to form corporatist powers 
were greatly reflected and echoed in the bourgeois public sphere. However, the `public' 
was gradually eliminated from that sphere (Habermas 1989). He continues his arguments 
relating to the development of the mass media: 
The mass media have on the one hand attained an incomparably greater range and 
effectiveness - the sphere of the public realm itself has expanded correspondingly. On 
the other hand they have been moved ever further out of this sphere and reentered the 
once private sphere of commodity exchange (Habermas 1989: 188). 
17 
As the capitalist economy developed further, the power of the capitalists greatly 
increased. Big enterprises eventually took control of the press that had traditionally 
maintained a `tense' relationship vis-ä-vis the state. As the enterprises either own or 
befriend the press, they have become increasingly shielded from its criticism and the 
control of the state. As a result, there can no longer be a balance between what John K. 
Galbraith called the `countervailing powers' of the tendencies toward a concentration of 
capital on one hand and a growing state interventionism on the other (Galbraith 1952). 
Although the centres of discussion and debate moved out from the salons and coffee 
houses of London and developed into the globalised press, meaningful public discussions 
have not been facilitated correspondingly. This is certainly not to deny the values brought 
by the development of mass communication. Thompson, for example, does recognise that 
thanks to the advancement of technology, `images and messages are made available to 
audiences which are greatly extended in time and space' (Thompson 1995: 75). This 
recognition leads to a criticism of the Habermasian theory as `it tends to treat the 
recipients of media messages as passive consumers' (Thompson 1990: 116). While there 
are many other criticisms of the Habermasian theory, its merits are widely recognized as 
well. As Curran pointed out: 
It offers nevertheless a powerful and arresting vision of the role of the media in a 
democratic society.... Within this public sphere, people collectively determine 
through the processes of rational argument the way in which they want to see society 
develop, and this shapes in turn the conduct of government policy (Curran 1996: 82). 
Garnham also perceives that the `first virtue' of Habermas's work is `to focus upon 
the indissoluble link between the institutions and practices of mass public communication 
and the institution and practices of democratic politics' (1992: 360). The recognition of 
such a link is of essential importance in analysing how the public sphere was demolished 
in a certain country and how it has affected economic changes. It is expected that the 
Habermasian theory will be very useful for this kind of interdisciplinary research 
combining media studies and economics. 26 
26 Thomas McCarthy wrote in the introduction to the English translation (The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere) of Habermas's seminal work as follows: `It combines materials and methods from 
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Another merit of the Habermasian approach is that it contains important warnings 
against falling into `the simple dichotomy of free market versus state control'. It was 
succinctly explained by Garnham: 
Habermas distinguishes the public sphere from both state and market and can thus 
pose the question of the threats to democracy and the public discourses upon which it 
depends coming both from the development of an oligopolistic capitalist market and 
from the development of the modern interventionist welfare state (Garnham 1992: 
361). 
For Habermas, the public sphere or communication system should secure autonomy from 
both the state and the market. An important issue in this regard is what this normative 
assertion means in today's world where market power is much stronger. This question is 
critical because the assertion might be interpreted as the logic of status quo or 
`neutralism' without taking into account the economic changes that have occurred. In fact, 
the era when Habermas's welfare-state interventionism caused serious concerns is over, 
and instead there is a renewed interest in the state as being capable of representing public 
interests against market forces. The fact that the press is captured by capital implies the 
need for the press to establish an alliance with the state. While the public sphere should 
secure autonomy from the state and the market, it is the state, not the market, which 
makes this possible. 
Communication Theory, Economic Power and Crisis 
In response to criticism leveled at his concept of the public sphere, Habermas has 
elaborated his seminal work while accepting some of the criticism. With regard to the 
structure of the public sphere, he explained: 
The communication structures of the public sphere are linked with the private life 
sociology and economics, law and political science, and social and cultural history in an effort to grasp 
the preconditions, structures, functions, and inner tensions of this central domain of modern society' 
(McCarthy 1989: xi). 
19 
spheres in a way that gives the civil-social periphery, in contrast to the political center, 
the advantage of greater sensitivity in detecting and identifying new problem 
situations (Habermas 1996: 381). 27 
As he observed, those who can perceive various problems of society and present 
them as topics for public debate are not the `exponents of the state apparatus, large 
organizations, or functional systems' but `intellectuals, concerned citizens, radical 
professionals, self-proclaimed advocates' who are situated in the civil-social periphery. 
The upshot is that it is `only through their controversial presentation in the media' that the 
topics thus formulated by them can hope to reach the larger public and become public 
agenda (Habermas 1996: 381). 
However, if the press fails to achieve this role, he argues, `issues will tend to start in, 
be managed from, the center, rather than follow a spontaneous course originating in the 
periphery' (1996: 380). Decisions made in such reversed processes are often faced with a 
legitimacy crisis because they violate democratic procedures. Harbermas, on one hand, is 
worried about the disappearance of the public by the expansion of the media, namely, re- 
feudalisation of the public sphere; on the other, he expects the revitalisation of the public 
sphere by `a counterweight of emancipatory potential built in communication structure 
themselves' (1987: 390). 
His alternative proposals, based on a rather optimistic vision, have differentiated 
Habermas from the earlier generation of the Frankfurt School who remained intellectual 
pessimists. As the titles of his major publications show, `The Theory of Communicative 
Action' (1981) is a social reform theory that aims to resolve gaps Between Facts and 
Norms' (1992) through communicative action. By turning our attention from labour as an 
interaction between nature and human beings to communication as an interaction between 
human beings, he effectively proposes social reform through communication, not a 
revolution by the working class. 
In his later work, Habermas analyzed society within the conceptual framework of 
27 
Habermas's views concerning communication structure are indebted to Bernard Peter's model. According 
to Peter, processes of communication and decision-making in constitutional systems display features in 
which they lie along a center-periphery axis. The political center is formed by the familiar institutional 
complexes of administration, judicial system, and democratic opinion formation (e. g. parliamentary 
bodies and political elections). The civil-social periphery comprises private organisations, business 
associations, labour unions, interest groups and so on (cited in Habermas 1996: 354-355). 
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`life-world' (Lebenswelt) and `system-world' (Systemwelt). The `life-world' is a realm 
where language-based communication between autonomous human beings can take 
place. 28 However, it is increasingly threatened in modern society. Individuals are caught 
in the oppressive communication mechanism of the `system' where they are unable to 
express themselves. The `system' is a realm where `money' (Geld) and `power' (Macht), 
rather than language, are the means of communication (1981: 476). 
The so-called `colonisation of life-world' could occur when the economy and the 
bureaucratic system, which follow the path of over-rationalisation in late capitalist society, 
control and manage society by means of `money' and `power'. 29 In a so-called 
`administered society' (verwaltete Gesellschaft) or `system-world', it is difficult for 
individuals to make independent decisions concerning their lives. 
His theory of communicative action also has many shortcomings. With the view that 
society is no more than a linguistic communication network, for example, he idealized 
communicative rationality, although the society is obviously more than the language 
(Castoriadis 1997). It is also questionable if a `life-world' colonised by the `system' could 
have an opposing power to the very `system' (Kim, C. 1996). In addition, a variety of 
criticisms have pointed to its abstractness, eclecticism, tautology, eliticism and westernism 
(Wellmer 1991; Park 1994; Chung 1995; Cho 1998) 
With regard to tensions between the market and the state, which will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter, it is important to understand the hierarchical status between 
`money' and `power' which control communication in the `system-world'. Habermas 
suggests that economic power and administrative power be constrained through 
democratic procedures in order to prevent the colonisation of the `life-world'. What makes 
this possible are the forces generated by communicative actions, and these forces come 
from the opinion-making processes of numerous local public spheres (Öffentlichkeiten). 
Such a view raises the question of whether or not imposing the same restrictions on 
administrative power as on economic power would be helpful in strengthening democracy. 
In the early 1980's when Habermas proposed his theory of communicative action, it 
28 'Life-world' is, according to Habermas, `the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where 
they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world, and where they can criticize and 
confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements' (Habermas 1996: 126). 
29 Based on his `thesis of internal colonisation', Habermas argued that Horkheimer and Adorno criticised 
`instrumental reason' in their Dialectic of Enlightenment but failed to develop a new concept of rationality. 
Habermas proposed `communicative rationality' as an alternative (Habermas 1987: 332-373). 
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was not easy to determine the relative significance of the problems of capital 
concentration and power concentration. In addition, his concept of `system' relies on 
Parsons' work and, to a large extent, also on Weber's work on bureaucratisation. 
Accordingly, their views on the negative consequences of bureaucracy are similar. 
However, as we shall see in chapter 2, the need for controlling economic power is greater 
in the wake of globalisation and neo-liberalism, which have invoked the `retreat of the 
state' and helped capital become more powerful. As briefly mentioned earlier, the problem 
is that controlling economic power is dependent on administrative power, which also 
needs to be controlled. Such difficulty is compounded by the fact that the controlling 
process should be based on democratic procedures, or what Habermas calls 
`communicative action' 
In providing a comprehensive explanation about causes of economic crisis which 
explicitly recognises the role of communicative factors, it is also essential to examine 
what Habermas calls the `legitimacy crisis'. His view that late capitalist states are faced 
with a legitimacy deficiency (Habermas 1975) is associated with his evaluation of welfare 
state interventionism. Crises of the economic system can spread to a rationality crisis of 
the political system along a detonating fuse of state intervention, and it is very difficult to 
intervene in the market while not damaging the logic of capital. Even if the state system 
demonstrates its rationality in addressing such a daunting task, Habermas noted, the 
secondary crisis - legitimacy crisis - is still possible. For the logic of capital is in 
contradiction with that of democracy. 
Given that these concerns about the legitimacy crisis were rooted in the era when 
state interventionism was widespread, what implications do they have for the era when the 
retreat of the state is common? From the perspective of neo-liberalism, there is little 
ground for state interventions, but, if attention is paid to the negative consequences of neo- 
liberalism, such interventions are to some degree justifiable. In the case of serious 
economic crisis, moreover, such intervention is seen as indispensable. Therefore, it is 
necessary to develop a new perspective on debates concerning legitimacy. 
In highlighting the legitimacy crisis, Habermas tended to exclude the possibility of 
an economic crisis or believed that it could be easily addressed. For Habermas, a crisis of 
overproduction could be prevented through Keynesian state intervention, or even if a crisis 
occurred, the state would intervene, which in turn would lead to legitimacy crisis 
J') 
(Habermas 1973). 
However, considering the causes of recent economic crises and the increasing 
difficulties in taking Keynesian measures due to the retreat of the state, the legitimacy 
crisis arising out of state intervention should not be overemphasised. Asian economic 
crises in the 1990's also call for a new perspective on the legitimacy of state intervention. 
If state intervention were undertaken in ways that served only the logic of capital 
accumulation, it certainly would be neither fair nor democratic. If this happened, as left- 
wing critics argued, Habermas's theory would contribute to the `consolidation of 
bourgeois dominance' or the `legitimisation of capitalist ideology' (Park 1994). As 
economic power has increased its status in late capitalist society, it is true that Habermas's 
early theory has gradually lost its relevance. Habermas came to the issue of economic 
power as he witnessed the difficulty in creating a public sphere within the political arena 
and the rapid differentiation of the economic arena from civil society. Yet he failed to 
predict that such a change would accelerate. As the material basis of the labour value 
theory was eroded due to the historical shift from labour -a key factor of surplus value 
production - to science and technology, the fate of a social and economic theory depends 
on socio-economic changes. A theory which cannot catch up with reality would simply 
disappear into the history of theory. However, the presence of shortcomings in the 
Habermasian communication theory does not mean that it has lost its relevance, because it 
is still true that enhancing communicative rationality will serve as a method of creating 
social agreements in controlling economic power. 
Media Influence and Economy 
Long-term Influence on Economic Thought 
Theories about media influence have evolved over time and they differ from school 
to school. Within the tradition of empirical research, portrayal of the power of media has 
oscillated between `powerful effect' and `limited effect' theories. Denis McQuail 
distinguishes the following four phases in explaining the evolution of media effect theory 
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within this tradition: 1) all-powerful media; 2) theory of powerful media put to the test; 3) 
powerful media rediscovered; and 4) negotiated media influence (2000: 417-422). 
Klapper has suggested that `mass communication does not ordinarily serve as a 
necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions through a nexus of 
mediating factors' (Klapper 1960: 8). This forms the basis of the theory of `limited 
effect'. 30 The reason why many scholars suggested the `limited effect' of the media is 
partly due to the fact that their research was limited to the short-term media effect. In the 
70s, however, leading researchers in the field began to focus on the long-term media effect. 
McQuail noted: 
The renewal of effect research was marked by a shift of attention towards long-term 
change, cognitions rather than attitude and affect, and towards collective phenomena 
such as climates of opinion, structure of belief, ideologies, cultural patterns and 
institutional forms of media provision (MaQuail 2000: 420). 
While the media effect theories have had vicissitudes within the liberal-empirical 
tradition, scholars within the Marxist tradition have steadfastly adhered to their conclusion 
about media influence. Their view is in accordance with their claim that the media are the 
`ideological agencies of class domination'. Curran and his colleagues wrote that `research 
studies that denied media influence were so disabled in their theoretical approach as to be 
scarcely worth confronting'. They combine two traditions as follows: 
The classical empirical studies] revealed the central role of the media in 
consolidating and fortifying the values and attitudes of audience members.... Marxist 
and critical commentators have also argued that the mass media play a strategic role 
in reinforcing dominant social norms and values that legitimize the social system. 
There is thus no inconsistency, at an empirical level, in the two approaches (Curran, 
Gurevitch and Woollacott 1995: 14). 
30 Klapper and other scholars also accept a large number of exceptions where the media have a great impact. 
They allow exceptions such as when the media may be or has been persuasive, when audience attention 
is causal, when information rather than attitude or opinion is involved, when the media source is 
prestigious, trusted or liked, when monopoly conditions are more complete... '(cited in Curran, Gurevitch 
and Woollacott 1995: 13). 
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These two research traditions are in agreement that the media contribute to the 
consolidation of the values and norms held by the audience. This common ground 
provides us with the starting point. One of the hypotheses of this thesis is that the press 
played a decisive role in turning neo-liberalism into the main-stream ideology in Korean 
society. From this is derived another hypothesis that rational public debate was hampered 
as a result of the one-sided thought and that economic policy-making process has also 
been distorted. 
It usually takes a long time for the values and thoughts of an individual or the 
majority of the members of a society to change or to be reinforced. It is particularly 
difficult to change the overall trend of the main-stream ideology of a society. However, 
this is where the media can have an impact. As Tichenor and his Minnesota team (1980) 
have demonstrated, the media `reinforce or operate to maintain the larger social system' 
and `tend to reflect the perspectives of organisational power centres such as business and 
other power groups' (cited in Jeffres 1986: 272). 
Economic organisations, in particular, will show resistance to economic thought 
which may hamper their pursuit of gains and protection of their vested interests. One of 
the reasons why neo-liberalism has become so fashionable is that it supports the activities 
of the winners of the market (conglomerates, for example). Under this ideology, market 
participants who already enjoy favourable entry conditions can further benefit from their 
relative advantages. Those who already suffer from unfavourable entry conditions will 
have to languish or sink. The media industry itself is made up of economic organisations. 
Moreover, the greater part of their income depends on advertisement of large corporations. 
The direction is thus set. 
Economic thought, however, does not always move in the direction of reinforcing 
the existing values. As illustrated by Keynes and Friedman, when the economic conditions 
underwent radical changes calling for a new paradigm and when effective use of the media 
is persistently made to propagate new thought, the overall trend of main-stream economic 
thought can also be changed (cited in Parsons 1989). This is because economic thoughts 
reflect people's perceptions about economic reality; the perception cannot be free from 
long-term saturating by the media. 
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Short-term Influence on Economic Policy 
Many scholars agree that short-term media effects are rather limited. Even studies 
that are designed to assess media effects in a sophisticated manner can at best produce 
`dusty' results as described by Blumler and Gurevitch (1995: 237). 
However, under some special circumstances, as mentioned above, short-term media 
influences may be sufficiently powerful. For example, when the information that is 
transmitted through the media is manipulated or exaggerated, the impact could be 
unusually powerful. Such a practice will inevitably damage the public sphere and this is 
why Habermas took the trouble to emphasise that the information transmitted by the 
media `must be truthful' (cited in McNair 1999: 22). 
Another example relevant to the powerful short-term media influence can be found 
in the practice of Korean journalism, which used to be satirised as `pan journalism'. Faced 
with an important event, the press heats up very rapidly and then cools down as rapidly as 
it has heated up. However, this has the effect of concentrating all the media resources to a 
single topic over a short span of time. The sheer amount of messages bombarded upon the 
audience may require a separate consideration, which may turn out to yield a different 
conclusion from the `limited' short-term media effect theory. 
It can be said that in a period of increased uncertainty and crisis, short-term media 
influences can be greater than usual. Faced with a rapidly changing situation, the audience 
cannot but greatly depend on the information supplied by the media. For Koreans, the 
economic crisis of 1997 was said to be the greatest crisis they have encountered since the 
Korean war of 1950-1953. Faced with such a shocking and unexpected economic crisis, 
the demand for economic information was inevitably greater. 
The topic that requires a special attention in this study is how the press can influence 
economic policy decisions. This is a question of the interaction between economic 
journalism and the political-economic system in a country. Economic news reports and 
detailed comments and forecasts not only affect the economy but, to a certain extent, they 
dictate significant policy changes. The dynamism of the economy stems from the 
decisions of the three major players - household, enterprise and the government - and 
none of these players are free from the influence of the economic news. Neil Gavin 
summarises this point: 
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Economic news reports are becoming more important to the workings and functions 
of the economy itself.... Impressions and perceptions are today central factors of the 
national economy (Gavin 1998: 131-132). 
Some studies are concerned with showing the interaction of variables such as 
economic news, consumer sentiment, economic conditions (reality) and presidential 
popularity. For example, economic news could distort economic reality by adopting an 
unduly negative tone, which stirs up feelings of anxiety and malaise (Glassman 1993; Kim 
K. 1997). As a result, consumer sentiment as well as the market will lose buoyancy or sink 
more deeply into depression (Kurtz 1990; Graber 1993). This will also have an impact on 
presidential popularity (Blood & Phillips 1997). 31 
Economic news reports can bring about changes of economic policy by changing the 
thought of policy makers. Jeremy Tunstall briefly mentioned the British media's impact 
on exchange rate and interest rate policy-decisions when the media changed their 
traditionally held position on these matters. According to him, the newspapers `have not 
only changed their own minds, but they have played an active part in changing the minds 
of the politicians and the Great British public' on matters of interest and exchange rates 
(Tunstal l 1996: 3 70). 
Economic policy making is after all a matter of choice. When the media show a 
clear preference for a certain policy alternative, it seems to be unavoidable that the policy 
makers' choice will be affected by it. On the other hand, policy-makers also make use of 
the press to justify their policy decisions and mobilize public support. As will be 
elaborated later in this thesis, both news making and policy-making are the products of the 
interaction between the two institutions - the media and the government. 
Keynes and Friedman held the view that economists should play a leading role in 
setting the political agenda. They also put their convictions into practice. The `agenda- 
setting effect model' which was first proposed by McCombs and Shaw starts with the 
assumption that even though media coverage may not easily bring about attitudinal or 
behavioural changes in the audience, this audience may actively seek solutions to the 
perceived problems, once they are convinced of the importance of the issues by extensive 
Many scholars classify these kinds of media effects into long-term effects (e. g. Blood and Phillips 1997: 
99), but, this thesis includes them in short-term influences as a relative concept of `long-term influence on 
economic thought'. 
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news coverage (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 176-187). 
This point is further developed as the `priming effect'. Iyengar and Kinder (1987), 
on the basis of their research of television news, concluded that `news not only increases 
the perceived salience of those issues that are covered most, but also works to prime 
viewers to give these issues more weight in their overall evaluation of political candidates 
and parties' (cited in Willnat 1997: 55). 
In reference to the `framing effect', Entman (1993: 51-58) suggests that `framing 
involves selection and salience'. In other words, only a few themes or certain aspects of 
issues are placed in the frames of news production, while others are left out of the frames. 
Iyengar argues that since television news largely relies on an episodic frame, instead of a 
thematic one, `its effect is generally to induce attributions of responsibility to individual 
victims or perpetrators rather than to broad societal forces, and hence the ultimate political 
impact of framing is pro-establishment' (Iyengar 1991: 16). This framing effect of 
television news can also be partly applicable to newspapers. Such defects of agenda set by 
the media may cause the distortion of public opinions and lead to wrong policy decisions. 
There is no guarantee that the agenda set by media coverage will immediately be 
reflected in the policy-making process. However, the `two-step flow model' proposed by 
Lazarsfeld and his research group (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955) and the `multi-step flow 
model' which can provide an insight into how the agenda set by the media can eventually 
be reflected in the policy making process. The policy-makers themselves may not 
necessarily be impressed by the agenda. However, opinion leaders (the President, for 
example) may be influenced, and through them, their followers (ministers and policy- 
makers) may be influenced. As the ability of the policy-makers will be evaluated by the 
evaluator's perception of how they have coped with the perceived prime issues, the 
policy-makers cannot lightly ignore the agenda that is largely set by the media coverage. 
Another point, which deserves careful attention in studying the impact of the media 
on government policy-making, is the concept of `the obstinate audience' (Bauer 1964), 
which posed a challenge to the theory of `all-powerful effect'. This concept is based on 
the recognition that the audience is not a creature that can be easily swayed by the media 
messages. While it would be difficult to question this recognition, it should be noted that it 
would be wrong to put the government decision-makers in the category of `obstinate 
audience'. This is because they operate, as McQuail noted, `within the pre-existing 
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structure of social relationships' (2000: 419). As a result, factors such as human 
relationship within the bureaucratic hierarchy, desire for promotion, and alumni network 
can influence their opinions and behaviours. 
Korean Society and Media Models 
The word `crisis' can be traced back to the Greek 'krinein' (to judge). 'Krisis' thus 
has the meaning of `the time for judgment' or `the decisive moment'. Likewise, crisis is 
closely connected to judgment and decision. For instance, if wrong decisions were made 
or rather if one decides to postpone the decision when a decision is needed, then a crisis 
might be approaching. 
There were a number of critical moments for decision during the period leading up 
to the Korean economic crisis of 1997. Many decisions were made on the level of 
grandiose discourse which uses sound-bites such as `Reforming the mentality', 
`Internationalisation', 'Globalisation', `Deregulation', `Strengthening competitiveness', 
`Liberalisation of the financial industry'. Also, government economic policy decisions for 
individual issues and companies' investment decisions to enter into a new area of business 
were the stages of decision-making which ultimately might lead to the economic crisis. 
Then the question is: were those decisions taken in a manner which reflects the 
interests of the Korean people on the whole; or at least, were they in the interest of those 
directly involved in the affair; had conflicting interests been adequately resolved through a 
rational-critical debate in the `public sphere'; had the debate been conducted with 
sufficient and accurate information; had the opportunity to participate in the debate been 
extended widely enough to give a legitimacy of the decisions taken? 
An attempt to answer these questions will lead one to tackle a more fundamental 
question: is there a `real democracy' in Korea? As is well known, democracy is best 
grasped as 'a system of procedural rules'. Of course, the results arising out of these 
democratic procedures are sometimes not the best. The superiority of democracy, as John 
Keane emphasised, is not to guarantee 'consensus and good decisions', but to provide 
citizens with 'the possibility of reconsidering their judgements about the quality' of the 
29 
decisions (Keane 1991: 177-178). In this way, the inertia of wrong decisions can be 
controlled and the legitimacy of decisions is secured. When Korean society is analysed 
from the perspective of democratic procedures, it will be revealed why wrong decisions 
have been so frequent and have persisted without being rectified, thereby causing 
significant damage to people. In this sense, it is possible to suggest that the decision- 
making processes of Korean society were marred by deep problems. 
The above-mentioned discourses adopted by the government had far-reaching 
impacts on Korean society and the economy. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether they 
were carefully adopted through democratic procedures. For example, the then President 
Kim Youngsam's decision to adopt the discourse of `Globalisation' in 1994 provided the 
decisive momentum for the opening up of the domestic market and deregulation of the 
financial services industry. However, there appears to have never been consensus even 
within the government itself, let alone social consensus. 32 
Nonetheless, the agenda, once decided even in this way, had the power to push 
Korean society in a particular direction, functioning as ruling discourses which the 
mainstream intellectuals, bureaucrats and the chaebol try to propagate into the society. 
Their ultimate goal is aptly summarised in a memorandum33 of Kang Kyungsik, the then 
Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) of Economy: `to eliminate all elements which may hinder 
the full functioning of the market' (Kang 1999a). 
Their perception was already too hardened by ideology to accept their opponents' 
point of view. Keane has argued that democracy is against any such ideology. Instead, 
democracy requires acceptance of the `indeterminacy, controversy and uncertainty' of 
human perceptions (Keane 1992: 96). He further argued that every decision and every 
ideal should be subjected to reconsideration. Democracy and the freedom of 
communication make it possible (Keane 1991). 
In order to have a democratic scrutiny of the government's ruling discourses and 
policies, there should be agencies of reform which could rally forces with a 
comprehensive range of diverse interests. Labour unions and non-governmental 
In a book, even his son wrote as follows: 'Regarding the globalisation policy, even the members of the 
secretariat of the President were hardly aware of its contents. A policy of such magnitude for the nation 
was therefore announced without any internal discussion. Such a style of statesmanship may need to be 
discussed. ' (Kim, H. 2002). 
When Kan-, was later prosecuted for criminal negligence, some of his personal papers came into the 
prosecutor's custody. His memorandum came to light as a result. 
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organisations could be mentioned in this connection as the countervailing forces which 
stand against the alliance of discourse forged between the state and the chaebol. However, 
neither of these two had accumulated sufficient power in Korea at that time. Labour 
unions were overshadowed by the all-powerful chaebol and they had difficulties even in 
being accepted as a partner in the corporatism. Non-governmental organisations remained 
too diffuse and lacked the focus of power. 
No doubt, the ruling class could itself be the agency of reform. However, at an early 
stage Kim Youngsam government became a partner in the state-chaebol alliance. It could 
not represent the interests of the people. The then government, according to Choi Jangjip, 
had superficial appeal for the masses, but it also had authoritarian tendencies. It needed 
strong support from the media to induce popular support (Choi, J. 1994). 
Now we can consider the media as the final candidate for a countervailing agency. 
The Korean press, however, has a crucial limitation in that it is entirely left to a free 
market. It is widely recognised that the media in a free market have a tendency to over- 
represent right-wing interests. According to Curran, the free market, `restricts the effective 
freedom to publish'; `reduces the circulation of public information and renders people less 
well informed'; `restricts participation in public debate'; `undermines intelligent and 
rational debate' (Curran 2000: 128-129). It is therefore possible to entertain a hypothesis 
that the Korean media are hindering democracy. 
At the meeting point between the theories of democracy and media studies, we may 
find the Habermasian public sphere and communication theory, and then as more concrete 
ideas, the public service media model or the democratic media model. These models can 
provide a path to a `real democracy'. Those who have developed the `public service' or 
`democratic' media model are greatly influenced by Habermas. As we have already 
examined Habermasian concepts, it would be useful here to review media models. 
According to their models, the media should function as a forum for democratic 
negotiation and compromise between conflicting interests in a society. In order to achieve 
this, the media should provide a wide range of information and opinions and offer a forum 
for discussion. To encourage discussion, social groups should have an equal or equitable 
right of access to the media (Garnham 1986; Keane 1988,1991; Curran 1991,2002). As 
requirements for a democratic media system Curran has listed as follows: 
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[The media system] should empower people by enabling them to explore where 
their interest lies; it should support sectional group identities and assist the 
functioning of organizations necessary for the effective representation of group 
interests; it should sustain vigilant scrutiny of government and centres of power; it 
should provide a source of protection and redress for weak and unorganized 
interests; and it should create the conditions for real societal agreement or 
compromise based on an open discussion of differences rather than a contrived 
consensus based on elite dominance (Curran 2002: 247). 
Although it has been developed with a specific reference to the broadcast media, 
Curran's `working model' could perhaps be extended to a wider range of media including 
newspapers. It is composed of the core media sector as public service solutions, civic 
media sector, professional media sector, private enterprise sector and social market 
sector. Of particular importance to the Korean situation are the civic media sector and the 
social market sector. 34 These two, as mentioned above, appear to be the weakest sectors 
in Korea. As Curran emphasised, in order to establish meaningful connections between 
`civic organizations' and `the wider public', and also to promote minority media, the civic 
media sector and the social market sector need to be developed (Curran 2002: 241-244). 
Keane has argued that in the hands of the liberalists, democracy was limited to the 
political sphere. As a result, economic power relationships in a civil society were largely 
ignored. He emphasised that the ideals of democracy must be extended to a wider range of 
civil society (Keane 1988,1991: 170). His view has a particular relevance to the study of 
this topic. As we shall see in the following chapters, undemocratic decisions taken within 
a chaebol or other economic power (an over-investment decision, for example) do have 
far-reaching impacts on the life of citizens in general. 
For the ideal type of `public service' or `democratic' media, Keane and Curran 
proposed the `non-state and non-market media system' (Keane 1991: xii) `which is 
controlled neither by the market nor the state' (Curran 2002: 247). Keane has pointed out 
that in order to increase the diversity of media, legislative measures are needed. Through 
34 Curran prescribes the functions of two sectors as follows: The civic media sector supports organizations 
(e. g. political parties, new social movements, interest groups, and sub-cultural networks) that are the life 
force of democracy; ... The social market sector takes the 
form of minority media operating within the 
market, which are supported by the state (Curran 2000: 144-147). 
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law, the state power should be regulated; through the state, the market should be regulated. 
He emphasises that `public regulation of the market should seek the creation of a genuine 
variety of media which enable little people in big societies to send and receive a variety of 
opinions' (Keane 1991: 155). 
Public opinion plays an important role in a democracy. However, when it ignores 
minority interests and over-represents special interests, the democracy is threatened. 
Curran pointed out that the media tend to support `dominant power interests' and seven 
types of power could act countervailing pressures: cultural power; state empowerment; 
media regulation; source power; consumer power; producer power; and staff power 
(Curran 2002: 151-155). What kinds of interest the media support depends on how 
effectively these countervailing pressures act. The investigation of the countervailing 
powers, along with the requirements of the media models as mentioned above, within a 
country-specific media environment could serve as the yardstick to identify the 
undemocratic elements of the Korean press. This will give an opportunity to test whether 
or not the public sphere in a country is working properly, and more broadly if genuine 
democracy is in place. 
Listing a variety of control mechanisms in the Constitution is no guarantee of 
democracy. The constitutional arrangement of the separation of powers may have the 
designed effect of checking various governmental organs. However, there is no 
mechanism of checking the ever-expanding economic powers. The press, no doubt, is a 
part of the power that needs to be checked, together with the chaebol. Although the press 
has established itself as the critical power vis-ä-vis the government, their criticism is 
considerably softened vis-ä-vis the chaebol. The press can be a means of promoting 
democracy. To the contrary, when it begins to `manipulate' public opinion, it can hamper 
the democracy. 
Herein it is possible to argue that the Korean economic crisis was partly due to the 
Korean press, the problems of decision-making and public opinion formation, going a step 
forward and the deficiencies of democracy in Korea. To give detailed examples, it may be 
true that as the Korean press failed to coordinate conflicting values, the potential for crisis 
was continually being accumulated. It may also be the case that when the crisis arrived, it 
was amplified by the defective decision-making mechanism of the government and the 
private sectors. 
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The quest for the true causes of the economic crisis might well lead to this awareness 
and, eventually, to these hypotheses. It may be possible to establish a meaningful 
connection between the economic crisis and the failure of democracy. From this 
perspective, one could argue that the economic crisis cannot be explained by economic 
causes alone. The topic must be approached and analysed as an issue of a malfunctioning 
communication mechanism as well. 
Surveillance of the economic powers' attempts to distort the market and the abuse or 
abandonment of governmental powers is an important responsibility of the press. If the 
Korean press not only failed to discharge its responsibility, but also actively distorted the 
market and hampered the proper functioning of the government during the critical periods 
of crisis and transition, the responsibility of the Korean press in the economic crisis can 
indeed be a heavy one. 
Outline of Text Analyses and Interviews 
As has been set out previously, this study proposes to investigate the role of the press 
in giving rise to the Korean economic crisis. This requires an analysis of the formation of 
the overall `discursive environment' during the period leading up to the outbreak of the 
crisis. In order to examine how the public sphere has been undermined and how that 
affected the economic changes, and more specifically, how the media exerted influence on 
the economy, this research relies mainly on two types of materials: media text analysis and 
interviews with policy makers, journalists, businessmen and PR staffs. 
The period under intensive consideration is from 1993, the first year of Kim 
Youngsam government, when political debates began to be overwhelmed by economic 
issues, going through the control of the IMF, until 2002, the last year of Kim Daejung's 
government, when the economic crisis seemed to enter a chronic state. 
Newspaper texts comprise economic news, commentaries, editorials and columns 
appearing in Korea and abroad. The editorials and columns are analysed more 
closely. Compared to factual coverage of events, these types of texts are believed to have 
greater influence on policy making or changes. 
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As one of the hypotheses of this study is that the press played a considerable role in 
promoting the neo-liberalism that became the mainstream economic thought in Korea, the 
reports relating to the overall formation of economic thought are touched upon. Certain 
themes proposed as new social and economic agendas (Globalisation, for example) and 
the coverage of important policy decisions receive particular attention. The discussion in 
this thesis is focused on the concrete economic issues that were highlighted during the 
period in question. They include the items such as: i) the entry of Samsung into and the 
bankruptcy of Kia in the car industry; ii) the insolvency of Hanbo and Hyundai's 
attempted entry into the steel industry; iii) the mushrooming of financial institutions and 
careless loan practices; and iv) the reckless expansion of Daewoo and Hyundai. In 
addition, they cover the investigations of the media's treatments relating to: v) foreign 
exchange control; vi) the negotiation with the IMF; vii) belt-tightening measures; and viii) 
the restructuring of industries. 
How the newspapers reported these issues is analysed mainly by qualitative methods, 
but this is supplemented by quantitative methods. Combining the two approaches has a 
strong point, as David Deacon and his colleagues argued, `in the interests of analytical 
enrichment and the triangulation of research findings' (Deacon, Pickering, Golding and 
Murdock 1999: 135). This method enables us to avoid fallacy in proving our hypotheses 
by quoting selectively certain sentences from certain articles. In particular, qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of ruling discourses can show mutual relations between texts, 
discourse practices and propagation of dominant ideology. 
For general data collection, all 16 newspapers with nationwide circulation are 
consulted. The Korea Press Foundation is running a website known as KINDS (Korean 
Integrated News Database System: www. kinds. or. kr). The keyword search method offers a 
great deal of accessibility and convenience. However, the method should be used only as 
an auxiliary measure because there is the danger of omitting critically important texts. In 
particular, column titles often give out very little information about the contents of the 
column. It is essential to actually look over an enormous number of newspaper articles 
about important economic issues. 
The main texts are Chosun, JoongAng, DongA and Hankyoreh, which are regarded 
as the leading papers in Korea. The first three of these papers enjoy an oligopolistic 
control of the market and the fourth one enjoys a somewhat special attention as it is 
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perceived as progressive. 35 The `leading people' in the various fields of society, as 
Tunstall observed, almost all `read the same few leading newspapers' (Tunstall 1996: 1). 
Occasional mentions, however, are made of minor newspapers, business newspapers, 
magazines as well as some of the special broadcast coverage of economic issues. Korea- 
related economic news coverage of influential foreign papers and news agencies must also 
be scrutinised, in order to assess their influence on a national economy in the era of 
globalisation. 
One point, which needs to be discussed here, is whether focusing on newspapers 
among all the mass communication media can be justified when the aim is to study the 
role of the media in influencing the performance of the national economy. The question 
becomes more pertinent considering that some scholars such as Katz contend that 
newspapers are no longer the `first medium of national integration' (cited in Curran 1998: 
180). 
However, it is expected that an analysis of newspapers alone will provide adequate 
insights or information when studying the relationship between economic news reporting 
and economic change in Korea. This is because of the overriding importance of the 
newspaper in Korea. The print media are likely to appear to have a far greater importance 
in countries with a Confucian tradition. This may not be unconnected to the precocious 
development of printing technology in Korea. 36 
In Korea, it is true, `the influence of broadcasting on mass culture is immense'. 
However, newspapers are considered to have `quite a significant political value because of 
their function of leading public opinion' (Park, Kim and Sohn 2000: 117). Park and his 
colleagues point out the unusually high rate of home-delivery subscription in Korea and 
the fact that a small number of newspapers enjoying an oligarchic domination of the 
media market lead the patterns of public discourse. Unlike the case of the US, the major 
newspapers in Korea have nationwide circulation and control the national media market. 
Moreover, this study is focused on the media's influence on economic policy-makers 
rather than the general audience. Because of this, newspapers need to be treated with 
35 The ideological leanings of the Korean press will be discussed in Chapter 2, in company with each 
newspaper's ownership and market share. 
According to a chronology of media events drawn by J. Watson and A. Hill, `first printed book, the 
Dharani Sutra, created in Korea from woodblocks on a scroll in A. D. 704, and discovered... in 1966' 
(Watson and Hill 2000: 339). And in the early thirteenth century, as John B. Thompson wrote, `Koreans 
were the first to develop a form of moveable type of made of metal' (Thompson 1995: 54). 
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greater attention than broadcast media. It is generally accepted that newspapers have a 
greater impact on policy-makers and the `elite' portion of the audience. The policy-makers 
in Korea often simply do not have time to watch prime-time news broadcasts. Instead, as 
described by Tunstall, `when they arrive at the office, most top politicians and 
administrators are presented with press cuttings' (Tunstall 1996: 1). 
Also, as at that time the major broadcast companies in Korea operated under the 
supervision of the government, government officials felt little need to watch the broadcast 
news. Yet another point to remember is that `television carries little business-related news 
in any case' (Gans 1980: 255). On the other hand, newspapers are `especially relevant' to 
economic journalism in terms of `depth, detail, and numbers' (Tunstall 1996: 354). 
Although newspapers' influence may be comparatively powerful, one cannot expect 
to reach a definitive conclusion about their influence on economic policy making. Even if 
there occurred a change of policy after a change of the media agenda or scathing news 
reports, the change may have been due to other intervening causes as well. McQuail 
agrees that `the media are rarely likely to be the only necessary or sufficient cause and 
effect, and their relative contribution is extremely hard to access' (McQuail 2000: 416). 
However, in-depth interviews with key policy-makers of the relevant period may 
provide a superior insight into the newspapers' influence on policy making. They might be 
influenced by the news reports in the planning, execution, alteration, cover-up and 
discarding of the policies. Such interviews will also provide the means of studying how 
the government as news sources influenced the news reporting as well. Not infrequently, 
the government resorts to intentional leaks about a policy to test the waters or makes 
informal requests to journalists to support the impending policies. 
In order to collect meaningful information from the perspective of media or 
communication studies, the interviews with policy makers were undertaken with the focus 
on the following questions: was there sufficient related information with which public 
opinions could be formed; did the civil-social periphery have adequate means (e. g. civic 
media sector) of voicing their interests to policy-makers; if not, is it possible to say that 
the public opinion' was `manipulated' by the chaebol or mainstream press; was there 
enough opportunity for meaningful debate to ensure the legitimacy of the decision- 
making; did the media play the role of coordinating and compromising the conflicts in a 
democratic way; if the decision was distorted, what were the causes; to what extent were 
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they influenced by the press; did the government have the power to correct failures of the 
market such as over-investment? Needless to say, actual questions will vary and will 
certainly have to be rephrased depending on issues and interviewees. 
Interviews with reporters, desks and columnists who have addressed an important 
economic issue would provide useful information in understanding the overall problem 
with the media in Korea. It could also be expected that such interviews would help us 
identify their political orientations that influence their reports, as well as the obstacles to 
their autonomous reports. These interviews would also reveal how the market forces could 
incapacitate the role of the media as `watchdog' and how the media helped the chaebol to 
be master of the distorted market. 
Another important group for interviews was executives, managers and PR staffs in 
the chaebol. If duplication and over-investment by the chaebol is the main cause of the 
financial crisis in Korea, it is essential to understand how such decisions were made. This 
question is particularly important for the revisionist hypothesis mentioned above. What is 
crucial from the perspective of communication studies is communication within a 
company or internal democracy, because the rationality of decision-making is, to a large 
extent, reliant on the decision-making mechanism. The question of why rational 
investment decisions were not made will be addressed in in-depth interviews with top 
managers. In addition, interviews with PR staffs will show how the chaebol as news 
sources have influence on the media and if they have successfully changed government 
policies. 
As a final result, a total of 44 interviews were used for this study. 19 out of these 
interviews were undertaken through personal communications when the present researcher 
was working as an economic journalist in Korea. The remaining 25 interviews were 
organized mainly as part of my research fieldwork during December 2002 to April 2003. 
Some follow-up interviews, when needed, were also conducted on the phone. As is shown 
in <Table 1-1>, interviewees include 11 government officials, 24 journalists, 7 
businessmen and 2 researchers. With regard to government officials, the interviews were 
undertaken mainly with those who were believed to have exercised great influence on 
policy makings and to understand what pressures have been imposed from outside on this 
decision making process. As a result, most of the selected interviewees were high-level 
officials in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Finance and 
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Economy. The journalists interviewed for this research included economic editors and 
economic journalists, and personal communications with them are also extensively used. 
As those government officials and businessmen who were involved in policy-making 
or the negotiations with the IMF are still actively working, some of them demanded 
anonymity or refused to grant an interview. However, the interviews covered a sufficient 
number of people who occupied key positions so that it was possible to get a fairly 
detailed picture of policy distortions by the press and the chaebol. When interview 
requests were refused (about 10 cases), numerous materials such as records mentioned 
above turned out to be reliable alternative sources of information. 
<Table 1-1> Interviews and Personal Communications 37 
Government Officials and Politicians II 
Top grade (Minister, Vice Minister) 2 
Higher grade (Deputy Minister) 3 
Medium grade (Director General, Section Chief, Junior Secretary to the President) 4 
Low grade (Executive officer) I 
Assemblyman (Chairman of Policy Planning Committee of the ruling party) 1 
Journalists 24 
Economic editors 
Other editorial staff 
Senior reporters and columnists 
Junior reporters 
3 
2 
4 
15 
Businessmen 7 
Executives 3 
Middle-level managers 4 
Others 2 
Scholar 
Researcher 
1 
1 
Grand Total 44 
This table is based on the professional position the interviewee held during which the events in question 
were unfolding, but if necessary, professional positions as of interview day or recent positions are 
mentioned. 
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Beyond methodological limitations 
As I mentioned above, this study is largely based on qualitative methods although I 
did occasionally make use of quantitative methods. For an accurate understanding of how 
the government, the chaebol and the media interacted and influenced policy formation 
during the period leading to the crisis, a contextual approach is indispensable. Especially, 
in order to assess the media influence on economic change, textual content analysis of 
news reports of the period must be put in perspective by a contextual approach. At this 
point qualitative research is, as Jensen wrote, `instrumental in extending the notion of 'text' 
to processes of intertextuality and of meaningful social interaction' (Jensen 2002: 244). 
In fact, qualitative research is closely associated with the tradition of contextual 
interpretation in social sciences. The interpretation of textual output of the media would 
lead to a contextual understanding if not only the texts but also the journalists who 
produced the texts, and the media organisations in which journalists operate and the socio- 
economic environment of these media organisations are all studied in a comprehensive 
manner. For instance, when several columns appear in different newspapers regarding a 
chaebol's move into a new area of business, a text analysis of these columns would 
provide a deeper and richer understanding if one takes account of the context in which 
those columns appear; the outlook and the motives of the columnists in question; the 
political stance, organisational norms and financial situation of the newspaper companies; 
the influence of the chaebol as news sources; and government policies on the chaebol. 
Participant observation is a very effective method for this type of research. What is 
obscured by the textual output can be revealed through participant observation. For 
instance, if one wishes to know how a particular news item is selected, rejected or 
highlighted, the best method to adopt would be to participate in the news production and 
observe, interview and talk with those involved in the news production. However, media 
professionals, as noted by Anders Hansen and his colleagues (1998: 36), often perceive 
themselves as an elite group and they tend to resist surveillance from outsiders. Although 
the question of access to the subjects of research poses a serious obstacle to observational 
methods, it is all the more so when the subjects are the media elites. Those who had 
themselves been media professionals do have an advantage in this regard. Such 
researchers would be perceived as former colleagues. A sense of solidarity of the 
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profession helps reduce the resistance from the media professionals who are the subjects 
of the research. The remarkable research of Marjorie Ferguson (1983) and Alastair 
Hetherington (1985) on magazine and news production was partly due to the fact that they 
were themselves the media professionals. 38 
This study is also based on the field experience and the materials39 accumulated by 
the present researcher who participated in the economic news report and observed the 
process of news production for about 20 years in Korea. The duration of participation and 
observation is of particular importance when one needs to trace `structural changes'. This 
study is focused on how economic thought and economic reality in Korea underwent 
changes, how the government policies, chaebol's influence and the stance of the media 
interacted over the past 10 years, and particularly how the media influenced the economic 
changes. Accordingly, a short-term observation and participation is not likely to produce 
any meaningful result for these topics. 
Although the present research was conducted through long-term participation and 
personal communications in the so-called `natural settings', it is not without its own 
problems and shortcomings. As the present researcher did not start his professional career 
with research in mind, his observation was not done in a systematic and carefully devised 
manner. There are areas where he does not have a large amount of data. To fill this gap, 
relevant texts focused on policy issues during the period leading up to the economic crisis 
will have to be collected more extensively. Many more key players in the government, the 
chaebol and the press during that period would need to be interviewed in a fuller manner. 
An issue posed relating to the extension of texts and interviewees is to select the 
sampling methods. A common feature of qualitative or field research, as many scholars 
have mentioned (e. g. Deacon et al. 1999; Sullivan 2001), is that most researches are 
conducted by non-probability (or non-random) sampling. This study also relies largely on 
non-probability sampling. However, the sampling was not constrained by any particular 
method. Once a class of materials is defined, the texts and the interviewees who were 
Ferguson who was a magazine journalist, conducted a study of women's magazines in the UK in the 
1970's. She notes that `my previous participation in their production... conferred advantages as well as 
applied restraints. It facilitated access to informants at all levels of hierarchy... '(1983: 217). Hetherington 
who edited the Guardian and was also a controller of BBC Scotland, later conducted a study of national 
news media (cited in Deacon et al. 1999: 252). 
This research has examined not only filed newspapers but also an enormous number of newspaper 
cuttings and documentation that were compiled by the present researcher who was working as an economic 
journalist. There are about 140 files in total, which are classified by subjects, items and events. 
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suited to the `goal' of each case study were collected and analysed. 
The selection of newspaper texts, as mentioned above, was mainly `targeted' on 
commentaries, editorials and columns relating to big economic issues of Korea, which 
appeared in the four major Korean papers and some foreign papers. Almost all news 
articles falling within this class were reviewed. Those items which are significant for the 
case studies and representative of the stance of each of the newspaper companies under 
study were then selected. 
Nevertheless, as the analysis of news reports is limited to news coverage of media 
companies, it has the disadvantage of failing to cover unreported but important news as 
well as the behind-the-scenes stories of covered news. In an attempt to overcome this 
shortcoming, other documents have been extensively reviewed, including report notes and 
memories of journalists, government policy records, prosecutors' investigation records and 
court records on dereliction charges relating to the currency crisis, records of the National 
Assembly hearings and classified documents such as the chaebol's PR project plans. 
Multi-step sampling was used in selecting the interviewees. This is in line with the 
contextual orientation of qualitative research. In order to study the arguable causal 
connection between news coverage and policy change, for instance, it is not necessary to 
interview all relevant persons. One can start with a limited number of interviewees who 
are necessary to have an independent corroboration of the clues supplied by media texts. 
After the initial interview, further interviews may be conducted when it is necessary to 
cross-check the statements which were made in the initial interview. Those who were 
responsible for policy formation at the time, news reporters, editors, entrepreneurs or PR 
staff may be contacted for cross checking purposes. Extensive, in-depth interviews with 
them would reveal the intricate mechanisms of news reporting and policy making which 
are all under the influence of organisational pressures and other complex constraints. 
However, purpose-oriented sampling must be done according to certain guidelines 
so that the interviewer's bias does not determine the selection of interviewees. While the 
present researcher's wide-ranging experience40 was useful in securing interviews with a 
40 The present researcher entered a conservative newspaper, Chosun in 1984, and then participated in the 
foundation of the only progressive newspaper, Hankyoreh in 1988. After having covered nearly all the 
government departments for economic affairs and the chaebol as a reporter, he was working for an editorial 
writer, a leading columnist, and then an economic editor. His first career as a speech writer 
for the 
chairman of LG group in 1983 was also very helpful in meeting the PR professionals of the chaebol and 
collecting 'unknown stories' relating to PR practices. 
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great variety of media professionals, businessmen and government officials responsible 
for economic policies, there are a few issues which might adversely affect objectivity of 
the research findings. They are as follows: 
First, sampling of interviewees might be biased by the interviewer's personal 
relationship and familiarity with them. In particular, media professionals as interviewees 
must be distributed across the whole range of the ideological spectrum. For this study, 
news reporters working at progressive newspaper companies and conservative ones were 
sometimes invited to come to a group interview session. Through discussions between 
them, it was hoped that their divergent views would emerge more clearly. Also, 
interviewees would need to be evenly distributed across the government departments who 
opposed to each other and the chaebol who competed against each other. 
Second, the interviewer must make every effort to refrain from holding any 
prejudice or preconceived notions about the result of interviews. The validity and 
reliability of interviews will depend on how successful the interviewer was in maintaining 
a neutral approach. By making use of interviews with economic editors of various 
newspaper companies, single observer bias could be avoided to a certain extent. 
Third, the research result may be affected by data collection bias in the course of the 
interviews. While the problem might be due to the interview method itself, it is difficult to 
draw honest answers from interviewees, especially high-level government officials, 
managers in the chaebol and media professionals. It is possible that they might provide 
distorted information and concentrate on self-defence. Yet, once anonymity is guaranteed, 
such a risk will be much smaller. One alternative in this regard would be to undertake 
interviews with those minorities who opposed unreasonable investment decisions or 
information manipulation, thereby collecting unknown episodes. At the same time, many 
company managers, policy makers and journalists who lost their jobs in the process of 
economic crisis and restructuring will be easily accessible for interviews. 
In short, the three major techniques of data collection adopted in this research are i) 
scrutiny of media texts and other documents; ii) participant observation; iii) talks and 
interviews. The combined method, it is hoped, could reduce biases inherent in a single 
method, a single source and a single investigator. 
Extreme caution ought to be exercised before assuming that the media determined 
public opinion in Korea in the later 1990s. Two generations of audience research, using 
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different methods, reveal that people have prior opinions, beliefs and values shaped by 
early socialisation, peer group influence and the discourses of everyday life, and that these 
prior dispositions give rise to selective responses to the media. 41 It is not argued here that 
the press brainwashed an uncritical, mindless public. However, what is argued in this 
thesis is that the Korean press offered a very selective representation of the issues relating 
to the management of the economy. The press tended to marginalise alternative 
interpretations of the economy other than those advanced by the government and powerful 
business interests, and tended to exclude from active consideration alternative policy 
options. The press thus did not function as an open forum of debate, and in this way 
militated against the development of an independent public opinion that might have acted 
as a countervailing force compelling a change of economic direction. 
In this context, where the potential power of critical opinion had been neutralised, 
the press exerted a significant influence on policy makers. However, this influence is best 
understood as contributing to policy outcomes rather than determining these. The 
influence exerted by the press coincided with that of other influences: those exerted from 
the president's office, the lobbying by powerful chaebol, and the consensus among trained 
economists. The press both expressed, and reinforced, the neo-liberalism of the era. It 
contributed to, but did not alone cause, the disastrous misjudgements and policy errors of 
this period. 
Finally, the economic crisis that engulfed Korea needs to be understood in its wider 
context. Although its causes are still the subject of continuing debate, it now seems clear 
that a number of factors were in play. The corporate sector had become over-invested, and 
was debt-ridden. The banking system was destabilised by this overexposure. The global 
economy had become inherently unstable due to the unprecedented velocity and volume 
of capital flows between national economies, facilitated by the development of new 
communications technology and the deregulation of global financial markets. In this 
already imperilled context, the government made things worse by making the wrong 
decisions. In this, it was encouraged and abetted by the Korean and foreign press. 
4' A particularly good overview of audience research, though one focused on television, is provided by John 
Tulloch, Watching Television Audiences, Arnold, London, 2000. For a recent study highlighting the 
limitations of press influence, as well as the variable, contingent and uneven nature of that influence, see 
James Curran, Ivor Gaber and Julian Petley, Culture Wars, Edinburgh University Press, 2005. 
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Neo-liberalism, the Korean Economy and the Press 
Introduction 
The meanings of `liberalism' are slightly different in Europe and the US, and even 
confusing in Korea. In Korea, as in the US, `liberalism' could mean free thinking, free from 
the grip of the conservatism. For this reason, `liberalists' in Korea are sometimes described 
as `progressive'. However, most of them believe in the market, favour the chaebol, and can 
thus be classified as `right-wing'. 
Among the economists who are regarded as `liberalists', those who emphasise 
fairness and order mainly come under the category of Walter Eucken's order liberalism or 
James Buchanan's constitutional liberalism. Some `liberalists' still remain in the category 
of Friedrich Hayek's evolutionary liberalism. Both groups of economists in Korea hold 
favourable views about the chaebol. However, the former group emphasises liberalism 
within rules, believing that the chaebol need to reform themselves. In contrast, the latter 
group believes that every existing institution is the fittest that survived the struggle for 
existence. Therefore, they do not think the government needs to reform the chaebol. 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century evolutionary liberalism has been 
severely criticised for its reactionary tendencies. It is, as it were, an ideology that failed to 
survive because it was, ironically, not `the fittest'. In Korea, however, it has attracted great 
attention because it has turned out to be very useful in defending the chaebol system. Neo- 
liberalist ideologues in Korea have argued that the chaebol of Korea are `the fittest' who 
managed to survive the poor conditions of governmental intervention and regulation. 
Regarding the financial crisis, which was triggered off by the over-investment of the 
chaebol who relied on excessive loans, Gong Byungho of the Korea Center 
for Free 
Enterprise (KCFE) has claimed in his book, Your common sense: you need to change it to 
survive: 
An important reason for the chaebol's reliance on loans rather than on the stock or 
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bond market was the presence of the numerous regulations that cripple stock or bond 
markets.... Had the market and its pricing mechanism been allowed to function 
properly, this financial crisis could have been avoided (Gong 1998: 34). 
In his argument, the principal offender of over-investment was stealthily changed 
from the chaebol to the government. 
Liberalism in Korea thus shows a wide spectrum of nuances. Nevertheless, the 
common features can be described as neo-liberalism that ardently defends the market 
mechanism. They also have neo-conservative tendencies in that they attempt to restore law 
and order. 
The ascendancy of neo-liberalism has brought back the issue concerning the 
relationship between the state and the market. This chapter aims to examine this issue from 
a historical perspective and also provide a critical review with regard to the depoliticisation 
of the market. It will also explore what distance the media need to maintain against the state 
and the market respectively, taking into account the level of socio-economic development 
in Korea. It is hoped that such conceptual clarifications will enable us to secure a 
comprehensive view concerning the status of neo-liberalism in Korea. 
The big difference among economists with regard to the roles of the state and the 
market explains why the debates about the causes of the economic crisis were so tense. As 
their views on the causes of the crisis differ, their prescriptions also differ. These debates 
were essentially related to the future direction of economic policies and also to the 
ideological directions of Korean society. For this reason, the debates were characterised by 
intense fights for `interpretative hegemony'. 
In order to evaluate the influence of neo-liberalism on economic thought and changes 
in Korea, it is essential to revisit these debates. Such a critical review will reveal the 
characteristics and limitations of the economic analyses put forward about the causes of 
economic crisis. The limitations will, in turn, indicate why this study pays special attention 
to non-economic factors, particularly the way in which the communication system operates 
in practice in Korea. 
Finally, a sketch of the ideological territory in the Korean media industry will help us 
develop a perspective that captures a crisis-inviting mechanism in the presence of 
ideological bias. 
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Market vs. State 
The debates about neo-liberalism also stem from different views as to the role of the 
state and the market. Neo-liberalism could perhaps be defined as an ideology that supports 
policies driven by the conviction that `free competition in a market will produce the best 
results'. Professor Coase of the Chicago School emphasises that even if the market may fail, 
government intervention cannot necessarily be the answer (Coale 1960: 1-44). 
Obviously, such belief relating to the minimal intervention of the government was 
also shared by Classical liberalism. However, neo-liberalism has a different context. When 
it emerged in the middle of the 20th century its main intention was to put forward an anti- 
thesis to the Keynesian welfare-state ideology. While neo-liberalists often quote the 
founding father of capitalist economic theory, Adam Smith, and earlier liberalists such as 
Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill and Emile Durkheim, they tend to conveniently 
disregard the pre-conditions of liberalism that formed the shared assumptions of these 
liberalist thinkers. 
However, as Amartya Sen (1987) points out, an accurate reading of Adam Smith 
would inform us that self-interested behaviour should not be understood in its narrow sense 
and that there is no evidence to show that maximisation of self-interest would lead to 
optimisation of the economy. For the earlier liberalist thinkers, free competition pre- 
supposed a degree of market regulation. Mill, for example, attempted to address the social 
difficulties resulting from natural rules of production by resorting to an artificially induced 
fairness of distribution and gradual social reform (Mill 1998). 
Such a liberalist tradition underwent a radical change with the onslaught of the capital 
crisis after the 1970's. In particular, the so-called Thatcherism of the UK and Reaganomics 
of the US adopted a decisively anti-labour, pro-capital approach as those regimes attempted 
to overcome the capital crisis by cutting down their welfare budgets, increasing labour- 
market flexibility, deregulating industries and privatising public companies. 
Thatcherism, according to Stuart Hall's analysis, emerged when the neo-liberalist 
effort to promote a free market economy was co-opted by the authoritarian Toryism which 
relied on the virtue of law and order. With an effective use of the populist discourse where 
the vices of industrial action, unionism, bureaucracy and tax feature prominently, the 
Thatcher government succeeded in combining the contradictory ideals of free market, 
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minimalist state and strong government (Hall 1983,1988). The government has to be 
strong, not to provide increased welfare services, but to enlarge the areas of market rule. 
This is what Charles Lindblom referred to as `the market as prison'. To suppress the 
demand for re-distribution of income and wealth a strong government was necessary. The 
strong government had the mission of preventing people from escaping the prison of the 
market (Lindblom 1982). 
The neo-liberalist conceptions of the state and the market are grounded upon an 
assumption: `in the beginning, there were the markets' (Williamson 1975: 20). 
However, many economic historians (e. g. Karl Polanyi 1957) show that the markets were 
not originally important institutions in comparison with the states and those large-scale 
markets were able to come into existence through the midwifery skill of the states. 
Depoliticising Market: Virtue or Vice? 
Neo-liberalists claim that the principle of market-driven resource distribution (one 
dollar, one vote) should not be influenced by the principle of political resource distribution 
(one person, one vote). Nevertheless, it is far from clear whether efficient resource 
distribution can be better achieved by the market rather than the state. As Joseph Stiglitz 
pointed out, just as the Keynesian assumption that the state will always act in the interest of 
the public is wrong, so is the neo-liberalist assumption that the state is always and 
everywhere inefficient (Stiglitz 1989). The claim that the market and the state should 
operate in distinct and separate spheres without interfering with each other can barely hide 
the raw interests of the market, which is intent on fending off the state intervention. 
In Korea, mainstream economists, who hold mostly neo-liberal convictions, have 
argued for a long time for the abolition of regulations. However, since the economy was 
depressed in 1993, they began to blame `high costs and low efficiency' for the economic 
depression and push the government to take action for `Strengthening competitiveness'. In 
order to combat `high costs', they advocated low wages, low interest rates, low land prices 
and low transport costs. The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI)42 and the Korea 
42 An interest group organised by Korean chaebol, apart from the Korea Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (KCCI). 
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Employers Federation (KEF) have emphasised the need for strong government 
intervention in these areas. Their argument is therefore marred with self-contradiction. 
They kept demanding the government crack down upon the labour movement in 
order to keep wages at a low level. They have often voiced their requests to the 
government to lower interest rates. In contrast to these vociferous demands, they rarely 
mention low efficiency in management and low levels of technology, which result in a 
poor rate of return. In short, they rarely blame themselves. In view of the development 
stage of the Korean economy, high wages are probably unavoidable. In order to compete 
with more advanced economies, they should have focused their efforts on high efficiency, 
but, they attempted to avoid the unavoidable - with the help of the government. 
Political economists appear to agree that de-politicising the market is not only 
infeasible but also dangerous and anti-democratic. This is because the market itself is a 
political product. As Chang Ha-Joon noted, `[the] proposal for its de-politicisation is at best 
self-contradictory and at worst dishonest' (Chang 2002: 549). He points out that many 
constructs of the market - for example, the establishment and distribution of property rights, 
minimum working hours, consumer protection and even prices - are subject to political 
influences. 
The relationship between the market and the state is at once complementary and 
potentially conflicting. It is rather common in many countries that once capitalists secure a 
dominant position in the market, they begin to influence political decision making as well. 
Such a state of affairs is undesirable not only for the state but also for the development of a 
market economy. 43 On the other hand, an over-enthusiastic policy decision to increase 
wages and welfare budgets may lead to inflation and ultimately drain resources that would 
otherwise have been put to production, thereby causing the overall impoverishment of the 
nation. 
In short, the relationship between the market and the state should not be perceived as 
a matter of dualistic choice, but as the one that must be worked out to achieve a harmonious 
balance between the two. A well-functioning market economy requires a well-functioning 
state. Lim Hyukbaek suggests that the way to liberty, equality and social justice is to reform 
the imperfect market and the equally imperfect state so that the two could explore the 
possibility of a `happy union' (Lim 1994: 157). 
This concern is echoed in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. See Sen (1987) for details. 
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Economic Development and the Media 
The attempt to conceptualise the roles of the market and the state - in the viewpoint 
of institutional economics or development economics - has oscillated between two 
extremes. The debate now appears to have led to an awareness of complementarity of 
institutions. The market-centred approach of the neo-classical economic theorists who 
would view the state as a `necessary evil' and the proponents of developmental state 
theory44 who would rely on the state to coordinate resource distribution, have both 
contributed to the emergence of the `market-friendly view'45 and the `market-enhancing 
view'. 
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The `market-friendly view' is modelled after the high performing Asian economies. In 
this view, the state appears to have achieved satisfactory results by carefully delineating 
policy priorities, encouraging high savings and training good-quality human resources. The 
`market enhancing view' reflects the recent theoretical trends in institutional 
economics. According to this view, the state itself is one among other economic entities in 
the system. Not only has the state overseen efficient functioning of the market, but also it 
has carried out its entrepreneurial role and thus contributed to an overall enhancement of 
the market function of the system (Seong 1998: 75-77). 
The proponents of institutionalist political economy regard the markets as an 
institution like any other institution. Market failure, therefore, has a considerably reduced 
significance. The market, according to Chang, is nothing but a component of so-called 
`market economy' or `capitalism': 
The capitalist system is made up of a range of institutions, including the markets as 
institutions of exchange, the firms as institutions of production, and the state as the 
creator and regulator of the institutions governing their relationships, as well as other 
informal institutions such as social convention (Chang 2002: 546). 
To this, the media should be added as an institution that carries out a role whose 
Jd For example, see Alice Amsden (1989), Robert Wade (1990). 
as The market-friendly view is closer to developmental state theory although the name might suggest 
otherwise, as the emphasis is on the role of the state in economic development. 
46 This view is adopted by Aoki and colleagues (1997) who analysed economic developments in East Asian 
countries. 
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significance is comparable to that of the market or of the state. In particular, considering the 
importance of mass communication in a modern society, the mass media can be expected to 
function as the institution for distributing information, `whistle-blowing' and organising 
public debates. 
Concerning the relation between society and press, there were `four theories of the 
press': `authoritarian', `libertarian', `social responsibility' and `communist' theory (Siebert, 
Peterson and Schramm 1956). In the early 1980's, McQuail (1983) and Altschull (1984), 
who witnessed the rapid economic advance of developmental states, added `development 
theory' to these four. McQuail suggested: 
A more positive version of media theory is needed which focused on national and 
developmental goals as well as the need for autonomy and solidarity with other 
nations in a similar situation. In the circumstances it may be legitimate for 
government to allocate resources selectively and to restrict journalistic freedom in 
some ways (McQuail 2000: 155). 
This theory represents the features of the Korean media in the age of a developmental 
state, but cannot be fully applied to the developed states, especially in the age of the retreat 
of the state. New socio-economic environments tend to require a new status of the media 
that maintain a distance from the market without being captured by the state. 
The tensions between the state and the market are not to be resolved by choosing one 
rather than the other. Instead, as Przeworski argued, they are to be relieved by providing 
incentives and supervision mechanisms to ensure that, within each of these organisations, 
the agent will strive to maximise the principal's interests (Przeworski 1992). The role of the 
media, then, is to guide and to watch out so that component institutions such as the market 
and the state can avoid violating the rules, lapsing into moral hazard or being co-opted by a 
particular group of the system. However, media industries themselves are no more than 
component groups of the system that are equally vulnerable to such risks. Herein lies the 
difficulty. 
: )1 
The Power of Neo-liberalism in Korean Society 
The Retreat of the State 
The studies of economic history (e. g. Lane 1958) reveal that capitalists would opt for 
state intervention and reap monopoly rent when such rent is likely to be greater than the 
gains from market generated revenue. However, when the scale of economy becomes large 
enough that the gains from innovation are likely to be greater than monopoly rent, they 
would rather try to be free from the state's interference. 
After decades of high economic growth that had been achieved through 
developmental state policies, Korean society began to ride the wave of neo-liberalism or 
neo-conservatism in the 1980's. The state had to retreat. Park Chunghee's government was 
succeeded by the military regime of Chun Doohwan. Chun's government, although 
authoritarian in the political sphere, steered away from a state-led economy and began to 
follow the course of `privatisation' of the economy. As Song Hogeun has remarked: 
The beginning of the so-called `self-regulation era' was not because of the Chun 
government's will for democracy, but because it was the best way to boost the 
economy. Booming economy and high growth rate were the keys to secure the 
stability of the authoritarian regime (Song 1992: 209). 
The ruling military group of the time appointed neo-liberalist proponents of the 
market economy to crucial government posts in a short-term attempt to boost the 
economy. The government was seeking to forge cooperation with the chaebol. 
All across the board, hundreds and thousands of people were banned from politics and 
stripped of their posts. Some of them were even sent to military camps where they had to 
go through ranger training courses. Amidst the reign of `revolutionary' terror, the chaebol 
were spared intact. 
The military government collapsed in the face of an unprecedented `civil struggle for 
democratisation' in 1987. Roh Taewoo47 came to power and made a partial attempt to 
' Although President Roh was also one of the leading members of the counter-coup in 1980, he could seize 
power thanks to political splits within the opposition party. 
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implement the demands for democratisation. His government pursued a series of reforms 
including the implementation of the `Real-name Financial Transaction System', punitive 
taxation for speculative real estate transactions and restrictions on the chaebol's entry into 
certain defined industries. 
By then, however, the chaebol had grown extremely strong with decades of 
accumulated capital. As predicted by Lane (1958), when the capital saw that the proposed 
reforms were a hindrance to their pursuit for profits, they rallied forces to resist the reforms. 
They mobilised interest groups and media industries under their control and started to 
mount an opposition. They vigorously lobbied to block the enactment of reform bills, or 
failing that, to delay the implementation of the reform acts. The government's programme 
for reforms was not a proposal to introduce `novel' arrangements. Most of the proposed 
reforms were, in fact, already well in place in many industrialised countries. The chaebol, 
however, portrayed the reforms as `state intervention'. What they now called the `market 
economy', so went their argument, would be crippled by state intervention. Their 
opposition was effective. The proposed `Real-name Financial Transaction System' was 
indefinitely postponed. The other reforms were also watered down and perfunctorily 
implemented for a couple of years before they were finally abandoned. 
However, the `Ban on Speculative Real Estate Transactions' (8 May 1990) which was 
subsequently introduced to curb the sharp increase in real estate prices provided another 
occasion for a tour de force as it required the chaebol to dispose of their real estate that 
were unrelated to their business operations. The neo-liberal leaning of Korean society 
began to manifest itself when the chaebol expressed their accumulated discontent in a 
variety of flora. The government's industrial policies and even the fair trade regulations 
were criticised as `market interference'. The chairman of Hyundai, Chung Juyung, decided 
to enter politics. Chairman Chung used his unparalleled wealth and the organisational 
support of his super conglomerate to form a political party. In the election for the National 
Assembly held in March 1992, his party won 31 seats. However, his unsuccessful attempt 
to run for the Presidency in late 1992 dealt a heavy blow to his super conglomerate, 
Hyundai. This is an episode where economic power attempted to take over political power 
as well. It was a wasteful attempt in every sense. 
To summarise, the relationship between the chaebol (capitalists) and the state during 
the successive governments of Chun and Roh cannot be described simply as the captivity of 
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the state by the chaebol. The relationship is, in fact, more dynamic and complicated. 
Obviously there is some indication of `captured state' or at least `collusion', as is illustrated 
by the imprisonment of both Chun and Roh when their corrupt practice of receiving 
impressive amount of money from the chaebol was revealed soon after they left 
office. However, it is also true that the pressure for reform was at times strong enough to 
make them embark on a collision course with the chaebol. Their decision to engage in such 
a high risk battle was perhaps their desperate effort to complement the deficiency of 
legitimacy from which they were suffering. 
The Consolidation of Economic Powers 
It is noteworthy that as democracy was advancing in Korean society, the capitalist 
giants also made strong attempts to organise themselves as an interest group. Their sphere 
of influence expanded and their lobby became more effective. The Federation of Korean 
Industries (FKI) emerged as the focus of their endeavours to organise themselves. FKI was 
created during the reign of Park Chunghee to foster the chaebol as the driving force for 
economic development. At the beginning, therefore, there was very little room for conflicts 
between the chaebol and the state. 
According to some analyses (e. g. Hong 1993), however, as the negative consequences 
of the chaebol-driven economic growth strategies on the overall national economy began to 
surface in the late 1970's, the FKI eventually defined itself as representing the interests of a 
handful of capitalist giants rather than the interests of all industries. Interestingly, this 
development was accompanied by the repositioning of another employers' organisation, the 
Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as a body that represents the interests of the 
medium or small size entrepreneurs in the provinces. The giants have effectively moved out 
for a much-needed, exclusive `solidarity'. 
During the successive governments of Chun and Roh, the FKI successfully blocked 
the introduction of the `Real-name Financial Transaction System'. They were also opposed 
to the enactment of `Fair Trade Law', which - as a result - took 17 years to see the light of 
day. It is paradoxical that an organisation whose mission statement prominently features 
`promotion of free market economic order' rejected the vital piece of legislation aimed at 
54 
policing the market. 
In 1996 the FKI hosted a special symposium to propagate the view that many 
regulations aimed at the chaebol were allegedly unconstitutional. Participants of the 
symposium expressed a view that various measures of the `Fair Trade Law' and `Securities 
Regulation Act', which were aimed at alleviating the concentration of capital within a 
chaebol (restrictions on cross-holding, restrictions on a chaebol's equity holdings in a 
commercial bank, for example), were basically unconstitutional (Lee, C. 1996). The pro- 
chaebol press covered this as an important topic. Hankook Kyungjae, of which the FKI 
members are the major shareholders, devoted two entire pages to report this as well as an 
editorial urging the government to proceed with the necessary law reform (Hankook 
Kyungjae, 20 June 1996). 
The neo-liberal ideology provided the argumentative force for the FKI's attempt to 
challenge the state's legitimate economic policy decisions. Another source of the FKI's 
power can be found in the practice of the ruling politicians who used the FKI as a 
convenient channel for political fund-raising as well as treating it as a `partner' in the 
government's efforts to boost the economy. The problem, as Lee Keunsik aptly pointed out, 
was that `for the government to seek policy consultation with the FKI, which is after all an 
interest group of the oligopolistic chaebol, is contradictory to its mission' (Hankyoreh, 11 
Sep. 1995). The Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and other non- 
governmental organisations have argued that the FKI is no more than `a cartel of the 
chaebol'. They also called for the dissolution of the FKI. 
However, the futility of such an effort was a matter of public knowledge by then. In 
the mind of opinion leaders in Korea, the FKI had already succeeded in portraying itself as 
the `necessary channel' between industry and the remainder of society. Each year the FKI 
secretariat organised factory visits for a large number of reporters, politicians, religious 
leaders and heads of various organisations. Schoolteachers were also invited to economics 
lecture tours on site. These programmes were funded by the FKI as one of its regular 
operations. The budget for these `social cooperation projects' amounted to about four 
million dollars in 1996. This was increased to ten million dollars in 1997 when the FKI 
strengthened its neo-liberal propaganda activities. The FKI used part of this budget to fund 
overseas training programmes for labour union leaders as well. 
The chaebol have forged a strong alliance with ruling politicians through marriage or 
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by offering top managerial posts to politicians or to high-ranking government officials upon 
their retirement. President Roh, for example, married his daughter off to the son of the 
chairman of SK Group, Choi Jonghyun, who later became the president of the 
FKI. President Roh's son, in turn, was married to a daughter of the chairman of the 
Dongbang Group, Shin Myungsoo. Toward the end of 1991 President Roh sent a 
memorandum to the Finance Minister instructing him to lower interest rates. It emerged 
afterwards that the memorandum had been prepared by Shin Myungsoo (Lee et al. 1995: 
271). Choi Jonghyun also had his share of influence. He was invited to a meeting held in a 
hotel attended by the Finance Minister and the Chairman of the Bank of Korea. Choi gave a 
lengthy speech expounding a monetarist view that the increased supply of money will 
bring down the interest rate' (Lee et al. 1995: 272). 48 It would have been simply 
unthinkable for him to have such an audience for his speech had he not forged a close 
connection with the President through his son's marriage. 
Also, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Economy, Shin Hyunhwak, Yoo 
Changsoon, Kang Kyungsik and many other former high-ranking government officials 
became advisers or executive directors of the chaebol. This added considerable power to 
the industry. Their lobbying led to the distortion of government policies in Korean society 
where connections play an important role. An official in the Financial Policy Section of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) admitted this in an interview undertaken for 
this thesis: 
When a person who has until recently been my boss approaches me as the finance 
director of a chaebol, it is not easy to ignore his requests. As a result, economic 
policies can be changed in a bad direction (interview 20 Feb. 2003). 
In connection with the consolidation of the chaebol, another interest group that 
deserves to be mentioned is the Korea Employers Federation (KEF), which represents 
capitalists' interests. Its main purpose was to coordinate employers' positions in wage 
negotiations. As the labour force of the time could not cohesively organise itself to form an 
industry-wide union or nation-wide federation of unions, the KEF was very effective. In 
1996, the KEF persuaded industry leaders to make a controversial decision to blacklist 
48 Choi studied economics at the University of Chicago, `the cradle of monetarism'. 
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graduates who had a record of participating in student demonstrations (Hankyoreh, 31 Aug. 
1996). 
Compromises and negotiations between federated labour unions and the employers' 
federation can certainly be a positive mechanism for healing social cleavage and for 
reforming the system on a basis of social corporatism. However, when there is a serious 
imbalance of respective bargaining powers, it will lead to unreciprocated concessions and 
sacrifices by one side. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the collective actions of an 
interest group can be robust when there are a small number of members who can easily 
communicate and who have shared values, convictions and interests (Clague 1997). The 
famous passage of Vilfredo Pareto is particularly relevant here. He noted that: 
[IfJ a certain measure A is the case of the loss of one franc to each of a thousand 
persons, and of a thousand franc gain to one individual, the latter will expend a 
great deal of energy, whereas the former will resist weakly; and it is likely that, in 
the end, the person who is attempting to secure the thousand francs via A will be 
successful (cited in Sen 1999: 122). 
Labour unions, non-governmental organisations and other citizens' movements have 
inherent weaknesses in this regard. The FKI and KEF confirmed this by showing how well 
these handfuls of chaebol can organise themselves and proceed with collective actions with 
effectiveness. 
The Subordination of Politics 
A three-decade long period of rule by former army generals came to an end in 1993 
when President Kim Youngsam came to power. President Kim declared the start of what he 
called `civilian government'. He began his presidency by undertaking a comprehensive 
programme for political and social reform. Under the catch-all phrase of `Building a New 
Korea', he used the sub-catchphrases of `Reform', `Strengthening competitiveness' and 
`Redressing law and order'. His enthusiasm for 'Reform' was very strong at first. His 
decisions to disclose the wealth of high-ranking government officials, to oust corrupt 
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bureaucrats and to ban private cliques within the army (which had provided the power base 
for the former military regimes) won him the heart of the people. Opinion polls in the first 
year of his presidency recorded 90% popular support for the government. 
Upon close analysis, however, the limits of his policies are obvious. Apart from the 
agenda of `Reform', the remaining agendas are the typical sound bites of neo-liberalist 
governments. President Kim's `Reform', therefore, was bound to clash with the remaining 
two (conservative) agendas that were discordant with his will to `Reform'. Neo- 
conservatism as well as neo-liberalism emphasises the efficiency of the market while 
supporting the law and order argument of the government. The ruthless crackdown on 
labour movements, which took place half a year after the beginning of the so-called 
`civilian government', was therefore pre-ordained. 
`Strengthening competitiveness' was given concrete content by the new government's 
economic policies, which were summarised in the `Plan for the New Economy'. In 
substance, they largely reflect the demands of the capitalist giants who successfully pleaded 
the need for `Rescuing the economy'. At the time of the presidential election, the FKI had 
produced a proposal entitled `What should government officials do in the new government: 
the business view' which spelled out their wishes and was later reflected in the government 
plan mentioned above 
It appeared to be during the period between the outbreak of a labour dispute at 
Hyundai (June 1993) and the government's surprise announcement of the `Real-name 
Financial Transaction System' (August 1993) that an anti-reform alliance was forged 
between the conservative block of the ruling class and the capitalists (e. g. Kang and Park 
1997: 134). The new government had been in power for less than six months by then. The 
demand of the anti-reform alliance was that the focus of government policies should be 
shifted away from `Reform' to `Rejuvenation of the economy'. This move was justified by 
the economic slump of the time. Some even went so far as to suspect that the so-called 
`slump' had been `induced' with a purpose (e. g. Kim, S. 1994; Hong 1997a). In the 
National Assembly in 2003 Representative Kim Boogyum also asserted, "Over the past 
three presidential terms, each time the pro-reform government came to power, the chaebol 
avoided domestic investments to bring the government to its knees" (Records of the 
National Assembly Debates, 17 Apr. 2003). 
The change of the catch phrase signalled the adoption of the neo-liberal, neo- 
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conservative ideology by the Kim government. While the `Rejuvenation' could have been 
achieved by reforming the chaebol-centred economic structure, in reality, the `Reform' was 
understood as consisting of `deregulation' and `privatisation'. The `hands off' policy of the 
government was expected to accelerate the pace at which the inefficiency of the system 
accumulated, because, by then, the market had already been stifled by the monopolistic 
dominance of the chaebol. 
The government began such a shift by removing the borrowing restrictions affecting 
some of the more heavily indebted chaebol. Construction of new plants within the already 
over-crowded area of Greater Seoul was permitted for the chaebol. Major construction 
projects to build social capital were carried out by private entrepreneurs. Public 
corporations were rapidly privatised. The major beneficiaries were the chaebol. Amidst the 
privatisation drive, the regulation of mobile communication services was `handed over' to 
the FKI, which was asked to select the mobile communication service provider from among 
their members. In other words, even the communication service policy was entrusted to the 
cartel of the chaebol. The charter for the communication service provider was eventually 
granted to Choi Jonghyun, the Chairman of the SK Group and the FKI. 
The executive committee meetings of the FKI, which were presided over by Choi 
Jonghyun, were referred to as `Economic cabinet meetings'. The residence of Lee Keunhee, 
the chairman of Samsung, was the meeting place of the owners of the chaebol. It was called 
the `Blue House II' at that time (Hankyoreh 20 Apr. 1995), named after the Blue House, the 
Official Presidential Residence of South Korea. 
Toward the end of his term, President Kim Youngsam became a vigorous advocate for 
`Globalisation', `minimal state and market extension'. In this climate, the FKI-affiliated 
think-tank, the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) produced a paper, which argued: 
Except for the Defence and the Foreign Service, all government departments may be 
abolished and that it will reduce the number of bureaucrats by 90%.... Higher income 
tax rates and other measures of artificial redistribution of income could lead to an 
exodus of domestic companies to foreign countries with the consequent breakdown of 
the government budget. The Incremental income tax rate system and the government- 
led unemployment benefit and national pension scheme should be abolished. Majority 
voting can fall prey to popular demand and political considerations will overshadow 
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economic considerations. Because of this, some of the advanced countries suffer from 
49 sluggish economic growth. The principle of majority voting must be re-examined. 
The contents of the report were not implemented as government policies. Yet the 
report played an important role in blocking the wider introduction of incremental income 
tax rates, unemployment benefit and a national pension system. More significantly, the 
report shows that major capitalists were not content to remain within their own areas of 
corporate management but were attempting to increase and broaden their influence in social 
welfare policies. In doing so, it went further in questioning the fundamental principle of 
democracy, majority voting, based on the belief that it is simply an obstacle to economic 
growth. The preparation of the report attracted special and personal attention from 
Chairman Choi over a long period. Consequently, it was more than a collection of 
independent ideas of the researchers involved. According to a researcher who was closely 
involved in the research project, Choi repeatedly gave his strong support, saying "Even a 
small corporate enterprise endeavours to have managerial strategy for decades to come. 
How can a country afford not to have a decent strategy? Prepare a report which can serve as 
a roadmap for the country's future. " (DongA, 15 Apr. 1997). 
Regarding the FKI's attempt to broaden its influence, Hong Duckryul observed: 
Now the FKI is attempting to wield its power to control the government. The FKI is 
engaged in a head-to-head with the government. The FKI is effectively attempting to 
suppress free communications in a civil society (Hong 1997a: 12-13). 
Having succeeded in transforming potential threats to their capital accumulation into 
a golden opportunity for unhindered expansion, the chaebol began to show an interest in 
what they called `Management toward the society'. This resulted in the infiltration of the 
chaebol's logic into civil society. In other words, community values such as democracy, 
human rights, welfare and environmental protection are overwhelmed by industrial values 
such as competition, efficiency and productivity. Using Habermasian terminologies, the 
values which a `system' (e. g. economic power) seeks have come to control the `life-world' 
49 On 14 April 1995, FKI published a report, `Recommendations for humankind of the world in the 21st 
century'. As it met with a furious reaction, FKI withdrew the report. 
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and the communication system of civil society is seriously undermined. 
In particular, top ranking chaebol such as Samsung and Hyundai have amassed 
sufficient power to resist the government. They therefore mounted pressure on the 
government and civil society in order to foster a favourable business environment. Their 
desire to have greater influence and a greater presence in society is partly due to their proud 
conviction that industries should lead society. It is also a reflection of their grievance and 
bitter feeling that their hard-earned achievements were scarcely recognised by the people 
and that they were ever open to persecution by the government. 
In April 1995, Chairman Lee of Samsung made the following remark during his visit 
to China: "In Korea, industries are the second class, the administration, the third, and 
politicians, the fourth class. " For President Kim, who has complied with most of the 
demands of the chaebol, Chairman Lee's remark landed like a bombshell (Hankook 18 July 
1998). 
Samsung first put forward the idea of contracting out the social overhead capital in 
Korea. Samsung also promoted the privatisation of public corporations. In fact, as an 
economic analyst noted: "The policy maker, in truth, is neither the Senior Secretary to the 
President for Economic Affairs, nor the Minister of Trade and Industry. It is Chairman 
Lee. " (Hankyoreh, 20 Apr. 1995). Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that it was 
Samsung and the chaebol who benefited most from those government policies. 
Chairman Lee would say with confidence, "The present government's reform can 
only last for five years. Samsung's reform is perpetual. When 180,000 people unite, nothing 
is impossible. " Scholars, bureaucrats and other members of the FKI appeared to hold a 
view that `in a sense, Samsung's power surpasses that of the Korea Central Intelligence 
Agency (KCIA) during the military regime. If you are in the bad books of Samsung, you 
will have a tough time for a long time' (Hankyoreh, 20 Apr. 1995). Kim Kyun and Park 
Soonsung have pointed out: 
Economic liberalism would not put a limit to itself. It will inevitably attempt to 
control the entirety of system of the society. Capitalist giants, which have grown in a 
protected environment (the developmental state provided the `womb' for the giants to 
grow), have finally come out to exercise their control over the state and the society 
(Kim and Park 1998: 367). 
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Song Minkyung also noted that ever since the `Plan for the New Economy' of 1993, 
the concentration of wealth and power in the chaebol was not even perceived as a problem 
(Song, M. 1998). A study, which closely traced the changes and oscillations of government 
policies toward the chaebol, summarised the historical development of the power balance 
between the government and the chaebol in the following way: i) before the mid-1980's, 
the government had enjoyed dominance over the chaebol; ii) then, the relationship changed 
to that of symbiosis; and iii) after the mid-1980's the chaebol secured superiority (Kim, E. 
1988). Since then, the tensions and occasional duels between the government and the 
chaebol, which arose out of the attempt of new governments to control the chaebol, have 
often ended with the victory of the chaebol. 
Belated Debates on the Economic crisis 
Scholarly debates surrounding the causes of the Korean economic crisis are sharply 
divided, perhaps just as spectacular as the sudden rise and abrupt fall of the country's 
economy. The arguments about the causes of the Korean economic crisis can be classified 
into two broad categories: first, internal cause arguments which explain the crisis with 
reference to structural weaknesses of the Korean economy; second, external cause 
arguments which rely on outside conditions or impacts such as the instability of the 
international currency market of the time. 
The internal cause arguments can be further divided into two main groups. From the 
`over-regulation' view, the state-led development economic policies of the East Asian 
countries have reached their limits. From the `under-regulation' view, the economic crisis 
followed the decline of the coordination role of the state. External cause arguments also 
take various shapes, ranging from those which explain the crisis as an `out of the blue' 
breakdown of the international financial market to those which point the finger at the so- 
called `American conspiracy'. 
The debate goes on. Not only among economists in Korea, but also among 
influential scholars in Europe and the U. S. However, it seems that there is an unbridgeable 
gulf between the two views. The irreducible differences in seeing one and the same event 
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may perhaps stem from the divergence in the overall outlook on the economy: the market 
and the state as two distinct points of emphasis in understanding the economy. In other 
words, the conflicting views reflect the tension between the economic ideology of the 
market (one dollar, one vote) and the political ideology of democracy (one person, one 
vote). 50 Most countries, including South Korea, espouse democracy and capitalism at the 
same time. Nevertheless, it is probably easier said than done. 
Efforts to establish the causes of the economic crisis should not be viewed merely as 
an exercise to repair the pen after the sheep have escaped. They will serve as an important 
signpost for the future progression of the Korean economy. Depending on the diagnosis, 
the prescription will vary. Proponents of the market will endeavour to extract the `lessons' 
of the crisis to further reduce the role of the state. Those who emphasise market failure 
will attempt to see the crisis as an exhortation to revive the role of the state. This section 
attempts a critique of divergent views about the causes of the Korean economic crisis. A 
comprehensive approach will then be introduced. 
State-driven Economy under Fire 
Both in Korea and beyond, 5' a widely accepted view about the causes of the Asian 
economic crisis is that the state-driven development economic strategies have reached 
their limits. Government industrial policies which heavily rely on a regulatory regime and 
a government controlled banking industry eventually led to the instability of 
conglomerates, which in turn led to the instability of banks and financial institutions. This, 
according to the proponents of the argument, led to the financial crisis. Mainstream 
economists in Korea, especially those who hold neo-liberal convictions, share this 
view. For a long time they have been occupying key positions in universities, research 
institutes, in the press and in the government. They have expressed their persistent worries 
about `government failure' in the economic sphere and have been arguing for the market- 
50 Capitalism is based on competitive markets and private ownership. Those who own more stocks are 
bound to have a greater voice. Democracy is based on a different ideology, which abides by the decision 
of a majority of the population. Capitalism takes for granted the inequality between the rich and the poor 
whereas serious economic inequality may threaten the very basis of democracy. 
si The Economist (23 Nov. 1997) also asserted that a long tradition of state-guided development was the 
fundamental cause of the problem. 
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driven economy. They advised the government to stop regulating loans to the chaebol and 
to remove strict market entry conditions for the chaebol. They effectively argued for the 
abolition of regulation, although they may appear to propose the `loosening' of regulation. 
However, the consistency of their arguments is often in question, as inconsistently they 
used to frequently ask the government to intervene in controlling high costs mainly in 
relation to increases in wages and interest rates. 
Paul Krugman offered a forecast of the future of East Asian economies based on the 
criterion of efficiency. In response to a glowing report about the East Asian economies - 
The East Asian Miracle prepared by the World Bank (IBRD 1993), he put forward an 
argument - The myth of Asia's miracle that the high growth rates of the East Asian 
countries were not sustainable. According to him, the East Asian economies had until then 
enjoyed input-driven growth, rather than efficiency-driven growth. East Asian countries, 
he continued, had reached the limits in mobilising labour and the capital. Their previous 
glory was due to hard work, rather than high efficiency (Krugman 1994). 
When the financial crisis hit the East Asian countries in late 1997, Krugman's thesis 
was hailed as insightful. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in the same vein, 
demanded a rather harsh and comprehensive corporate restructuring and the opening up of 
domestic markets. However, it is doubtful whether his view - which was advanced in 
1993 - could still hold true in 1997. The neo-liberal trends of the time had required a new 
economic order and the East Asian countries had already opened up their capital markets 
when the crisis hit. It must also be noted that his thesis was based on a calculation of 
productivity that only takes account of quantitative analysis. The peculiar features of 
Asian values and other non-quantifiable variables were omitted from his analysis. 
Jeffrey Sachs noticed the enthusiasm for education and a strong propensity for 
saving which characterise Asian countries. He thus believes that the Asian development 
model can still work and that high growth rates in those countries can continue (Sachs 
1997). Krugman himself, in a newspaper interview, expressed the following view: 
The IMF and Washington were a little too impatient in declaring the demise of the 
East Asian development model. They were perhaps overly enthusiastic in their 
attempt to comprehensively reform the institutions of the countries concerned 
(Chosun, 7 Jan. 2000). 
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Mainstream economists in Korea seek to explain the economic crisis as resulting 
from the non-existent or compromised market mechanism. They therefore prescribe 
discontinuation of government intervention in the market. They believe that this is the way 
to overcome the economic crisis. Lee Kyu-Uck, for example, lists the following as the 
causes of the economic crisis: 
1) immature market mechanism and generalised regulatory scheme of the 
government; 2) under-development of the banking industry caused by the regulatory 
regime; 3) politicisation of labour issues; and 4) insufficient market mind. The most 
urgent task to overcome the financial crisis is to review the institutional framework 
which hinders the full development of the market (Lee, K-U. 1998). 
Lee Keun-Sik developed a similar argument: Due to the government-led economy, 
there accumulated a great deal of inefficiency and corruption. According to him, creativity 
and motivation can emerge only in the market economy. He therefore urged the 
consideration of a shift of paradigm into that of `liberalism' (Lee, K-S. 1998). 
It is perhaps inevitable that they blame the government for the economic 
crisis. Through their economic research institutes the chaebol launched a sweeping attack 
against the failures of the government, enumerating high wages, high interest rates, the 
overall bureaucratic system of the government and even the social problem of 
`ostentatious consumption'. Their views appeared in profusion in the form of countless 
research reports relating to the economic crisis. In all likelihood, they seem to make use of 
the economic crisis to corner and contain the state so that they can expand the sphere of 
the market. 
Crisis from Under-regulation 
Scholars who hold the view that a measure of state intervention is necessary for the 
economy seek to explain the Korean economic crisis as a result of under-regulation rather 
65 
than over-regulation. 52 According to them, it is wrong to think that the state-led 
development policies have reached a dead-end. Instead, the crisis came because, at too 
early a stage, the government had abandoned its roles. Chang Ha-Joon, for instance, 
pointed out that `ill-managed financial liberalisation, abandonment of investment 
coordination, and poor exchange rate management were the underlying causes of the 
crisis' (Chang 1998: 1,555). 
It may be that the decision to adopt a neo-liberal stance was made without fully 
appreciating the peculiar features of the Korean economy, whose markets are at the mercy 
of the chaebol. Market-driven reforms pursued under such circumstances could have 
triggered off or quickened the economic crisis. Linda Weiss, for example, made the 
following observations with regard to the East Asian economic crises - indeed, the Korean 
economic crisis in particular: `If the state turns out to be part of the problem, it is more 
precisely a problem of too little state capacity, rather than too much state involvement' 
(Weiss 1998: xiii). 
If the investment coordination or other regulatory measures of the state did cause the 
crisis, she asks, then why did the crisis also hit countries like Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia where such an intervention by the government was non-existent? She also noted 
that by the time of the foreign exchange crisis of 1997, the nation states in East Asia were 
`but a pawn in the invisible hand of the global market' (Weiss: x ). In the case of South 
Korea, the sphere of state control had been shrinking for the preceding ten years or so. The 
government no longer had any effective means to prevent excessive investment. The 
warnings of government officials were simply brushed aside by the chaebol. This state of 
affairs led to undisciplined expansion and diversification of business activities of the 
chaebol relying on loans. 53 Duplication and over-investment in all areas of industry also 
followed 
Deregulation of financial industries saw a remarkable increase in merchant banking 
corporations. In 1994, there were six of them; by 1996, there were 30 of them. They were 
in fact the catalyst to the financial crisis. While the banks were still under some form of 
52 To name a few scholars who have these leanings (emphasising the role of the state): R. Wade, J. Stiglitz, 
A. Amsden, Chang Ha-Joon and Lee Byungchun. For a collection of articles on this point, see Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 22 1998, and The Crisis and Big Transition (in Korean, edited by Kim, Kyun and 
Lee, Byungchun), Seoul, Dangdae. 
sz For the chaebol, this could be a way of diversifying their portfolio. However, if it goes wrong, the state 
will have to correct the market failure and finally the taxpayers will suffer. 
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regulation, the merchant banking corporations acted as the private purse of the 
chaebol. This accelerated over-investment. 
Wade and Veneroso have argued that the state must have control not only over 
domestic loan transactions but also over foreign loan transactions involving domestic 
corporations and banks (Wade and Veneroso 1998). They take the view that this is an 
important safety mechanism to ensure the stability of an economy that achieves high 
investment by relying on loans. Such control is also necessary to maintain the autonomy 
of the national economy vis-ä-vis foreign lenders. One reason for the reckless business 
practice of merchant banking corporations is that there was virtually no state control over 
them. Regarding the failure of merchant banking corporations, Lee Byoungchun pointed 
out that `it must be noted that this [merchant banking] is an ingredient of free market 
capitalism. It is not part of developmental state model' (Lee, B. 1998: 113). 
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the financial market and corporate behaviour 
in the run-up to the economic crisis, it is possible to argue that the crisis was caused by 
under-regulation rather than over-regulation. The problem lies in the market-guided 
economy rather than in the state-driven economy. 
Globalisation and External Impact 
The external cause (or impact) arguments are proposed to explain the Korean 
economic crisis with reference to the inherent natures of the international capital market 
and changes in external conditions rather than structural problems of the Korean economy. 
There are several varieties of these views, each with a different point of emphasis. For 
example, there are views which see the Korean economic crisis as i) a straightforward 
foreign currency squeeze; ii) an aftermath of the collapse of the South East Asian 
economies; iii) a result of the conspiracy of the international financial giants; iv) an event 
aggravated by the IMF; or v) a result of the US hegemony. Often, a few of these factors 
are mentioned together as contributing causes. 
Those who put forward these views, by and large, point their fingers at 
`globalisation' as the underlying cause of the crisis. They tend to hold the strong points of 
the East Asian economies in high esteem. They argue that these economies have healthy 
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foundations and that they still have viable mechanisms for economic growth. According to 
this view, when the transient crisis is over, these countries can bounce back. Sachs, for 
example, argues that the East Asian economic crisis occurred not because their growth 
potential has been exhausted, but because foreign lenders have simultaneously declined to 
allow revolving loans for short-term debts. It was a foreign currency squeeze, according to 
this view (Sachs 1997). Josep Stiglitz, the then Vice President of the World Bank, in a 
speech delivered at an international forum which was held two years after Korea came 
under the supervision of the IMF as a price for its emergency rescue loans, went as far as 
saying that the Korean economic crisis was not due to the failure of the Korean economy. 
It came because huge amounts of foreign capital had flooded the floor; Korea was the 
victim of its own success (Stiglitz 1999). 
Scholars who see the Korean economic crisis as a `straightforward foreign currency 
squeeze' note that, apart from the foreign currency deficit, Korea had no signs of trouble 
in its macro-economic indices. The economy was enjoying a high growth rate (5.0%) in 
that year. Unemployment was low (2.6%). Inflation and financial health were in a 
satisfactory or even exemplary state. It is true that the balance of payments, among other 
macroeconomic indices, was in bad shape in 1997. Nevertheless, it was far from nearing a 
generalised default. 
Kim Dongwon, for example, has argued that although the balance of payments (in 
deficit) worsened from 2.5% of the GDP in 1995 to 4.7% in 1996, it cannot be viewed as 
the cause of the foreign exchange crisis because, in the case of other countries, the crisis 
came when the payment deficit was about 8-10% of GDP (Kim, D. 1998: 238). 
Proponents of the external impact thesis point out that an economy that shows 
healthy fundamentals could easily collapse when attacked by speculative foreign investors, 
which characterise the globalised financial market. International financial capital appears 
to operate upon a `rational' criterion of an expected rate of return. However, in fact, it is 
often ruled by `flock mentality'. Lee Chan-geun noticed that the remarkable advancement 
in information technology has aggravated the ravaging effect of the international 
investment capital: 
Hundreds or thousands of million dollars worth deals could take place in a second. 
Traders do not have enough time to analyse market information fully. When they 
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operate with inadequate information, the best policy is to follow the mass. This flock 
mentality could amass the capitals scattered all over the world at one place - with a 
devastating effect (Lee, C. 1998: 105). 
The view that the Korean economy suffered from a contagious plague that had 
visited the South East Asian economies is based on this investment psychology. Min 
Sangki, for example, analysed the Korean foreign exchange crisis with specific reference 
to the flow of international capital and the contagion effect. He pointed his fingers at the 
flow of foreign capital which `came like a tidal wave to the Asian countries in the 90s and 
which withdrew rapidly in 1997' (Min 1998: 58). However, the nation states in the age of 
globalisation largely lack capacities to build up a breakwater before a tidal wave comes. 
Credit rating agencies in the US are also criticised for further encouraging the 
irrational `herd instinct' of international capital. Rather than countering irrational 
investment decisions by providing accurate information, their move often triggers off and 
multiplies the crisis. 
The `conspiracy' thesis that blames the international financial giants - mostly based 
in the US - is relied on this line of argument. According to this thesis, these 
financial 
giants had something to gain from the harsh restructuring programmes that the IMF forced 
upon Korean industries. 
The arguments, which blame the IMF, are based on a claim that, as Martin Feldstein 
wrote in a column, what was a mere foreign currency squeeze was mis-diagnosed by the 
IMF as a structural defect of the Korean economy. Strict and ruthless restructuring 
programmes were then forced upon the country, which eventually turned the foreign 
exchange crisis into a generalised economic crisis (Financial Times, 3 Mar. 1998). The 
rehabilitation programmes prescribed by the IMF for the Asian countries invariably 
required a comprehensive opening up of capital markets and domestic financial markets to 
foreign investors. 
Some conspiracy theorists maintain that Korea's decision to seek rescue loans from 
the IMF was already in the interest of the Wall Street and Tokyo financiers. Once the IMF 
extended emergency loans, they could secure their credits. The opportunity to buy up 
Korean companies cheaply is an extra. The complete opening up of the Korean financial 
market was the persistent demand of these financial giants who had ceaselessly advocated 
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it through their governments. Also, the elimination of surplus production capacity was the 
godsend for the international industrial capitals. 
Without firm evidence, it would be simply irresponsible to concede the `conspiracy 
theory' that the United States provoked the Asian financial crisis on purpose. However, a 
close scrutiny of the Korean case would reveal circumstantial evidence that implies that 
this theory is not entirely ungrounded. As is shown above, a group of economists have 
been to some extent successful in evaluating the relevance and effectiveness of the US-led 
policy measures in the context of the economic crisis in Korea. Nonetheless, little is 
known about who are behind these measures, what are their intentions, and their linkages 
to foreign media reports (i. e., the influence of foreign media reports on the policy 
measures). It is thus believed that careful investigation of foreign media reports and a 
series of in-depth interviews with government representatives of financial negotiations 
will indispensable to fact finding. 
Toward the Comprehensive Approach 
Theories about the causes of the Korean economic crisis thus show a great deal of 
divergence and none of them appear to cover the whole ground. This is in part because, in 
a sense, the crisis is still continuing, and also partly because the causes are complex. 
Establishing the causes, however, leads to future plans for the Korean economy and it may 
influence the direction in which Korean society will progress. 
The internal cause theses tend to rationalise the prescriptive programmes of the IMF 
as they see that the internal structural problems of the Korean economy were the causes of 
its financial crisis. This view thus limits the range of economic strategies in Korea in 
relation to other countries. In this view the Koreans' choices are considerably reduced. 
Lee Chan-geun pointed out that since the 80s, Great Britain, Italy, France, Sweden and 
other countries have met with crises that were dealt with as foreign exchange crises. 
However, in the case of the East Asian economies, they were treated differently and 
internal structural causes were sought. He thus emphasises the presence of the double 
standard (Lee, C. 1998). 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to put all the blame on external causes. For 
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example, the contagion thesis does not offer a satisfactory explanation either. Had the 
Korean economy been healthier, it could have survived the danger of contamination when 
it did arrive. Korea did not survive. Japan and Taiwan did. Concerns have been expressed, 
however, about the external impact thesis or the external conditions thesis. By putting the 
blame on its neighbours far and near, strong or not so strong, these could dampen efforts 
for the reform of the Korean economy. This view could certainly enjoy a warm reception 
among those who are opposed to the reform, but not so much by the international 
financial market, which may view it as a serious lack of drive for reform and self- 
improvement. It will not be of much help to the Korean economy. 
Internal cause theses, as we have already seen, can broadly be classified into two 
categories. Those who believe that the over-abundance of regulation was the main vice are 
contraposed against those who argue that the lack of regulation was the arch-vice that 
brought about the `fall' of the Korean economy. However, it must be recognised that 
neither of these views can be complete. Both of them have their own weaknesses. 
Proponents of the market tend to go to the extreme of condemning the necessary 
involvement of the state without which the stability of the market would be difficult to 
achieve. Proponents of state intervention tend to turn a blind eye to the deleterious 
legacies of the dirigiste development era. Both these camps appear to have a selective 
vision of the Korean economy in an effort to maintain the coherence of their views. In 
doing so, their vision of the economy as a whole is often not sufficiently comprehensive. 
A careful observation of the Korean economy will show that the strong and weak 
points of the market and the state are intermingled. It is often difficult to separate what 
was due to the failure of the market and what was due to the failure of the state. 
Regardless of where it stemmed from, however, the foreign exchange crisis of 1997 was 
an outward manifestation of accumulated deficiencies and defects of the Korean economy 
as it was exposed to external impacts. As the negative sides of the market and the 
developmental state were coming to the surface, the economy was considerably 
destabilised. At that juncture the international financial market took a sharp turn against 
Korea. The whole system then collapsed. 
From the dynamic angle of analysis, there is an important point to note. At that 
critical moment neither the government nor the market was functioning. There was a kind 
of vacuum that lasted for quite a long time. For example, the government had already 
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abandoned the task of investment coordination. Yet the private sector has not developed the 
know-how for assessing the viability or the profitability of proposed investments. The 
retreat of the state conceptually corresponds to the expansion of the market, but in Korea 
this has resulted largely from the expansion and consolidation of the chaebol. Thus, the 
monitoring system which is capable of treating an `unhealthy' market has disappeared. Azit 
Singh has also expressed a similar view in an interview: 
The Asian financial crisis was brought about because those countries have abandoned 
the Asian model and attempted the deregulation of their financial industry with little 
or no defence mechanism in place (Chosun, 30 Dec. 1999). 
Linda Weiss has suggested that `state capacity has acquired new significance in a 
changing world economy' and that the state must have the `transformative capacity'. In 
other words, the state must have `the ability to coordinate industrial change' (Weiss 1998). 
South Korea in the late 90s had already abandoned the `traditional mechanism' and the 
`Asian model'. Unfortunately, its government also lacked the `transformative capacity'. 
External shocks, once imposed in such situation, have the potential risk of escalating into a 
crisis. 
Numerous diagnoses and prescriptions had been proposed since the crisis. An 
important question is, however, why these vibrant debates could not have taken place 
earlier. This question is essential because the lack of public debate itself might be a 
comprehensive cause which eventually led to the breakdown of the economy. For a proper 
understanding of the causes of the economic crisis, it is necessary to have recourse to 
studies concerning the dynamic process of public opinion formation and media influences 
on economic policies. A comprehensive analysis of non-economic factors is therefore 
equally important as, or at least, complementary to economic analysis. 
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Ideological Leanings of the Korean Press 
The Asymmetry of Two Wings 
`Public opinion' means a common opinion that many people hold about an issue of 
general concern; but its formation is often influenced by the media professionals and the 
intellectual elite whose views are transmitted to the public through the media. If a large 
number of the media companies have a particular ideological leaning and if the majority of 
the members of the intellectual elite belong to a particular class or are in alliance with a 
particular class, the `public opinion' is more likely to be skewed. When the views of the 
media (professionals) are presented under the guise of public opinion, the audience will 
probably accept them as genuine reflections of public opinion. When the media's 
ideological leanings are too strong, the media may no longer accept the views of the public 
and observe or discern the reality. If that happens, the media will carry views that are 
opposed to public opinion. 
Public opinion is of vital importance to the democratic decision-making process. 
However, when it appears distorted in the media, when it is banished from the media, 
which are busy to represent the interests of a particular group, then reliance on public 
opinion will be anti-democratic. Political decision-making that relies on specious public 
opinion will eventually harm social cohesion and integration. McNair warns of the danger 
of `manufactured' information: 
If the information on which political behaviour is based is, or can be, manufactured 
artifice rather than objective truth, the integrity of the public sphere is inevitably 
diminished. To the extent that citizens are subject to manipulation, rather than 
exposed to information, democracy loses its authenticity and becomes something 
rather more sinister (McNair 1999: 26). 
History tells us that when the press is left entirely to the logic of the market, what will 
survive will be the right-wing press. As noted by Curran in his study of press history in 
England, such a process `contributed to a growing divergence between editorial and public 
opinion in a form that greatly over-represented the right' (Curran and Seaton 1997: 89). It is 
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not too unusual to see right wing newspapers survive competition for advertisements. 
However, the ideological leaning of the Korean press was so excessive that it could not be 
entirely explained by the general trend. To understand the case of the Korean press prior to 
the outbreak of the financial crisis in December 1997, an examination of the situation in the 
year 1996 is needed. Out of 28 daily papers including economic dailies and local papers, 
only one (Hankyoreh) represents the middle-left wing, while the other 27 papers are located 
on the right of the ideological spectrum. According to Song Hogeun, Hankyoreh is situated 
in the middle to left; to its right are DongA, Hankook and JoongAng; Chosun was 
occupying a fairly wide range of the right (Song, 1998: 306). 
Newspaper circulation data are treated as confidential in Korea. A sample analysis 
(10,000 subscribers) carried out in 1996 by the Korea Advertisers Association however 
showed that Hankyoreh had 6.2% of the total circulation of nationwide general newspapers, 
while the conservative Chosun, JoongAng and DongA accounted for over 65.6%. 54 
Assuming that the remaining papers and the economic dailies are all in the right wing, the 
ratio of `right wing' to `left wing' paper was estimated at 97: 3. See below for Korean 
nationwide newspapers, classified by ownership, ideological leaning and market share. 
<Table 2-1> General Newspapers of Nationwide Circulation in Korea 
Title Ownership Ideological leaning Market share*(%) 
Chosun-ilbo private right 24.9 
JoongAng-ilbo chaebol right 20.7 
DongA-ilbo chaebol-rooted right 20.0 
Hankook-ilbo private right 8.7 
Kyunghyang-shinmun chaebol right 7.8 
Hankyoreh-shinmun 60,000 contributors middle-left 6.2 
Kookmin-ilbo religious body right 2.9 
Segye-ilbo chaebol-religious body right 2.5 
Seoul-shinmun government right 2.1 
Munhwa-ilho chaebol right 1.6 
* Source of market share: A Survey on Press Audience (1996), Korea Advertisers Association. 
A recent survey of the Korea Advertisers Association in 2001 showed that these three papers occupied 
74% of the market. 
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Choi Jangjip pointed out that `in countries with social and economic development at a 
level comparable to Korea, few have media whose ideological spectrum shows the degree 
of conservatism observable in Korea' (Choi, J. 1994: 60). What could then explain this 
extraordinary imbalance of the time? Firstly, about half of the nationwide newspapers are 
owned or part-owned by the chaebol. Out of ten newspapers, four were owned by the 
chaebol. Two out of four economic dailies were also owned by the chaebol. It would be 
hardly surprising that these papers represent the interests of the chaebol in their news 
reporting and analysis. Chosun is the quintessential conservative newspaper. Although it 
was often criticised as `commercialising national security', Chosun managed to appeal to 
the fears of the Conservatives concerning the military confrontation between the two 
Koreas and reigns as the newspaper of widest circulation in Korea. Ultra-right religious 
groups own two other papers, Segye and Kookmin 
Secondly, advertisement revenues account for an unusually high proportion of the 
total revenue of the Korean press. As of 1995, the ratio of subscription revenue to 
advertisement revenue for Korean newspapers was 21: 79. The ratio is much higher in other 
countries: 40: 60 in Britain, 53: 47 in France and 61: 39 in Japan (Chung, Mun and Song 
1996: 29). Korean newspapers are under constant pressure to find potential advertisers. In 
this regard, it is of the utmost importance to make their news content appealing or attractive 
to those who have high purchasing power. There is therefore the inherent likelihood of 
Korean newspapers adopting a conservative stance. When it comes to the coverage of 
economic, labour and social affairs, the Korean press is more than likely to represent vested 
interests and sacrifice the ideal of fairness. 
Finally, the confrontation between the two Koreas has continued to provide 
`convincing' excuses for persecuting left-wing people and newspapers. One year after the 
civil uprising on 19 April 1960, a left wing Minzokilbo was launched. Four months later, 
however, an army general, Park Chunghee, staged a successful coup. The newspaper was 
abolished and its president, Cho Yongsoo, was executed after a `revolutionary' court martial 
charged him unjustly with espionage. 
Hankyoreh, which was launched in 1988 as a fruit of the `civil struggle for 
democratisation', was also suppressed insidiously by the then conservative government. 
The paper was founded by former journalists who had been expelled from their jobs under 
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military regimes. Thanks to the voluntary financial contribution of around 60,000 people 
who cover a wider spectrum of society from workers to intellectuals, the paper was at first 
capable of maintaining its critical tone against the government and the chaebol. For this 
reason, the intelligence agencies put pressure on major public corporations not to place any 
advertisements in Hankyoreh. In 2001, a memorandum prepared by the Agency for 
National Security Planning (a successor to the KCIA) was leaked. The memorandum shows 
that secret operations were under way in order to undermine the Hankyoreh's influence. 
The memorandum was prepared in 1997. It contains instructions such as: 
All government offices should refrain from subscribing the paper; no extension 
should be granted for the repayment of the company's debt to the bank; the 
discontented employees should be closely monitored to foster and encourage the 
internal strife; suspected communist sympathisers should be thoroughly investigated 
and prosecuted; the right wing conservative journals should be mobilised to launch 
continual attacks against the pro-communist nature of the paper; the information 
about the company's irregular practice to secure the placement of advertisements 
should be collected and revealed in due course. ' (Monthly Chosun, Apr. 2001). 
Just as a bird with asymmetric wings can only circle around rather than move forward, 
so the serious imbalance between left wing and right wing papers encourages public 
opinion to circle around conservative values. Neo-liberal theorists argue that the newspaper 
market will improve through consumer choices. However, as Entman and Wildman (1992) 
mentioned, `product diversity' does not always guarantee `idea diversity' 
Economic Reporting and Neo-liberals 
The conservative leaning of the Korean press vividly manifests itself in economic 
news reporting. Even those newspapers that may maintain a balanced approach in other 
areas of reporting invariably fall back on the conservative stance for economic reporting. 
For example, JoongAng showed a degree of progressiveness by supporting the so-called 
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`Sunshine policy'. 55 In contrast, with regard to economic news reporting, this paper is 
undoubtedly pro-chaebol. As it started as an affiliate of Samsung, it has inherent limits. 
56 
Such a situation is not unique to this newspaper. In fact this is to a large extent the case with 
other newspapers of nationwide circulation, because, as mentioned earlier, the chaebol own 
about half the newspapers and the advertisement revenue accounts for nearly 80% of total 
revenue for these newspapers. 
Some observed that while Chosun takes a conservative stance in all areas of reporting, 
JoongAng adopts the neo-classic, corporate and market centred approach to economic news 
reporting (Kim and Kim 1997: 100). Chairman Hong Seokhyun of JoongAng Media 
Network himself remarked as follows in an interview: "Our paper adopts a basically 
conservative approach. As far as the economic policies are concerned, JoongAng's stance is 
genuinely conservative. As for security issues, Chosun is truly conservative" (Media Oneul, 
9 May 2002). Interestingly, it has been suggested that `even Hankyoreh', which started out 
as a progressive paper, `is beginning to show a tendency to conservatism' (Shim 1996: 123). 
More precisely, `Hankyoreh may show progressive leanings in its coverage of labour, 
poverty and environmental issues; but its coverage of macro-economic issues makes it 
difficult to pigeonhole the paper' (Kim and Kim 1997: 124). 
Examining the economic journalists' personal outlooks as well as the economic 
determinants that affect the newspaper's position can produce a more reliable analysis of 
economic news reporting. The financial and institutional restraints under which a paper has 
to operate will no doubt influence the contents of the paper. Of course, they cannot 
determine the contents entirely. The connecting link between `economic determinants of the 
media' and `the contents of the media' should perhaps `be sought in the professional 
ideologies and the work practices of media professionals' (Curran et al. 1995: 1819). 
The economic journalists of Korea, by and large, tend to show strong neo-liberalist 
leanings. No doubt, this is because they have also been exposed to the neo-liberalist trend 
that stormed the Korean society in general. Their educational backgrounds also contributed 
55 As regards the policies concerning North Korea, there are two traditions: hardliners who believe in the 
importance of military superiority and economic sanctions; pragmatists who believe in the need for a 
peaceful approach particularly through economic aid to North Korea. The latter approach was adopted and 
substantiated by the Kim Daejung government, which is called the `Sunshine policy'. 
56 JoongAng is in the process of severing its ties with Samsung. Yet a brother-in-law of Lee Keunhee, the 
chairman of Samsung, is still the chairman of JoongAng. The paper enjoys favourable terms in 
transactions with Samsung. 
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to the formation of their economic thoughts. The economics faculties of Korean universities 
function as the conduit for American neo-liberalist ideas. Their influence seeped through 
other disciplines as well, paving a way for `imperialism of economics'. 
As early as 1991, Amsden took notice of the unusually large number of American- 
trained Korean economists (ATKEs). She suggested that this might pose a potential threat 
to the Korean economy. In addition to the research, Chang and Evans also discovered that 
between 1987 and 1995, Koreans accounted for as high as 9.7% (776 out of 8040) of the 
economics PhDs awarded in US universities (Chang & Evans 2000: 32). A survey of 230 
Korean economists shows `59% of academic economists and 43% of non-academic 
economists have received graduate training at U. S institutions', while the total ratio is much 
lower at 16% in Japan (Cho 2001: 68). 
Upon returning to Korea, these ATKEs find their way into universities, research 
institutes and relevant government departments. A good number of them became neo- 
liberalist ideologues dominating the economic columns in newspapers. According to Kim 
Manheum who analysed newspaper column writers during 2001, more than 70% of the 
external writers were educated in the US. In particular, the conservative papers had only 
8-20% of their external writers educated in Korea 
57 (Kim, M. 2001). Many reporters also 
have had the opportunity to receive US training. Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo and LG have 
each set up a press foundation. 
58 They provide a one-year training course in the US for 
middle or high-ranking news reporters. As the US economy was booming throughout the 
1990's, American neo-liberalism was therefore perceived as the `messiah for economic 
prosperity'. 
Not all ATKEs are neo-liberalists; but most of them were duly impressed by the 
Chicago School economics, which appeared to have resolved the problem of stagflation. 
Many of them accordingly became monetarists. Cho found that `over 60% of the US 
trained Korean academic economists answered in favour of the establishment of a money 
supply rule', which implies that the ATKEs strongly `tended to believe in monetarist views'. 
In particular, over 90% of those ATKEs responded that de-regulation would enhance the 
efficiency of the economy. About 70% responded that the labour unions' power should be 
Among external writers, 84% in JoongAng, 70% in DongA and 66% in Chosun were educated in the US. 
In contrast, somewhat progressive papers such as Hank yoreh and Daehanmaell had about 2030% of their 
external writers educated in the US (Kim, M. 2001). 
ss Some of these press foundations even run joint-training programmes with American universities. 
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reduced (Cho 2001: 72-75). 
The leanings of the Korean intellectual elite toward American bred ideas may hamper 
the formation of a healthy `public sphere'. Kim Taedong 59 explained the chronic 
ineffectiveness of reform programmes targeting the chaebol in a radio talk programme: 
"The government, the media and academia are comprehensively flooded by pro-chaebol 
people" (PBC Radio, 23 Apr. 2003). The ideological leaning of the media is all the more 
problematic. That is because the stronger their leaning toward a view becomes, the more 
powerful the media influence becomes. According to studies of media influence, this 
influence is increased: i) when different papers report the same, or similar, views about an 
issue; ii) when similar news coverage appears over a long period but moving in a consistent 
direction; iii) when the audience receives the same message from a variety of channels (e. g. 
Yoo and Lee 1994: 160). Media practices in Korea at the time of the financial crisis appear 
to fit these cases. 
Conclusion 
Habermas sees the public sphere as `a warning system with sensors'. He therefore 
argues that `the public sphere must amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect 
and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them 
with possible solutions, and dramatize them' (Habermas 1996: 359). If the Korean press 
had emphasised the diversity of values and interests in a democracy and led the way to 
rational public debates, society could have been a learning place for democracy, not for de- 
politicisation. 
As we have seen in this chapter, the discourse of `minimal state' and 'de- 
politicisation of the market' in Korea is an indication that the market, which has become 
sufficiently powerful under the protective environment offered by the state, now attempts to 
reject state intervention and take over the traditional areas of competence reserved to the 
state. At times, the state endeavoured to control and to police the chaebol who were all- 
After the financial crisis, Kim Daejung appointed him as the Senior Secretary to the President for 
Economic Affairs. Due to his progressive leanings, the press accused him of being pro-communist. 
Eventually, he had to step down. 
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powerful beings in the distorted market. However, such endeavours could not last long. In 
the so-called democratisation era, to the contrary, political power was increasingly subject 
to economic power. This was partly due to the different nature of the two powers 
(democratic or authoritarian) and each term of office (limited or unlimited), but also due to 
the solidarity of the economic powers. Underlying this scene change was the gale of 
globalisation fertilised by neo-liberalism. 
The debates after the outbreak of the financial crisis were also basically 
confrontations between the supporters and critics of neo-liberal economic policies. 
However, it seems that most of the currently available works are based on economic 
analysis that looks at only some economic indices. As for economic units, the focus was 
narrowed down to the state and the chaebol, and the issue of the media as part of `policy 
community' was excluded. In a broader view, the crisis could have been examined in 
relation to the system of formulating public opinion and making decisions, and essentially 
to the issue of democracy itself. Unfortunately, such an attempt was lacking at that time. 
Democratic media, as discussed in the previous chapter, can be an effective tool for 
revitalizing `genuine democracy' and `politics'. However, such a role could not be expected 
from the Korean press. The Korean press was excessively slanted to the right. In particular, 
`market fundamentalists' who were trained in the US have dominated the economic news 
reports and depoliticisation of the economy has become the guiding principle for editorial 
desks. The role of the media, as a `warning system' which helps detect problems with the 
national economy and as an `arena of public debates' that encourages seeking political 
resolutions, has been to a large extent paralysed. 
As discussed, neo-liberalism has played an important role in determining the role of 
the media as well as the relationship between the government and the chaebol in Korea. By 
taking into account such ideological backgrounds, social environments and institutional 
conditions, the causes of the economic crisis will be better understood. 
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The Disseminating Mechanism of Neo-liberalism 
Politics of Discourse and the Media 
Why do people comply with oppressive social institutions which may at times take 
away more than they give to individuals? Why do people even support them with 
enthusiasm? Edelman offers an explanation with reference to the political effectiveness of 
symbolic actions (Edelman 1971). Not only politicians but other influential members of 
the society resort to political symbols to have their ideals incorporated into political 
debates and to obtain political support. They participate in the politics of discourse. 
60 
According to some studies, discourses describe and define in our daily lives `what 
is possible to say and what is not possible to say', and `what is possible to do and what is 
not possible to do'. By doing so, they lead our perception of the reality and our action in a 
certain direction, creating and repeatedly emphasising particular values, meanings and 
norms. By doing so, discourses eventually subordinate the public under these particular 
values, meanings and norms at the expense of other values, meanings and norms. It is 
through discourse that the power acquires its ideological basis (Althusser 1971; Kress 
1989; Foucault 1993). 
Then, what were the values and norms which were emphasised in the course of the 
politics of discourse during Kim Youngsam's presidency (1993-1997) to define and 
determine the popular perception of the reality? How could the chaebol hold hostage the 
government which presented itself as the `first civilian, reform-oriented government' in 30 
years? How did the chaebol achieve the pre-eminent position within the axis of 
government-chaebol-media which ruled Korea? Discourse analysis can be effectively used 
in answering these questions. Relating to the advantages of discourse analysis, Deacon 
and his colleagues noted: 
60 Kang Myunggu and Park Sanghoon, as mentioned in chapter I, researched the `politics of discourse' by 
analysing political symbols in the early years of Kim Youngsam's presidency (Kang and Park 1997). 
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The critical scope and potential of discourse analysis resides most of all in its 
examination of how relations and structures of power are embedded in the forms 
of everyday language use, and thus how language contributes to the 
legitimisation of existing social relations and hierarchies of authority and control 
(Deacon, Pickering, Golding and Murdock 1999: 150). 
A comprehensive investigation of the ruling group's discourses can serve as a basis 
for elucidating how the conservative elements of the Korean society could neutralise the 
challenges of the reformers from within the ruling bloc and solidify the ruling bloc. What 
is particularly important to this investigation is the power and role of the media in the 
politics of discourse. In reference to such ideological process, Robert Ferguson 
emphasises the media's power, arguing that power relationships are never equal: 
[T]he media have particular powers, and that, in turn, they are able to represent a 
wide range of power relations in the world beyond the media text. The media also 
have the power to prioritize and to define issues for debate and representation 
(Ferguson 2004: 19). 
The focus of this chapter will be placed particularly on the question of what role the 
media played in making the neo-liberalism as the undoubted mainstream ideology. The 
Korean media seemed to be not simply a messenger but a producer of dominant discourses 
who, as part of the ruling bloc, sometimes led the government. A careful study of some 
ruling discourses of the time can provide useful tools for a comprehensive analysis of the 
Korean economic crisis. Greater emphasis, therefore, must be accorded to these topics 
than the topic of how each of the individual policy issues was reported by the media. 
Textual analysis in this research, as briefly mentioned in chapter 1, relies mainly 
upon qualitative analysis, but quantitative analysis is undertaken whenever necessary and 
feasible. Through the qualitative analysis of political symbols (e. g. 'Global isation') of the 
time, one can understand how such ruling discourses were finally accepted as a `common 
sense'. This method can be a fluoroscope through which to look into the power relations 
within the ruling bloc (government-chaebol-media), which are unlikely to be revealed by 
quantitative analysis. 
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The experience and insights about discourse practices the present researcher has 
accumulated as a journalist or an `insider' provides valuable sources for qualitative 
research. On the other hand, the `objectivity' of such approach might be questioned, as the 
present researcher was a `participant' or an `opponent' in the very process of creating and 
disseminating discourses. 61 Herein is the necessity of the quantitative analysis as well. 
Even if the results of quantitative analysis are trivial, they can provide a starting point for 
qualitative analysis and a clue to infer the power relations of Korean society. Combining 
two methods together enables us not only to cross-check results of each analysis, but also 
to understand comprehensively the disseminating mechanism of neo-liberalism. 
The Rise and Fall of Ruling Discourses: Quantitative Analysis 
In the 1990's, the state, the chaebol and the media forged a firm alliance of 
conservative leaning. They were in agreement that neo-liberalism, which was rapidly 
spreading in many Western countries, should be the ruling ideology of the Korean society 
as well. When Kim Youngsam came to power in 1993, the President set his catchall phrase 
as `Building a New Korea' and attempted a comprehensive programme for reform (dubbed 
as `Reforms without sanctuaries'). As pointed in the previous chapter, however, the grip of 
neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism neutralised his attempt. The purported reforms of the 
economy and the media proved unsuccessful. The failure of reform was brought about by 
the successful resistance of the chaebol and the media. 
On his visit to Seattle in November 1993 to attend the APEC (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation) summit meeting, President Kim declared `Internationalisation'62 
as the new foundation of his government's policies. The `Reform' then transformed itself 
into `Internationalisation'. The demand to purge corruption and to continue to extend the 
`Reform' was then brushed aside as `clinging to the past grievances'. The new discourse 
was grounded upon a statement, `We need to move forward into the world and into the 
In order to enhance the objectivity of this research, the present researcher who has been working 
for a 
progressive newspaper interviewed many journalists of conservative newspapers. 
ý- 'Internationalisation' is perhaps not often used in the English language, and has a different meaning from 
'globalisation'. In Korea, though it was sometimes used interchangeably with 'globalisation', there were 
considerable differences of nuance at the era of discourse. 
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future' (cited in Kang and Park 1997: 138). 
The Kim government's prime discursive symbol has evolved from `Building a New 
Korea', `Internationalisation' and finally to `Globalisation' by the beginning of 1995. 
There are some significant differences between `Internationalisation' and `Globalisation'. 
`Globalisation' suggests that the state boundary no longer matters. It announces a world of 
trade unhindered by state boundaries. It is a harbinger of rapid opening up of protective 
trade barriers. In fact, having failed to devise an adequate means of coping with capital 
movements across the border, the Korean economy collapsed in a financial crisis which 
struck it less than three years after the Kim government began to produce the grandiose 
discourse of `Globalisation'. 
During these three phases in the evolution of the main discourse, many other 
subordinate themes63 (sub-discourses) had surfaced and sank. Just an exception is the 
subordinate theme of the `Strengthening competitiveness' which was consistently 
emphasised. 64 According to Przeworski, neo-liberalism has it that the foremost value in 
government policies should be the increase of the national wealth rather than welfare. The 
political argument for integration is therefore subordinated to the economic argument of 
competition (Przeworski 1990: 20-23). From this standpoint, it was inevitable that Kim's 
presidency, which was increasingly leaning toward neo-liberalism, saw `Competitiveness' 
emerge as a new mantra. 
The process through which the ruling bloc was `composing the reality' can be 
traced by examining the frequency of newspaper articles which contain one or more key 
discourses (discursive symbols) of political nature. <Table 3-1> shows the monthly 
number of articles in the four major newspapers (Chosun, DongA, JoongAng, Hankyoreh) 
which contain one of the four discourses (New Korea; Internationalisation; Globalisation; 
and Competitiveness). This quantitative analysis made use of the Korean Integrated News 
Database System (KINDS: www. kinds. or. kr) which is maintained by the Korea Press 
Foundation. The newspaper articles for this analysis are limited to the editorials, columns 
and feature/serialised articles because these types of articles strongly reflect the views of 
those who wrote them and those who employ them (newspaper companies). 
6, Based on van Dijk's discourse analysis system (van Dijk, T. A. 1987), Kang and Park set up several 
themes under each of the discourses of `New Korea' `Internalisation' and `Globalisation'. Under the 
discourse of `New Korea', for instance, the themes such as `Reform', `Strengthening competitiveness' and 
'Establishing state disciplines' were placed. 
64 See the <Table 3-I>. 
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<Table 3-1> Frequency of Articles with Ruling Discourses (19931997) 
Number of Articles by Month 
Discourses 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1993 
New Korea 39 69 44 32 23 27 15 23 16 25 13 17 
Internationalisation 33 33 25 23 34 24 33 44 31 50 122 194 
Globalisation 5 1 3 4 4 6 10 7 4 6 19 16 
Competitiveness 103 113 98 98 73 83 58 83 81 100 147 267 
1994 
New Korea 13 9 2 8 4 2 3 2 7 14 10 5 
Internationalisation 275 165 111 93 89 84 69 70 102 106 116 149 
Globalisation 79 33 23 11 17 15 12 17 23 31 93 376 
Competitiveness 321 214 113 144 159 130 127 131 196 198 173 218 
1995 
New Korea 4 3 2 5 2 2 4 3 4 0 2 4 
Internationalisation 76 58 57 40 35 30 25 45 52 56 27 40 
Globalisation 340 184 205 183 118 117 75 109 106 104 70 96 
Competitiveness 199 133 148 141 118 121 96 119 141 89 91 101 
1996 
New Korea 5 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 4 0 3 
Internationalisation 35 37 35 34 48 41 42 24 29 43 37 35 
Globalisation 93 90 108 74 88 84 78 56 55 72 59 75 
Competitiveness 154 114 130 121 143 169 206 138 178 283 252 258 
1997 
New Korea 4 1 3 1 2 2 0 3 1 0 2 4 
Internationalisation 56 29 34 41 37 28 22 38 38 29 38 60 
Globalisation 82 53 51 45 59 66 48 50 47 66 63 100 
Competitiveness 311 149 238 194 193 242 195 172 174 196 228 321 
* The key word search method available at KINDS is used in counting the numbers of articles published 
in four major newspapers by months and discourses. The articles with each discourse are obtained from 
entering the key word after selecting above-mentioned papers and three types of articles. In January 
1993, for instance, these four newspapers produced 39 articles which contained the word `New Korea'. 
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Using these data, one can obtain <Figure 3-1>. It shows that the articles containing 
`New Korea'65 appeared most frequently in 1993 when Kim Youngsam's presidency 
began. By the middle of that year, however, `Internationalisation' became the dominant 
concept. From the middle of 1994, `New Korea' had lost the pride of place in the ruling 
discourse. 
Articles related to `Internationalisation' began to increase from the middle of 1993 
and reached a peak in January 1994, when the government adopted it as the key concept of 
state policy. It is usual that when a new concept appears in the political discourse, it 
receives a heightened attention in the media. Even so, there appeared as many as 275 
editorials, columns, feature/serialised articles in January alone. This high frequency 
indicates the vigour with which the four major newspapers produced the discourse of 
`Internationalisation'. It had occupied the position of leading discourse until 
`Globalisation' replaced it in November of that year. 
<Figure 3-1> Frequency of Articles with Ruling Discourses 
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* The `Competitiveness' is omitted from the <Table 3-1> because it is a subordinate theme, not major 
discourses like the others. 
65 
In December 1995, the ruling party changed its name into `New Korea Party'. For the present quantitative 
analysis, I did not take into account the articles about the New Korea Party as they are not directly 
concerned with the production of `New Korea' discourse. 
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The discourse of `Globalisation' began its rapid ascendance in November 1994, 
when President Kim announced it as the main policy concept. In December, there 
appeared as many as 376 editorials, columns, feature/serialised articles which contain 
`Globalisation'. Throughout the rest of Kim's presidency, `Globalisation' was the leading 
concept of the political discourses, a mantra appearing again and again in the Korean 
media. Considering that `Internationalisation' was sometimes used interchangeably with 
'Global isation', the sheer quantity of the discourses of `Globalisation' and 
'Internationalisation' 66 was enough to overwhelm the readers. 
Qualitative Textual Analysis 
`New Korea' 
The quantitative analysis shows the changing patterns in the leading discourse. 
Qualitative analysis is still necessary in understanding the reasons for the change. Within 
the ruling bloc of government-chaebol-media, who took the lead in the production of 
political discourse? Under what context and with what motive did the newspaper 
companies use such discourses? Qualitative contents analysis of newspaper articles aims 
to answer these questions. 
As we have seen, President Kim's drive to `Build a New Korea' was grounded at an 
early stage. It has been suggested that that was due to inherent limits of his political power 
base. 67 However, another important reason for his failure may be the success of chaebol- 
media with neo-liberal inclination in their offensive against the government. Neo- 
liberalism provided the vital argumentative force for the chaebol-media. Neo-liberalist 
values and policies were portrayed as the essential ingredients for the development of the 
state. They no longer were perceived as abstract ideas. They infiltrated into the mentality 
66 As the Figure 3-1 shows, `Internationalisation' was superseded by `Globalisation' in December 1994. 
However both show a similar pattern in the evolution of their frequencies. This may suggest that, to a 
certain extent, these two words were used interchangeably. 
6' Kim had long been fighting against the military dictatorship in Korea. After his defeat in the presidential 
election in 1988, however, he forged an alliance with his erstwhile enemies. He entered the conservative 
ruling party and won the candidacy with his programmes for reform. 
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and life style of the people. Neo-liberalism afforded a convenient means of packaging the 
private interests of the ruling sectors and presented them as public interests. 
At the very beginning of Kim government, the chaebol and the media were not 
against the new government. As they had long enjoyed their oligarchic dominance of the 
market by virtue of their alliance with the military rulers lacking in legitimacy and 
democratic credentials, the chaebol and the media were uneasily observing the beginning 
of a civilian government which was democratically elected. 
Especially during the presidential election, the controversial candidacy of Chung 
Juyung, the Chairman of Hyundai, brought out the dangers of plutocracy. Some were even 
arguing for dismantling the chaebol. The chaebol, therefore, were attempting to improve 
their reputation by advocating managerial reforms. Samsung was proposing `New 
Management' and LG was putting forward the concept of `Just Management'. 
68 
Kim Youngsam's drive for comprehensive reform started as soon as he was elected. 
The reform plan was enjoying the support of the media and the people. They felt as though 
Kim's presidency was about to bring about a truly `New Korea' with thoroughly reformed 
politics and economy. When the FKI's committee of chairmen gave a press conference at 
the beginning of 1993 offering reservations about the new government's drive for reform 
of the chaebol, Chosun, in its editorial, severely criticised it as motivated by shameless 
pursuit of self-interests (Chosun, 7 Jan. 1993). 
Nevertheless, the views of the conservative newspapers during this period require a 
more careful analysis. They singled out `lack of etiquette and good manners' as the 
`Number 1 Korean disease' (Chosun 26 Jan. 1993). Another newspaper was urging `Stern 
application of law - let's straighten up things' (JoongAng 22 Jan. 1993). Yet another paper 
was suggesting, `Above all, let's learn to queue properly' (DongA 15 Jan. 1993). By 
arguing that these things should be the foremost tasks of the new government, they 
revealed their implicit intention to lead the government in the direction of order liberalism 
and neo-conservatism. 
In contrast, the moderate-left newspaper Hankyoreh voiced its concern that 
President Kim's reform may move in the direction of `neo-conservatism without any real 
structural reform' (3 Feb. 1993). Korea Progressive Academy Council, which has the 
68 Choi Taeryong pointed out that the discourse for managerial reform played a role in opposing the move to 
dismantle the chaebol which surfaced in 1990 (Choi, T. 1994: 176). 
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progressive leaning, held a policy debate entitled `Neo-conservatism and New Korea'. 
They warned the dangers of `small government thesis' which calls for de-regulation and 
reduction of welfare budget. Their debate went virtually unnoticed except for an article in 
Hankyoreh (26 Mar. 1993). In a country where the press has a pronounced ideological bias 
in one direction, it is highly unlikely that the voices of the minority will be reflected in the 
public opinion and communicated to the political centre. 
The sluggish economy of the time had the consequence of depriving the minority of 
its tiny voice. From April 1993, there began to appear feature articles reporting the 
economic slump and urging a change of mindset. Chosun started out with serialised 
articles entitled, `New Slump' (2-9 Apr. ). It was followed by many serialised articles such 
as `Rescue the Economy' (Chosun, June) and `The World is in a Race: We Must Change' 
(JoongAng, July). These articles typically exaggerated the recession phrase of the business 
cycle and often, if not always, attributed it to the government reform drive. With regard to 
investment depression, for example, an article about `New Slump' argued that `even after 
the new government was launched, enterprise activities remain suppressed in a chilly 
mood of audit and inspection and a wait-and-see policy prevailed' (Chosun, 9 April). 
Amid the articles dealing with the economic slump of the time, some had the eye- 
catching and sensational titles such as `Eliminated from the league of the four Dragons: 
our economy' (JoongAng 10 Mar. ), `Endless falling economic slump' (Chosun, 9 Apr. ), 
`Domestic demand weakens: here to stay long' (Chosun 29 June). These articles might 
have further undermined the economic performance. These `negative headlines' in 
reporting economic news, as Blood and Phillips found, `have a significant and negative 
impact on subsequent consumer sentiment' (1997: 111). In this climate, the prominent 
columnist of Chosun, Ryu Keunil (editorial writer in chief) advocated a `Grand alliance 
between reform and economy' (10 Apr. 1993). JoongAng made a plea, `Let's turn our 
attention to the outside world' (23 May 1993). In July 1993, the chaebol who were on the 
defensive from the reform efforts announced through the FKI: 
In an era of economic warfare, the paramount task of the state is to foster the 
growth potentials of the economy. The debates about the economic reform can only 
weaken the competitiveness of the industries by dragging them into a wasteful war 
of attrition (Weekly Gazette of the FKI, 28 July 1993). 
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JoongAng followed this up with an article by a conservative scholar Lee Sangwoo, 
`The shift of phases in the pending reform' (12 Aug. 1993). Chosun responded with a 
contributing article by a professor of Seoul National University, Cho Dongsung, `Audits 
should be short, the economy should be long' (18 Sep. 1993). The headline of his article 
became a cant phrase. These articles proposed a shift of policy emphasis from `Reform' to 
`Economic rebounding'. They converged to the new focal point of emphasis: 
`Strengthening competitiveness'. `Competitiveness' - together with `Reform' and 
`Redressing the law and order' - used to be one of the subordinate themes of the discourse 
of `New Korea'. As a result of the discursive offensive of the anti-reform forces who made 
use of `Economic rebounding', `Competitiveness' became the foremost concept taking 
precedence over `Reform' and even over `New Korea'. As the `Reform' was painful to 
implement, its scope was reduced to a `Reform without undermining competitiveness'. 
Thus, de-regulation and law and order in the employment relationship became the newly 
defined targets of the `Reform'. 
In connection with the discourse of `Strengthening competitiveness', the role of the 
FKI deserves particular attention. This is because the FKI became the sponsor for 
production of neo-liberal discourse and the media undertook the task of propagating it. 
The `anti-reform alliance' was effortlessly forged. Since then, the pattern has repeated 
itself: the FKI hosts a debate, seminar or public lectures where neo-liberalist economic 
theorists were invited to speak; the media ensure high-profile coverage of the event. In 
July 1993, the FKI hosted a meeting of corporate executives entitled, `New Government's 
Visions for Restoring Economic Vitality, and the Views of the Industries'. It was soon 
followed by a colloquium whose title says it all: `Colloquium for Members of the Industry, 
the Academia and the Media for Strengthening International Competitiveness'. To this 
Colloquium, which was in fact a series of public lectures, Finance Minister and other 
Ministers for relevant departments were invited (Kang and Park 1997: 135). 
In September 1993, the `Private Committee for Strengthening the National 
Competitiveness' was formed. It was to be chaired by one of the chairmen of the five 
industry organisations (which include FKI, KEF, and KCCI). In the event, it was chaired 
by the Chairman of the FKI. The Committee hosted a `debate for all citizens' which was 
entitled, `Strengthening the National Competitiveness and Reforming the Mentality'. The 
Committee also launched overseas training programmes. It offered to senior reporters and 
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scholars a new overseas training programme which covered all training and travel 
costs. The programme was called, `Site visits to the globalisation movement'. News 
reporters despatched to the Economic Planning Board (which oversees public 
corporations) were also offered trips to England so that they could study the `Results of 
privatisation of public corporations in England'. Subsequently, all newspapers were filled 
with feature articles urging privatisation of public corporations. The somewhat progressive 
Hankyoreh was no exception (Hankyoreh, 1 -4 Feb. 1994). 
In the face of the united resistance of chaebol-media, the reform-oriented group in 
the ruling bloc capitulated. Between September and November of 1993, President Kim 
had one to one meetings with the chairmen of the chaebol. At one point, he said, 
"Legitimate wealth should not be criticised. There will not be any policy measures which 
may dampen the industries' enthusiasm for investment" (Hankook, 16 Sep. 1993). 
`Internationalisation' 
Careful investigation is needed to answer the question of exactly who in the ruling 
bloc is the producer of prevailing discourse. It is not being doubted that the government 
and the chaebol are the producers of the discourse. However, it would be wrong to 
imagine that the media was just a `messenger'. In fact, they also attempt to gain influence 
or control by setting the agenda. 
Regarding the discourse of `Internationalisation', it was believed to have become 
the policy agenda after President Kim's speech at the beginning of 1994 after his 
attendance at the APEC meeting in Seattle in November 1993. However, a more careful 
investigation of the matter shows that Chosun played an important role in creating this 
discourse. Already on 1 January 1993, the headline for the New Year's special editorial 
was entitled `Let's become a member of the internationalised society'. The newspapers 
announced the launch of a serialised article, `Korea, a Lonely Isle' (1 Jan. 1993). On 11 
January, another editorial appeared with the heading `The way to the true 
Internationalisation'. Throughout the year, Chosun dealt with the topic of 
`Internationalisation' while other newspapers and academia paid little attention to the topic. 
In April 1993, when President Kim's reform drive was all the rage, Chosun 
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published an editorial, `Reform means Internationalisation' (26 Apr. ). It was essentially a 
demand to change the course of the reform efforts. More editorials and columns along this 
line followed suite. `Let's start with Kim government's Internationalisation' (10 Oct. ), 
`Bureaucracy hinders Internationalisation' (9 Nov. ). Choi Chunglim, the head of Chosun's 
editing staff, wrote a column entitled `Slumping Internationalisation' (6 Oct. ). He argued 
that `the President must take the initiative for Internationalisation. ' 
At the beginning of November 1993, the government started to adopt the concept of 
`Internationalisation' in its ruling discourse. On 14 November, Chosun took the unusual 
measure of publishing two editorials dealing with Internationalisation, thus attempting to 
set the course of the government's policy. In an editorial entitled `What is 
Internationalisation', they set out the concept. In another editorial, `A case for corporate 
model of government administration', they argued that `Internationalisation calls for a 
reform of government administration', thus offering a concrete method for implementing 
`Internationalisation'. At last, President Kim publicly announced on 18 November that 
`Internationalisation' would be the policy goal of the government. Chosun warmly 
welcomed the move. There soon followed editorials such as `The essence of 
Internationalisation is de-regulation' (28 Nov. ), `Internationalisation and nationalism' (12 
Dec. ). Further feature articles including a column, `Internationalisation of our mindset' (30 
Nov. ), appeared to deal with concrete themes of `Internationalisation'. 
By this time, other newspapers such as JoongAng and DongA also jumped on the 
bandwagon and offered various arguments for `Internationalisation'. When the trade 
negotiations for the Uruguay Round were concluded in December 1993, the discourse of 
`Internationalisation' was given a new push. Newspapers were flooded with articles, 
columns, feature/serialised articles advocating `Internationalisation'. They all contained 
neo-liberalist proposals such as `de-regulation' and `reduced government'. However, there 
were meaningful differences among individual newspapers. 
While Chosun appeared to emphasise the need for reform of the bureaucracy, 
JoongAng emphasised de-regulation. In a serialised article entitled `Time for a Change', 
Chosun made a categorical assertion that `The worst obstacle on the road to 
Internationalisation is the bureaucratic organisation' (4 Jan. 1994). In another serialised 
article, `The Way of an International Citizen' (27 Dec. 1993 -2 Feb. 1994), Chosun 
advocated for a change of people's mindset. It appears that Chosun's neo-conservatism 
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was grafted into the neo-liberalist trend of the time. When JoongAng argued for de- 
regulation in its editorial, `Time for shaping up the policies for the chaebol' (1 Apr. 1994), 
Chosun quickly replied with an editorial, `Time for the chaebol to shape up their own 
structure' (2 Apr. 1994). One must remember that JoongAng is owned by Samsung. The 
`corporate' identity of the newspaper company affects the discourse it produces. 
Chosun was surprisingly critical of the chaebol considering its basic tenet of neo- 
liberalism and neo-conservatism. That was perhaps motivated by its rivalry with 
JoongAng, a chaebol owned newspaper. Chosun sometimes outperforms the progressive 
Hankyoreh in its criticism against the chaebol. That is because Chosun's financial situation 
is strong enough to withstand pressures from its major advertisers. In a group interview 
with the present researcher, an economic reporter from Chosun replied, "I rarely felt the 
pressure from the managers in connection with my news reports about the chaebol" 
whereas his counterpart in Hankyoreh replied, "It is not easy to ignore the pleas of the 
Head of my company when my article is likely to be critical of our company's major 
sources of advertising income. After all, he is the Head of my company who was elected 
by us" (interview, 14 Mar. 2003). 
In 1993, Chosun took the lead in advancing the discourse of `Internationalisation'. 
Yet JoongAng did not stand by as an onlooker. JoongAng took pride of itself as the 
`Locomotive of change and reform'. 69 Of course, the contents of the reform it was 
advocating were squarely based on neo-liberalism. JoongAng contributed very much to 
the propagation of neo-liberalism in Korea. In doing so, it attempted to promote the 
market driven economy and to advance the social climate which is favourable to the 
chaebol. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the persistent theme of the discourse advanced by 
JoongAng in 1993 was `Strengthening competitiveness'. We have seen earlier that 
`Competitiveness' and `Reform' were the competing themes subordinate to the `New 
Korea' discourse of Kim government. We also saw the chaebol's role in promoting 
`Competitiveness' at the cost of `Reform'. The part played by JoongAng in this process is 
worthy of note. January 1993 was a time when the chaebol were lying low. JoongAng, 
however, published the New Year editorial `Let's build a joyous society' on 1 January 
69 JoongAng was trying to implant those images in people's mind through their internet home page and 
advertisements. 
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1993. On 5 January, they followed this up with another editorial, `Conditions for a joyous 
economy'. The same theme was pursued in various articles `Regulations obstructing 
corporate operations: worsening the slump' (11 Jan. ); `Regulations weakening the 
competitiveness' (12 Jan. ) and `Regulations arresting corporate moves' (13 Jan. ). These 
articles were bombarded even before the President-elect Kim took office in February. In 
May, when the new government still had the energy and enthusiasm for `Reform', 
JoongAng published an editorial, `Corporate Reform: the enthusiasm and the reality' (2 
May). Concrete proposals and arguments were set out in a contributing article by a neo- 
liberal economist Chung Goohyun, `Reforming the conglomerates: not to be undertaken 
rashly' (21 May). 
The slumping economy gave a boost for JoongAng's discourse practices. Editorial 
titles included `Economy: big frogs in a small pond' (11 July); `Competitiveness of 
Korean economy far from satisfactory' (26 July); `International competitiveness: the 
foremost aim of our time' (10 Aug. ) and `Competitiveness: the road to join the advanced 
states' (22 Sep. ). As one can see from these titles, `Internationalisation' and 
`Competitiveness' were seamlessly combined. These two concepts did have overlapping 
contents but the emphasis of the former lay in raising the standards of various institutions, 
manners, customs to the level of advanced states whereas the latter had the emphasis on 
de-regulation. As the economic slump persisted, the `Internationalisation' advocated by 
Chosun came to mean raising the `Competitiveness' (as advocated by JoongAng) to the 
level of advanced economies. 
JoongAng pushed forward its ideas through a great number of articles with serial 
titles such as `Issues of New Economy' (June 1993), `Problems of Public Corporations' 
(June 1993), `Tasks of the New Economic Team of the Government' (Dec. 1993), 'Mid- 
term Assessment: Where does the New Economy Go from Here? ' (July 1994) and 
`Privatisation of Public Corporations' (July 1994). JoongAng criticised the restrictions 
placed upon the chaebol in taking over the public corporations. They also argued for 
predominantly private ownership of banks, most of which were owned by a lot of 
shareholders without a large shareholder. From September 1994, they launched long 
serialised articles, `Advanced States: What Makes Them Different from Korea]' which 
purported to report the `success stories' of foreign countries which adopted neo-liberalist 
policies. Similar series appeared at the time: `Japan Revisited', `Corporate Innovation and 
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Corporate Success: In-depth Report' (Aug. 1994). Regarding the education service, 
JoongAng carried long-term serialised articles, `Educational Reform in Advanced States' 
(9 Nov. ,,, 30 Dec. 1993), `Our Future Lies in the Success of Education' (1-25 Sep. 1994) 
which emphasised the need for `Competitiveness' in education. JoongAng criticised the 
government which was opposed to donation to private universities in return for places. 
JoongAng argued that the government must stop meddling with the university education. 
<Figure 3-2> shows the discourse practices of the four newspapers during the three 
year period from 1993. The discourse of `Internationalisation' was excelled by Chosun 
whereas `Competitiveness' and `Globalisation' were most frequently appearing themes of 
JoongAng's articles. JoongAng and Hankyoreh published a similar number of articles 
containing the word `Reform' (2,707 articles for JoongAng and 2,695 articles for 
Hankyoreh). However this must be assessed with caution. JoongAng's discourse of 
`Reform' was aimed at de-regulation to improve the competitiveness. In fact, JoongAng 
had by far the largest number of articles which contained both `Reform' and 
`Competitiveness' during this period (382 articles). By contrast, JoongAng had a small 
number of articles which contained both `Reform' and `Chaebol' in the text. During this 
period JoongAng had only 51 such articles compared to 248 such articles appearing in 
Hankyoreh. 
<Figure 3-2> Major Discourses of Four Newspapers (1993-1995) 
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JoongAng did not regard the chaebol as the targets of reform. For example, in a 
New Year editorial entitled `Shaping the framework of the state in an era of 
Internationalisation' (1 Jan. 1994), JoongAng was advocating comprehensive reform in 
politics, administration, education and other areas. Yet they kept quiet about the chaebol. 
It seems that the active alliance between the chaebol and the media in the 
production of ruling discourse greatly contributed to President Kim's adoption of 
`Internationalisation' discourse. A former Junior Secretary to the President told in an 
interview: 
If you did not talk about `Internationalisation' and `Competitiveness', you're sure 
to be accused of living in the by-gone era, an anachronistic person who does not 
even read newspapers. If you raised an objection to those values, you were 
cornered (interview, 22 Mar. 2003). 
The cabinet reshuffle which followed shed a number of Ministers and high ranking 
officials who had been energetically pursuing the reform programmes. Han Wansang, a 
somewhat progressive Minister of Re-unification remarked immediately after leaving the 
post, "I have been severely criticised by some of those who did not welcome the trends of 
the post-cold war era. But when sufficient time passes, my contribution will be assessed in 
a fairer manner. " (Hankyoreh, 22 Dec. 1993). He had attempted to introduce some 
elements of the policy which was to be adopted later by President Kim Daejung under the 
name of `Sunshine policy'. While in office, he was vehemently attacked by Chosun who 
accused him of being a pro-communist. When the impending cabinet reshuffle was being 
discussed, Chosun had an editorial `Managerial ability should be the criterion for the new 
cabinet' appearing on 17 December 1993. 
The new cabinet was indeed filled with neo-liberalists and neo-conservatives. In the 
name of `Competitiveness', a series of policies aimed at de-regulation of the chaebol were 
announced. Of course, the FKI welcomed the new move. In its New Year statement in 
January 1994, it announced, `A new consensus is beginning to emerge from the nation' 
(cited in Kang and Park 1997: 139). The FKI demanded further measures for de-regulation 
and wage stability. The FKI promised to form the Committee for Promotion of De- 
regulation and the Committee for Employment and Labour so that it could offer its views 
96 
to assist the new government in policy formulation. It was argued that the world economy 
had moved from an era of `fair competition' into an era of `unlimited competition'. It 
advocated for strengthening of the chaebol as an answer to the new challenges. 
The FKI could hear its voice echoed from the government. The Ministry of 
Information launched a public advertisement which was entitled, `Competitiveness: 
housewives too'. The discursive symbol of `Competitiveness' was used as a magic wand 
to bring out a consensus from the people. In the name of `Competitiveness', the 
government accepted the demands of the industry and declared 1994 as the `Year One of 
no industrial actions'. Guidelines for wages were also introduced. As the labour 
movements showed a violent reaction, the government swiftly responded with ruthless 
crackdown (Kang and Park 1997: 139). All newspapers, except Hankyoreh, welcomed and 
urged more rapid and effective control of industrial actions. 
In December 1993, economic indicators showed that `the slump is over'. However, 
the newspapers continued their discourse practices, insisting that the Korean economy 
should leap into the league of world class economic powers beyond the slump. Chosun 
launched many series of feature articles such as `UR and the Era of Competitiveness' (Dec. 
1993), emphasising that deregulation and opening up could be countermeasures in the era 
of open economy. 
JoongAng, for its part, carried out an extensive coverage in this direction, such as 
`The Economy in an Era of Genuine Open Market' (Dec. 1993), which called for a 
ground-breaking deregulation concerning business activities. In addition, JoongAng made 
`Look Outside' the theme of 1994 and launched an all-year round series about where 
Korea should be ushered to survive the new economic order (1 Jan. 1994). DongA also 
added its voice in its serialised articles, `Competitiveness: a Survival Kit in the Era of 
Internationalisation' (Jan. 1994). The core message of these conservative papers was that 
the role of the government in an era of Internationalisation should be limited to that of 
supporting the industry and the economy. 
Of course, there were lone voices expressing concerns about the policy overdrive. 
Hankyoreh offered its warnings against the excessive pace of market opening in its 
editorials: `Internationalisation should begin from sound domestic economic foundations' 
(10 Nov. 1993). It also published columns `The cult of Competitiveness' (2 Nov. 1993) 
and `The nation's Competitiveness and Internationalisation' (21 Jan. 1994) where the 
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paper asserted: `When the interests of the nation and of the workers are excluded, when 
public interests are ignored in this drive for Internationalisation and building up of 
Competitiveness, the whole enterprise may prove to be a failure. ' 
However, the voices of a newspaper which can claim only about 3% of the total 
number of newspapers issued in Korea were largely ignored or swamped by the 
mainstream news and feature coverage. At times, however, DongA - which was relatively 
less active in these discourse practices - allowed contributing articles such as `Dangers of 
blind conviction in Internationalisation' (23 Jan. 1994) which were incongruent to its 
stance. Such articles were rather isolated events. 
`Globalisalion' 
If a ruling discourse or political agenda which dominates government policy line is 
to secure legitimacy, the process of decision making should be democratic. In this respect, 
Habermas laid stress on the direction of communication flow: 
Binding decisions, to be legitimate, must be steered by communication flows that 
start at the periphery and pass through the sluices of democratic and constitutional 
procedures situated at the entrance to the parliamentary complex or the courts 
(and, if necessary, at the exit of the implementing administration as well)' 
(Habermas 1996: 356). 
In light of this, the process through which `Globalisation' came to be adopted as a 
ruling discourse was far from democratic. As mentioned in chapter 2, `Globalisation' had 
not been discussed even in the circle of the President's Secretariat, but somehow became 
the nation's policy goal and functioned as a `false barometer' which kept demanding rapid 
opening of the market and de-regulation. The crisis came eventually. 
According to Chang Jungsoo, the reporter of the Hankyoreh who accompanied 
President Kim during his APEC summit meeting in Indonesia, the adoption of 
`Globalisation' discourse took place on 16 November 1994 in the airplane to Australia 
after the summit meeting. The following is a reconstruction of what happened on that day: 
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President Kim summoned some of his secretaries in the plane. "There will be an 
informal meeting with news reporters tomorrow morning. Any idea? " Someone 
replied, "Perhaps a brief explanation of the results of these summit meetings. " 
President Kim appeared to think that something more was necessary. He went on, 
"It dawned on me this time that there are fabulous opportunities over here, outside 
Korea. I heard people speak about global market. Could you not make something 
out of that? " "Internationalisation or Globalisation, you mean? " replied someone. 
"Globalisation! That sounds new and attractive. Could you have something ready 
for tomorrow morning? " The secretary sent urgent faxes to the Economic Planning 
Board in Seoul asking for the meaning of globalisation and the case for pursuing it. 
The Economic Planning Board was then busy with the `Internationalisation' policy 
project. On that basis, they hastily prepared a press release and sent it back to 
Sydney. President Kim announced on the following day that from then on, 
`Globalisation' will be his long-term policy goal. This was the so-called `Sydney 
Announcement' (based on the then news reports and the interview of 2 July 2005). 
In spite of its somewhat `casual' beginning, the Globalisation policy had formidable 
repercussions. Initially, it had a lukewarm reception from the media which responded by 
asking, `is it any different from Internationalisation? ' However, the attitude soon changed 
and they started to seek something different. They realised that it could be the means of 
implementing neo-liberal ideology and furthering the interests of the ruling bloc on all 
fronts. 
JoongAng was particularly quick to respond. It is worthy of note that Samsung - the 
chaebol that owns JoongAng - was to benefit most from the `Globalisation'. As 
if they had 
been waiting for the announcement, JoongAng started a serialised article `The Future Lies 
in Globalisation'. The first article in this series was entitled `Reform policy now found the 
right target' (19 Nov. ). The article advanced the claim that the reform which focuses on 
punishing the past misdeeds has now more or less served its purpose... There is now a 
demand for forward-looking achievements'. The fourth article in the series was entitled 
`Reforming the institution and the mindset with a view to Globalisation' (23 Nov. ). It was 
asserted that: the least that the government must do is to refrain from restraining the 
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creative drives from the private sector and to endeavour to foster the environment for 
vibrant competition'. 
In its editorials which immediately followed President Kim's Sydney announcement, 
JoongAng welcomed what it termed `Long-term ideas for Globalisation' (18 Nov. 1994). It 
made its own policy suggestions as well in an editorial `What the President should do 
upon his return' (19 Nov. ). Another editorial purported to be a reminder for `Points to 
watch out in implementing the Globalisation' (23 Nov. ). The government announced a 
plan for re-organising the economic and finance departments on 4 December. JoongAng 
welcomed the move by launching a serialised article `Administrative Revolution on the 
Road to Globalisation'. The series started off with an article praising `The first visible 
result of the Globalisation announcement' (5 Dec. ). However, the government re- 
organisation was criticised by some as a publicity stunt to hide the emptiness of the 
`Globalisation announcement'. They claimed that the decision to merge the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning Board had the result of depriving the sense of balance in 
economic policies and that it was one of the causes for financial crisis of 1997. 
On the very day when the government re-organisation was announced, however, 
Samsung also announced that they would pursue their plan to start car-manufacturing. 
Samsung's plan to enter into the car-manufacturing industry had long been a highly 
contentious topic. The sudden announcement by Samsung was carefully timed to fish in 
troubled waters. The government referred to Globalisation in justifying its policy 
somersault and decided to allow Samsung to start car-manufacturing. In January 1995, the 
restrictions on investment in petrochemical industries were also lifted. The trend of 
Globalisation granted the wishes of the chaebol at last. However, both the car industry and 
the petrochemical industry were responsible for a tremendous scale of over-investment 
and trigged off the financial crisis of 1997. 
Chosun was then engrossed in the production of `Internationalisation' discourse. 
President Kim's `Globalisation announcement' met with a sarcastic response there. In its 
editorial, they criticised the government's announcement as `a move to get out from its 
political predicament caused by major accidents and corruption charges levelled against 
close aides of the President' (19 Nov. 1994). Chosun made clear its preference in another 
editorial `Politicians and the government: yet to be internationalised' (24 Nov. ). 
After a while, however, Chosun published a contributing article `Forward-looking 
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Globalisation' (8 Dec. 1994) by Choi Jonghyun, who was then the Chairman of the FKI. 
In this article, he argued that "we have been thinking about Internationalisation within the 
framework of nationalism" and lent his full support to the `Globalisation announcement'. 
Chosun had its own staff article `Globalisation: in need of details' (11 Jan. 1995) and 
urged the reform of education to meet the global standards. Chosun ended up adopting the 
`Globalisation' discourse. In 1994, Chosun carried a series entitled `Globalisation is the 
Word' (29 Nov. - 10 Dec. ) to emphasise the importance of foreign language learning. 
From the beginning of 1995, Chosun started to regurgitate long lists of articles with serial 
titles such as `Global New Strategy' (1-26 Jan. ); `Global Competitiveness' (1-9 Jan. ) and 
`Nurturing the First Class Citizens' (1-12 Jan. ). The core agenda underlying these series 
was that, as Globalisation is the key to strengthening competitiveness, the government 
should hurry to open up the economy and remove regulatory barriers and every 
individuals in the society should improve their own `competitiveness'. Regarding the 
chaebol, however, Chosun remained critical. In a feature article `The start of WTO era: 
when only the best can survive' (1 Jan. 1995), Chosun argued that `instead of developing 
expertise in specialised areas, the chaebol are keen to branch into a wide variety of areas 
in order to diversify risks'. 
Hankyoreh warned of the negative potentials of the globalisation drive in its column, 
`Globalisation: yet another cult' (5 Jan. 1995), and in its New Year's editorial, `Reviving 
the reform: reviving the people's hope' (1 Jan 1995). They criticised the decline of the 
`Reform'. Yet the voice of the minority was bound to be lost in the loud slogans of 
'Global isation'. When the Mexican peso plummeted, Hankyoreh made a plea to pay heed 
to the `Lessons of Globalisation in crisis' (16 Jan. ). However, JoongAng published a 
column `Digging a tunnel in an era of globalisation' contributed by a proponent of neo- 
liberalism, Kim Byungjoo (21 Jan. ) who argued that `some people in the press and in the 
government were attempting to use the devaluation of the Peso as an excuse for delaying 
the opening up of Korean market. ' 
At any rate, after adopting the ruling discourse of 'Global isation', the government 
undertook to review its various policies. The new agenda included `Company-like 
Government', `Sales diplomacy' and `Productive welfare'. In particular, the so-called 
`Productive welfare' meant welfare provisions which avoid burdening the economic 
growth. This neo-liberalist idea may have an appeal in a country suffering from the 
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crushing weight of social security spending. In the Korean society which has very few and 
weak welfare provisions to begin with, however, `Productive welfare' would simply mean 
indefinite avoidance of welfare provisions. 
The retreat of welfare policy is bound to enlarge and perpetuate inequalities. Such a 
policy can only be implemented, as pointed out by Edelman (1971), through a 
manipulation of political symbols. The examples of European countries which had 
reduced welfare spending were peddled around as the `global standard'. All had to be fair 
in the race toward `Globalisation' and `Competitiveness'. 
The chaebol did not sit tight. They started the practice of symbolic advertisement. 
Advertisements appeared where no particular products appeared. They were selling 
images and symbols rather than products: `Global management, that'll be the 
Daewoo'; `Global Super First, this is Samsung'; 'LG now has a new client, the World'; 
`Hyundai is going on top of the World'. The chaebol were not after the consumer's 
money. They were after the consumer's mind. Through a control of political symbols, they 
hoped to achieve a favourable environment for their business operations. 
In reference to `opinion management', Habermas takes a line from Steinberg: `By 
means of a dramatic presentation of facts and calculated stereotypes it aims for a 
"reorientation of public opinion by the formation of new authorities or symbols which will 
have acceptance" (Habermas 1989: 194). Labourer's Daily deplored: `No page of any 
media in Korea] is produced without the stamp of Globalisation. Without it, the 
authenticity of one's views is to be suspected' (21 Feb. 1995). 
Alliance for Ruling Discourses 
Reinforcing Solidarity 
We have seen that the press in Korea have not only conveyed the arguments 
advanced by others, but developed their own arguments and suppressed the arguments of 
certain others. They were an important producer of ruling discourses and as such led the 
government in making its policies. The values they espoused advanced mainly the 
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interests of the ruling bloc rather than reflecting the general interests of the civil society. 
As a result, the communication and decision making process seemed to flow from the core 
to the periphery. In the case of Korea, `the sluices' - which was mentioned by Peters (cited 
in Habermas 1996: 354) - were usually set to operate in one direction: from the centre to 
the periphery. What were the conditions under which the Korean press could engage in its 
`unhealthy' discourse practices in a manner which is far from Habermas's normative 
model or the democratic media model? Also, where did the power wielded by the Korean 
press come from? 
First of all, the reasons should be sought in the firm alliance within the ruling bloc 
forged by `common interests'. On the other hand, the opposing side was in disarray. The 
common interests are often observable in the relationship between the press and the 
chaebol. We have seen that JoongAng was most enthusiastic in promoting the ruling 
discourse of `Competitiveness' and `Globalisation'. JoongAng and Samsung share 
`common interests'. 
When Kim Youngsam and a reformist group joined the then conservative ruling 
party and succeeded in winning the Presidential election, the binding power of the ruling 
bloc including the government, the chaebol and the press was not that strong. This is 
because the bloc came to contain some progressive elements vigorously pursuing the 
reform. However, when the reformist group tried to set up the Committee for New Korea 
to implement Kim's reform programmes, anti-reform groups began to reunite. The 
Committee was grounded even before it was launched as the anti-reform groups were 
actively blocking the emergence of any potential opponents. 
On the other hand, the Committee for Implementing Internationalisation and the 
Committee for Implementing Globalisation - both of them were supported by the 
corporate sector - were launched smoothly (Kang and Park 1997: 140). The reason 
is that 
the interests within the ruling bloc were coordinated by then. It can be also attributed to 
the neo-liberalism which became the `common ideology' for most Koreans. A 
considerable number of intellectuals who had no immediate political interests joined in the 
debate as the propagator of neo-liberalism. 
The national assembly, the court and other state organs did little to check each other. 
Rather, they encouraged the Administration's energetic drive in a particular direction. 
These organs are often portrayed as acting on the basis of reason and rationality. However, 
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a closer look may show that this may not always be so: the press may aggravate the 
situation. When the national assembly is in session, for example, a great deal of discourse 
is produced. At this time the press can select and report only those remarks that fit their 
taste. The distortion of discourse can take place in this manner. Regarding the autumn 
session of 1993 Assembly, JoongAng had an article entitled `The focus of the question 
time'. Half of the article was filled with the remarks of the Assemblyman Kang 
Kyungsik70 who advocated market opening, overriding importance of the economy in 
policy considerations and `Internationalisation'. A sub-title for the article was `The 
economy according to the logic of economics: in one voice' (1 Nov. ). Some 
assemblymen71 were voicing their concerns about the side-effects of `Internationalisation', 
but they were largely ignored. 
In contrast to the united front of the ruling bloc, the opposing groups were lacking 
in number and organisational power. Citizens' groups were lacking cohesion and could not 
rally enough force. The chaebol could buy up political influence. Yet labour unions were 
too weak outside their work place to have any political impact. There are more than 10 
million workers in Korea; not a single seat in the National Assembly went to them. It 
would, of course, be unfair to criticise their lack of cohesion too much. When the 
discourse of `Internationalisation' was all the rage, the Minister of Justice remarked that 
`Internationalisation can only be achieved upon the foundation of a stable society'. He 
instructed the Director of Public Prosecution that `labour disputes must be sternly cracked 
down' (Hankyoreh, 24 Jan. 1995). JoongAng also had a column, `Labour-management 
relationship in an era of Internationalisation' where it was asserted that `in readiness for 
the Internationalisation, peace and order should first be restored in work places' (1 Feb. 
1995). 
`A working media model' devised by Curran (Curran 2002: 240246) could be 
applied to the press in Korea. Regarding the `private enterprise media sector', it is indeed 
rare that the major newspapers gave an adequate coverage of the workers' viewpoints. 
Those papers gave a full coverage of the chaebol views. The claims of the citizen groups 
and workers were often ignored or given an extremely cursory coverage. 
70 This very man was to become the DPM of Economy in 1997 
The Assemblyman Kim Keuntae put forward an argument that "the discourse of Internationalisation and 
Globalisation contains the logic of justifying in the name of the people the special favours enjoyed by the 
chaebol" (cited in Kang and Park 1997). 
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In the `civic media sector', citizen groups were lacking in organizational vigour as 
they were most often run by dignitaries, rather than activists. Even if they did produce 
important discourse, they lacked the media who could report their views to the wide public. 
The newsletters of these groups were barely surviving, if lucky. 72 There was no 
government subsidy and very little interest from the general public. Rather, some of the 
citizen groups were joining force with the ruling bloc. They participated in the discourse 
production of the ruling bloc. The Secretary General Suh Kyungsuk of the well-known 
Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), served as a member of the Committee 
for Implementing Internationalisation. He argued that "citizen groups and workers 
movements should turn their attention to strengthening the national competitiveness". 
According to him, "Educational reform should aim to provide skilled man-power which 
can sustain the national competitiveness" (Cho 1993). 
In September 1994, the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) 
was organised. The CCEJ and the PSPD were the two most important citizen groups. They 
made a great deal of achievements and voiced progressive views from time to time. 
However, both of them were pursuing reforms inspired by neo-liberalism. While critical of 
the chaebol, they were demanding de-regulation at the same time. The PSPD was actively 
pursuing `one dollar, one vote' movement in corporate governance. Regarding these 
moves, Yi Jonghyun observed that: 
These movements draw upon people's animosity of the state which had used 
violence to maintain its illegitimate power; another reason for blossoming of these 
movements is that the order which had been reigning until then was lacking in 
rational grounds compared to the order by market.... It would be a mistake to 
understand that the retreat of the state is the progress of society. 
73 
As the government has no policy to provide for the `social market sector', minor 
newspapers had to struggle for survival. The dire conditions of their existence sometimes 
led to distortion of their news report. Seoul Kyungjae (economic daily) used to be critical 
of the chaebol. However they decided to launch a one year long series of full-page articles 
72 Labourers' Daily, which started with 14 million workers as its potential subscribers, had to discontinue 
due to financial difficulties in April 2003. 
"A paper read in a seminar organised by Cambridge Korean Society (24 May 2001). 
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(39 in total) under the heading, `Industries' Survival is the Key to the Nation's Survival' (1 
Aug. 1995 ,,, 9 July 1996). In a personal communication with the present researcher, a 
reporter of the newspaper reluctantly admitted that "the articles were written in exchange 
for a huge sum of money paid by the chaebol" (personal communication, July 1996). 
As for the `professional media sector', it is unrealistic to expect that the Korean 
media professionals would stick to their calling as an objective transmitter, or make 
voluntary efforts to convey minority's voices. Young reporters in conservative newspapers 
often reply that they are closer to the progressive camp. Nevertheless, even their articles 
are often based on a neo-liberalist perspective. 
74 If the revolutionary potentials from 
inside the media organisation were the premises for Habermas's optimistic view, then the 
picture would become rather pessimistic for Korea as there is very little or no such 
potential in the media professionals in Korea. Hardt did point out that `journalists have 
never challenged the organization of media power directly and collectively' (Hardt 2000: 
217). In Korea, the media professionals do not even manage to have a vigorous labour 
movement to protect their own interests. 
Another reason for the major newspapers' oligopolistic control of the discourse 
market is, ironically, exaggeration and distortion in their report. There were numerous 
instances where these major papers arbitrarily selected and `puffed up' certain news 
sources in order to have a greater impact for their news report. The annual report of the 
International Institute for Management Development (IMD) can provide a convenient 
example to illustrate this point. The Swiss based Institute's `World Competitiveness 
Yearbook' is seized by the press and the chaebol each year to create the dominant 
discourse favourable to their position. 75 
In 1994, Korea was reported to have been ranked at 24th place. JoongAng made a 
big issue out of this. In a feature article `The shock of the IMD report', JoongAng offered 
an explanation that `inflexible regulatory schemes targeting big corporations undermine 
our competitiveness'. It proposed `Globalisation on all fronts' as an alternative to 
regulation (10 Sep. 1994). However, the article did not emboss that the report was based 
on a study of 41 of mostly advanced countries. Nor did it question the pertinence of the 
" For more details, see chapter 4. 
75 Yi Jong-hyun, a former correspondent who had covered European countries for Maeil KyungJae, said, 
"Reporting the IMD report was so important that some reporters negligent of it got reprimand from their 
desks (interview, 5 Nov. 2004). 
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items with which the report worked out the ranking. Financial Times had an article about 
the IMD report which raised doubts about its reliability. 76 
After a while, however, the Korea Economics Research Institute (KERI) which is 
founded by the FKI published a report claiming that `having reassessed the results of the 
IMD report from the Korean perspective, Korea should have been placed at 33rd place 
rather than 24th'. The KERI's report took additional account of the labour relationship 
among other items. JoongAng seized this report and launched another round of alarmist 
articles. An editorial `Banking industries should be entrusted to responsible private 
owners' (12 Oct. 1994) accompanied these articles as well. Sensational news reporting can 
have some real impact on the economic performance. In a personal communication of the 
time, an executive officer in the Ministry of Finance responded: 
The KERI's report did not take adequate account of the government's reform 
measures. It is deplorable that the chaebol who already have tons of problems are 
now pushing hard to branch into the banking industry. They are putting serious 
pressure on the government by manipulating the media. If this continues, we will be 
lucky if the country does not go bankrupt (personal communication, 13 Oct. 1994). 
In the following year, the Heritage Foundation published a report on economic 
freedom. According to the report, Korea was classified among the `nearly free' countries 
(Kookmin 14 Dec. 1995). Such a news should be a good news for neo-liberalists! 
Nevertheless, the conservative newspapers kept quiet about this report. When they judged 
that the report could undermine the discourse they had been producing, they did not 
hesitate to ignore it even if it was published by a conservative research institute in the US. 
Lastly, the slanted and provocative statements used by the conservative press may 
have strengthened the cohesion among those who are already favourably disposed to the 
conservative newspapers. Such language was a serious hindrance to the culture of 
meaningful debate and democracy. However, it may be an effective means to consolidate 
the inner cohesion of an interest group. Professor Gwak Sangkyung of Korea University 
contributed a column, `Requests for the new team for government's economic policy', 
76 It was pointed out by the newspaper that the research was done with 16,500 questionnaires sent out 
mainly to entrepreneurs but only 2851 were returned (Financial Times, 7 Sep. 1994). Such a biased 
sample and low response rate may have caused serious problems in survey analysis. 
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which stated: 
There is no need whatsoever to listen to the preposterous, childish assertions of 
certain people who have no sense of internationalisation, parochial, lacking in 
understanding and full of egoistic fears about opening up the market. The new 
economic team should boldly move forward to an open market (JoongAng 5 Oct. 
1994). 
It reads like needless accumulation of verbal violence against those who are 
opposed to rapid an opening up of the market. Gwon Youngbin, a staff editor of JoongAng 
wrote a column, `Globalisation and remote relatives of a chaebol family', which said: 
1. The chaebol are those who have hoarded money in dubious manners; 2. Chaebol 
Jrs. are the decayed managers; 3. Both of them are keen to have their tentacles all 
over. Now these three are the false stereotypes conjured up by the fascist rulers 
through their spin and misguided manipulation. Now we live in a new era of civilian 
government where the brilliant fanfare of `Globalisation' can be heard loud and 
clear. However, some crooked types are still peddling the old, false stereotypes from 
the by-gone era and seriously undermine the reputation and good standing of the 
corporate owners (JoongAng, 13 Feb. 1995). 
Instead of transmitting the concerns of the periphery to the general public, these 
media professionals were hotly engaged in a `cockfight' where savage attacks were 
launched against one's opponents. Until the Korean media undergoes a comprehensive 
reform to allow diversity of values and rational public debate, the democracy in Korea is 
likely to retreat or languish. 
Major Players in Discourse Practices 
According to some studies, when an enthusiastic view of the few who have a great 
deal of interest in an issue is reported in the media packaged as an expert opinion, those 
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who have little interest in the issue are likely to accept the view (e. g. Mun 1999: 7980). 
Propagation of ruling discourse requires ardent star players. 
Chairmen of the chaebol competently undertook the role. As mentioned earlier, 
Choi Jonghyun expounded his monetarist view to an audience composed of Finance 
Minister and the Chairman of the Bank of Korea. He then became the Chairman of the 
FKI during Kim Youngsam's presidency. His performance became more prominent. 
`Break the structure of high costs, low efficiency' was his mantra. 
As the head of the interest group of the industries, he often met the President and 
put forward his demands. Amidst the Globalisation fever, the export industries were 
experiencing difficulties because of the diminished rate of return. They were losing the 
competitiveness. In December 1996, Chairman Choi made a controversial announcement: 
"I met the President and requested him to use the Emergency Powers under the 
Constitutional law to freeze wages for the next five years". In a joint meeting between the 
Special Committee of the National Assembly and the Private Committee (both committees 
were for `Strengthening National Competitiveness'), Choi menacingly remarked, "having 
met with the President, I requested that the relevant officials who failed to lower the 
interest rate to the level of the industrialised countries of the West should take the 
responsibility" (Hankook Kyungjae, 5 Dec. 1996). His remark which was opposed to 
revising the industrial laws77 was also taken seriously and favourably reported by most 
media under the titles such as `Revising the industrial laws causes the crisis' (JoongAng, 5 
Dec. 1996). 
No serious efforts were made to analyse the reasons for the economic crisis and the 
possible alternative ways to cope with it. A newspaper voiced a critical view through such 
articles as an editorial, `Diminished Competitiveness due to chaebol' (Hankyoreh 11 Sep. 
1996). However, conservative papers continued to point a finger at increased labour 
costs. Due to the pressure from rapidly diminishing support for the government, the 
demand for freezing wages was not fully implemented. Nevertheless, the situation led to 
large scale lay-offs. Wage negotiations which took place in the following spring saw that 
wages were effectively frozen in the face of imminent threat of further lay-offs. 
77 At that time, the government attempted to allow for multiple labour unions at the workplace, which failed 
due to the opposition of employers. Samsung notoriously took advantage of the law which prohibited 
multiple unions, for example, by encouraging its loyalist workers to organise a union before a bona fide 
one coming into existence. 
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Chairman Lee Keunhee of Samsung had brought about the so-called `Lee Keunhee 
syndrome'. Chairman Lee became the charismatic preacher who propagated the neo- 
liberalism to the nation. `Competitiveness' and `Global Super First' were his mantra. His 
in-house speeches delivered and broadcasted to all Samsung employees in all locations 
were subsequently made in video cassettes. Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) 
decided (upon the president's special request) to broadcast Chairman Lee's `in-house' 
speeches for about one and half hours during the evening prime air time. Chairman Lee's 
speech came with his own request, `Listen to my speech at least 50 times over'. Opinion 
polls78 often showed that Chairman Lee literally became a household name for one of the 
most favoured entrepreneurs. 
Chairman Lee's pursuit of `New management' had an impact on government policy 
as well. Many of his ideas such as `New Management' were echoed in President Kim's 
initial economic master plan, which was unveiled as `New Economy'. The government 
departments were not free from the generalised exhortation, `Learn Samsung'. The 
training for government officials and ruling party members was done by so-called 'out- 
sourcing': they spent days in the training complex of the chaebol who organised the 
training programmes for these `clients'. The Ministry of Internal Affairs decided that all its 
officials and the local government chiefs all the way down to the level of township 
(17,000 in total) should receive training by the chaebol. Many of them went to Samsung's 
training centre and watched Chairman Lee Keunhee's videotaped lectures on `The 
philosophy of New Management'. Under these circumstances, a neologism appeared: the 
`Republic of Samsung'. The expression often appeared in the title of newspaper 
columns. 79 
At about this time, it became fashionable for chairmen of the chaebol to publish 
autobiography recounting their entrepreneurial achievements. Almost all of these 
`autobiographies' were written by `ghost writers' who were paid to dramatise the virtues of 
the chairmen. The trend started with Chairman Kim Woojoong (of Daewoo), The World is 
Wide with Opportunities. It was swiftly followed by Chairman Chung Juyung of Hyundai, 
Ordeal, but no Failure. When these autobiographies became the best-sellers and put the 
78 For example, a survey of university graduates in the first half of 1995, which was conducted by Recruit, a 
job search news magazine. 
79 For example, see Song Heeyung (Chosun, 24 July 1996) and Chung Youngmoo (Hankyoreh, 20 Apr. 
1995). 
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respective chaebol in favourable light in the eyes of the readers, about 10 others followed 
suite. 
Korea Economics Research Institute (KERI) and Korea Centre for Free Enterprise 
(KCFE) which were founded by the FKI, and Economic Research Institute of each 
chaebol are very important sources of neo-liberal discourse. The weekly Sisa Journal, 
albeit arbitrarily, singled out five most influential pro-chaebol ideologues. Four of them 
are the heads of KCFE and research institutes of the chaebol (Daewoo, LG and 
Samsung) (Sisa Journal, 8 Jan. 1998). 
These research institutes not only reproduced and consolidated neo-liberalist 
ideologies. They also developed and published policy proposals and thus influenced the 
government policy decisions. The KCFE had a particularly wide range of activities. 
Faithful to its mission statement (propagation of the spirit of free enterprise), it offered 
financial support for publication of neo-liberalist scholars' works. It supported university 
societies of neo-liberalist leaning. It published an impressive list of titles for liberalist 
works, booklets, videos, cartoon series, which were often donated to various 
places. Following the example of the Heritage Foundation, it sent out, via fax, brief 
papers80 or short articles to opinion leaders as a rapid response to upcoming issues. 
Columnists or reporters who may write something critical about neo-liberalist ideas or 
policies could expect to have a same day or next day response from this Centre. News 
reporters pressed for deadline could contact the Centre as it offered a hotline network of 
scholars who would give neo-liberalist comments about the urgent issues of the day (or the 
afternoon). 
The Centre has closely monitored the views of various participants of economic 
policy debates. In 1999, it prepared a detailed report analysing the views and leanings of 
high-ranking government officials (6 Ministers or Vice-ministers), leaders of non- 
governmental organisations and professors (35 in total). Because of the scathing tone and 
McCarthyism of the analysis, the report (available on the internet) provoked huge 
controversy. 
The Centre's director, Gong Byungho, is well known for his adamant defence of 
neo-liberalist ideas. For him, the proposals for reform of the chaebol were the `biological 
vestiges of jealousy and envy harboured by the poor against the rich' (cited in Kim, S. 
A0 Opinion Leaders 'Digest, Executive Essay, etc. 
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1997). He also argued that `even incompetent owner management can be more efficient 
than the clever professional management' (Seoul KyungJae, 2 Sep. 1999). Those who 
disagreed with him were often dismissed by him as leftists. Ryu Simin, who professed to 
be a liberalist, criticised Gong in the following terms: 
Gong despises humanism and idealism; in short, those who are critical of social 
inequalities; those who defend the state intervention in the market and those who 
attempt to change the existing orders are all treated by him as equally retarded or 
equally senseless (Ryu 1999: 217). 
In his book, What is Market Economy? (thirdly printed, 15 Nov. 1997), Gong wrote: 
The scare-mongering government officials' fear of foreign debt has, in fact, never 
proved to be of substance even if some scholars appeared to mention it from time to 
time during the earlier period of economic growth (Gong 1997: 407). 
Just 20 days later, the Korean economy proved to be in need of emergency loans of 
IMF. 81 As Chang Sangwhan noted: 
The financial crisis was only followed by a lukewarm criticism of the chaebol's 
share of responsibility. That was because the chaebol succeeded in misguiding the 
public opinion using the media and their research institutes (Chang, S. 1998). 
Intellectuals who are in academia or in government research institutes are under no 
duty to propagate the neo-liberalist ideas. However, driven by their personal conviction 
and sometimes lured by money, they contributed to conservative newspapers, published 
learned articles, attended public debates and gave public lectures. As a result, neo- 
liberalist ideas were propagated further. The vice chancellor of Seoul National University, 
Song Byungrak, the chancellor of Yonsei University, Song Ja, and the director of Yeouido 
Research Institute (the conservative party's think-tank), Yoo Seungmin, are considered as 
the most prominent neo-liberalist ideologues together with Min Byungkyun, who replaced 
R' Cited in Chung Taein (1998). 
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Gong Byungho as the director of the Centre for Free Enterprise. The Korea Development 
Institute (KDI) is the biggest and most prestigious research institute fully funded by the 
government. Yet it has had a leaning toward the neo-liberalism. It has consistently 
advocated for minimal state intervention and market driven economy. The weekly Sisa 
Journal, as mentioned earlier, enumerated five pro-chaebol ideologues. The fifth one is 
Cha Dongsae, the Director of the KDI (Sisa Journal, 8 Jan. 1998). 
The free competition in the market for ideas, which Schumpeter emphasised82, was 
not that competitive in reality. This is because there existed, as Coats and his colleague 
wrote, `an even distribution of power among disseminating and receiving individuals and 
institutions'. They further developed: 
With respect to individuals, reputation and position are crucial: the cost of effective 
dissemination falls sharply the more widely the individual economist is known and 
respected. Here decreasing marginal costs obtain, and the same applies to 
institutions (Coats and Colander 1989: 13). 
As the above-mentioned individuals were mostly the heads of `prestigious' 
universities or research institutions in Korean society, their discourse practices could be 
effectively carried out thanks to the `prestige' of their institutions. The discourse produced 
by those neo-liberal ideologues was absorbed, reproduced and forcefully delivered to the 
public by the media industries which shared the same ideological outlook. Foreign 
scholars, in particular, are the darlings of the Korean media. Renowned foreign scholars 
are featured in the whole page interview articles appearing on every New Year's Day. In 
the middle of the 1990's, many foreign scholars (e. g. James Buchanan) were invited by the 
media or the chaebol to give public lectures expounding their liberalist economic 
theories. It was by the media that their lectures could effectively reach the whole nation. 
82 Joseph A. Schumpeter made a farewell speech at Bonn, on 20`x' June 1932: "There is no use fighting 
something which life will sooner or later eliminate anyway.... All we can say is that if in science 
something wins through it will have proved its right to exist, and if the thing is not worth anything, it will 
surely wither" (Schneider 1975: 40). 
113 
Conclusion 
According to Habermas, in any given ruling discourse, there is politically motivated 
distortion of language. The distortion is firmly in place even in our routine conversation 
(cited in Mun 1996: 253). Yet people are often unable to recognise such distortion. When 
the ruling discourse of the Kim Yongsam government changed from `New Korea' to 
`Internationalisation' and then to 'Globalisation', who could possibly understand its deep 
impacts on their daily life? Through these changes in ruling discourses, neo-liberalism 
(even though not agreed) could penetrate into people's minds and be translated into 
various institutions without much resistance from the public. 
A survey in 1995 showed that 83.6 % of Koreans were aware of the 'Globalisation' 
discourse. When they were asked to name the most important policy goal in the 
`Globalisation', 24.8% of them mentioned `changing the people's mindset' (Weekly 
Administration Affairs 12 June 1995). The survey appears to suggest that not only did the 
`Globalisation' gain acceptance, but the people were actively endeavouring to adopt it as 
the new frame of reference for their actions. 
The role of the media was tremendous in creating and disseminating ruling 
discourses. In the early stages of the new government, the media and the chaebol 
maintained a loose alliance while exercising restraint in criticising the government. 
However, when the `Reform' discourse of the government began to pose threat to their 
vested interests, the conservative media changed course and mounted resistance. The 
alliance of media-chaebol succeeded in containing the government within the strait jacket 
of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. The triple alliance of government-chaebol-press 
was forged in this manner. They used the ideology as favourable discourse conditions. 
Also, by disseminating their ideology, they enlarged their sphere of influence. 
Once the state was securely stripped of sharp teeth for `Reform', the media and the 
state became friendly partners to further the interests of the industries. In one voice, most 
players began to chant `Internationalisation' and finally `Globalisation'. The `Reform', 
however, was portrayed as incompatible with the remaining policy aims. Hankyoreh laid 
emphasis on `Reform' whereas Chosun was focused on 'Internationalisation' and 
JoongAng was going for 'Globalisation' and 'Competitiveness'. Such differences between 
these major newspapers can be to a large extent explained by their financial status and 
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their relationship with capitals. 
Korean media industries have strived to consolidate their ideological basis, to 
enlarge their sphere of influence and to increase their economic power. To this end, they 
produced and reproduced symbols and discourses which they disseminated. Often, they 
did no more than conveying and amplifying the discourses of the political, social and 
economic players so that they could reach the general public. At times, however, when 
their own ideological or political stance was at risk, the media industries assumed a task 
which was more than that of dispassionate communication channels. Indeed, they 
sometimes initiated the creation of a new discourse and called for the government to 
accept it. 
Of course, this does not mean that all the discourses of the time had only negative 
aspects. If some of them were adequately promoted, the resulting discourse could have 
enriched the life of the public and upgraded the standards of corporate management and 
political culture. In the case of `Globalisation', however, its negative aspects were 
amplified, as it emphasised solely deregulation and market opening without making any 
serious efforts for reform. Most of the press were enthusiastic about the growing market, 
but not in reform. 
The evolution of ruling discourses toward furthering vested interests was possible 
due to the solidification of the government-chaebol-press alliance and the weakness of 
countervailing powers. Labour unions were yet to grow as a political power, and influential 
civil organisations tended to favour neo-liberal reform policies. In the case of the media, 
major newspapers offered an unrivalled sphere of activity for neo-liberalists, as civic media 
and social market sectors remained underdeveloped. In this way, neo-liberalism came to 
establish itself as the mainstream in the Korean society. 
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A 
Corporate Failures and the Press: Two Case Studies 
Introduction 
The Triangle of Policy Community 
After having surveyed the process through which public policy decisions were made 
in the US, Peters pointed out that `elected political representatives, civil servants, and 
pressure or policy groups' form the `iron triangles of policy communities' (Peters 1986). 
However, this may not be applicable to the process through which economic policies and, 
in particular, chaebol and industrial policies are decided in Korea. 
First of all, `Elected political representatives' and `civil servants' in countries with a 
relatively short history of democracy, unlike in Western countries where the tradition of 
bureaucracy is firmly in place, act like a body in the policy communities. Until very 
recently, the Korean political system was, with some degree of cynicism, described as 
having the `kingly President'. In other words, the Executive headed by the President 
wielded a great deal of power. As a result, political parties and the National Assembly 
were largely left out of the `policy community'. Policy decisions were taken at the 
initiative of the `government', that is, the ruling factions and the Executives. 
Citizen groups in Korea have only very recently begun to emerge as pressure or 
policy groups. It is probably with the formation of the Citizen's Coalition for Economic 
Justice in 1989 that citizen groups have begun to show active interests in chaebol and 
industrial policies. Full-scale involvement of citizen groups in these issues did not start 
until the launch of the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy in 1994. These 
citizen groups' efforts bore some fruits. Introduction of `class action' is an important 
example. However it happened only in 2002 and some key stipulations were suspended. In 
addition, policy groups have had very little influence. Apart from research institutes 
funded by the government or by the chaebol, most policy groups kept a low profile. They 
played a passive role, responding to the invitations of newspapers to contribute opinions. 
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Even then, the opinions of progressive and offbeat scholars were often ignored. 
On the other hand, the chaebol themselves had a non-negligible influence in the 
formation of policies concerning the chaebol and industry. Exactly how the chaebol 
exerted their influence will be the topic of this chapter. It will be argued that the chaebol 
have been not only the target of these policies but also the decision makers of the same 
policies. 
Controversies surrounding policies about the chaebol or industry often take the form 
of propaganda warfare. Public opinions form the basis of policy making in a democratic 
society. However, not infrequently, public opinions are in fact the opinions of the media or 
of the elite. The media will no doubt cooperate or contest with the government or the 
chaebol depending on their stance and on the issues. The government and the media, it 
would seem, have no immediate vested interest in policies about the chaebol. One could 
therefore expect that they would maintain impartial views taking account of the interests 
of the public. If they do have different views, that is because they have different criteria 
for their judgment. In other words, the government seeks the voters' support whereas the 
media would seek the support of the audience or the readers. The opinions of voters may 
not necessarily be the same as the opinions of the readers. 
Different newspapers have different readers. Moreover, the media would not only 
need the readers' support; they also need the support of the chaebol who are the major 
sources of advertisement revenue for the media. The growing trend of reader-driven or 
market-driven news reports can seriously distort government policies. There are many 
other factors which determine the stance of newspapers or the broadcast media. The media 
are not a mirror which merely reflects the economic reality. The media should be regarded 
as a member of the `policy community', which has a certain amount of power to shape the 
policy direction in accordance with its stance. 
Broadly speaking, the press can have an effect on policy decisions by influencing 
public opinion, which will have an impact on election. It is a long-drawn process of 
feedback. In reality, however, a mere expectation that a news report would have a negative 
effect on the upcoming election can have enough power to alter the government's policy 
decisions. Furthermore, many senior journalists specialising in economic matters are 
members of various committees dealing with economic policies such as the Industrial 
Policy Review Committee or the Committee for Review and Development of Taxation. 
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They can therefore have an immediate impact on policy decisions. 
That the press is in a position to influence policy formation or policy change is 
corroborated by numerous episodes involving economic journalists and policy makers. In 
the seminar on economic news reporting83 mentioned in chapter 1, Lee Janggyu, then 
Economic Editor at JoongAng, said, "People may possibly be interested in news reports on 
crimes or politics; but news reports on economic matters have the greatest power to 
influence the government's policy decisions". Song Daehee, formerly an adviser to the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy, concurred, `Policy makers have no choice but to be 
sensitive to the criticism of the press' (Song 2000: 51). 
In short, the triangles of policy communities for matters concerning the chaebol are 
usually composed of the government, the chaebol and the press. It is a triangular, rather 
than linear, relationship because each party influences and is influenced by the remaining 
two parties. All three of them thus contribute to the formation of policies. Depending on 
the case, however, the triangular relationship will not occur when the chaebol or the press 
is not intimately involved in the process of the matter. However, sometimes, the 
relationship of the chaebol and the government or that of the chaebol and the press plays a 
more important role, while the remaining party merely plays a supporting role. 
Along the road to the economic crisis of 1997, the chaebol and the government made 
a number of policy decisions. As we have seen in chapter 2, however, there is no 
consensus as to the causes of the economic crisis. It is thus not easy to say exactly which 
decisions led to the economic crisis. In this chapter, we shall examine some of the 
decisions for which the chaebol should take the responsibility: Samsung's entry to car 
industry, Kia Motors' bankruptcy, Hanbo's reckless decisions to expand its operations, 
Hyundai's decision to enter into politics and expand its operations. The case of Hanbo and 
that of Hyundai have different backgrounds. However, they both raised the question of 
internal democracy within the organisation and attempted to enter into the steel industry. 
So these two cases will be discussed together. The role of the government and the press 
must also be investigated. For this purpose, we shall begin by looking at the factors that 
determine the stance of the press in its news reports about the chaebol. 
The seminar regarding 'Economic News and Economic Reality' was held by the Korea University and 
Samsung Press Foundation on 31 October 1996. 
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The Chaebol, Communication and Democracy 
What are the social and political implications of the chaebol in the process of 
democratisation of Korea? The chaebol have half a century of history starting from the 
industrialisation of Korea. 84 Until recently, however, scholars have paid little or no 
attention to the chaebol other than to their economic and managerial aspects. Academic 
works on the chaebol concentrated themselves on the ownership structure, management 
and efficiency of the chaebol. 
The wider implications of the chaebol in the social and political context of Korea 
began to be studied mainly by younger scholars after the `Civil struggle for 
democratisation' of 1987. The powerful movement of civil disobedience against the 
military dictatorship brought about the democratisation of political processes. However, 
that did not guarantee widespread democratisation in other aspects of the society. It was 
not a mere coincidence that progressive academic organisations such as the Korea Social 
& Economic Studies Association, the Community for Korean Political Studies, and the 
Korean Society & Korean Press Research Group began to mushroom at about that time. 
As their names suggest, these organisations were focused on the study of Korea and 
Korean society. 
In the following year, these organisations formed the Korea Progressive Academy 
Council with the aim of conducting inter-disciplinary studies to achieve `real' democracy 
in all aspects of Korean society. In 1996, nearing the onslaught of the currency crisis of 
1997, the Academy Council held a symposium entitled, `Control Mechanism in Korean 
Society - the Chaebol and the Press' with the participation of 17 member organisations. 
The tenet of the symposium was that the chaebol and the press are at the core of the 
problems facing the Korean society. The participants of the symposium accordingly 
proposed reform measures aimed at the chaebol and the press. However, the 11 out of 13 
articles85 presented in the symposium dealt with the chaebol and the press as if these two 
94 
Some scholars distinguish the chaebol into a few types chronologically. According to Lee Jaehee, until 
1950, the chaebol were mainly commercial enterprises; in the 60's and 70's, they were industrial 
enterprises; and since the 80's, they are monopolistic entities (Lee, J. 1999: 39). 
In a brief general introduction, Lee Sanghee remarked that the ownership structure of the press is at the 
heart of the problem of the control system of Korean society' (Lee, S. 1996: 22). Hong and Gong claimed 
that the problem of chaebol system must be understood not only in terms of economic fairness and 
efficiency but also from the stand point of democracy and the public nature of civil society' (Hong and 
Gong 1996: 28-39). 
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were separate topics. These articles therefore did not fully bring out the merits of an 
interdisciplinary study apart from the fact that they were presented together on one 
occasion. They did not thoroughly explore how the chaebol and the press are intertwined 
in their corporate control and management structure, how they cooperate to maintain their 
control and to `manipulate' public opinions to the detriment of democracy in Korea. 
Although the scholarly attempt was not entirely successful, it nevertheless did have a 
news value. However, the new attempt was completely neglected by the mainstream press. 
If the awareness of offbeat scholars about a certain problem was to have any impact, their 
views must be communicated to the public. Yet the press failed to do so. None of the 
papers, except Hankyoreh (21 Oct. 1996; 4 Nov. 1996), even mentioned the symposium. 
There lacked a healthy forum for discussion out of which public opinions could emerge. 
As we have reviewed in chapter 1, Habermas' observation of the communication 
structure of the public sphere and the `public service' or `democratic' media models can 
provide an explanation for why important topics about the chaebol could not become 
public agenda before the visitation of the financial crisis. The press abandoned its role and 
failed to convey the voices of civil-social periphery to the larger public and to the political 
centre. Instead, these topics remained no more than obscure problems raised by 
progressive scholars within the academic circle. 
All this while, as discussed earlier, the chaebol reinforced their consolidation in the 
face of the retreat of the state. The chaebol's control of the society increased as a result. 
Subordination of politics inevitably followed. The market-centred approach which was 
proposed as an alternative to the strategy of developmental state by main-stream neo- 
liberal economists turned out to provide an argument for the chaebol's transformation. The 
chaebol grew under the protective environment of developmental state. When they had 
sufficiently grown in size, they started to disfavour state intervention. They were looking 
for an argument which could be used against state intervention. To an extent, the market- 
centred approach did have positive results as it removed extreme cases of unlawful and 
unfair dealings, which had been practised when there were no rules at all. The rules of the 
market introduced some degree of orderliness to the economy. However, when the market 
was dominated by gigantic chaebol, the self-correcting mechanism of the market, 
supposedly at work thanks to the `invisible hand', turned out to be powerless. The 
pressure for reform which might have come from outside the market was not likely to be 
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significant when subordination of politics to the logic of economy continued. Using their 
economic power, the chaebol shrewdly controlled the press and politicians. They even 
own the press or enter into politics. The chaebol are not merely economic entities 
responsible for production and provision of goods and services. They are one of the ruling 
groups in Korean society. 
In terms of Habermas' communication theory, the chaebol in Korea form part of the 
`system' as opposed to `life-world'. According to his theory of communicative action, 
which we reviewed in chapter 1, the `system' is a realm where money and power, rather 
than language, are the means of communication (Habermas 1981: 476). In Korea, where 
the balance of power within the ruling groups is tipped in favour of economic entities such 
as the chaebol rather than political entities, one may entertain a hypothesis that money is 
the decisive means of communication within the `system'. The chaebol have direct control 
of the means of communication by outright ownership of media companies. They 
indirectly influence the press by their decision about where to place their advertisement. 
The life-world, according to Habermas, is a `transcendental site' where autonomous 
human beings `can reciprocally raise claims', `criticise', `settle their disagreement and 
arrive at agreement' (Habermas 1987: 126). However, as the life-world tends to be 
colonised by the system world, individuals are subject to oppressive communication 
mechanism (Habermas 1987: 301-373). The chaebol can be studied as forming part of 
such a communication mechanism. If internal democracy of a chaebol is undermined by 
its oppressive communication mechanism, their employees' day-to-day life will be 
adversely affected. Furthermore, the wrong decisions made by the oppressive 
communication mechanism may give pain to the national economy and the whole society. 
The Chaebol and the Press : Unfair Tug-of-war 
The Chaebol as News Sources 
As pointed out in chapter 1, news-reporting organisations maintain a close 
relationship with their environment. When they find suitable items in their environment, 
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they process and deliver them as news. In return, they receive material resources for their 
survival. The problem posed by the chaebol is that they are not only news sources but also 
the providers of financial resources for the media. More significantly, they are `very 
important' news sources as well as `oligopolistic' providers of financial resources in 
Korea. 
In a capitalist society, it is perhaps inevitable that industrialists are important news 
sources. However, the chaebol in Korea have some special features. One of the chaebol, 
for example, has dozens of companies, each of which is a news source, and thus their 
products cover the whole range of consumer's pages. Every detail of the chairman of the 
group and his business decision receive the spotlight of the news coverage. Scenes of 
violent strikes in their work places become photo sources of newspapers. When a 
chairman decides to enter into politics, political correspondents will follow him. When a 
chairman is involved in a corruption scandal, social affairs correspondents will follow him. 
The chaebol have an even stronger control of financial resources for the media. The 
newspaper companies have a very weak financial position and they are overly reliant on 
advertisement revenue. Also, a substantial portion of their advertisement revenue comes 
from the chaebol. Although both the press and the chaebol are influential institutions in 
Korea, the chaebol do have a considerable control over the press because of their financial 
power. This is the starting point of the unhealthy relationship between them. 
In the case of Britain, the Royal Commission on the Press indicates that until the mid 
70's, advertisers' influence on the media was not significant (RCP 1949; 1962; 1977). 
However, scholars such as Curran have shown that since the late 70's, newspapers have 
been increasingly under the influence of advertisers (Curran 1978). Curran's subsequent 
works uncovered that the media would respond to the demands of advertisers `in the ways 
they have sought to maximize revenue' (Curran 1986: 333). 
The efforts of the press in Korea to maximise revenue brought about new formats for 
reporting economic affairs in the 90's. Special reports appeared which were designed to 
solicit placement of advertisements. These reports can be described as `news reports in the 
nature of advertisement'. These reports have introduced products that would attract a great 
deal of advertisements which are placed at the bottom of the page or on the opposite page 
to where the reports appear. Some of these reports may run on several consecutive pages. 
There appeared weekly specials on cars, electrical appliances, financial products, real 
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estate, department stores, credit cards, weddings, jewellery, franchise stores, and so forth. 
Not to mention JoongAng, Chosun and DongA, but even the progressive Hankyoreh 
would feature the annual (which became biannual in recent years) special coverage on 
`Big Hits' where the newspaper purports to select the most successful products for the 
benefit of the readers. The real purpose of this coverage is to solicit placement of 
advertisements. In preparing these reports, newspaper companies use information and 
sources `manufactured' and provided by public relations departments of the chaebol. The 
contents of these reports, of course, reflect the intentions of news sources. 
On the other hand, the `Sponsor's Section' which appeared first in JoongAng should 
be understood as `news report on order' or `advertisement in the form of news report' in 
that the wishes of advertisers are directly reflected in the report. Even though these reports 
are nothing more than advertisement, most consumers are not aware of such disguise. 
Whether it is `news report in the nature of advertisement' or `advertisement in the form of 
news report', these kinds of articles rarely expose shortcomings of the products or offer an 
impartial comparison of prices of comparable products. They are basically misleading the 
readers. This is due to the fact that the news source is also the source of financial 
resources of the press. 
An even greater problem is that, along with these special reports on consumer 
products, daily reports on economic affairs are very much influenced by the chaebol who 
are the news source. As discussed in chapter 1, many factors contribute to the selection 
and treatment of news. Gans observed that the news report is `the exercise of power over 
the interpretation of reality' and that its contents are determined in the course of a tug-of- 
war among news sources, journalists and audience (Gans 1980: 81). The power of the 
chaebol as the news source flows from the mere fact that they are the main source of 
economic news. For journalists who always have to look for news items, the chaebol are 
`reliable and stable' sources of news. In return, the chaebol gain a privileged access to 
news media. 
When the relationship between journalists and the news source becomes too close, it 
may degenerate into a collusive connection. Many journalists appear to regard it as more 
or less inevitable that their relationship with the news source borders on a collusive 
connection. Many scholars and journalists have already pointed out that economic news 
reporting is overly reliant on news sources (Kim et al. 1977; Underwood 1993; Lee, J. 
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1997). Economic editors also recognise this. In the seminar on economic news reporting, 
Kim Younghan, who was the Economic Editor at Kookmin, said: 
Compared to social affairs reporting or to political affairs reporting, economic 
affairs reporting relies more on the governmental sources and on corporate 
sources. As a result, economic news reporting tends to be less critical. In recent 
years in particular, the chaebol have grown very powerful and the press has 
become less critical of them (Samsung Press Foundation 1998: 104). 
`Asymmetric information theory' offers an explanation as to why an institution or an 
individual who has more information has more power (e. g. Mishkin 1991). As one of the 
most important news sources and the provider of financial resources for the press, the 
chaebol have a considerable power. They use their superior power to `spin', `sex up' or 
`tone down' news reports to their liking. Manning mentioned that the increased power of 
`spin doctors, advisors and image consultants' in political discourse is likely to pose a 
threat to public sphere (Manning 2001: 10). However, their power is perhaps more 
palpable in business-related news. 
In fact, the chaebol in Korea have public relations department for each of their 
affiliated companies. On top of this, they have the group-wide public relations 
`headquarters' reporting directly to the chairman of the group as a whole. The public 
relations `headquarters' of the chaebol such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG are headed by 
the chaebol's top ranking employees who have dozens of support staff. Placement in the 
public relations `headquarters' is considered to be an `elite track'. Employees in that 
department are promoted faster than others. These public relations employees of the 
chaebol have a great deal of influence over the press. They command the most important 
sources of advertising revenue and news items for the press. They are well connected to 
journalists through personal networks, and they have a deep corporate pocket from which 
they can draw when it is appropriate to offer journalists money in the name of chonji. 86 
96 The literal meaning of chonji is `a little token of one's gratitude', but in practice it means something 
between gift and bribe. Such practice is so widespread among journalists that the Korean dictionary adds 
the explanation that chonji is often offered to teacher or journalist (Standard Korean Dictionary, 1999). 
Thanks to Hankyoreh's campaign against it, chonji appears to be reduced in terms of frequency, but not to 
be eradicated. A survey of journalists conducted in 1995 shows that 73.6% of journalists who responded 
to the survey have received chonji (Korea Press Research Institute 1995: 92). 
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The PR staffs of the chaebol are in daily contact with a `party of reporters'. A `party 
of reporters' is a unique feature of the Korean press which is maintained because it meets 
the needs of the news source and the press. This practice facilitates news source's 
lobbying and public relations efforts. In the past, `parties of reporters' were exclusive 
groups of news reporters from nationwide newspapers and broadcasting companies who 
shared an office freely provided by the news source. They were `in residence' at the news 
source, usually receiving free meals as well as requests for dissemination of news released 
by the news source. In the past it often played the role of a `clearing house' for chonji 
offered by the news source to the press. It can turn into a ring of corruption and collusion 
between the press and the news source. The chaebol sometimes offer free holidays to their 
`parties of reporters' under the pretext of providing an opportunity to report the news of 
their overseas plants. 
Because of such a close or collusive relationship between news reporters and the 
news sources, news reporters came to depend on news releases provided by the news 
sources. Their news report tends to be identical and it is hard to expect them to investigate 
potential problems of the news source. 
As the newspapers became thicker in the 90's with increased numbers of pages, the 
influence of the chaebol as news sources increased decisively. Several statistical studies 
show that the proportion of advertising sharply increased as the newspapers accumulated 
more pages (Journalists Association Newsletter, 13 May 1995; Lee G. 1996). The 
competition to get more advertising did considerable damage to the independence of 
news-rooms. Most newspaper companies began to put pressure on their employees to 
boost subscriptions, often by encouraging their friends and relatives to make subscription 
applications. In some companies, there sometimes appeared a practice of offering a 
portion of the advertising revenue as a rebate to the journalist who secures a placement for 
advertisement. Research into Korean journalists' reporting behaviour shows that 89.5% of 
journalists employed by newspaper companies of nationwide circulation have been asked 
at least once by their employer to solicit subscriptions or to secure placement of 
advertisements (Kim and Kim 1999: 67). This is an important development in that it could 
create cracks in the `fire wall' between news-rooms and sale departments. 
PR staffs' decisions to place or not to place their advertisement come to be perceived 
as a more powerful and effective means of influencing the contents of news reports than 
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the chonji which are handed directly to journalists. Journalists who receive chonji from a 
source may nevertheless write an article which may be critical of the source. However, it 
may be far more difficult to be critical about an advertiser. An implicit message from the 
management and the editorial staff is often conveyed to the journalist regarding an article 
about the advertiser. In fact, the research cited above shows that 36.8% of news sources 
agreed that `chonji and entertainment had a significant effect on contents of news articles' 
whereas a much higher proportion (71.9%) replied that `it is possible to influence the 
contents of news articles through placement decision of advertisements' (Kim and Kim 
1999: 77-78). 
PR staffs of the chaebol are particularly sensitive to news articles which may contain 
negative reports about their chairmen. If the first edition of copies which are despatched to 
provinces in the evening for delivery in the following morning should contain such an 
article, the PR staffs would make every possible effort to remove or water down the article, 
or change the title at least, for the following edition to be delivered in Seoul and nearby 
areas, which are all important for them. This unique practice that PR staffs thoroughly 
screen first-edition newspapers plays the role of gatekeeper especially regarding chaebol- 
related bad news. The following remark of a PR staff of a chaebol shows the degree of his 
confidence in controlling contents of news articles: "If we notice it by 8: 00 pm, we can 
certainly remove it" (Media Oneul, 15 May 1996). 
Indeed, it is more than likely that the chaebol have a network of informants within 
the press. The leak of inside information has become a serious problem with the 
introduction of computerised typesetting systems (CTS), which make the contents of news 
items accessible to the management or to the advertising department while the items are 
still in the briefed information, a draft stage, or being edited. Many economic editors 
disclosed in informal talks with the present researcher that they had been contacted by PR 
staffs of the chaebol regarding news articles which were damaging to their chairmen or 
their family members even before the first edition was out. 87 One economic editor said: 
87 
Employees of the advertising department or the management appear to hand over 
the information about news articles in order to strengthen their ties with the 
These remarks were made in informal talks during three day long seminars mentioned earlier. As the 
seminars were held for economic editorial writers (October 1996) and economic editors (May 1998), the 
present researcher also attended the two seminars as the person concerned at that time. 
126 
chaebol. It is even possible that some members of the editorial staffs may also be 
doing the same thing. They are exchanging information with the chaebol because 
it has some advantages for both sides (personal communication, 31 Oct. 1996). 
Another economic editor confided that: 
An executive director responsible for public relations of a chaebol requested that a 
particular article be removed saying that "If our advertisement and a news article 
critical about us should appear in the same newspaper on the same day, I will be in 
trouble". He made it rather clear that "If you cannot remove the news article, we 
would have to remove the advertisement". I had no choice but to remove the news 
article (personal communication, 7 May 1998). 
When it is evident that negative news coverage is going to appear soon, the public 
relations department concerned would set the goal of minimising the impact of the news 
coverage. Their staff would conduct carefully organised lobbying and publicity stunts. A 
confidential document" leaked from inside the SK Group89 shows how it controls the 
contents of a news article, `persuades' the journalists concerned and uses its advertising 
decisions. The document is entitled, `PR Plan for the Media Regarding Shareholders' 
General Meeting'. The document was prepared in response to an intelligence that a 
number of professors, lawyers and accountants from the People's Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy were to attend the shareholders' general meetings of SK 
Telecom and Samsung Electronics to uncover and denounce illegal dealings of the owners 
of these companies. 
The two companies were accused of allegedly defrauding the companies' money, 
tens of millions of dollars respectively, through a complex scheme of transactions between 
sister companies and gifts to family members. The owner families' dubious dealings 
triggered off the minority shareholders' movement in Korea. The confidential document 
sets out three stages of publicity measures to be taken: 
88 
89 
The present researcher secured the document from a deep throat of SK group in March 1998. 
SK is a market leader in telecommunication and petro-chemical products. Its chairman Choi Jonghyun 
was also the chairman of Federation of Korean Industries at that time. 
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1) Before the shareholders' general meeting, indirect measures should be taken to 
disperse the attention of the public and the negative aspect of minority 
shareholders' movement must be emphasised in order to promote favourable 
opinions for the company; 2) On the day of the shareholders' general meeting 
itself, positive news reports about the company should be released in order to 
attract the attention of the public away from the negative publicity efforts of 
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy; 3) After the shareholders' 
general meeting, public relations efforts should be focused on presenting a 
favourable image of the group in order to change the opinions and attention of the 
public (a confidential document of SK Group, Mar. 1998). 
To implement these plans, the document continues, a press release entitled 'SK to 
enhance transparency of its management' will be distributed, charity events such `Help the 
Orphans' and `Blood Donation' will be launched and advertisements will be placed 
emphasising SK's philanthropic programs. The document further states that `the president 
himself together with the executives must come into contact with the head of the editorial 
department, duty editors and journalists to persuade them'. The document also 
recommends the company `to induce those opinion leaders who are favourably disposed to 
the company to contribute articles to newspapers'. The document includes a plan `to 
contribute articles to readers' opinions sections of Chosun and Hankook to make use of 
people's negative views against foreign capitals'. This is because the activists of the 
minority shareholders' movement have secured proxies from foreign shareholders to 
attend the shareholders' general meeting. SK therefore plans to present the situation as 
`domestic management under threat from foreigner capitals'. The document shows how 
the news source attempts to manipulate `public opinion' in the format of two-way 
communications. 
The document did not remain dormant. The action plans were carried out by all 
component companies of SK group. 65 companies including SK Telecom and Samsung 
Electronics held their shareholders' general meeting on the same day, 27 March 1998. 
Several chaebol appear to have been in communication with SK and timed their 
component companies' shareholders' general meeting to disperse activists and news 
reporters. The document mentions the need to `closely manage' reporters. In this context, 
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`close management' suggests presentation of chonji. The document also mentions `the 
need to manage the group's advertising'. In fact, nearing the shareholders' general 
meeting, the SK group's advertisements appeared in large quantities in all the newspapers. 
Constraints of Chaebol-related Reports 
There are several factors which contribute to hamper the Korean press from 
reporting chaebol-related news in a proper manner. The usual symptoms of the press left 
to the free market mechanism can certainly be found in Korea in an aggravated state. 
There are also other problems which are unique to the Korean press. Several of them stem 
from the power and advantages of the chaebol as the source of news and of financial 
resources for the press. 
First, as noted in chapter 3, the overwhelming majority of journalists and columnists 
in Korea have neo-liberalist leanings. They look upon the chaebol as the winner of market 
competition. Even when they recognise problems posed by the chaebol, they take a lenient 
view that those problems can gradually be addressed through an improved and better 
functioning market. They hold a conviction that `a better company is the one which makes 
more money and offers better products'. They turn a blind eye to unfair trade practices and 
the ills of monopolistic or oligopolistic control of the market by the chaebol. This stance 
can become the `practical consciousness' mentioned by Williams (Williams 1977: 5571). 
In consequence, they do not even realise that the judgment they express in their articles is 
made from a particular ideological standpoint. As they hold a conviction that their point of 
view is a matter of common sense, their views are unlikely to change. The chaebol-related 
reporting is not going to change either. 
Second, the unique ownership structure of newspaper companies in Korea poses 
another problem. As explained in chapter 2,16 out of 28 newspapers including 4 
economic dailies and 2 English dailies, had nationwide circulation (as of 1996). Out of 
those 16 newspapers, 8 were owned by the chaebol or their affiliated companies. Many of 
local newspapers were also owned by the chaebol or influential construction companies in 
the region. Furthermore, newspapers that are not owned by the chaebol are often owned 
and run by family members of the founder who have up to 99% of the shares. In some 
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cases, the owner also makes editorial decisions as the publisher. This is in striking contrast 
with newspapers of worldwide reputation which are either listed on a stock market (New 
York Times, Washington Post), owned by individuals who do not control the management 
(The Guardian, Le Figaro), non-profit corporations (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), or 
partly owned by employees (Le Monde, Information, Asahi, Yomiuri). Unlike these 
newspaper companies, the Korean press has little or no institutional safeguard against the 
owner's interference with editorial decisions. 
According to Lee Sanghee, `when the ownership of a newspaper is concentrated on 
an individual, there cannot be separation of ownership, management and editorial 
decisions. In fact, the editorial power will effectively be in the hands of proprietors. Their 
political values and outlook will directly be reflected in the newspapers' (Lee, S. 1996: 
21). In particular, the chaebol have used newspaper companies owned by their affiliated 
companies to provide protection for the mother companies by covering up their 
questionable dealings. The chaebol have also used newspaper companies to build up 
public opinions for lobbying purposes. 
In Korea, the press is recognised as `almost omnipotent institutions of power'. Even 
though newspaper companies cannot claim any democratic credentials, their owners as 
heads of these institutions wield considerable power. Additionally, many honours are 
showered upon them. Many studies show that the reasons for owning a newspaper 
company in Korea are not simply to make money. The owners aim to share the power of 
the press (Won 1998: 76; Park 2000). A survey of Korean journalists was conducted to 
ask them to choose one or more of the suggested reasons why big corporations are trying 
to own a newspaper company. `To secure the power of the press' was the answer chosen 
by 57.3% of the respondents. Other reasons included `To obtain a means of public 
relations for the company' (19.9%) and `To process and manage information' (13.4%) 
(Kim and Kim 1999: 69). Segye90 and Kookmin are owned and issued by unorthodox 
Christian denominations. Each year, they incur huge loss, which is met by donations from 
many devotees. 
The ownership structure of newspaper companies can explain why newspapers 
rarely contain articles critical of the chaebol. Little needs to be said about newspapers 
90 The paper is owned by Unification Church founded by Moon Sunmyung. It is a sister paper of The 
Washington Times. Before the economic crisis of 1997, Unification Church was a small-sized chaebol in 
Korea, having about 10 affiliates. 
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owned by the chaebol themselves, yet owners of other newspapers are also reluctant to 
find themselves in an awkward situation with the chaebol. When the newspaper's 
ownership is concentrated on a few individuals, they are more likely to interfere with the 
editorial decisions and profit maximisation becomes their overriding objective. The 
problem is that the influence of capital is growing inexorably each year. 
When asked to single out `the group or entities that have the greatest influence on 
the reporting behaviour', 39.6% of journalists in a survey in 1991 pointed their fingers at 
the capital (owner, management and advertisers). In 1993,50.1% of journalists thought so 
(Yang 1995: 130). In 1997, a survey on 602 reporters shows that the proportion was 
increased to 62.8%y1 (Korea Journalists Association 1997). A study conducted in 2002 by 
a weekly newspaper for media critique reveals that 67.2% of journalists responded that 
they are `under the pressure from the owner and the management' (Media Oneul, 16 May 
2002). To a considerable degree, pressure from the owner and the management originates 
from advertisers. 
Third, newspaper companies' weak financial position hampers them from 
undertaking investigative reporting and criticism of the chaebol. According to the annual 
accounting report of 1996, which was one year before the economic crisis of Korea, few 
newspaper companies were making profits. Kyunghyang, Moonhwa and Segye, which 
were owned by the chaebol, were suffering from impaired capital. Seoul Kyungjae 
(Economic Daily) had debt amounting to 9,700% of its assets. Hankook's debt was 
1,563% of its assets. The attraction of the `power of the press' is the reason these 
companies continue their operation. Their power also supports their existence in that they 
can continue to secure loans from banks. Banks are forced to extend loans to them because 
the banks themselves have many questionable dealings relating to loans, which they do 
not wish to be reported. 
The symbiosis between banks and newspaper companies forms one side of a 
symbiotic triangle of the press, banks and the chaebol. As we shall examine in more detail 
in chapter 5, the close connection between banks and the chaebol turned out to be an 
important factor in bringing about the economic crisis as the relationship degenerated into 
a mutually consumptive dependence while the warning mechanism of the press remained 
91 The percentage (62.8%) was calculated from 5I. 3% chose `owners and the management' and 11.5% 
chose `advertisers' as the most influential group. 
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defective and inactive. If the market is not dominated by the chaebol and if the newspaper 
companies' financial position is healthier, the chaebol and the press could maintain a 
healthy relationship where each one carries out its proper roles. 
The excessive competition among newspaper companies began after the `Civil 
struggle for democratisation' of 1987 which removed restriction on setting up of 
newspaper companies. The technological advancement in newspaper production that 
occurred with the introduction of the computerised typesetting system also intensified the 
competition as it became possible to set up a newspaper company with a relatively small 
amount of capital. Initially, the situation appeared to be a gospel as minority groups' 
voices could have an opportunity to be heard. 
However, as the new technology `has not reinvigorated popular publishing through 
the new, minority papers' in Britain (Curran and Seaton 1997: 293), it did not break the 
oligopolistic market control of major newspaper companies in Korea. The mushrooming 
new, minority papers mostly failed to diversify the media market. Contrary to the 
convictions of advocates of the free market, dramatic increase in the number of newspaper 
companies led to excessive competition which in turn brought about weakening of 
newspaper companies' financial position. Because of their weak financial position, 
newspaper companies came to depend even more on the financial resources of the chaebol. 
The end result was that freedom of the press was diminished. It was yet another example 
of market failure. The retreat of freedom of the press meant that the chaebol became even 
freer from valid criticism. 
Fourth, because of excessive competition among newspaper companies, more copies 
began to be printed and newspapers became thicker. As a result, articles with soft contents 
were booming, which consequently diminished articles critical of the chaebol. As for the 
number of copies, Won Yongjin has shown that, as of 1996, the total number of copies 
printed daily by 110 newspapers was in the region of 17 million. However, about 3 million 
copies weighing 450 tons were immediately recycled as used paper (Won 1998: 73). The 
reason for this bizarre practice of wasting is that newspaper companies are under a great 
pressure to print more copies in order to secure advertisement. As mentioned in chapter 2, 
newspaper companies are overly dependent on advertising revenue. In order to survive, 
they print more copies than the demand of the market. The surplus copies are delivered 
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free of charge to households even against their wishes. 92 The rest is recycled. 
93 
Dire competition among newspapers led to excessive promotional events. As a result, 
some papers are derided as `bicycle paper' and `bidet paper'. That is because in an effort 
to boost subscriptions, some newspaper companies offered a bicycle or a bidet to first- 
time subscribers who sign a contract of subscription for one year. As the situation got 
worse, Britannica Book of the Year (2004) took the case of Korea `to illustrate the level of 
the gimmickry involved with newspaper subscriptions' in the world: `a South Korean 
government commission found that more than 75% of subscription offers since 2000 had 
come with a discount or gift' (2004: 242). 
Excessive promotional events put financial pressure on all newspaper companies. 
Such a market condition was fatal to new entrants to the market. Smaller papers with weak 
financial resources could not compete and their circulation shrunk. This led to diminished 
revenue from advertising, which was their main source of income. Competition among 
newspapers also made newspapers thicker. In 1987, newspapers had, on average, 12 pages 
per day (72 pages per week). In 1996, the number of pages increased to about 50 pages per 
day on average (up to 320 pages per week). 
The newly added pages were filled with `soft' articles. Economic news articles in 
particular were dramatically increased. In the case of major papers, the daily economy 
section of 6-8 pages (as of 1998) was accompanied by frequent special reports on 
economic affairs. These special reports dealt with real estate, stock market investment, 
new products, consumption, gossips about corporate executives and interviews with 
prominent businessmen. Most of them were `lucrative' or `moving stories'. 
Macroeconomic analyses of economic cycles were regarded as `too difficult' and therefore 
were treated as having a secondary importance. According to a weekly for media critique, 
`it became more and more difficult to find articles which uncover dubious dealings of the 
chaebol' (Media Oneul, 21 Nov. 2002). Ironically, the quantitative increase of economic 
news led to a diminution of articles critical of the chaebol. JoongAng, which took the 
initiative in increasing the number of pages for the economy section, was received by 
9' It is not uncommon that three or four different papers were freely delivered to a household. Stopping the 
delivery of free paper was extremely hard due to the persistent marketing efforts of the distribution agents 
for each newspaper company. 
93 According to the records of Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) released on 16 October 2003, free copies 
account for about 33-35% of all printed copies including those of Chosun, JoongAng and DongA. 
1,33 
readers as `the newspaper which has the best economy section'. 
94 JoongAng, a sister 
company of Samsung, is strongly in favour of the chaebol and it hardly ever even 
mentions the very word `chaebol' because of the negative connotations of the word in 
Korean. 
Fifth, robust criticism against the chaebol is hampered by the attitude of journalists 
due to the lack of professional autonomy. We have so far examined structural restraints on 
chaebol-related news reporting. However, there are also restraints stemming from 
journalists themselves. When journalists feel that their autonomy is undermined, they 
could make an attempt to regain their professional autonomy. Nevertheless, the attitude of 
major papers' journalists, which emerged from personal communication and interviews 
with them, shows that although they do have a degree of professionalism, they are cynical 
about their autonomy. A senior reporter of Chosun lamented: 
Although I can stick my nose up in the air as a reporter of a major newspaper 
while I am in the company to which I am assigned, I am a mere pawn in the chess 
board when I am back in my own company. If just a list of personnel changes is 
attached on our company's bulletin board, I can be posted to the sales department 
or advertisement department the next day. What about autonomy? (personal 
communication, May 1998) 
A junior reporter of DongA said: 
Once you are caught going against the wishes of the owner of the company, you 
are done. The owner will be there for ever generation after generation. Please do 
not expect me to go against him. Rather, I would write stuffs which I know would 
please him. Do not expect me to be a hero. I am a wage-earner, no more, no less 
(interview, 20 Feb. 2003). 
A junior economic reporter of JoongAng complained: 
94 In a paper read at the seminar mentioned in chapter 1, Kim Kyun (media scholar) stated that `newspaper 
A was chosen by 80% of the respondents of our survey as having the best economics coverage'. In a 
private conversation with the present researcher, he confirmed that `newspaper A' was JoongAng (personal 
communication, 8 May 1998) 
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If I propose in our department's editorial meeting something no more radical than 
an article on the widening gap between the rich and the poor, for example, the 
response would be, `Where have you been wandering lately? Could you not find 
anything better to write about? ' They would think that I am simply a `has-been'. 
Do you want me to propose an article which is critical about the chaebol? 
(interview, 20 Feb. 2003) 
As Weaver and Wilhoit (1991: 163) have observed, journalists' lack of autonomy 
appears to be all the more serious in the largest news organizations. Korea is not an 
unusual case. JoongAng is well known for its ruthlessly competitive environment for its 
journalists. Computerised text processing has made it possible to compare even the 
number of words each journalist has written. Several papers have a policy of posting able 
and competent reporters to the secretariat of the owner for a brief period. The company 
expects them to familiarise themselves with the owner and the management. On the other 
hand, those journalists who have gone against the grain can sometimes be posted to harder 
and tougher departments. They are thus invited, in an indirect manner, to resign. 
The lack of journalists' autonomy in Korea is also related to the recruitment and 
training mechanism for them. The competition to become a journalist in Korea is very dire. 
Journalism is regarded as one of the most attractive jobs and it is normal to see 1000 or 
even 2000 candidates competing for about ten posts at each employment exam. The 
successful candidate, once selected and recruited, will normally remain with the company 
until retirement age. There is very little horizontal movement from one company to 
another company. This situation makes journalists dependent on the company's hierarchy. 
While they are trainees in the company that selected them, they go through a period of 
apprenticeship which is almost `medieval' in that the trainee is required to faithfully 
imitate his senior's practice in every detail. There is a very rigid hierarchy where absolute 
respect and obedience must be shown to one's seniors even if the difference is only one 
year. It feels almost like a military organisation. 
As a result, even if one's senior or the editorial staff should arbitrarily change one's 
article, the established practice means that one should have no complaint. According to a 
study of reporting behaviour, 89.8% of reporters surveyed replied that they `would follow 
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the experience and views of the editorial staff or find a compromise solution by altering 
the contents of the article' when there is a disagreement between the reporter and the 
editorial staff (Kim and Kim 1999: 61). Since the editorial staff are keen to maintain a 
good relationship with the management, some articles critical of the chaebol can hardly 
survive the process of editing. 
Sixth, the complex nature of economic issues together with the lack of specialist 
knowledge on the part of journalists can be viewed as imposing limits on criticism against 
the chaebol. Economic issues require one to make a choice among several policy 
alternatives. Yet it is extremely difficult to make accurate predictions. Each one of the 
competing policy alternatives has strong points and weak points which makes it very 
difficult to compare them and to single out the most desirable one. Even economists have 
difficulty in explaining economic issues in a clear and concise manner. Their explanations 
tend to be abstract or complicated. In spite of the ambivalent nature of economic issues 
and of the complexity of economic theories, economic journalism must carry out the task 
of swiftly reporting the issues together with a clear and concise analysis. Some economists 
such as Solow even argue that economic theories are bound to be distorted in the course of 
being communicated to the public. Economic problems are complex phenomena. Theories 
which purport to explain them must also be complex. It is impossible to reduce them to 
simple theses and brief explanations which can be understood by the general public 
(Solow 1989: 81-82). The controversies regarding the chaebol are still an ongoing issue. It 
is not easy to arrive at any definitive conclusion yet. 
On the other hand, economic journalists often have relatively little expertise in 
economic issues. As the economic affairs department is just one of the departments within 
the news room like any other departments, journalists are posted to the economic affairs 
department as a part of their usual rotation cycle. There are not many journalists who have 
an academic background in economics or management. 95 Even those who have such an 
academic background are not necessarily posted to the economic affairs department. One 
needs not to be an academic to be a journalist. Nevertheless, it is not a strong point for a 
newspaper company that it has relatively few reporters who have specialised in economics 
at the undergraduate or graduate level. The company does not provide time or an 
95 A survey of 1995 conducted by Korea Press Research Institute shows that out of 1024 journalists in the 
sample, only 94 (9.6% of the sample) had a degree in economics, business administration or trade. 
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opportunity for studying economics. In fact, there is not enough time to get sufficient 
materials to fill the increased number of pages in the economy section. The following 
remark of an economic editor of a major newspaper shows why economic news reporting 
is done with little expertise: 
We cannot afford to have the leisure of studying. We need to get the required 
quantity first. I have no problem with the principle of two sources or getting the 
expert's opinions, etc. But how are you going to fill the vast and numerous pages 
like that? You need to decide upon the message you want to get across and then you 
simply back it up with what comments you manage to get (interview, II Mar. 2003). 
The so-called `expert opinions' attached to reporters' articles may be no more than 
devices to be seen plausible. Far from guaranteeing objectivity of the articles, they can be 
mobilised to distort a certain economic reality. However, such a thing is no more than `a 
strategic ritual' justified `in the name of objectivity' (Tuchman 1972; Manning 2001: 68). 
The lack of expertise on the part of economic reporters leads to a lack of critical 
analysis of economic issues. To remedy the situation, scholars and professors are often 
invited to contribute as external columnists. However, their columns are often too 
removed from the reality. Also most of these external columnists in Korea have neo- 
liberal leanings. Their particular views are communicated as if they are the only possible 
and correct views. 
Seventh, strong personal connections in Korean society and corruption of journalists 
hamper critical reporting of chaebol-related news. Personal connections based on place of 
origin and the old boys' networks constitute the base of the political, social and cultural 
networks in Korea (e. g. Kim, K. 1993). Park Myung-Jin and her colleagues have also 
argued that `the political system of Korea has a Western appearance, but its operation has 
been more dependent on informal and pre-modern methods than official and reasonable 
procedures' (Park, Kim and Sohn 2000: 115). 
In the case of the chaebol, Seo Jaejin has shown that `the majority of managerial 
staffs are either from the family members of the owner of the chaebol or from the same 
region as the owner's place of origin (Seo 1988). The managerial staffs are in turn 
connected to the high-ranking employees in newspaper companies through old boys' 
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networks or regional connections. Lobbying and `peddling of articles' are done through 
these personal networks. 
Chonji, as mentioned earlier, plays the role of lubricant in making these kinds of 
personal connections operate without a hitch. In particular, Chonji from the chaebol took 
the form of a large sum of money. They were offered and received with an implicit 
expectation and understanding that they would eventually be reciprocated in one way or 
another. They seriously undermined fairness of economic news reporting. 
Samsung's Entry into the Car Industry 
Samsung in Korean Society 
In Korean society, Samsung is not simply a commercial corporation. It is recognised 
as a powerful institution. Its economic power96 has become influential enough to check 
the ruling political party, the government and the press. A chaebol's economic power has 
reached a point where it can vie against the elected political power or the collective power 
of the press. While other chaebol have suffered from the economic crisis of 1997, 
Samsung has consolidated its own power base. By the mid '90s, Samsung was already 
described as a `super power' (Hankyoreh, 20 Apr. 1995). Also, the expression `Republic 
of Samsung' used at that time suggests its influential status (Chosun, 24 Jan. 1996). A 
special coverage of Samsung appearing in Hankyoreh reports the following impression of 
the time: 
Samsung is the author of the governing ideology; is deeply involved in the making 
of government policies; is in control of all sectors private and public with its 
intelligence gathering capabilities, organisational support and money. Samsung 
has become a super-power who is beyond the reach of the government or the press 
(Hankyoreh, 20 Apr. 1995). 
96 As of 2002, shares of Samsung affiliates account for 26.8% of the shares traded in the Korea Stock 
Exchange. 19.8% of total exports of Korean companies are by Samsung's affiliates. 
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The power of Samsung, especially that of Chairman Lee Keunhee stems from his 
firm grip of the control mechanism within the group, its oligopolistic control of the market, 
and the ruling political ideology and the political system of Korean society. Samsung had 
55 affiliates in 1996, which was one year before the economic crisis. Chairman Lee had a 
complete control of these affiliates with his 1-2% share of these companies because of the 
scrupulous and complicated structure of cross-ownership and mutual guarantees between 
affiliates. Samsung's confidence and dynamism were expressed in the popular sayings of 
the time: "The President of the Republic has a fixed term; Chairman Lee's power has no 
terminus"; "With the money and the organisation of Samsung, everything is possible. " 
Chairman Lee himself said, "The present government's reform can only last for 5 years. 
Samsung's reform is perpetual. When 180,000 people unite, nothing is impossible. ' 
(Hankyoreh, 20 Apr. 1995). 
To a certain extent, the great power of Samsung comes from its superior intelligence 
ability. The Wall Street Journal described Samsung's superior ability to collect, analyse 
and utilise intelligence and likened it to that of CIA (Chosun 24 July 1996). Overseas 
intelligence is dealt with by employees of Samsung Trading Corporation and other 
Samsung affiliates who are stationed in foreign countries. The speed and accuracy of their 
intelligence is well recognised. When Deng Xiaoping died in February 1997, for example, 
JoongAng, which is Samsung's sister company, broke the news the following morning in 
an article by its correspondent in China. That was before the official New China News 
Agency reported the news. 97 JoongAng was aided by Samsung's intelligence network, 
which is connected to China's power centre. It is said that the death of Kim Ilsung of 
North Korea in July 1994 was also first notified to the South Korean government by 
Samsung Trading Corporation's Chinese Branch rather than by the government's 
intelligence agencies. 
Many of Samsung's domestic employees are also engaged in intelligence gathering 
activities on a regular basis. When they meet government officials or journalists, they 
report their meetings to the group's intelligence service. Samsung's intelligence service 
was sometimes headed by a former staff of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency. Its task 
97 New China News Agency posted the news of Deng's death at 2: 44 am. JoongAng already had the news 
included in the final edition of prints which were to be delivered in the following morning. 
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is to process and analyse the intelligence so that it can be used in their business operations. 
However, some information can also be used for lobbying and other purposes too. In 1995, 
for example, it emerged that owners of the chaebol had regularly offered vast numbers of 
bribes to the Presidents of Korea (who were formerly army generals) during their 
presidencies. At that time, little was reported about Samsung's lobbying during prosecutor 
investigations, but interviews with the reporters of the time reveal the following: 
At first Samsung began lobbying with the Public Prosecutors in order to remove 
Chairman Lee from the list of indictees, but their lobbying efforts were turned down. 
At that point damaging information was leaked about the questionable wealth 
accumulated by some of the top ranking Public Prosecutors who were leading the 
case. Although the Public Prosecutors had a belief that the leak was from Samsung, 
they could not but swallow their anger98 (personal communication, Nov. 1995; 
Chosun 24 July 1996; interview by telephone, 5 Oct. 2003). 
People in Korea say that `if you are not in the list of Samsung's internal database, 
you are probably not an important person'. If Samsung wishes to get a business project 
approved by the relevant person in the Ministry of Finance and Economy, for example, 
Samsung can immediately draw up a list of their employees who are personally acquainted 
with the person in charge of this approval. These employees are mobilised for lobbying 
purposes. Each year, Samsung's employees must submit the names of notable people 
whom they are personally acquainted with (Chosun, 28 Nov. 1994). 
Samsung scrupulously maintains these personal networks, which are made up of 
thousands of opinion leaders such as high-ranking government officials, senior journalists, 
academics and politicians. During festive seasons, expensive gifts are offered to them. 
From time to time, Samsung offers overseas trips or research grants to win them over. 
High-ranking government officials and senior journalists often say that Samsung is `smart'. 
Yet the admiration is mixed with apprehension that Samsung is `redoubtable'. They 
appear to hold a view that `in a sense, Samsung's power surpasses that of the KCIA during 
the military regime. If you are in the bad books of Samsung, you will have a tough time 
9x Those chaebol owners who bribed tens of millions dollars were released on bail and eventually received 
suspended sentences. 
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for a long time' (Hankyoreh, 20 Apr. 1995). 
What were the reasons for Samsung's superior position compared to Hyundai, LG 
or Daewoo, who were more or less of the same size as Samsung? One of the reasons is 
that Samsung is connected to the media network through JoongAng. The foundation of the 
JoongAng Media Network shows a capitalist's participation in politics through the press. 
With regard to the reasons for entering into the media network, the previous chairman Lee 
Byungchul wrote in his autobiography: 
[In turbulent periods in Korean politics] I was accused of having accumulated my 
wealth in an unlawful manner, taking no account of entrepreneur's mission and 
contribution to the society. As I keenly felt that businessman's power was very 
weak and limited, I decided to be a politician. But after one year's deliberation, I 
gave up my ambition and turned to the media. I have sought ways to promote good 
politics, discourage bad politics and to contribute to the harmonisation and 
stabilisation of society with a force stronger than that of politics. I decided to set up 
a comprehensive mass media company (Lee, B. 1986: 182-183). 
JoongAng was founded in 1967. It owned 5 of the 8 super-high speed rotary presses 
that were in Korea at that time. JoongAng printed a massive number of copies, many of 
them freely distributed. It soon became one of the major papers of nationwide circulation. 
For the initial five years, JoongAng sustained a huge amount of net loss. However, it could 
afford to do so because it had Samsung's backing. 
In July 1996, while the competition between Chosun and JoongAng intensified, an 
employee of a distribution agent99 of JoongAng stabbed and murdered a worker of a 
Chosun distribution agent. This incident escalated into Chosun's attack against Samsung. 
For three days, Chosun published 37 articles criticising Samsung. The press and the 
chaebol, the two power bases in Korea, are usually on good terms mediated by the 
advertising. However, the unfortunate incident unsettled the balance and an all-out war 
was being waged. Samsung responded by withdrawing all their advertisements from 
Chosun. As the two sides gradually came to an understanding that indiscriminate attacks 
would be harmful to both sides, a ceasefire was achieved. The overall assessment was that 
99 Each of nationwide newspaper companies in Korea has individually several hundreds distribution agents. 
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although JoongAng sustained some loss, it nevertheless defended its position from an 
allied attack from Chosun, DongA and Hankook. After the incident, newspaper articles 
critical of the chaebol became even more rare. 
When a newspaper company is an affiliate of a conglomerate, as pointed out by 
Curran, it would `[result] in no-go areas where newspapers were reluctant to investigate 
for fear of stepping on corporate toes' (Curran and Seaton 1997: 82). When the group's 
owner is practically controlling all affiliates of the group, which is the case with many of 
the chaebol in Korea, the problem becomes aggravated. Not only is investigative reporting 
discouraged, newspapers are mobilised to defend affiliates from legitimate attack and 
criticism. Newspapers are even used to prepare the ground for business operations of an 
affiliate. They can be used as a public relations arm of the chaebol. On the occasion of 
public prosecutions in respect of the chaebol's bribes mentioned above, newspapers 
owned by the chaebol vociferously raised the complaint that the public prosecution was 
seriously undermining the economy. In a meeting of chairmen of the chaebol at the 
Federation of Korean Industries, a complaint was raised that newspapers owned by some 
members of the FKI are putting the blame on other members who do not own any 
newspaper (Hankyoreh, 11 Nov. 1995). 
Organisational Culture and Decision Making 
Samsung is sometimes described as a cult-like organisation because it has an 
organisational culture which does not allow any criticism of the management. Those who 
met with people at Samsung in connection with some major issues involving Samsung 
such as its entry into car industry, nearly all agree that `employees of Samsung speak in 
one voice regardless of their rank or position' (personal communications, 1993-1995). 
This organisational atmosphere is partly connected to Samsung's policy against 
labour unions. In order to avoid organising labour unions, Samsung offers the carrot of 
high salary and uses the stick of cracking down any attempt to organise a labour union. 
Samsung abuses the provision of Labour Standards Act which requires that there be only 
one labour union at one work place. Samsung takes the initiative to set up a pro- 
management labour union thus preventing the organisation of hard-line labourers. 
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The provision in question has been the topic of continued controversy. ILO has 
already recommended nine times that this provision be repealed. Nevertheless, the 
provision still remains in force due to Samsung's effective lobbying (Ohmynews, 2 Apr. 
2003). If there are still some employees who attempt to organise a union, Samsung resorts 
to persuasion and threats to prevent the organisation for labour union. In 1995, the 
German Branch Office of Samsung Electronics was brought to a labour court for having 
attempted to prevent the organisation of labour union in this manner. 
Due to the neo-liberal inclination of Korean society, however, quite a lot of people 
are hostile to labour unions and support Samsung's anti-labour policy. The strategy of the 
`First class industry Samsung' had the consequence of instilling in the mind of many 
Koreans a conviction that `no labour union means excellent corporate performance'. The 
view of the ruling political group also coincided with this optic. On 4 September 1993,100 
President Kim Youngsam first met with Samsung's Chairman Lee Keunhee among all 
owners of the chaebol. President Kim explained his decision to see Chairman Lee, `From 
now on, I intend to see entrepreneurs who have satisfactorily dealt with labour unions 
first' (DongA, 20 Sep. 1993). Negative views against labour unions may stem from a lack 
of understanding of democracy. When one understands that `democracy is a political 
process whereby conflicts and dissonances are identified, expressed and eventually 
resolved to achieve integration of society', 101 denial of labour unions would be 
undemocratic as it merely suppresses the conflicts rather than resolves them. 
One striking example representing Samsung's organisational features is the change 
of working hours to 7: 00 am until 4: 00 pm. At that time, Samsung was fully engaged in 
`quality management' following Chairman Lee's instruction `to change everything except 
your wife and children'. His instruction to put forward working hours by two hours 
resulted in a radical change of life style for 180,000 employees plus their family members: 
Samsung employees started work at 7: 00 am' 02 which, in turn, offered them substantial 
free time in the afternoon when the work finished at 4: 00 pm. The normal working hours 
in Korea were 9 to 6. Such an overnight change of the employment conditions affecting 
100 At the time, President Kim Youngsam was adopting `Strengthening competitiveness' in place of 
`Reform' as the key concept of his ruling discourse. 
10' Presented by Professor Choi Jangjip in a debate `Assessing the First 100 Days of the New Government' 
held on 29 May 2003. 
102 In Korea, seven o'clock in the morning is seen as very early. This is related to the fact that the Korean 
Standard Time follows Japan which is located in east of Korea. 
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hundreds of thousands employees was possible because Samsung's affiliates had no 
labour union. Individuals who live in a repressive world cannot participate in decision- 
making even crucially affecting their own life. 
After the introduction of new working hours, the production team for Samsung's 
internal newsletter carried an article that surveyed responses of employees' partners. The 
article contained negative views of the changed working hours, reporting that partners 
were experiencing inconveniences as they had to wake up much earlier than before. Those 
who were involved in the publication were moved to other departments. Copies of the 
newsletter which had already been distributed were recalled. The offending article was 
deleted from the newsletters. The chief public relations officer of the group held a meeting 
convening about 30 employees who produced newsletters and gave instruction that care 
should be taken not to include articles which are against the management policy of 
Chairman Lee. From the point of view of Habermas' theory of communicative action 
(1981), this gives a good example where the `life-world' is controlled by the `system'. The 
room for communication from below is extremely limited. 
Samsung's rigid attitude toward critical voice is not limited to internal 
communications. Critical views of non-governmental organisations voiced against 
Samsung can rarely be reported in the media because of Samsung's influence on the 
media as the major advertiser. When 43 law professors lodged an accusation alleging 
unlawful evasions of inheritance tax by Chairman Lee's family members, the event was 
very cursorily reported in only Hankyoreh and Chosun for appearance's sake. The incident 
involved potentially collusive sale of unlisted shares of Samsung's affiliates at a 
considerably reduced price to a son of Chairman Lee thus avoiding inheritance tax. 103 The 
incident had a far greater news value than what those inconspicuously cursory reports 
would suggest. Hankook in fact had a column by an external columnist entitled `No more 
illegal inheritance for chaebol' in the first edition of its prints on that day. However, 
Samsung successfully lobbied to have it removed in further editions of prints (Hankook, 
27 Nov. 2000). 
Suppression on criticism leads a situation where important decisions are made in an 
10' Unlisted shares of Samsung's affiliates were transferred at a low price to Chairman Lee's son. The shares 
were subsequently listed with a huge windfall to the son. The son paid 1.6 million dollars of inheritance 
tax in respect of 4.5 million dollars of unlisted shares. When the shares were listed, they were worth 3 
billion dollars. With these operations, the son effectively took control of most of Samsung's affiliates. 
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authoritarian, rather than democratic, manner. There were many decisions in Samsung 
which depended not on debates but on the personal will of the chairman. No doubt, if the 
decision turns out to be the right one, Samsung's organisational culture provides an 
excellent locomotive for bringing the project to a successful completion. Samsung's 
decision to invest in semi-conductor was a good example. If, however, the chairman's 
decision turns out to be a wrong one, the consequences will be dire because there is no 
mechanism for putting a break to the drive. 
Samsung's decision to enter into car industry after it has already committed its 
resources to ship building, petro-chemical products and aviation industry is a pertinent 
example. Since Samsung - with its superior intelligence ability - was fully aware of the 
situation of car industry in Korea where already five manufacturers were engaged in a cut- 
throat competition, there can be no explanation for Samsung's decision to enter into that 
market apart from Chairman Lee's personal will and doggedness. He has a keen interest in 
cars. 104 He wanted to turn his personal passion into a business project. Once he made up 
his mind, no one in Samsung could change it. The Manager, a German monthly magazine 
for management, wrote that: 
Chairman Lee has no need to obtain executive directors' approval. He is under no 
scrutiny from auditing directors. When he makes investment decisions, he often 
does it without much preparation almost as if he is betting in a gambling game.... 
The quasi-military organisations of Samsung carry out Chairman Lee's orders 
unflinchingly (Manager, Oct. 1997). 
PR and Lobbying: Key Steps toward the Car Industry 
Samsung's effort to enter into the car industry took the form of a public relations 
campaign accompanied by heavy lobbying. Samsung appears to have recognised that, 
going by the logic of industrial policy, Samsung's case was too weak to persuade the 
government's industrial policy team including the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
10' Chairman Lee owns nearly all kinds of world best cars such as Mercedes's, Porsche's and Ferrarri's. He 
was rumoured to be a speed maniac who enjoyed driving a Porsche in a German Autobahn at more than 
200km per hour. 
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(MOCI). The government at that time took the view that the chaebol had entered into too 
disperse and wide a range of industries with the result of diminished competitiveness of 
Korean industries in general. The government was pursuing a policy where each chaebol 
was urged to specialise in some chosen areas rather than expand its operation into nearly 
all areas. The government had a statutory means of enforcing its policy. The relevant 
statute allowed the government to deny license for the proposed foreign technology 
transfer if it should be damaging to national economy. For its car manufacturing project, 
Samsung was relying on a technology transfer from Nissan of Japan. 
Samsung had the strategy of rallying favourable public opinions through public 
relations campaign in the first place. And those who are opposed to Samsung's proposal 
would then be personally approached by Samsung's lobbyists. Samsung took a round- 
about approach to lessen adverse public opinions. This is why in 1990 and 1992, Samsung 
attempted to enter into commercial vehicle (such as lorry) manufacturing. In fact, the 
applications were made and pursued by Samsung Heavy Industry and the group's public 
relations (PR) department rather than by the team for car manufacturing. 
In 1997, the Journalists Association Newsletter of Korea, uncovered a confidential 
document entitled `Report of Activities Relating to the Press' which was written by 
Samsung Heavy Industry in 1992. The document shows how the PR staffs bribed 
journalists and guided the overall tone of the news reports. According to the Report, the 
PR staffs have `induced news reports on the backlog and long waiting list for commercial 
vehicles whereas the statement of automobile labour union which is opposed to 
Samsung's entry was given a low profile thanks to persuasion and lobbying efforts 
directed individually at journalists. ' The Report also states that in order to lessen the 
opposition to Samsung's entry to the industry, those media which use the expression `car' 
in reporting Samsung's attempted entry were made to use `commercial vehicle' instead. 
The Report also has a section on `analysis of individual media's reporting patterns'. 
Four out of the 16 media - such as newspapers, broadcasting companies and press agents - 
were classified as favourably disposed. The Report adds that most of these favourably 
disposed media were initially opposing Samsung's proposed entry to the commercial 
vehicle manufacturing industry. The Report concludes that the lobbying efforts of 
Samsung made them favourably disposed. Six media are classified as neutral. It is stated 
in the Report: `These media were initially opposed to Samsung's entry, but our lobbying 
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made them neutral'. The remaining 5 media are classified as negative. It is explained: 
`These media had weak ties with us in the first place'. Regarding one paper, in particular, 
the Report stated as follows: `The paper reported Samsung's proposed entry to 
commercial vehicle manufacturing as a strategy to enter into car manufacturing in a 
round-about way. The paper purports to oppose Samsung's entry to the industry' 
(Journalists Association Newsletter, Aug. 1997). 
The Report also has a chapter `Actions to be taken in relation to the press'. In this 
chapter, it is recommended that: `Contacts with editors of economic affairs department 
must be maintained in the form of quarterly meetings with our executives. At least twice a 
year, gifts should be offered to them too'. Similar recommendations were made with 
regard to journalists reporting Samsung's proposed entry (Journalists Association 
Newsletter, Aug. 1997). Maintaining `contacts' would require offering chonji in the 
context of the Korean press. In the end, Samsung succeeded in entering into commercial 
vehicle manufacturing in 1992 with an official promise from the chief executive of 
Samsung Heavy Industry that `no attempt shall be made to enter into car manufacturing. ' 
For Chairman Lee, however, the entry into commercial vehicle manufacturing was 
simply a stepping-stone toward entering into car manufacturing. In 1993, the `Quality 
management' was declared, working hours were put forward by two hours and a radical 
quality control measure was introduced whereby if a single faulty product is spotted, the 
whole production line will be stopped. Chairman Lee was advocating a revolutionary 
reform of mentality. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Chairman Lee's outspoken 
style was under the spotlight of the media. `Learn from Samsung' was a familiar phrase 
for the whole nation and even for the government. President Kim Youngsam was also 
shifting the ruling discourse from `Reform' into `Internationalisation' and `Strengthening 
competitiveness'. 
As the economy entered into a slump, the political climate was becoming favourable 
to the chaebol, especially to Samsung. Chairman Lee took notice of this and became 
bolder in his speech. In Tokyo, he met with a correspondent of DongA and expressed his 
interest in entering into car manufacturing. He said, "Our country's survival depends on 
exports. The leading companies should not be tied down by a criticism about their 
aggressive expansion into a wide variety of business areas or by the government policy for 
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business specialisation. "105 (DongA, 4 Aug 1993). He was defiant to the criticism about 
Samsung. Other chaebol interpreted Samsung's management reforms as `preparing the 
ground for further expansion into more business areas' (Kyunghyang, II Aug. 1993). 
Riding on the tide of `internationalisation', JoongAng laid paving stones for 
Samsung's entry into car manufacturing. JoongAng had a special report, `Car industry: In 
need of a greater drive'. It was asserted: `Considering that it takes two years to build a 
new production plant, it can be said that the investment in production facilities is lagging 
behind the ever increasing demand for cars' (JoongAng, 17 Nov. 1993). In a seminar 
organised by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade (KIET), Professor Otti 
of Lancaster University and Dr Yoo Seungmin of the Korea Development Institute (KDI) 
claimed that `the argument that Samsung's entry into car manufacturing will result in 
over-investment is wrong, considering the increase in demand for cars in the worldwide 
market'. Their claim was given a high profile in the all newspapers (e. g. JoongAng, 26 
Nov. 1993). 
The tone of the press which had been critical of Samsung's entry into commercial 
vehicle manufacturing now took a favourable turn. On an analysis of views expressed in 
the editorials of newspapers regarding Samsung's proposed entry into car manufacturing 
at the time, it is possible to say that DongA was opposed, Chosun was neutral, Hankyoreh 
was supportive with reservations, and JoongAng was enthusiastically supportive. In an 
editorial entitled `Too many car manufacturers already', DongA warned about the 
weakening of competitiveness of Korean car manufacturers in the worldwide market. It 
recommended that the government should `restrain the construction of new production 
plants' (DongA, 28 Apr. 1994). Chosun had an editorial entitled, `Premises for Samsung's 
entry to car manufacturing'. It was argued that `if Samsung insists on entering into car 
manufacturing, it should at least get rid of some of its affiliates as a precondition for 
undertaking car manufacturing'. The editorial concluded that `the real issue which must be 
closely examined is over-investment or surplus of production facilities' (Chosun, 28 Apr. 
1994). Hankyoreh had an editorial entitled, `Controversy about Samsung's proposed entry 
to car manufacturing'. According to the editorial, `it is not easy to say whether Samsung's 
proposed participation would improve or weaken the Korean car industry's 
105 The business specialization policy was to guide the chaebol to restrain their unrelated-diversification and 
concentrate on 3-4 specialized business fields. 
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competitiveness. Allowing all contenders to compete can be a way of life in the era of 
internationalisation'. The editorial added an argument that Samsung must show its 
determination to concentrate itself on car industry by selling off some of its disparate 
affiliates' (Hankyoreh, 28 Apr. 1994). 
However, one needs to go beyond the editorials, as readers will treat analysis 
articles as reflecting the stance of the newspaper. Hankyoreh and Chosun had analysis 
articles which were more critical of Samsung than their respective editorials. For example, 
Hankyoreh had an analysis article, `More to lose from Samsung's entry' (Hankyoreh, 27 
Apr. 1994). Chosun had an article, `More negative points - public opinion and the 
government opposed as well' (Chosun, 8 May 1994). In the case of DongA, however, 
news articles such as `Debates on Samsung's entry into car manufacturing' (DongA, 30 
Apr. 1994) took a more neutral stance than the strong opposition voiced in its editorials. 
JoongAng was, of course, enthusiastic about Samsung both in its editorials and in news 
articles. The other major papers also showed a considerable rift between editorial writers 
and reporters. 
Why, then, did such internal drift occurred? First, the issue itself was complex and 
controversial, and was often understood and analysed differently depending on viewpoints 
about the market and the state. At the same time, these different individual views were full 
of confidence, which made intense conflicts inevitable. These conflicts were extremely hot, 
particularly when the time had come for concrete decisions, even though concessions had 
been made to the overall issues such as ideological dispute. Finally, the media was divided 
thanks to the desperate lobbying effort by Samsung and other car companies. As the 
lobbying efforts of the existing car companies were patchy and uncoordinated, they could 
not overpower Samsung who had the unmistakable goal of carrying out the wish of its 
owner. Indeed, the incoherence in almost all newspapers, except JoongAng, was to a large 
extent attributable to Samsung's aggressive man-to-man lobbying. 
Manipulating `Public Opinion' 
In March 1994. the Strategic PR Team within the Secretariat of Samsung's 
Chairman prepared `New Communications Plan for Samsung Group'. According to the 
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document, which was exposed by Hankook two years later, Samsung understood that 
favourable public opinion was the key for entering into car manufacturing. It appears that 
Samsung was using the newspaper (JoongAng) owned by its affiliate to this end. The plan 
lists the following actions to be taken: 
To run special reports in JoongAng; to form a favourable public opinion about 
Samsung's entry into a new business area; to establish a close relationship of 
cooperation with the press, research institutes and the academia; to make 
concentrated efforts to maintain good contacts with academics, journalists and 
government policy makers (Hankook, 20 July 1996). 
The fact that the plan was drawn up by a team of Chairman Lee's secretariat, rather 
than Samsung Heavy Industry, indicates the strong determination of the group as a whole 
to pursue Samsung's proposed entry into car manufacturing. 
In order to turn the public opinion in their favour, Samsung drew up a list of about 
3,000 persons who were considered to be influential in shaping public opinion. Samsung 
then looked for its employees who were personally acquainted with these opinion leaders. 
These employees of Samsung were mobilised to get in touch with the so-called opinion 
leaders. In these meetings, Samsung's case was presented and constant efforts for 
persuasion were made. For those who would not be persuaded, Samsung was studying 
possible alternative measures (Hankyoreh, 21 Apr. 1995). A public relations director of 
one of the car manufacturers at the time complained: 
Samsung's public relations campaign was tenacious. We were having difficulty in 
finding a person who could present a counter-argument (personal communication, 
May 1994). 
Commissioning certain academics to write columns in newspapers is an effective 
means of shaping public opinion in a chosen direction. Academicians' columns about a 
particular economic policy are delivered to the readers in a packaging which has the aura 
of expert knowledge. The included messages can have a greater impact on readers who do 
not have any detailed knowledge of the matter. It is also convenient for the newspaper 
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company because these columns can be used to deliver certain messages which the 
company itself is reluctant to be openly associated with. The newspaper company can say 
certain things without having to do the talking for it. If these contributed columns are 
commissioned due to the connection between the news source (a chaebol, for example) 
and the newspaper, there is a serious risk of distorting the policy options. Of course, there 
is the usual disclaimer, `the views expressed in the contributed columns do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the paper'. However, such a thing is only a device for the above- 
mentioned `strategic ritual' to display `objectivity'. 
There were an increasing number of external columnists contributing columns 
supporting Samsung's entry into car manufacturing. For example, Professor Kang 
Chulgyu contributed a column (DongA, 15 May 1994) where he argued that `the attempt 
to regulate new entry can have negative side effects of restraining competition'. He was in 
favour of Samsung's proposed entry into car manufacturing on the condition that Samsung 
take voluntary steps to avoid concentration of economic power. 
Even if a newspaper maintains an appearance of impartiality by publishing two 
opposed columns side by side, it is not necessarily a guarantee of impartiality. Articles 
listing the `pros and cons' of Samsung's proposed entry (DongA, 30 Apr. 1994, for 
example) were in fact favourable to Samsung which was attempting to overturn the 
government's decision not to allow Samsung to manufacture cars. These articles had the 
effect of re-opening the case which had already been closed. JoongAng had a special focus 
article about the pros and cons of Samsung's proposal. Their articles formulated the issue 
as if it was a contest of consumers versus manufacturers (JoongAng, 27 Apr. 1994). The 
articles concluded that `although there can be many other criteria, the ultimate conclusion 
should depend on a consideration of consumer benefit and the order of market economy'. 
Their point was that while the regulation of new entry is for the benefit of the existing 
manufacturers, Samsung's entry would benefit consumers. It was Samsung's argument. 
However, such an argument was appealing to many readers as the public interests 
were increasingly focused on `consumption rather than production' 
106 (Parsons 1989; 
Manning 2001). After several of these columns and news reports, Samsung commissioned 
a survey by Korea Gallup. Samsung used the results of the survey to put pressure on the 
106 Using this concept, Samsung advertised its new car in 1998 with an assertion, `When it's made by 
Samsung, it's different. ' 
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government. Major papers also reported the survey. According to the survey, 69.3% of 
respondents supported Samsung's entry into car manufacturing. Their reasons were that 
Samsung's participation would result in: `improved quality and technical innovation'; `fair 
and equal opportunity for business'; `development of national economy'; `benefits from 
Samsung's good reputation'; and `widening of consumer's choice'. ' 07 
Contorted Triangle: Dragging Politics into the Fight 
Samsung's attempt was met with a resistance when the then Minister of Commerce 
and Industry, Kim Chulsoo, secured in May 1994 the President's decision not to allow 
Samsung's entry. The key policy makers were still hostile to Samsung's expansion. 
Minister Kim and Director General for Machinery and Basic Industries, Lee Keunwoo, 
were still opposed to Samsung's proposal. Their reasons were clear: 
As there is already a shortage of experience technicians, Samsung's entry will bring 
about excessive recruitment competition. Also, too excessive competition among 
domestic car manufacturers would be inevitable, which will mean that not a single 
one of them could ever become a leading car manufacturer in the worldwide market 
(Hankook, 2 July 1998). 
However Samsung would not sit back in resignation faced with this much of 
resistance. As the first round proved unsuccessful because of the opposition from 
specialist bureaucrats, Samsung chose the strategy to win over politicians and to make 
them put pressure on the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The project was now being 
pursued by a special task force `Planning Group for 21st Century' headed by Lee Pilgon 
of the Chairman Lee's secretariat. It was decided to appeal to the popular sentiment of 
people in Busan area which was the political base of President Kim Youngsam. Samsung 
had the experience of securing a license to enter into commercial vehicle manufacturing 
during the presidency of Rho Taewoo by announcing that the vehicle assembly plant 
would be built in Daegu, which was the power base of the then President Rho. 
107 'Survey of people's attitude to Samsung's entry into car manufacturing', Korea Gallup, 2--3 April 1994. 
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This time, Samsung promised to build the car assembly plant in Busan. Shinho 
Industrial Park, which was chosen as the proposed site, is located near Busan, the second 
largest city of Korea. As a result, the land price was high. Shinho Park also had unstable 
ground as it was built by land-filling on the shallow seabed. It was an architectural 
nightmare to prepare the ground for the construction of the proposed plant. Tens of 
thousands of concrete piles had to be used. The cost of building the plant would already be 
four times as much as that of Hyundai's Asan plant or Kia's Hwasung plant. Nevertheless, 
doubts about the feasibility or viability of the project were silenced by Chairman Lee's 
instruction to secure the license at all costs. 
In order to carry out and coordinate the plans to mobilise the citizens of Busan, 
seven of the high-ranking employees of Chairman Lee's secretariat were sent to Busan. 
One of them recalled, "It was very easy to guide the public opinion. As the local economy 
was in a slump, everyone was saying that the plant must be built here to create jobs. Local 
papers and citizen groups took the initiative and contacted us' (DongA, 13 Apr. 1998). 
They launched a movement to collect one million signatures from citizens of Busan. 
Citizens' meetings, marches and demonstrations were given a high profile in major papers. 
In August, a public debate was held by Institute for Industry and Management 
Research attached to Seoul City University. The event provided a strong theoretical 
support for Samsung. Yoo Seungmin of Korea Development Institute denounced the 
government's regulatory policy: 
Suppose the government prevents Samsung from entering into car manufacturing 
and tells it to concentrate on petro-chemical products, electronic goods, electric 
appliances and machinery which it does well at present. What if, however, in five or 
ten years, investment in these latter areas turns out to be disastrous for the nation? 
Will the government pick up the bill? (Hankook Kyungjae, 20 Aug. 1994). 
Professor Shin Bongho also argued: 
When a company enters into a market and fails to survive, it is the company itself 
which will suffer most. Therefore, whether or not to enter into a market is a question 
which the company must decide for itself.... The concerns expressed by the 
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government as well as by the existing manufacturers about the ills of excessive 
competition are mostly unfounded. They do not appear to be fair and impartial 
concerns (HankookKyungjae, 20 Aug. 1994). 
Public debates organised by academics may have an appearance of fairness and 
impartiality. Depending on the selection of participants, however, these debates are 
certainly capable of producing one-sided views about a policy issue. Professor Kang 
Chulgyu, who organised the above-mentioned debate, has strong convictions in market 
economy. As mentioned earlier, he had already contributed a column to DongA urging that 
Samsung should be allowed to enter into car manufacturing. In such a case, it may be 
suspected that the public debate is held in order to put forward a particular viewpoint. 
Moreover, the press can select the contents of the debate in reporting them. If certain 
views were emphasised at the expense of other views, the readers are exposed to news 
items which have gone through two stages of distortion. As Manning feared, `much of the 
material journalists work with in producing news items is thoroughly contaminated with 
values, partial descriptions and professional spin' (Manning 2001: 68). 
Samsung announced `Samsung's Business Plans for the Development of Busan 
Areas' that it would develop a new port, build a new hospital and make many other 
investments in Busan area if it is allowed to enter into car manufacturing (DongA, 26 Aug. 
1994). Samsung also maintained frequent contact with influential politicians from the 
Busan area who were bound to be sensitive to the wishes of the people of Busan. The 
politicians with whom Samsung maintained `good contact' included the Chief Secretary to 
the President, the Secretary General of the ruling political party and the Minister of Home 
Affairs. It was about six months before the local government election. One could not find 
a more opportune moment. 
In October, Park Jaeyun, who was the Chief Economic Adviser to the President and 
who was in agreement with the Minister of Commerce and Industry regarding Samsung's 
proposal, was suddenly replaced by Han Yiheon. It was rumoured in the industry that 
`supporters of Samsung were being promoted in the government' (Chosun, 3 Dec. 1994). 
Lee Keunwoo, a high official who was dealing with Samsung's application in the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry (MOCI), testified in an interview undertaken for this thesis: 
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As Han Yiheon kept meeting with Lee Pilgon of Samsung who was heading the task 
force for this matter, Han came to play the pivotal role in changing the mind of the 
President (interview, 22 Mar. 2003). 
In a National Assembly inspection of the MOCI, many of the ruling party's 
assemblymen were aggressively questioning Minister Kim Chulsoo who was opposed to 
Samsung's entry to car manufacturing. 
In November, when the discontent toward the government was rising in Busan, Mr. 
Han visited Chairman Lee Keunhee: 
Han: If you wish to enter into car manufacturing, you need to come up with 
convincing arguments and make concrete and tangible efforts. It would be counter- 
productive merely to put pressure on the President. 
Lee: What kind of efforts do you mean? 
Han: In 1993, Samsung made a promise of corporate reorganisation. But there has 
been no visible result in this area. The negative public opinion about Samsung's 
aggressive expansion must be dealt with first of all before you can expect to have a 
favourable opinion about the proposed entry into car manufacturing (DongA, 13 
Apr. 1998). '08 
On 27 October, Samsung announced a plan for reorganising its business structure 
whereby its 50 affiliates would be consolidated and reduced to 24 affiliates. The 
remaining question was to find a decent excuse to overturn the government's own decision 
which was taken half a year earlier. The discourse of `Globalisation' which came to the 
surface at the time provided just that. As discussed in chapter 3, JoongAng played an 
important role in promoting the discourse of `Globalisation'. After announcing 
`Globalisation' as the government's comprehensive policy objective after attending the 
APEC summit meeting in Indonesia, President Kim Youngsam was returning to Korea. In 
the airplane, he convened the ministers who were accompanying him and asked the Chief 
Economic Adviser, Han Yiheon. The scene of the meeting was 4 years later disclosed in 
Hankook: 
10" It was disclosed in DongA a few years later. 
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President Kim: It is now a global era with no frontiers. If Samsung's proposed 
entry to car manufacturing is conducive to strengthening the competitiveness of 
Korea, I suppose we need to give a go-ahead. What do you say to that, Mr. Han? 
Han109: You are right, Sir (Hankook, 6 July 1998). 
The MOCI was completely excluded from the decision making. Once the new 
decision was taken, the MOCI's involvement was limited to securing a pledge from 
Chairman Lee that Samsung would not be engaged in recruitment practices unduly 
damaging to the existing car manufacturers. 
On 2 December, the government announced that Samsung would be allowed to 
enter into car manufacturing. The announcement was read by the Vice-Minister of 
Commerce and Industry who were favourable toward Samsung. Minister Kim who 
refused to change his personal conviction was removed one month later. The Director 
General for Machinery & Basic Industry who had been dealing with Samsung's 
application was not even notified of the announcement. A few working-level bureaucrats 
within the Ministry who were favourable toward Samsung were later recruited by 
Samsung as directors. On 5 December, Samsung lodged its application for the 
introduction of car manufacturing technology, releasing an additional plan for corporate 
reorganisation to reduce their affiliates. 
What we need in order to look at more carefully in this tug-of-war between the 
government and the chaebol is the role of the press. The press, which is in the policy 
triangle consisting of the government, the chaebol and the press, is expected first of all to 
bring to light the heart of the matter and then to help the process of rational decision 
making by providing opportunities for fair and reasonable debates. From this point of 
view, the Korean press posed many problems. 
Regarding Samsung's strategy to mobilise the people of Busan, such a strategy can 
be criticised as an abuse of public opinion with a view to distort policy options. However, 
no newspaper was critically investigating the negative aspects of Samsung's strategy. 
Instead, the press faithfully followed the wishes of Samsung by reporting the citizens' 
'09 Han Yiheon later ran to become an assemblyman from Busan. During the campaign, he claimed that 
Samsung Motors' plant was built in Busan thanks to his efforts. 
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meetings and demonstrations. The press, in fact, was mobilised by Samsung. 
Also, the repeated announcement of Samsung's business reorganisation plans and 
`Business Plans for the Development of Busan Areas' were mainly a public relations stunt 
rather than genuine plans for concrete actions. However, the press failed to appreciate it 
and instead reported those announcements with a great deal of pomp and excitement. 
Samsung announced in 1993,1994 and in 1998 immediately after the economic crisis, 
several plans for reorganising its business operations and consolidating its affiliates. Yet 
few of these plans were actually implemented. The number of Samsung's affiliates 
actually increased in the meantime. 110 As we have seen, most papers recommended that 
Samsung be allowed to enter into car manufacturing but the recommendation was on the 
condition that Samsung takes steps to restructure its business. Eventually, it can be said 
that such conditions that appeared in many articles were no more than `strategic rituals' to 
justify their recommendations. 
In particular, JoongAng, which was an affiliate of Samsung, enormously contributed 
to the Samsung's entry. For example, regarding Samsung's announced plans for 
restructuring; Professor Chung Guhyun was invited to contribute a column which 
interpreted the plans as the `start of genuinely professional managerial system' (JoongAng, 
28 Oct. 1994). Professor Song Byungrak of Seoul National University was also invited to 
contribute a column where he argued that `the biggest electronic industry is the car 
industry'. Of course, he had Samsung Electronics in mind. He asserted that `domestic 
competition is necessary for globalisation' (JoongAng, 7 Dec. 1994). On the day of the 
announcement of the government's approval of Samsung's proposed entry, JoongAng had 
an editorial which argued: 
Car industry now moves out of the oligopolistic control of the market. A proper 
competition will now begin for consumers' benefit and for the development of 
national economy. It is evident that benefits will go to consumers and the fruits of 
economic development will make the nation's economy grow. This is our gesture of 
globalisation (JoongAng, 3 Dec. 1994). 
110 According to a survey of Fair Trade Commission, the number of Samsung's affiliates which was 48 in 
1991 increased to 55 in 1996 and to 64 in 2001. 
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Also, in an editorial which appeared on the day the application for technology 
import was accepted, it was asserted: 
It is indeed very fortunate that the government attempts a major shift in its industrial 
policy on the occasion of Samsung's entry into car manufacturing (JoongAng, 8 Dec. 
1994). 
Out of 10 major papers, DongA, Hankyorerh and Hankook had relatively more 
articles critical of Samsung's attempt to enter into car manufacturing. In the case of 
editorials, even Hankyoreh and Hankook did not offer opposition., 11 However, DongA 
was ardently opposed to the attempt. On 4 December appeared an editorial, `Reconsider 
Samsung Motors! ' On 7 December appeared another editorial, `Coherence needed in 
economic policies'. On 9 December, it had yet another editorial where it was asserted: 
`Labour unions of car industry need to refrain from strikes - Samsung needs to reconsider 
its attempt to enter into car manufacturing'. 
As explained earlier, labour unions, citizen groups and other pressure groups did not 
play a significant role in the policy decision making process. Labour unions of the existing 
manufacturers held large-scale meetings and demonstrations in protest to Samsung's 
attempt, but they failed to attract the attention of the press. 112 Citizen groups were equally 
powerless. The Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice, for example, revealed its 
weakness when the Coalition's Busan Branch announced its support for Samsung's 
proposed entry to car manufacturing. Hardly a coalition, in fact. 
By contrast, the press played a very influential role within the policy community in 
connection with Samsung's entry. Influential as it was, however, the press's role was 
negative rather than positive in bringing out the key issues and conducting rational-critical 
debates. In fact, the press knowingly or unknowingly went along with the chaebol's 
strategy for manipulation of public opinion. By doing so, the press played an active role in 
breaking down the public sphere. 
It is true that the government's policy decisions are not always influenced by the 
'.. According to the Gazette of National Union of Media Workers (Dec. 1994), DongA and Kookmin (minor 
paper) were the only two papers which voiced opposition in editorials. 
112 In order to understand why labour unions mostly fail to attract the attention of the press, see Aeron Davis 
(2002). 
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reports of the press. When the policy makers firmly ignore negative or critical reports of 
the press, the influence of the press is going to be limited. Samsung's failure in its first 
round of attempts can be a case in point. However, as pointed out in chapter 1, the press's 
influence on the government's policy making can unfold itself in multi-steps. For example, 
in its second round of attempt, Samsung made use of the politicians and the press which in 
turn put pressure on the policy makers. The then Director General for Machinery and 
Basic Industries, Lee Keunwoo, in an interview undertaken for this research, made the 
following remarks which are of some interest: 
At first, some papers published contributed columns which criticised the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry in the name of `free competition'. But that was all right. 
Although they put forward an argument that industrial policies are an anachronism 
in the global era, I could ignore it because it must be from a few professors who 
know nothing about the real nature of the chaebol and the practical issues facing the 
industry. However, when Samsung began to manipulate public opinion and most 
papers started to side with Samsung, I felt cornered. All my friends and even my 
wife were asking, `Why is it that only you are against Samsung Motors? ' I did feel 
the power of the press. When the chaebol mobilise the politicians and the press to 
change the mind of the President, what good does it do to have firm convictions as a 
specialist bureaucrat? (interview, 22 Mar. 2003). 
The reason for Samsung's success in the second round of its attempt was that it 
managed to have the press on its side and caused dissensions within the government. As a 
result, Samsung secured the hegemony in the policy community made up of the 
government, the chaebol and the press. Policy makers initially rejected the agendas which 
were set by Samsung. When the ruling political groups adopted them, however, the policy 
makers were influenced. The press's influence in this case worked in two-step flow. In the 
course of making policy decisions, those agendas would usually manifest themselves in 
the form of policy alterations. When the imbalance of power is too great, they are reflected 
into the final policy with very little alterations. 
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`Scapegoat' and Catastrophe 
Samsung's entry marked the beginning of the disaster for the Korean car industry. 
The car companies started to make a great deal of pre-emptive investment in order to leave 
out Samsung's chase. The yearly capacity of assembling cars expanded from 1.44 million 
in 1993 to 3.50 million in 1997. It was expected to increase up to over 4 million in 1998 
taking account of the new production by Samsung. The operating ratio of equipment was 
only 5060% in 1996, and yet more than 110,000 cars remained unsold. Approximately 
10 trillion Korean `won' (10 billion US dollars) of the new investment remained as debt 
without creating any revenue. A government research institute's warning113 about over- 
investment turned out to be true. 
When the Big Three chaebol of Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo began to compete 
in the car industry, the first victim to fall was the firm specialising in car-manufacturing, 
Kia, followed by the smaller producer, Ssangyong. Kia was the least `chaebol-like' 
conglomerate in the sense that its companies were run by professional management staff 
rather than by the chairman's family members. Kia, together with Hyundai, was deemed 
to have the most advanced technologies in the industry. Yet it could not survive in the 
market which was distorted by the chaebol's unfair trading practices such as cross-debt 
guarantees between affiliates and cross-subsidiary trade. 
Samsung also ran into trouble. They had already spent 2 trillion won (2 billion 
dollars) on the construction of the assembly plant; they lost 87% of the original capital 
(805 billion won) three years after the establishment of corporation in 1995 due to the 
accumulated deficit. The loyalty to Nissan was as high as 280,000 won (280 dollars) per 
car. At the time, selling a car meant the loss of 1.53 million won (1,530 dollars). It was 
also difficult to ensure the transition of technologies from Nissan and to find parts- 
suppliers. Samsung's sales strategy hinged upon the `traditional' way of mobilising its 
own employees. One car was allocated to a common clerk; five cars to a manager; and 
certain numbers to the parts-supplying companies. Such illegal practice was later exposed 
by the Fair Trade Commission. 
On realising that it was impossible to survive on its own, Samsung began to attempt 
KIET under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was opposed to Samsung's entry fearing the 
possibility of overinvestment, whereas KDI under Ministry of Finance and Economy supported it. 
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to take over Kia. On 21 May 1997, Seoul Kyungjae reported exclusively the `Report for 
Restructuring the Domestic Car Industry' written by Samsung, which claimed: 
Kia's debts have increased and there will be little financial aid from other affiliated 
firms of the group as it has no competitive firm apart from the car manufacturer. 
Accordingly, the whole structure of the domestic car industry should be reformed 
centring on the leading groups which have better possibility of growth (Seoul 
Kyungjae, 21 May 1997). 
The report was interpreted as `the government should help Samsung take over Kia', 
ensuing the conspiracy claim between the government and Samsung. Although the public 
sentiment moved for Kia, it appeared to be Kia who was more damaged from it. The news 
report that the eighth biggest group was in financial trouble accelerated the demand for 
loan repayment from non-bank financial institutions that refused to renew the loan 
arrangements with Kia. At this point, some raised doubts that Samsung might have leaked 
the report intentionally. A manager of a security corporation commented later, "After the 
Samsung 's report was revealed, the rumour that Kia has come to an end spread rapidly" 
(Hankook, 15 Aug. 1998). Samsung explained that the report was not an official document 
but was written for the sake of internal discussion. 
However, on 22 August another report was revealed, entitled `The Present State of 
Seedling Projects and the Future Plan' produced by the Secretariat of Samsung. The report 
was dated on 4 March, indicating that it was made a month prior to the previously 
revealed one. This report emphasized a particular strategy to `undertake Kia by gaining 
favour of public opinion in the take-over and by establishing the cooperative relation with 
the government'. 
Preceding this, an internal report of the Ministry of Finance and Economy was 
disclosed on 4 August under the title of `Government Position to Handle Kia Motors'. It 
explicitly highlighted that the government intended to arrange the take-over by the third 
party after dishonouring it (Hankook, 15 Aug. 1998), which convinced people of the 
conspiracy between Samsung and the government. 
The conflict between the government and Kia over the resolution of either `court 
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receivership' or `composition' 114 took more than two and a half months, bringing about a 
great deal of loss to the finance market as well as Kia itself. It damaged the credit status of 
the nation, which was later conceived as one of the significant reasons that caused the 
financial crisis. The decision should have made far sooner since either way had good and 
bad aspects at the same time. However, Kang Kyungsik, the DPM of Economy, and Kim 
Sunhong, the Chairman of Kia, did not make any compromise. Whereas the government 
tried to replace the top management by the `court receivership', Kia conceived of the 
government's suggestion as the plan to hand over Kia to Samsung. Kia had deep suspicion 
on the DPM Kang who formerly worked to induce Samsung Motors' plant to Busan. 
In fact the decision should have been made by the creditors. Whilst announcing 
publicly that the decision would be made by the private sectors involved, Kang intervened 
in every way. While he allowed Jinro and Ssangbangwool to have the `composition' by 
mutual agreement between debtors and creditors, he forced the banks and the merchant 
banking corporations involved to reject Kia's proposal for `composition'. On one hand, 
attributing the fundamental problem to Chairman Kim, DPM Kang considered Kim's 
immediate retirement as the only solution without making any effort to compromise. On 
the other hand, Kim just tried to maintain his leadership in Kia, not showing any 
responsibility for the group's crisis. 
It is noteworthy that the press played a substantial role in the policy community 
concerned with the Kia issue. JoongAng explicitly represented Samsung's interest through 
its articles showing favour to Samsung: for instance, `Composition seems gone off (5 Oct. 
1997) and `Financial clouds expected to be sorted out soon' (5 Oct. 1997). These articles 
were intended to deliver the message that the possibility of composition was bleak and the 
option of court receivership should be taken soon so as to stabilise the financial market. In 
light of the timing of these articles, they appear to have contributed to pushing public 
opinion toward court receivership. From the perspective of Samsung, it was important to 
block composition, because that would enable current management to stay, thereby 
making it more difficult for Samsung to take over Kia. The effort of JoongAng continued. 
Many columns, including one by Kang Wisuk, `Responsibility of the government for free 
market economy' (JoongAng, 6, Oct. 1997), and an interview article with DPM Kang, 
114 Composition is an institutional arrangement which aims to resolve loan repayments through dialogue 
between the debtor and the creditor, and, unlike court receivership, does not assume the retreat of the 
current management. 
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entitled `Kang who has enemies on every side amidst economic difficulties' (JoongAng, 
20 Oct. 1997), encouraged him to move forward. ' 15 
A year later, in the serials of `Secret Stories of Civil Government 5 Years' in 
Hankook, it was pointed out that the articles of JoongAng played a certain role in 
disengaging the relationships between the banks and Kia. It reads: 
In the interview of JoongAng, the Kia's Chairman Kim was reported to say that "the 
government and the banks intended to kill me and the company". However, Kim 
was furious when he heard about the interview article after the first edition was 
printed out, denying and pointing out the story which obviously intends to cause the 
serious estrangement of Kia from the government and the creditors. The title of the 
interview was replaced in accordance to Kia's strong objection, but the interview 
itself was circulated next morning in Seoul as such. It was not surprising that the 
government officers and the creditors involved were angry (Hankook, 24 Aug. 
1998). 
DongA stood in opposition to JoongAng in a series of editorials, by claiming that: 
`No to third party's take-over of Kia' (6 Aug. 1997); `Composition: The only resolution 
for Kia issue' (27 Sep. ); and `Some reasons why Kang should go now' (21 Oct. ). 
Hankyoreh seemed ambivalent to the reader due to the different angles between an 
editorial writer's columns which were hostile to Kia, on the one hand, and economic 
affairs department's coverage which was sympathetic to it, on the other. Most of other 
papers were also unable to maintain the coherent internal opinion. In several papers, views 
were split even within the same department between 'Samsung's original sin' and `Kia as 
mainly responsible'. That was an extra inning of the conflicts which happened when 
Samsung initiated their action to enter into car industry. At that time, the economic editor 
of one of the major newspapers remarked in a private meeting among economic editors: 
I kind of got the feeling that the government and the media were trapped thanks to 
15 Hong Seokhyun, the chairman of JoonAng and a brother-in-law of Chairman Lee Keunhee, was 
appointed as the secretariat of DPM Kang in 1983. When DPM Kang was appointed as the Chief 
Secretary to the President, Hong again joined him as his assistant. This shows how special their 
relationship has been. 
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the chaebol's propaganda and lobbying about the car industry. We have never seen 
the media divided as now, have we? In my newspaper, editorial writers talk about 
`market logic' but reporters handling car industry raised their eyebrows, 
complaining "what the hell the market logic is about when the whole Korean car 
industry is dying". Even when we managed to get together for a drink, it ended up 
with a fighting and it was hard to control. It was no longer about logic, but it 
became all about emotional conflicts (personal communication, Apr. 1994). 
In retrospect, DongA was the one newspaper who had maintained its anti-Samsung 
tone from the entrance of Samsung into car industry to the Kia issue. By contrast, 
JoongAng was consistent in maintaining its pro-Samsung tone. Most of the other 
newspapers either became pro-Samsung or could not voice a consistent position due to 
internal conflicts. The press did not lead the rational discussion by failing to assess the 
points of Samsung and Kia issues. 
On 22 October Kia entered court receivership; on 29 October Chairman Kim 
resigned. At that very moment, however, Hong-Kong based Peregrine Securities was 
preparing the report of `Get out of Korea, now' (DongA 23 Oct. 1998). Kia's debt of 7 
trillion won (7 billion dollars) had been changed from assets to insolvent bonds, which 
came to be a substantial cause for financial crisis. Later in 1997, the average debt rate of 
the car industry hit 717%, the highest among all industries. A month later, the whole 
Korean economy came to be aided by the IMF. Samsung Motors also had the debt of 3 
trillion won even before producing the first car. 
After all these vicissitudes, Kia came to be merged into Hyundai; Samsung into 
Renault; and Daewoo into GM. Only Hyundai remained alone as a Korean car maker in a 
car industry where five chaebol pit. Lee Pilgon, former Chairman of Samsung Motors, in 
an interview after resigning from Samsung, said, "I hope the conglomerates have learned 
lessons from this event that they should invest more carefully", and added "I am the main 
culprit as far as the problem of Samsung Motors is concerned" (Chosun, 12 July 1999). 
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Two Bigots of the Steel Industry 
Decision-making in Two Dynasties 116 
Another example which demonstrates the media failure and the resulting economic 
tensions can be found in the steel industry. In this episode, two chaebol were involved: 
Hyundai and Hanbo. Both wanted to enter into the steel industry, but Hyundai failed and 
Hanbo succeeded. The successful Hanbo was eventually faced with bankruptcy, setting a 
stepping-stone toward financial crisis. In investigating the causes of such dramatic failure, 
the first step should be to examine corporate culture of these chaebol. 
Chung Juyung was so absolute a monarch that his nickname was `Kingly Chairman' 
within the Hyundai group. His four younger brothers and 10 or more sons and nephews 
were all in chairmanship, but there was no one among them to speak out without reserve 
to Chung's face. Even Seyung, Chung's younger brother and 50 years' business partner 
who had led Hyundai Motors into a world-class car maker, used to say, "It is my elder 
brother that I am most awed by" (Maeil Kyungjae, 11 May 1994). A former secretary in 
Chung's office recalled: 
Even chairmen and chief executives of Hyundai affiliates were always cowed in the 
presence of `Kingly Chairman'.... Before they entered his office to get his signature, 
they usually asked to me, "How is he feeling now? " On hearing that he was not 
feeling so well, they would retreat from the room without hesitation (Pressian, 22 
Feb. 2003). 
In Hyundai's headquarters, offices were allocated to chairmen according to their 
familial rank; from Chung's own on the top 14th floor to the others; ' downstairs. 
Patriarchy was a norm in Hyundai, so Chung's sons should used the back doors instead of 
the front doors. Hyundai was controlled completely by the Chung family, but Chung 
rejected flatly the criticism from the outside on the managerial succession within the 
family by saying that `my sons and grandsons are professional managers, for they 
116 Donald Kirk, a former Seoul correspondent for the International Herald Tribune, published his book on 
the Hyundai group, of which the title was `Korean Dynasty: Hyundai and Chung Juyung' (Kirk 1994). 
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graduated from business schools and have been involved in the management for over 10 
years' (Huh 1999: 224). In this regard, Kim Keewon pointed out: 
In the chaebol system, chairman enjoys the ultimate power of top decision-making 
until death, and his blood relative succeeds him only because he is chairman's 
blood relative. Therefore it is impossible to reproduce top management in a steady 
manner and to make a rational decision in this pre-modern monarchial dictatorship 
of the chaebol (Kim, K. 2001). 
Chung's charisma was based on his achievements in establishing Korea's largest 
chaebol with 62 affiliates, 117 as a result of diligence and passion of a primary school 
graduate who had ran away from home. We can never overestimate his contribution to 
Korean economic growth. However, Chung, a leading actor of Korean miracle in the 60's 
and 70's, had continued to fail in the business ever since the 80's. Along with the 
establishment of Hyundai Electronics, Hyundai Petrochemical, and Hyundai Timber in the 
80's, running for the presidency and joint ventures with North Korea in the 90's were 
examples of such failures. What were the reasons for such failures of Hyndai, which had 
created a series of success stories like Hyundai Construction, Hyundai Motors, and 
Hyundai Heavy Industries for 30 years since its establishment? 
First, we can take into account changes in its external business environments. In the 
`age of development' under Park Chunghee's leadership, profits were something 
guaranteed only if a business got a license or bulk order from the government. In the 80's, 
however, this became impossible due to increased competition and market liberalization, 
both internationally and domestically. 
Second, we should point out the failure in the decision-making system within the 
Hyundai group. In spite of environmental changes, Hyundai relied upon only Chung's 
personal passion and sense of business. There was little room for professional managers in 
managing the group. Chung would push forward with his idea even when the idea needed 
further high-standard expertise and close examination. In his autobiography, Chung 
himself wrote, "They [Chung's aides] know that once I made up my mind, it will never be 
reversed by any means" (Chung, J. 1998: 226). In response to the criticism of reckless 
1" In terms of the number of affiliates, Samsung had 61 affiliates in 1997, one less than Hyundai's. 
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business expansion, Chung kept on saying, "It is just a nonsense made by frogs in a small 
well [that do not know the big ocean] to disapprove of the concentration of economic 
power simply on account of the size and the number of business lines" (Chung, J. 1998: 
372). 
Hyundai showed very negative attitude toward labour union and suppressed labour 
movement frequently. Chung said, "[Korean] labour laws are bad because they capped the 
maximum labour hours to 44 hours a week without considering the situation in which 
workers should work more" (Hankyoreh, 20 Nov. 1991). He was displeased with industrial 
actions, and kept on saying that he had accepted as much as paid and had done as ordered 
when he had been a grain store worker (Huh 1999: 345). According to Chung, employees 
have only to follow the management's instruction, and do not need to intervene in the 
management. 
An example of Chung's arbitrary decision against all objections from others in 
Hyundai was his entering politics in 1992, which was mentioned in chapter 2. This was 
triggered by the government order to sell off Hyundai's real estates deemed `possessed for 
a non-business purpose' and additional tax collection from Hyundai Construction. Making 
the most of Hyundai group's money and organization, Chung won 31 seats in the National 
Assembly in two month right after the formation of the Nationalist Party. Moreover, he 
drove on running for the presidency. He integrated the politics and the economy entirely 
and boasted of the party membership of all Hyundai employees and 2.5 million employees 
of Hyundai's subcontracting companies and their families. 
Munhwa-ilbo, a Hyundai-owned newspaper launched in 1991, functioned as the 
party's bulletin. With the slogan of the `President of Economy', his election pledges such 
as `national income of 20,000 dollars' and `supply of half-priced apartments' were absurd 
enough, but some voters, disappointed with the existing politicians, anticipated his 
presidency. Rumour had it that, at the later stage of the election campaign, Hyundai 
affiliates would intentionally close down their businesses and become insolvent in order to 
cause the public feeling that the government was oppressing Hyundai group. 
Chung's great gamble to acquire the political power using his economic power 
turned out to be a failure early on. ' 18 Nevertheless, its consequences harmed the Korean 
118 Chung Juyung won 388 million votes (16.3%). Kim Youngsam was elected by wining 997 million votes 
(42%). 
167 
economy as well as Hyundai in an extended period from then on. It was revealed that 
Hyundai Heavy Industries had diverted 43 billion won (43 million dollars) of corporate 
fund to political fund, and Chung and over 100 Hyundai managers were investigated or 
prosecuted. Within the Hyundai group, some guessed that Chung would regard those 
prosecuted as martyrs and promote them to an important position and that a company with 
no punished employees might be treated unfavourably in the next annual personnel change. 
A senior executive of Hyundai in a private meeting recalled: 
Who would resist the corporate frenzy driving all the employees into fervor of 
election? All have worked with real enthusiasm, donating parts of our salaries 
to the Party. It seems to me that we were all hypnotized collectively (personal 
communication, 23 Dec. 1992). 
When Chung returned to management and chaired an executive meeting in 15 
March 1993, he directed the executives as follows: "To recover the damaged image of the 
group, build as many signboards as possible along the highway. Each affiliate should form 
professional sports teams119 within the limit of company profit (Huh 1999: 110). 
Hanbo is another chaebol whose corporate culture is very close to Hyundai's. 
Hanbo and Hyundai are different from other chaebol in terms of the official name of the 
Chairman. Like Hyundai's `Kingly Chairman', Hanbo group called Chairman Chung 
Taesoo `Chairman-General' in order to distinguish him from other chairmen. As Chung 
Juyung's eight sons inherited the corporate control, Chung Taesoo's three sons took a 
chairmanship in three respective sectors. 
The two Chungs were similar in the sense that they regarded their companies as 
their private property and employees as their subjects or servants. For example, Chung 
Juyung said "I am spending my money" when he used the corporate money for his 
presidential election (Chosun, 11 Dec. 1992), Chung Taesoo said in a trial, "it is natural 
for a lord to dispose of the crops in storage that servants cultivated and harvested" 
(Hankyoreh, 16 Apr. 1997). It is strange that all Hanbo affiliates had the same anniversary 
of the establishment, but that the date changed every year. Since Chung had changed the 
19 Hyundai has created professional sports teams in almost all sports areas popular to Koreans (e. g. football, 
baseball, basketball, volleyball, and Sseereum -a type of traditional wrestling). 
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anniversary dates of acquired companies to his date of birth, which was based on the lunar 
calendar, the unified anniversary would change year by year. 
Employees were thought of as an object to infuse the corporate policy into, not an 
equal partner of mutual communications. A corporate bulletin is a way of facilitating 
communications within a company. However, Hanbo's bulletin of January 1999, the 
month of its bankruptcy, coloured its future as rosy forecasting `Hanbo Steel expects 170 
billion won in black in 1999' (Hanbo Family, Jan. 1999). 
It is not too much to say that the business expansion of Hanbo almost depended 
upon Chung Taesoo and his sons' lobbying and PR activities. Business feasibility analysis 
was considered as a waste of money and time, and a prudential manager was regarded as 
lacking a positive drive. They thought that feasibility and profitability of business was 
something that could be improved by lobbying. `Sooseo Scandal' in 1991 illustrates the 
fact that Hanbo maximized its business profitability by having Sooseo region's land use 
plan altered. It was made public that celebrities in politics and the press had been bribed 
with a huge amount of money. It was well known to the press that Hanbo's senior staff in 
charge of public relations presented an extremely generous chonji. 
We can infer also from Chung's plan to establish a press foundation the fact that he 
considered public relations and lobbying as the keys to his business. Although Hanbo was 
merely ranked among the 30 biggest chaebol, he intended to hold the advantage of the Big 
Four120 which were each running a press foundation at that time. It was only a month 
before the bankruptcy of Hanbo that Chairman Chung held an establishment ceremony for 
the press foundation, assuring a donation of 5 billion won (5 million dollars) `to return 
profits to society'. A good relationship with the press was crucial in concealing the 
problems of its `family management' and `lobby management. ' 
Hyundai 's Attempt for the Steel Industry 
How did power game between Hyundai and the government proceed as the former 
attempted to plunge into steel industry? What was the role of the media in the process? To 
120 The press foundations established by Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo and LG have bestowed many 
generous benefits to journalists. 
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answer these questions, for a start, it is necessary to examine the background of the project 
and decision making process of Hyundai. This is because the internal factors such as 
Hyundai's willingness to propel the project and their unity play a significant role in a tug- 
of-war of the policy community. What must be investigated in the following are factors 
such as tendency of the policy authorities and media environment surrounding Hyundai. 
In March 1994 Hyundai resumed their steelworks project which they had not 
developed any further since a draft plan of 1978. The restart can be explained by the 
chaebol's eagerness for business expansion and Chung Juyung's political judgment. 
Chairman Chung convened a press conference in Tokyo voluntarily to announce his plan 
to build a large-scale steelworks at Ulsan in the southeast of Korea. Then this enormous 
investment project of 7.7 billion dollars for the construction of three steel furnaces, 
occupied the front pages of newspapers in both Korea and Japan. This was also a sign of 
Chung's ambition to rejuvenate the group after his failure in politics. 
Another motive was the competition with Samsung, which was preparing for its 
business expansion into the car industry. The situation was that Samsung invaded heavy 
industries such as shipbuilding, heavy equipment and construction which had been 
traditionally Hyundai's business realm while the latter entered into light industries such as 
electronics and semiconductors which had been the main business areas of Samsung. 
Samsung's encroachment on the car industry meant that Hyundai stood in a one-sidedly 
defensive situation because the car industry was a stronghold of Hyundai. 
However, paradoxically, Samsung's ardent endeavour to enter into car industry was 
in a sense beneficiary for Hyundai to expand into the steel industry. Once Samsung was 
allowed to take up the car industry, it would undermine the business specialisation policy 
advocated by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. As a result, Hyundai would be able 
to raise the principle of equity. It was out of this calculation that Hyundai did not raise 
strong objections about Samsung's entry into car industry. In fact, while other car 
companies including their labour unions were desperate to obstruct Samsung's entry, 
`Ulsan car plant of Hyundai kept silent' (Hankyoreh, 9 Dec. 1994). Hyundai retreated 
from the united front at an early stage. However, both attempts by Samsung and Hyundai 
were thwarted by the obstinate objection of the MOCI that adhered to the business 
specialisation policy. 
Yet as Samsung finally succeeded in entering into the car industry and Kim Chulsoo 
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was dismissed from the post of the Minister, Hyundai reinvigorated their project to enter 
into steel industry in 1995. In 1996 Chung Monggoo, 12' the eldest son of Chung Juyung, 
took the lead in promoting the steelworks project. His move can be seen in relation to the 
strife among the second generation chairmen of Hyundai surrounding inheritance and 
leadership. By driving the project of entering into the steel industry which had been the 
main aspiration of the group for twenty years, Chung Monggoo tried to obtain his father's 
credit, extract funds from his siblings' companies and become the chairman who lead the 
whole Hyundai group. Yet for this very reason, Hyundai underwent an internal split and 
lost the driving force to enter into the steel industry. His brothers were negative about the 
steelworks project for the reasons that it would bring in little practical profits and it would 
not fit into the separation of affiliates. 
However, Chung Monggoo embarked on the project under the aegis of his father. 
He employed the tactics used by Samsung when they entered into the car industry. The 
political circumstance was also very similar to that of Samsung; the presidential election 
drew near. A difference might be found in the fact that Hyundai leaked to the press two 
places, rather than one, as candidate sites for the steelworks. The two proposed sites were 
Gunsan in the west coast and Hadong in the south coast of Korea, where there has been a 
long-standing regional conflict. The two regions started vigorous campaigns for inviting 
the steelworks in their own region to the extent that heads of the local governments even 
mobilized their administrative staff for the campaigns. Hyundai assigned their employee 
whose homes were either Gunsan or Hadong a task of obtaining signatures in the petitions 
- one thousand for a department chief and three hundred for a mere clerk - 
in their trips to 
their home at the Mid-Autumn Festival. Although Hyundai had already internally decided 
the site as Hadong, their public relations team pretended as if the site had not yet been 
decided. For instance, the general tone of news reports at the time was well reflected in the 
following: `Two regions came up as the competent sites proposed for the steelworks, yet 
the final decision is to be made' (JoongAng, 18 Sep. 1997). 
However, the financial crisis in November overshadowed the controversies 
surrounding the construction of the steelworks. The failure of Hyundai's attempt is viewed 
rather as a fortunate incident for Hyundai as well as the Korean national economy. A high 
ranking employee of Hyundai in a private talk with the present researcher said: 
12' As the eldest son, Mongpil, was killed in a traffic accident in 1982, Monggoo became the eldest. 
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It was a great fortune that we did not get the permission to establish the steelworks. 
If the permission had been given and Hyundai had invested heavily at the outset, it 
would have taken much longer for the whole Korean economy to get out of the IMF 
ruling (personal communication, Dec. 1997). 
Although Hyundai's entry into steel industry was prevented by the financial crisis, 
we cannot attribute the whole `achievement' to it. To clarify the circumstances in which 
Hyundai, which could enter into every industry they wanted, was unable to expand into 
steel industry over twenty years, the characteristics of the members of policy community 
and their interaction must be investigated. 
First, it was a significant factor for Hyundai's failure that there existed a few core 
members who supported the business specialisation policy in the government and a public 
steel company. The potential competitor of Hyundai was the Pohang Steel Company 
(POSCO: public enterprise) with competitiveness in the world. The former chairman of 
POSCO, Park Taejoon who was a strong man in the ruling party obstructed Hyundai's 
entry into steel industry. It means that Hyundai's reliance on political power, unlike 
Samsung, could not be very effective. After Park receded from the power, high officials in 
charge - such as the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Kim Chulsoo and the 
Director 
General for Machinery and Basic Industries, Lee Keunwoo - upheld the business 
specialisation policy and were not persuaded by chaebol's logics. The MOCI argued that 
`Another steelworks with integrated furnaces would result in oversupply and would not be 
environmentally friendly due to its antiquated technologies. ' 
Second, Hyundai's unskilled public relations and lobbying activities might have 
been a factor. Unlike shrewd Samsung, Hyundai gave reporters the impression that their 
public relations practices were carried out in a `bulldozer style'. For instance, Jhe Jeong- 
im who was then an economic journalist wrote: 
The higher staffs of Hyundai were lobbying by holding golf games in which the 
owners, the management staffs and the senior journalists of major newspapers were 
invited... 
. The 
junior reporters' articles that criticized Hyundai were sometimes 
thrown into a bin by the editors. At the time some directors of Hyundai showed a 
172 
kind of attitude that `it is no use how many reports you write'. Such arrogance 
provoked anger among journalists (Jhe 2002: 159). 
Hyundai was rather insensitive to minute information, as captured in Chairman 
Chung's remark: "Don't be concerned about such details but push it through from a broad 
view" (Chosun, 28 Nov. 1994). A general evaluation was that Hyundai was no match for 
Samsung in terms of lobbying skill. In this regard, Lee Keunwoo, then Director General 
for Machinery and Basic Industries of MOCI, reflected as follows: 
At that time, I became a main target of lobbying by both Hyundai and Samsung as I 
was charged with car and steel industry. In comparison with Samsung, Hyundai's 
lobbying skill was amateurish (interview, 22 Mar. 2003). 
Although the car industry of Samsung and the steel industry of Hyundai could be 
approached from the same logic of `free competition', most stubborn controversialists 
who supported Samsung Motors remained silent about Hyundai Steel. 
Third, some evidence can be inferred from the failure of Hyundai that even a small 
number of newspapers could cast a great influence on the policy making process if they 
made a certain issue an agenda by reporting it intensively. In frustrating Hyundai's entry 
into the steel industry, it can be observed that Hankyoreh played such a significant role. 
The newspaper tenaciously delved into the problems of Hyundai's expansion into the steel 
industry by publishing approximately eighty reports and commentaries about this during 
the period of three years when Hyundai were promoting the project. Examples include 
`Industry policies swaying from the root' (23 July 1994), `Dashing-forward taking 
advantage of the revival of economy' (12 Apr. 1997), `Hyundai Steel seizes the 
opportunity of the election wind" (20 Oct. 1997). In particular, its exclusive report of the 
internal document of Hyundai, `The Plan of Operation for Entry into Steel Industry' (12 
Apr 1997) triggered consequent reports of other newspapers (e. g. Seoul-shinmun, 13 Apr. 
1997), and contributed to drawing public attention into steel industry. Hankyoreh also 
tried to bring the problem of steel industry into public discussion by serializing several 
articles under the title of `Scrutinise, Hyundai's Entry into Steel Industry' 
(1-4 Nov. 
1997). 
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While Chosun, in terms of economic affairs, reported on Hyundai Steel rather 
neutrally, it stirred up public opinion from the perspective of environmental problems. At 
the last stage when Hyundai and the Kyungnam Province agreed Hadong as the site for the 
steelworks and put pressure on the central government, Chosun covered in two pages the 
actual environmental damages expected in the district (Chosun, 21 Nov. 1997). The 
satellite photo of Guangyang Bay aroused people's visual imagination about how much 
worse it would be if Hyundai Steel was built in the already congested industrial area. 
Other newspapers were not absorbed into the issue, covering only a few facts, except for 
Munhwa-ilbo, an affiliated company of Hyundai, which argued that Hyundai Steel should 
be allowed on grounds of the principle of equity. Yet it was regarded as an uncommon 
voice. Munhwa was a newly established newspaper whose influence cannot be compared 
with that of JoongAng in establishing the Samsung Motors. 
Fourth, the role of civil organisations was not insignificant in obstructing the 
establishment of Hyundai Steel. Hyundai succeeded in leading the campaign of inviting 
the steelworks in Hadong County, yet they did not expect that the residents of Namhae 
County, which faces Hadong across Guangyang Bay, would carry out such a strong 
boycott. In particular, fishermen of Namhae Island waged a vigorous boycott campaign 
against the construction plan, for instance by staging a performance-style demonstration 
which depicted the damaging effects of the steelworks to the eco-system including the 
fishing ground and the shore field (Chosun, 21 Nov. 1997). They, in alliance with various 
nationwide environmental organisations, also raised the issue of the `social cost' for 
constructing the steelworks. This process demonstrates how influential, in some cases, 
civil organisations' activities could be in the process of policy making. 
A Detonator of the Financial Crisis: Hanbo Steel 
An investigation of the process in which Hanbo entered into the steel industry and 
was finally confronted with bankruptcy shows that mistakes had occurred repeatedly at 
every critical moment, which could have been avoided or at least minimized if effective 
and rational discussion had been in place. Not only Hanbo themselves, but also financial 
institutions, the government and the political authority made imprudent decisions on the 
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issue. This process is also illustrative in showing what disaster could be brought if the 
members of the policy community do not properly play their roles. 
First, the greatest problem is found in the structure of decision making within 
Hanbo. There was little internal capability to control Chairman Chung who had over- 
confidence in the merit of expanding business. It was possible to some extent through the 
politics-business collusion that the apartment construction company founded in 1974 
could become to rank among the top ten chaebol in 1996. Through the lobbying, Hanbo 
were able to take out bank loans as if they were withdrawing their own money. And yet it 
was seen as Chairman Chung's `ability'. Turning into a vicious circle, some of the bank 
loans were spent in lobbying and public relations activities. Hanbo even took over the 
insolvent enterprise, the Yuwon Group, on the condition that they had to invest 5 trillion 
won in Hanbo Steel. This decision seemed to be based on the prediction that the bigger 
they are, although with larger debts, the greater voice they could make against banks. In 
short, they put blind belief in `too big to fail'. Chairman Chung's remark represents such 
consciousness. As a summons by the Prosecution Offices drew near, he hospitalised 
himself and said audaciously, "Hyundai and Samsung who have borrowed 50 or 60 trillion 
won, are perfectly alright, what matters about a mere 5 trillion won (5 billion dollars)? " 
(Chosun, 31 Jan. 1997). 
Second, as a high official in the Ministry of Finance and Economy said, "the chief 
criminal of the Hanbo situation is `political finance', not `government-ruled finance"' 
(Chosun, 25 Jan. 1997). The political circles were at least accomplices. The so-called 
`Hanbo list', which was revealed in the process of investigation after bankruptcy of Hanbo, 
included 56 politicians. It exposed why `most assemblymen had kept silent in spite of 
demanding a lot of material about Hanbo in the annual parliamentary inspection of the 
administration' (DongA, 26 Jan. 1997). Demanding such material might be a signal to send 
to Hanbo who they wanted to contact. Besides, it came to light that Hanbo kept the `secret 
political money' of the former president, Roh Taewoo, which was received from the 
chaebol. 
Third, the Government and the Financial Supervisory Service played a little role. 
The COREX method that Hanbo imported was a new technology with low-pollution, but 
it did not suit mass production. In an interview, Lee Keunwoo, then Director General for 
Machinery and Basic Industries, said: 
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I stood against import of the COREX method, but Hanbo succeeded to receive the 
permission. I wondered to whom they lobbied. As the import of new technology 
could enjoy the tariff preference, Hanbo seemed to push forward with their plan 
without serious consideration (interview, 22 Mar. 2003). 
In 1995 a researcher of the Institute for Management under POSCO wrote: `Hanbo 
Steel would suffer a loss of tens of million dollars every year after completion'. After the 
report was leaked, he received disadvantage in personnel affairs (Hankyoreh, 27 Jan. 
1997). Jaeil Bank and Seoul Bank increased their loans for Hanbo in 1994 even after 
receiving reports from credit assessment institutions, which warned a default risk in 
relation to the loans to Hanbo. In the end, the Presidents of the Banks turned out to be 
bribed by Hanbo (DongA, 30 Jan. 1997). 
It was one of the main problems that even though such early warning systems were 
institutionally established they did not function in an efficient way to provide the basis for 
rational decision making. The press also did not reach beyond reporting unknown episodes 
even after it turned into a grave issue. The press showed very weak features in 
investigating report, as far as the chaebol were concerned, because of many constraints 
mentioned earlier. 
The press sometimes played a significant role in irrational decision making through 
distorting the reality beyond dereliction of its duty. When Hanbo Steel started in business, 
all the newspapers carried praising articles such as `The biggest industrial complex of the 
west coast -a happy dream' (Hankyoreh, 21 Feb. 1993) and `The era of electric furnace 
will be opened' (JoongAng, 16 Jan. 1995). These were probably understandable given that 
it was difficult for reporters to recognise Hanbo's problem at the time. 
However, even in the very summer of 1996 when Hanbo was caught in a `trap of 
business expansion' and ran into bankruptcy, the press was still manufacturing its image as 
`a prosperous group'. One of the reasons was that the press relied heavily on the 
information provided by Hanbo as a news source. The other reason was due to the power 
of advertising. Hanbo endeavored to change the negative image related to the `Sooseo 
Scandal' by means of advertisement. Hanbo's massive investment in PR brought about the 
instant boom in the newspaper advertising market which was suffering from depression. 
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This coincided with the period when many newspapers reported a great number of positive 
stories about Hanbo, such as `A dreamy steelworks of the 21S` century, the grand 
construction work is going smoothly' (Segye, 14 Aug. 1996). 
Hanbo sometimes paid the expense of overseas coverage activities for many 
newspapers. In real circumstances, it seemed that they tried to disguise their financial 
dilemma. For instance, the Kookmin, Kyunghyang and Daehanmaeil on 18 October 1996 
gave special coverage to Hanbo's participation in natural gas exploration of Siberia. In 
fact, these articles showed that the reporters who traveled the Siberia region at Hanbo's 
expense, as Jhe Jeong-im explained, `played faithful roles according to their scenario' (Jhe 
2002: 127-129). Even in June 1997 when the Korean economy was suffering from the 
aftermath of Hanbo's bankruptcy, Hankook carried a big article interviewing a new 
successor of Hanbo, Chung's son, taking an opportunity of 100 days after being 
inaugurated as a chairman. The title of the article was `Banner of transparent management, 
reform of Hanbo obtained visible results' (Hankook, 18, June 1997). 
In January 1997, Hanbo became finally bankrupted and the malignant loan became 
the first detonator leading to the financial crisis. A massive wave of bankruptcy weakened 
the Korean economy so considerably that the Asian currency crisis in the autumn of that 
year could easily affect Korea. It also needs to be noted that the Hanbo scandal was a 
turning point toward the crisis in that it involved the then President's son and thereby 
damaged the government's authority. As the call for `the retreat of the state' gathered more 
support, the government capability of handling economic issues was seriously dwindled. 
Hanbo, which imposed its debt of 5 billion dollars over the Korean economy (eventually 
taxpayers), was sold to a risk capital management company called `AK capital' at the price 
of only 370 million dollars in 2003. 
Conclusion 
We have seen that the chaebol, individually a corner of triangle of the policy 
community, have numerous defects with the internal decision-making system. The 
damaging effects of unilateral decisions by chaebol owners are not confined to the chaebol 
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themselves. In their single-minded attempt to achieve their decisions, the democratic 
decision-making system in the society tends to be weakened or destroyed, and the costs 
arising from this are shifted to other parts of the society which have not been given any 
opportunity to express their views. 122 As Pateman and Dahl pointed out, it is desirable 
that the democratic principle of participation and equality is applied to those organisations 
operating in the private sphere because they, as `private governments', also exercise their 
power (Pateman 1970; Dahl 1985). In view of this, the neo-liberal argument that `the 
principle of democracy is applicable to the public sphere, while the principle of liberty 
should be applied to the private sphere' is not convincing. 
As is seen from the cases of Samsung, Hyundai and Hanbo, management systems 
with `despotism' and `nepotism' may have the advantage of providing a strong driving 
force to achieve business goals `without distraction', but are also the cause of sclerosis in 
enterprise decision makings which require effective communication for their success. In 
addition, such management systems tend to rely more on a PR team. Pathological tenacity 
is often praised as `impulsive forces' while family management is translated to 
`brotherhood'. Once PR is used to cover up the problems inherent in pre-modern the 
management system, it will not contribute to improving public relations but contribute to 
making matters worse. Early revelations of these problems would provide an important 
avenue for problem-solving within the company and also in the society. Democracy within 
the organisation is the core value which the company should develop to promote rational 
decision making. 
The government, which is supposed to prevent company misbehaviours through 
establishing proper institutional arrangements and ensuring effective supervisions, was not 
capable of playing these essential roles in the aftermath of `the retreat of the state'. 
Similarly, political parties and congress, which are assumed to resolve social conflicts 
based on democratic principles, have been captured by the chaebol, often causing more 
tensions to the already volatile situation. The chaebol have successfully involved politics 
and politicians, which turned out to be leverage for policy distortions. Politicians in power 
were so single-mindedly interested in their local constituents and their political future that 
they made successful attempts to host the Samsung car factory in Busan and the Hanbo 
122 With regard to governance in the chaebol, Hong Duckryul concluded that the centralised governance 
within the organization and factory despotism becomes a key issue in Korean society and therefore 
democratic principles should be expanded to economy and society (Hong 1997b: 23 1.264). 
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steelworks in Dangjin. However, they ended up with terrible loss for the very local 
constituents. 
The tug-of-war in a policy-making process requires the presence of a fair umpire 
and arbitrator. As it should be based on truth, it is essential to locate and disseminate the 
facts, thereby promoting rational discussions. Such roles are exactly what are expected 
from the democratic media in the policy community. For resolving policy conflicts in a 
democratic process, the media should explain the merits and disadvantages of alternative 
policy options and their potential effects, while ensuring the delivery of the views of 
people concerned in a fair manner and ultimately the rational operation of public sphere. 
However, we have seen that the function of the Korean media was rather vulnerable 
to numerous constraints, especially when it came to the chaebol and industrial policies. 
Even worse, it is often the case that, as the power of money became unprecedentedly 
strong, the media were actively involved in distorting information and disrupting rational 
discussions, thereby misleading policy decisions. The chaebol, as news sources, were 
increasingly capable of controlling the media and exercising greater influence in policy 
decisions. Indeed, the power of the chaebol over the media has tended to increase since the 
`struggle for democratisation' of 1987. This is largely in line with the deregulation drive 
concerning chaebol-related policies and the further concentration of economic power since 
the democratisation. This means that the chaebol, as news sources, have strengthened and 
consolidated their position as financial resources for the media. Yet, as the failure of 
Hyundai in its adventure into the steel industry demonstrates, the success in the tug-of-war 
with the media is not always guaranteed for the chaebol. 
The cases of Samsung and Hanbo show that unilateral and even arbitrary decisions 
made in the absence of internal democracy within the company could survive critics and 
oppositions from the media and the government. Samsung and Hanbo mobilized all kinds 
of PR efforts, often manipulated public opinions, and eventually quelled the opposition of 
techno-bureaucrats by mobilizing politicians. At almost all stages of these processes, the 
media were involved. Some were critical, while many others were misled or volunteering 
to be supportive and cooperative. In these cases, media reports influenced policy makers 
directly or through politicians in a multi-stepped way. 
In short, once the public sphere at different stages was paralysed, undemocratic and 
irrational decisions could be adopted and implemented without being curbed. The wrong 
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decisions of the chaebol, which are made when the local public spheres (Öffentlichkeiten) 
within the chaebol is broken down, could blow up industrial policies of a country. This is 
because the chaebol have the power to control the wider public sphere (Offentlichkeit) 
where government policies of a country are discussed and determined. 
The huge amount of defunct debts created by Hanbo (5 trillion won), Kia (7 trillion 
won) and Samsung (3 trillion won) continued to suffocate the financial market in Korea. 
In particular, a considerable proportion of these debts involved foreign currencies to 
import new technology from abroad, which apparently contributed to the foreign exchange 
crisis in late 1997. The business specialization policy became questionable as Samsung 
entered into the car industry, and the chaebol were now on the high road of business 
expansion without a break. The further market expansion of the top chaebol, particularly 
through internal transactions and financial oligopoly struck blows not only to small and 
medium enterprises but also to middle-ranked chaebol with somehow solid technological 
capabilities. Thus, it should come as no surprise that these middle-ranked chaebol such as 
Halla, SSangbangul, Jinro, Chunggoo and Woobang fell into insolvency one by one, and 
the Korean economy was rapidly approaching the economic crisis. 
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5 
Silent `Watch-dog' 
Introduction 
As to whether it was the general enterprises or the financial institutions which 
played the decisive role in bringing about the foreign exchange crisis, views vary greatly 
among scholars. Those who tend to recognise the chaebol's usefulness emphasise 
government failure or government-managed financial system, in particular (e. g. Jwa et al. 
2000). Those who are critical of the chaebol, on the other hand, focus their attention on 
market failure. They argue that the chaebol's overinvestment was the main cause of the 
crisis. Cho Wonhee, for example, claims that `considerable portion of loans extended to 
the industry turned out to be barren, generating no profit, and then the industrial panic led 
to credit panic and eventually to financial panic' (Cho 1997: 9). 
The divergence of views is noticeable within government departments too. The 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), which oversees financial institutions, appears 
to take the position that the industry's overinvestment was the cause of the crisis. However, 
the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE), which is responsible for 
providing support to the industry, tends to argue that the under-developed financial system 
was to blame. In a sense, these conflicting views123 are advanced in an effort to absolve 
the relevant Ministry. 
The bad loans of financial institutions are, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
mostly due to bad performance of the industry. Nevertheless, if financial institutions had 
had a properly functioning credit and risk assessment mechanism and used it in making 
loans, some of the more outrageous instances of overinvestment could have been avoided. 
The analysis offered in this chapter is based on an assumption that both the industry 
and the financial institutions contributed to the deterioration of the situation. In particular, 
as their shortcomings were combined, the Korean economy inexorably led to the crisis. 
123 Regarding this. further discussions based on interviews will be attempted in chapter 6. 
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The previous chapter attempted an analysis focusing on the industry. In this chapter, we 
will focus on the financial system as it is the other responsible party of the crisis. We shall 
see how rash decisions to de-regulate financial industry led to mushrooming of weak 
financial institutions. It will also become apparent why the government departments have 
failed to carry out their duties while the foreign exchange crisis was rapidly and palpably 
approaching. 
We shall have a close look at the role of the press, in particular. This chapter deals 
with whether the press adequately fulfilled its role by giving an advance warning and what 
impacts the press had on economic change. Regarding the relationship between the 
economic news reporting and the economic performances, there are many studies as we 
reviewed in chapter 1. Many of these tend to show that economic news with an unduly 
negative tone could distort economic reality and eventually could make the economy 
worse (e. g. Glassman 1993; Kim K. 1997; Blood and Phillips 1997). 
However, the opposite is also possible. Economic news could be overly optimistic 
and therefore fail to report the symptoms of approaching crisis. In this regard, the Korean 
case requires a close examination. In an era of economic opening-up, it is also of interest 
to observe how a financial or capital market responds when the domestic media and 
foreign media adopt different tones of economic news reporting. 
For an adequate assessment of the media's impacts on the performance of economy, 
it would be necessary, as argued in chapter 1, to examine not only the micro-economic 
variables, such as consumer sentiment, but also broad issues about economic policy and 
economic thought. The preceding two chapters offered an account of how the press 
provided support for neo-liberalism which became the main-stream ideology and how 
neo-liberalism influenced the decision making for industrial policies. This chapter will 
attempt to investigate the process through which neo-liberalism was translated into 
government policies for financial industry. For this purpose, one should begin by closely 
examining how Korea made the decision to become, and eventually became a member of 
the OECD. We will then examine how policy decisions were made and enforced regarding 
financial industry and foreign exchange, and what role the media played in that context. 
We will also see how the communication and decision making processes functioned 
within the government as well as in the larger society of Korea, and eventually what 
influence they had on economic changes. 
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Rush for Financial Liberalisation 
Toward the OECD 
To a certain extent, the financial industry should take credit for the brilliant 
economic success of South Korea which took place over the past 30 years. High saving 
propensity and targeted credit allocation to strategic industries were virtually fuels for 
sustaining high economic growth. Why, then, did Korea decide to discard this policy 
which was being regarded as a model for economic growth for many developing 
countries? The policy transformation was so abrupt and comprehensive that such changes 
cannot be explained solely by a new climate for financial industry. 
The all-out transformation of financial policies can be explained as realisation of the 
logic of globalisation which occurred against the backdrop of neo-liberalism. As discussed 
in chapter 4, President Kim Youngsam's `Globalisation Plan' was announced at the end of 
1994 without any preparation. However, it turned out to be an all-purpose tool for the 
chaebol and ruling interest groups to promote and protect their interests in all fronts of the 
government's activities and policy formation. Conservative newspapers such as JoongAng, 
which is an affiliate of Samsung, took the initiative for agenda-setting. Arguments were 
advanced to remove various regulatory frameworks which were preventing duplication 
and overinvestment. It was also advocated that the government's economic departments 
should be trimmed down and that Korea should become a member of the OECD. President 
Kim's `Globalisation Plan' was thus taking shape. 
De-regulation of financial industry suddenly became an unavoidable task of the time 
which must be accomplished without further delay. In the era of globalisation, the chaebol 
were portrayed as the most globalised entities in Korea. It was the government's task, they 
said, to remove obstacles which may be in the chaebol's way. The argument was aimed at 
reducing the government's role in matters concerning financial industry and the chaebol. 
However, the Korean case shows that de-regulation of financial industry could be 
dangerous if it results in removal of vitally important regulations and weakening of the 
supervisory mechanisms. Especially if it results in collusive mergers between industrial 
capital and financial capital: the outcome could be devastating. 
In fact, the Korean government initially maintained a somewhat moderate and 
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considered approach to de-regulation of financial industry. The government proposed 
`Three Phases toward De-regulation and Opening up of Financial Industry' when it was 
engaged in the `Financial Policy Talks' with the United States in the early `90's or in 
negotiations under the Uruguay Round. However, when the negotiations with the OECD 
began, the timetable for phased de-regulation was drastically shortened and brought 
forward. Korea aimed to secure the membership of OECD by 1996 and OECD's main 
concern was to remove state barriers against free movement of capital and services. In 
order to meet the requirements of the OECD, Korea would have to introduce de-regulatory 
measures which were sure to deal fatal blows to its relatively under-developed financial 
industry and capital market. Whether Korea should nevertheless become a member of the 
OECD should therefore have been a highly controversial issue arousing heated debates 
and public discussions where various policy alternatives are explored. 
What happened was the opposite. Securing the membership of the OECD was one 
of Kim Youngsam's promises made in the presidential election campaign of 1992. Kim 
made the promise because it projected a `fantastic image of a developed nation' and was 
thought to increase his chances of winning the election. However, the problem is that, 
under a strong presidential government like Korea, such an election promise can have a 
great deal of driving force of its own. Although it was just one among numerous other 
promises and there was no way of knowing whether the electorate really supported this 
particular promise, the government went ahead with plans to secure the membership of the 
OECD, claiming that it was the government's `promise with the nation'. Opposing views 
were simply ignored. 
Some officials within the government were skeptical about the hasty attempt to 
secure the membership of the OECD. Nevertheless they dared not raise their voice. Chung 
Euidong, former Public Information Officer of the MOFE, said: 
The government failed in the risk management because of its rash and premature 
efforts to join the OECD while the Korean economy was not up the standards of the 
developed countries. But no government officials would openly challenge the 
presidential promise (interview, 20 Mar. 2003). 
Koo Bonryong, former Deputy Minister for Trade and Investment Policy of the 
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MOCIE, also recalled: 
It was something which was not going to bring much benefit but had to introduce a 
great deal of obligations. Nevertheless, the government pushed it through without 
any policy debates (interview, 21 Mar. 2003). 
In fact, government departments and agencies were actively engaged in the public 
relations campaign to emphasise positive aspects of membership of the OECD. For 
example, a report prepared by KIET, a research institute under the MOCIE, stated that `the 
membership of the OECD is the stepping stone for Korea to enter into the League of 
Developed Countries'. The report also claimed that `de-regulation of movements of 
capital will have favourable consequences as the increased in-flow of capital will put the 
overall balance of the Korean economy in the positive (KIET 1996). 
Most papers uncritically reported and repeated these promising claims. They even 
went ahead of the government and published over again columns urging to secure the 
membership of the OECD (DongA, 12 Oct. 1993; Chosun, 12 Nov. 1993; among many 
others). When Mexico, after becoming a member of the OECD, faced a crisis because of 
sharp devaluation of the peso in January 1995, a view was expressed that this must be 
taken as a warning that Korea should `slow down' its efforts to secure the membership of 
the OECD (e. g. Hankyoreh, editorial of 16 Jan. 1995). A conservative paper, JoongAng 
dismissed this view in a column by saying that `certain papers and government officials 
are attempting to use the fall of the peso as an excuse for delaying the opening up of the 
market' (JoongAng, 21 Jan. 1995). 
The press took it upon itself to puff up an image of a developed nation. Serialised 
articles such as `The Way of International Citizen' (Chosun, Dec. 1993) and `Look 
Outward! ' (JoongAng, Jan. 1994) poured out. In an article entitled, `Foreign exchange 
control beats the world record', Chosun advocated for revolutionary abolition of foreign 
exchange control. The article came with sensational and hyperbolic subtitles such as 
`Restrictions on foreign remittance and foreign travel expenses - No such restrictions 
abroad' 124 and `Blocking foreign loans for domestic companies - Domestic companies 
suffer' (('hosun, 10 Sep. 1994). Deficits in the travel balance were at 500 million dollars 
124 Many developing countries also restrict foreign remittance to alleviate chronic dollar shortage. 
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in 1993. However, they increased to 1.1 billion dollars in 1995 and to 2.6 billion dollars in 
1996, as a sharply increasing number of people began to travel abroad and their spending 
habits became more and more extravagant. 
Mushrooming of Financial Institutions 
The period between 19941995 saw numerous financial institutions mushrooming. 
It was the period when the government actively took steps to join OECD. At the end of 
1995, around 3040 institutions in each type of financial service (bank, securities, 
insurance, lease, investment, and merchant banking) were milling around in the small 
financial market of Korea. The argument was that tougher competition would better 
prepare Korea for the opening up of the financial market. Yet the reality was that the 
Korean financial market was teeming with small fish. The attractive theory that `those 
who survive the competition will emerge as big fish' turned out to be an empty slogan 
because `financial institutions do not die alone'. If a financial institution goes bankrupt, it 
will have serious repercussions on the national economy. The government had to intervene 
with life-supporting measures. 
Merchant banking corporations were once regarded as the `the goose that lays the 
golden eggs'. 125 However, in 1997 they fell in the aftermath of de-regulation. At first, in 
1992, the government had to withdraw its decision to allow certain chaebol to set up 
merchant banking corporations. By contrast, in 1996, the chaebol discreetly but effectively 
achieved what they wanted, as 15 investment & finance companies in Seoul were allowed 
to become merchant banking corporations. Many of those investment & finance 
companies had been set up by the chaebol and they now became merchant banking 
corporations. These merchant banking corporations operated as the chaebol's cash box 
enabling them to over-invest. They had little experience or expertise in international 
financing business. Nevertheless the government allowed them to borrow from foreign 
lenders. They contracted short-term loans at a relatively low interest rate from foreign 
lenders and used the fund to offer long-term loans at a higher interest rate. The practice 
125 Merchant banking corporations were allowed to engage in short-term financing, lease, underwriting and 
issuance of securities, foreign exchange business and any other financial services which do not fall within 
the proper business areas of banks. They were referred to as 'department stores for financial products'. 
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was repeated until a large scale mismatch of repayment dates triggered off the process 
leading to the financial crisis. 
It is important to have a close look at the factors affecting the government's 
decision to allow investment companies to become merchant banking corporations. It was 
an important policy change which cannot be explained as being due to the change of 
market situation. In fact, the logic of the market does not give any satisfactory explanation 
because merchant banking corporations in 1996 were already facing a tougher market. 
There were 6 of them in 1992, whereas by 1996,15 of them were competing. The decision 
to further increase the number to 30 - moreover, 20 of them were affiliates of the chaebol - 
cannot be explained or justified by any economic arguments. The important differences 
between 1992 and 1996 are that robust debates took place within circles of people who 
made policy decisions and that the press was carrying out its critical role in 1992, but, in 
1996 neither of these took place. 
When the Ministry of Finance announced the `Development Plans for Merchant 
Banking Business' in June 1992 and suggested that 2 or 3 more merchant banking 
corporations would be set up in addition to the existing 6, all papers except JoongAng 
were critical. At that time, unconfirmed information was being circulated within the 
financial services circles that Samsung and two other chaebol were attempting to set up 
merchant banking corporations. DongA published an article, `Chaebol likely to fund the 
election campaign are suspected to benefit from favouritism' criticising the Finance 
Ministry's announcement (DongA, 17 June 1992). Chosun joined the criticism with an 
editorial, `Reconsider the decision to allow more merchant banking corporations' (Chosun, 
18 June 1992). Animated debates took place in the Deliberation Committee for 
Development of Financial Industry. Many of the civilian members of this Committee took 
the view that the Finance Ministry's decision was likely to lead to excessive competition 
and that it was undesirable for the chaebol to enter into merchant banking business. The 
Finance Minister backed off and withdrew the decision. 
In 1996, however, a strong pressure for de-regulation of the financial services 
industry appeared in the wake of Korea's joining of the OECD. The Deliberation 
Committee for Development of Financial Industry could not resist the pressure of the time. 
Major newspapers were urging the government to take more liberal measures toward de- 
regulation of the financial services industry. 
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It did not take long before adverse side effects of the distorted policies for the 
financial services industry started to emerge. Most merchant banking corporations 
`competed' to provide long-term loans for the chaebol, without adequately reviewing the 
viability or profitability of over-ambitious investment proposals and, as a result, they 
found themselves in danger of bankruptcy together with the chaebol. As the cash flow 
problem of merchant banking corporations was spreading to financial industry at large, the 
Bank of Korea in October 1997 decided to offer special loans amounting to 1 trillion won 
(1 billion dollar) to 16 merchant banking corporations including the chaebol's affiliates. It 
was apparent that these loans had very little chance of being repaid. 
The dire consequences of a policy decision which was quietly made in a closed 
chamber without any public meetings or public debates were going to fall on the general 
public. Yet that was not all. One month later, Korea asked for emergency loans from the 
IMF, which demanded that the number of merchant banking corporations be reduced from 
30 to 10.126 
The chaebol's ownership of banks was another topic which had long been discussed 
in the `policy community' consisting of the government, the chaebol and the press. In 
order to be rid of regulatory restrictions, the chaebol have, since the early `80's, 
persistently demanded that entry restrictions on financial industry be lifted. As it was a 
time during which `the retreat of the state' was hailed as the way forward, some of the 
restrictions on entry and operation were removed. The chaebol quickly secured a foot-hold 
to move in to the financial services industry by setting up non-banking financial 
institutions. They also bought considerable portions of shares of banks although they 
could not own the banks because of the restriction on ownership of a bank. Accordingly, 
economic research institutes run by the chaebol or the Federation of Korean Industries as 
well as neo-liberal economists endlessly argued that the ceilings on the ownership of 
shares of banks should be abolished. 
Chaebol's ownership of banks continued to be a hot issue throughout 1997 - starting 
from the setting up of Committee for Financial Reform in January until the financial crisis 
hit the nation at the end of the year. DPM Kang initially attempted to completely remove 
126 In the early 80's, it was the then Minister of Finance, Kang Kyungsik, who increased the number of 
investment and finance companies (the predecessor of merchant banking corporation) from 9 to 24. 
However, in 1997 when he served as the Minister of Finance and Economy again, he had to reduce the 
number of merchant banking corporations due to the financial crisis. Paradoxically, he, an avowed 
advocate of market economy, had to reap as he sowed. 
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the ceiling on chaebol's ownership of shares of banks or to raise them considerably higher. 
Yet the Committee proposed that the ceiling be raised from 4% to 10%. Thereupon, 
JoongAng argued in its editorial that `if one should choose to insist on the rather weak 
claim that concentration of economic powers is a matter for concern, one should 
nevertheless accept that at least someone should be allowed to own enough of the shares 
to have a sense of responsibility' (JoongAng, 25 May 1997). 
However, all other major newspapers, even though they also advocated for de- 
regulation of the financial industry, were on the different footing, saying that the proposed 
10% was too generous for the chaebol. Choi Chunglim, the Head of Editorial Room of 
Chosun, emphasized in a column, `chaebol's ownership of banks is the last thing one can 
agree with' (Chosun, 3 Apr. 1997; also see Hankook, 8 May 1997 for a similar article). In 
the previous year, Chosun invited Paul Volker, former Chairman of Federal Reserve 
Board of the U. S, to give a public lecture. The lecture was reported under the title, 
`Separation of chaebol and banks is desirable' (Chosun, 18 May 1996). Lee Hunjai'27 also 
contributed an article to a newspaper and claimed: 
It is not only the `ownerless' banks which are in difficulty. The merchant banking 
corporations and insurance companies which clearly belong to an owner are in 
greater trouble. Companies whose ownership is concentrated on an individual suffer 
from the owner's reckless attempts to expand the company, generally low ethical 
standards, and inheritance of managerial control to incompetent heirs of the owner - 
all these are nearly fatal to the companies' (Hankyoreh, 1 Dec. 1997). 
In the end, the government abandoned the proposed increase of the ownership 
ceiling. As discussed in the previous chapter, the chaebol are usually in a position to 
influence the press as they are the main advertisers for the press. It is therefore often the 
case that the chaebol and the press forge an alliance to put pressure on the government to 
make decisions which are in the interests of the chaebol. However, this does not always 
work. If the majority of the newspapers reveals the problem and presents it as a topic for 
public debate, the alliance of the chaebol, the newspapers they control, and the advocates 
127 He was to be appointed Chairman of Financial Supervisory Commission in the next government and to 
lead the restructuring of financial industry 
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of market economy within the government can lose the driving force. The unsuccessful 
attempt to raise the ownership ceiling of shares of banks is an exemplary case. 
Financial Industry Controlled by Industrial Capitals 
It would be a narrow sighted analysis to conclude that because the ownership ceiling 
for shares of banks was maintained, the attempt of industrial capital to control financial 
industry became powerless. The chaebol could have their men appointed as non-executive 
directors of banks and thus have a say in the bank's management. They have already 
owned a number of non-banking financial institutions as well. Based on a number of 
statistical data, ' 28 one can calculate the ratio of total assets by each sector of financial 
institutions. As the ratio of commercial banks dropped from 67.21% in 1980 to 37.38% in 
1995, in inverse proportion to it, that of non-banking financial institutions rose 
considerably. As the chaebol were now controlling the non-banking financial institutions, 
their overall influence on financial industry actually increased as the government's 
influence was in decline. Top ranking chaebol such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG and 
Ssangyong became comprehensive financial services groups whose business areas 
included merchant banking, securities, insurance, mutual savings & finance, factoring, 
venture capital, credit card, and investment management. 
Industrial capital's control of financial industry caused serious ill effects. The 
biggest problem was collusive tradings between non-banking financial institutions and 
their sister companies, which disrupted the market and eventually undermined the 
competitiveness of both sides. Financial institutions affiliated to chaebol thus functioned 
as short-term cash flow pipes for the chaebol. They ended with bogus assets consisting of 
unrecoverable loans offered to their mother company. 
The mother company's debt-equity ratio was also soaring. The total borrowings of 
the top 30 chaebol went up 3.9 times between 1993 and 1996. The proportion of short- 
term borrowings increased from 47.7% in 1994 to 63.3% in 1996. Non-banking financial 
institutions which are affiliates of chaebol often had poorer performance than their 
128 Source: Monthly Bulletins of the Bank of Korea, Monthly Reviews of the Insurance Supervisory Service, 
Monthly Reviews of the Securities Supervisory Service, and various issues. 
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competitors who are unaffiliated to a chaebol. 129 
In a favourite climate created by the de-regulation of the financial industry, non- 
banking financial institutions mushroomed and enjoyed symbiotic relationship with 
industrial capitals while their collusive deals were largely away from the government's 
scrutiny. However, it was bound to be short-lived. Considering that industries in Korea 
rely heavily the on financial market rather than the stock market to raise funds, abrupt 
opening up of financial market was more than likely to disrupt the financial market and 
undermine the stability of the industries. Neither the government nor the press was 
seriously concerned about these potential pitfalls lying in the way of de-regulation. This is 
a case which shows the importance of rational debate in avoiding potential risks lying 
ahead of us. 
The Arrival of Currency Crisis and `Unsound Dog' 
Economic Cycle and Reporting of Economic Crises' 
News reports dealing with economic cycles pour out during an economic slump. As 
argued earlier, these reports tend to be in the negative tone and present an account which 
is more pessimistic than the reality. It is primarily due to news reporters' sense of duty and 
somewhat obsessive penchant for criticism. Criticism of the present situation usually 
accompanies a pessimistic outlook upon the future. The same can be said about the 
reporting of economic cycles. While the economy is in a slump, one tends to have a 
pessimistic outlook. When the present economic situation is at its worst, the darkest 
outlook is most likely to prevail even if the economy might in fact be preparing to recover. 
This is due to the limitation of the human faculty which is accustomed to extrapolative 
thinking inferring the future from the past and the present. 
According to a time series analysis (Wu et al. 1996), while the economy is moving 
toward a slump, news reports regarding economic cycles have a great deal of influence on 
129 According to Yi Jonghyun, this was due to `adverse selection and moral hazards' which can be explained 
by using the theory of asymmetric information (Yi, J. 2001). 
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people's economic perception. On the other hand, while the economy is recovering, news 
reports about the performance of the economy have relatively little influence on people's 
economic perception. During such a period, one tends to rely not so much on news reports 
as on one's own experience in perceiving the economic recovery. Accordingly, Kim 
Seunghyun argues as follows: 
In a slump, economic news reports and the public's economic perception influence 
each other to form a negative spiral. The press tends to exaggerate the seriousness of 
the situation and offers a more pessimistic view; the public is likely to accept it as a 
truthful account (Kim and Kim 1997: 61). 
They explain such a reporting manner by the press function of `warning or 
enlightenment'. Yet news reports during an economic slump cannot fully be explained 
with reference to the above-mentioned `penchant for criticism' or to the function of 
`warning or enlightenment'. If one has a close look at the process through which 
economic news reports are prepared and reported, one can see that the function of 
warning and reporter's professionalism are considerably restricted by other factors such 
as time limit imposed by the deadline, lack of expertise in analysing statistical data, and 
the customary practice observed in the preparation of news articles. 
News reports about economic cycles are no exception. News articles which merely 
report the information provided by the government or the central bank may appear to be 
free from subjective interpretation of the report. However, that may not always be the case. 
For example, the outlook for possible changes of the economic cycle is made taking 
account of leading composite index. Nevertheless, in interpreting the index, the reporter's 
subjective opinion is bound to affect the conclusion. Feature articles and reportages are far 
more likely to convey subjective views of the reporter who might knowingly or 
unknowingly exaggerate certain aspects at the expense of the rest. Many of economic 
news reporters confess as follows: 
Once we receive the instruction to prepare an article about an issue, we are under the 
pressure to `come up with a news'. Inevitably, we focus on extreme or extraordinary 
facts which are sure to make a news (personal communications, 1997-1999). 
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Although the individual facts may all be accurate, their selection and concentration 
will give a seriously distorted account of the state of the economy. 
The `warning or enlightenment' by the press can easily be abused to promote the 
interests of news sources. The concentrated news coverage on the supposed `economic 
crisis' which poured out in the first half of 1993 after President Kim Youngsam's 
inauguration, as argued in chapter 3, reflected the chaebol's wishes to neutralise President 
Kim's aggressive reform programmes and to transform them into `pro-economy' 
programmes. The press responded to the chaebol's wishes and exaggerated the economic 
slump with articles that came with dismal titles such as `Eliminated from the league of the 
4 Dragons: our economy' (JoongAng, 10 Mar. 1993) and `Endless fall into economic 
slump' (Chosun 9 Apr. 1993). 
However, <Figure 5-1> show that the slump was at an end and the economy was 
preparing to recover. The government, however, was pressurised by overly depressing 
economic news reports. Accordingly, economic reform programmes were replaced with 
programmes to boost the economy. Comprehensive measures were introduced to boost the 
economy. Eventually, they created economic bubbles and gradually undermined the health 
of the Korean economy in the years that followed. 
<Figure 5-1> Export Growth Rate and Economic Cycle Change 
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* This Figure is drawn from the statistical data of Korea National Statistical Office. 
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Reports of `economic crisis' resurfaced in 1996. As shown in <Figure 5-1>, 
pessimistic news reports of the time were triggered off because the balance of trade began 
to shrink as the export was languishing. Nevertheless, cycle of coincident composite 
index, ' 30 which takes account not only of the export index but also of production, sales 
and labour market indice, continued to fly at a high altitude even though this was partly 
due to bubbles. As the diminished export was eventually to have a great deal of influence 
eventually on the performance of the economy, the news reports expressing concerns 
about languishing export could not be dismissed as an entirely false warning. 
However, the problem is that exaggerated reports can immediately affect and distort 
economic policy decisions. The flagging performance of the export index could equally 
have been reported in a calmer manner as a transient phase in economic cycles. 
Nevertheless, most papers cried out `Total deadlock' (e. g. Hankook Kyungjae, 3 July 
1996) and `All-out economic crisis' (e. g. Chosun, 29 July 1996) and demanded the 
government to take remedial measures. There were a few voices that the government must 
be wary of short-term policies to boost the economy. Hankyoreh, for example, argued that 
`Economic team need not fret' (editorial, 29 June 1996). However, the view failed to have 
any impact. In the end, the DPM of Economy, Na Woongbae who was advocating long- 
term policies for stable economic growth had to resign on 8 August. In September, the 
newly appointed the DPM Han Seungsoo announced `Comprehensive Measures for 
Economic Cycle Change'. The salaries for high ranking government officials and 
employees of chaebol-owned companies were frozen. 
It is important to study the background of the sharp turn in economic policy: who 
advocated it and how the proponents of the policy change gained momentum in the 
government circle. In the government organisation, it is the responsibility of DPM of 
Economy to formulate and finalise economic policies. However, his influence could at 
times be very limited. Not infrequently, he may be removed without even having an 
opportunity to pursue his own policies. In this connection, it is interesting to note that 
news reports expressing concerns about diminished export and impending slump initially 
appeared to give voice to the chaebol's demand. The articles were written by news 
reporters who are `assigned' to the chaebol. DongA, for example, published a feature 
130 This is obtained by removing the trend index from coincident composite index. It reflects the economic 
cycle of the time. If it is above 100, the economy is in a prosperous stage. Below 100 is thought to indicate 
sluggish economy. 
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article `Free falling export' where the Chairman of Korea Trade Association is quoted as 
saying that the government should cut interest rates and scrap regulations on getting 
foreign loans131 (DongA, 3 Apr. 1997). 
The long-established practice was that news reports about economic cycles were 
prepared by reporters assigned to the Ministry of Finance and Economy. However, during 
those days in 1996, reporters assigned to the Ministry were actually writing news articles 
refuting the news reports authored by pro-chaebol news reporters. Mr Park Jeonghoon, for 
example, was a reporter of Chosun assigned to the Ministry. In his news article, the DPM 
was quoted as saying that `although the economy may not be in good shape, the present 
situation does not warrant news reports which appear to suggest that a catastrophic 
disaster is just around the corner'. He wrote that `most of all, the present situation does not 
justify short-term policies although that is what those news reports implicitly advocate' 
(Chosun, 29 June 1996). Mr Park also conveyed the remarks of an unidentified source in 
the government: 
It appears as if the political parties, some government departments which are not 
directly responsible for economic affairs, the chaebol and the press have all formed a 
united front to puff up the image of economic crisis (Chosun, 29 June 1996). 
It was the same united front which, in 1990, succeeded in having Mr Chosoon, a 
pro-reform DPM, removed and replaced by Mr Lee Seungyoon, a staunch advocate for 
growth-driven economic policies. 
Kim Kyun's analysis shows that from July 1996, most papers concentrated their 
efforts to identify the causes for poor performance of the economy. They pointed the 
finger at `high cost, low efficiency'. From September, `high wage' began to be singled out 
from the list of four high-cost items, namely, interest rate, land price, labour cost and 
transport cost (Kim, K. 1997: 33). In mid-September, the Office of the President 
advocated a `Movement to Raise Competitiveness by 10%' and eventually the Federation 
of Korean Industries succeeded in achieving a freeze on wages in the form of an 
announcement, `Declaration to Freeze Total Amount of Wages'. 
A diminished rate of return caused by the chaebol's overinvestment and the 
A huge amount of short-term foreign debt turned out to be a main cause of the currency crisis. 
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increased financing costs resulting from sloppy and collusive financial deals were all 
swept under the carpet and hastily laid out in the name of remedial measures to boost the 
economy. Instead, `wages' were singled out as the main culprit for the economic crisis. 
We shall see that frequent cries about the supposed `economic crisis' made the public far 
less sensitive to the approaching dangers even when the dangers were real. Also, as the 
`wages' were wrongly chosen to take all the blame for poor performance of the economy, 
the real causes for economic trouble were left unchecked and they eventually led to the 
`true' crisis. 
Decision without Discussion 
The foreign exchange policy of 1996-1997 was one of the decisive factors which 
pushed Korean economy into the path to financial crisis. The failure of the foreign 
exchange policy can be explained by defects in the government's mechanisms for inter- 
departmental communication and policy decision. These defects emerged as side-effects 
of comprehensive re-organisation of government departments which followed President 
Kim Youngsam's so-called `Globalization Plan'. For example, the Economic Planning 
Board was merged with the Ministry of Finance to form the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy (MOFE). 132 The MOFE thus became a super Ministry which is responsible for 
taxation, budget and finance as well as economic planning and coordination. As there was 
no other Ministries which could compete or provide check and balance, the MOFE began 
to make decisions which could not be reviewed or corrected by other government 
departments. 
Before the mergence, there were lively debates between Ministers about macro- 
economic policy choices. Such a tradition of healthy debates was not repeated between 
relevant sections within the MOFE. The leanings and styles of the DPM and concurrently 
the Minister of the MOFE turned out to provide policy guidelines which were not easy to 
challenge. One of the DPM, Hong Jaehyung in fact instructed that `sections within the 
MOFE should speak in one voice'. A newspaper pointed that out: 
132 The new government which took power after the currency crisis decided to divide up MOFE. The 
Financial Supervisory Commission and The Ministry of Planning and Budget were therefore separated 
from MOFE. 
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Policy decisions which were made in the absence of lively debates and the 
mechanism of check and balance could become dogmatic. ... If the 
decision making 
process within MOFE is problematic, the MOFE could end up being a dinosaur with 
a huge body and a small brain (Hankyoreh, 23 Feb. 1995). 
Few people paid heed to such criticism. Other Ministers did not want to appear to be 
in conflict with the MOFE as well. The Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, Park 
Jaeyun, for example, instructed his staff `to avoid making statements about issues without 
prior consultation with the MOFE or if their views differ from those of the MOFE' 
(Hankook, 28 May 1998). This is partly due to the attitude of the press which denounced 
even the smallest signs of disagreement - which is inevitable in any policy coordination 
process - as revealing the `Departmental interests in conflict' (e. g. Seoul-shinmun, 19 Sep. 
1993) or `Departmental cacophony' (e. g. Segye, 19 May 1993). The press had very little 
tolerance for dissonance between government departments, even though it is nothing short 
of inevitable when trying to work out a policy alternative. 
Such attitude of the press had the result of depriving the public of the opportunity to 
participate in the decision making process for public policy. While the public had no 
information about the pros and cons of a particular policy choice, the policy was publicly 
announced in its final form. The serious defects of the communication and public 
participation mechanism were largely ignored by the press and they were therefore left in 
ignorance. The press did not take it upon itself to provide an alternative forum for public 
debates regarding the economic policy choices. After the currency crisis hit and Kim's 
administration was over, there were journalistic activities to uncover outrageous episodes 
of communication failures affecting Kim Youngsam government's policy formation. 
However, by then it was too late. 
The delay in devaluation of the Korean won (W) provided another cause for the 
currency crisis of 1997. Here also, it appears that the delay was due to defective or 
dogmatic decisions which remained unchallenged for too long. The export decline in 1996 
and trade deficit were rapidly increasing. Under these circumstances, the views of the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) were repeatedly ignored by the MOFE. 
Strong won was maintained at about 800 won for US dollar. It was only at the end of 1996 
that the MOFE started to recognise the problem. The MOFE thus allowed the exchange 
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rate to fluctuate over a wider range and attempted to buy dollars. However, this time, it 
was the Office of the President which opposed. The Senior Secretary to the President for 
Economic Affairs, Lee Sukchae, is known to have intervened by saying "how are you 
going to keep the prices under control if the won is devaluated? And what about losses 
from exchange rate fluctuation? You had better withdraw the proposal for devaluation. " 
There may well have been other reasons too. A former official who worked for the Senior 
Secretary testified, on the condition that his identity was not revealed, as follows: 
The Office of the President seemed to fear that if the won is devaluated, per capita 
income might fall below $10,000, which had a great deal of symbolic and political 
meaning for the government (Hankook, 29 Aug. 1998). 
In a country where political and executive powers are concentrated on the President, 
the Senior Secretaries to the President can exert considerable influence on policy decisions. 
Under such circumstances, rational and robust debates about economic policy alternatives 
become rather difficult. President Kim Youngsam has long been a `freedom fighter' who 
mounted unswerving opposition against the authoritarian government. However, he had 
no experience in economic policy issues. His Senior Secretaries for Economic Affairs 
such as Park Jaeyun, Han Yiheon and Lee Sukchae, wielded a great deal of power as they 
had enjoyed the absolute confidence of President Kim. 
In March 1997, President Kim had to face political embarrassment because it 
emerged that his son was implicated in `Hanbo bribery scandal'. President Kim attempted 
to get out of the political difficulty by cabinet reshuffle. DPM Kang Kyungsik and the 
Senior Secretary Kim Inho were thus newly appointed. Mr Kang was the sixth DPM 
during Kim Youngsam's presidency. 133 Because of such a frequent change of Ministers, 
economic policies during Mr Kim's presidency lacked consistency and often missed the 
timing while consistency and timing are perhaps as important as actual contents of an 
economic policy. In a Presidential system of government, it is the President who should 
ultimately be responsible for the success or the failure of various policies. Nevertheless 
President Kim's response to his political embarrassment and failure of policies was always 
133 As Mr Kang also had to resign three months before the end of President Kim's term, there were seven 
Deputy Prime Ministers during Mr Kim's five year term. 
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a cabinet reshuffle. 
The press is also partly responsible for the confusion caused by frequent cabinet 
reshuffle. Whenever the government appears to experience difficulty - whether it is 
policy-related or caused by incidents beyond human control - the press urges the 
government to appoint new people. Chosun, for example, had an editorial `Time to 
consider a cabinet reshuffle' published only 5 months after Kim Youngsam government 
was sworn in (Chosun, 29 July 1993). The editorial claimed that the new government's 
economic team appeared to lack the leadership. Professor Kim Kwangwoong pointed that: 
As the press insisted on a cabinet reshuffle whenever the government was 
experiencing a difficulty, it would be wrong to put all the blame on the President for 
the frequent cabinet reshuffle. People seem to have too high an expectation for `the 
right person' (Monthly Chosun, Jan. 1998). 
The economic policy team under the leadership of Kang Kyungsik and Kim Inho 
took a stance which clearly favoured market economy. Mainstream newspapers welcomed 
them. Their characters also appear in the following passage from the `Kang's 
Memorandum' which was subsequently seized by the Public Prosecution Bureau: 
We were both regarded as the best known economic policy makers who have a firm 
conviction in market economy. We did not at all think that there would be much 
divergence in our approach or solutions. Indeed, the press referred us as `fantastic 
duo' (Kang's Memorandum, 7 Mar. 1997). 
However, the problem was that they both had too similar views and leanings. When 
the government's pro-market policies began to show a number of adverse effects, two of 
the staunchest advocates of market economy came to occupy the leading posts in the 
government's economic team. 134 DPM Kang was described in a newspaper as `a person 
whose conviction hardens as he faces greater opposition' (Hankook, 31 Aug. 1998). Under 
134 Both of them studied law at Seoul National University. They both had an uncompromising policy stance. 
They both worked in the Economic Planning Board where neo-liberalism was dominant. They both went 
to the United States and even to the same school, Graduate School of Administration at University of 
Syracuse, for further training. 
199 
normal circumstances, such a strong character of a policy maker can be an important 
virtue as it can provide the necessary driving force for the policy. However, his leadership 
was ill suited to a critical situation in that he could not respond to rapidly changing 
circumstances in a flexible manner. 
It was due to DPM Kang's style and the rigid climate of the MOFE that the Korea 
Institute of Finance (KIF) was forced to withdraw its report which contained a fore- 
warning about the foreign exchange crisis. Upon Kang's appointment in March 1997, KIF 
published its periodic report `Economic Outlook' and pointed out that `there are 
possibilities that the country might be in default in a few months' time, and if the 
problems with Hanbo are not swiftly dealt with, there might be a sudden out-flow of 
capital. ' The MOFE issued a stem statement against KIF. KIF decided to withdraw all the 
copies of the report which had already been distributed. KIF also had a press release 
explaining and excusing itself. From the next month, the monthly issue of `Economic 
Outlook' ceased to appear. Choi Gongpil, the chief researcher responsible for the report, 
made the following remarks in an interview undertaken for this research: 
I know that DPM Kang himself expressed his displeasure to the Director of KIF. 
The decision to withdraw the distributed copies was made accordingly. MOFE often 
intervened to prevent discussions about the difficulties facing national economy. I 
myself was forced to discontinue research activities on foreign exchange. It is almost 
comical to see that when the economy is about to enter into a difficult period, the 
research output from governmental or semi-governmental economic research 
institutes sharply decrease. They keep quiet (interview, 30 Mar. 2004). 
In fact, KIF is an organisation which was set up by Korea Federation of Banks. It is 
neither a government department nor a semi-government organisation. In other words, the 
MOFE put pressure on a private organisation and had it withdraw the copies of the report 
it distributed. The MOFE intervened in this manner to distort the public opinion. DPM 
Kang may be an advocate of market economy; nevertheless, when it comes to `free market 
of opinions', he had no intention to let the market decide. 
Although DPM Kang advocated market economy, he was not consistent in applying 
his creed. He sometimes did not hesitate to intervene. He often went ahead with a decision 
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ignoring the opposition from officials who are better acquainted with the issues involved. 
Some of the decisions undermined the stability of the financial market. 
On 25 August 1997, for example, the statement he gave about governmental 
guarantee of foreign loans of financial institutions was not only against the so-called 
`principle of market economy' but also against the advice of carrier officials. He often 
abandoned his conviction about market economy in order to support the chaebol and 
financial institutions when they were in serious trouble. Although government intervention 
was eschewed by advocates of market economy, they relied on the government to clear up 
the mess created by market failure. 
On what ground did DPM Kang come to hold such a strong conviction? It is partly 
due to the advice of neo-liberal economists surrounding them. Kang also turned a deaf ear 
to those who held different views. The `Memorandum' where Kang recorded his meetings 
to collect `views regarding economic issues' shows that he met people who all had pro- 
market views or advocates of free trade. Many of them, as mentioned earlier, were 
directing economic research institutes funded by the chaebol and played a leading role in 
making economic policies of the time. Others were economic columnists for mainstream 
newspapers propagating neo-liberalist ideas in Korea. DPM Kang wrote in Kang's Diary 
(Kang 1999b) on the day (15 Mar. 1997) he met these economists, `After meeting with 
these experts, I could have an even greater conviction that the policies I had in mind are in 
the right direction'. 
After DPM Kang had collected the views of proponents of neo-liberalism, under the 
name of `public opinions', he had the MOFE prepare in two months `21 Tasks of the 
Government'. The report was presented to the President. Kang's Diary for that day (20 
June 1997) described that `the report proposes measures to set up the framework of market 
economy comparable to that of advanced countries and to remove accumulated obstacles 
to proper functioning of the market. ' His report did contain helpful suggestions about 
many problems with the Korean economy. However, it also contained copycat proposals 
uncritically modeled after Anglo-American solutions and proposals based on positive 
assumptions about market economy and the open market. One could also raise doubts 
about the strategy of pursuing the kind of long-term plans at the end of the presidential 
term and while the economy was not in good shape. 
During the ensuing six months until the currency crisis, the MOFE made a great 
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deal of efforts to propagate these policy plans. There were many `Discussion Meetings' 
for each subject area. However, they were used to explain and propagate the policies 
already decided. No genuine discussion took place. The Discussion Meeting on 
Restructuring of Prices, for example, was held in a resort town well known for its hot 
springs. About 40 people including reporters assigned to the MOFE were invited to a 
tourist hotel where the Discussion Meeting was followed by sumptuous entertainment. A 
public broadcasting media (KBS) was also used weekly to inform and propagate policies 
in 4 subject areas which are likely to attract the attention of the general public such as 
`social welfare in an aging society'. 
On 2 September, the government staged a high-profile event entitled `Progress 
Report on 21 Tasks' at Incheon International Airport, which was being built with the 
ambitious aim of becoming the air traffic hub of North-East Asia. President Kim attended 
the event to ensure maximum publicity for the event. The MOFE also published and 
distributed a booklet and audio-visual materials entitled `Tasks of the Government to 
Achieve Open Market Economy'. From October on, DPM Kang himself started a lecture 
tour all across the country. According to Kang's Diary (11 Oct. 1997), he instructed the 
MOFE `to organise support groups for market economy because a couple of lectures are 
not going to be enough to change the minds of people, and an overall change in social 
climate is what we need. ' 
DPM Kang was particularly enthusiastic about financial reform. The Committee for 
Financial Reform was chaired by Park Seong-yawng, who was the honorary chairman of 
Kumho Group. Park was assisted by the Deputy Chairman - Kim Byungju - who was a 
staunch advocate of market economy. Comprehensive de-regulation was already decided. 
However, the problem was the bill for amending the Bank of Korea (BOK) Act which was 
agreed upon behind the curtain among a few persons concerned, including DPM Kang. 
The officials of the Financial Policy Office of MOFE were concentrating all their efforts 
to go ahead with the proposed bill. They argued that separation of the Financial 
Supervisory Service from the Bank of Korea is of vital importance. However, the 
employees of the BOK felt that it was an attempt of the government to control the 
financial industry. 
Both camps attempted to win the public opinion. They tried to persuade economic 
reporters and used their personal connections to approach columnists. Between reporters 
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of a newspaper company, those who were assigned to the BOK disagreed with those 
assigned to the MOFE. The press was keen to report the tug-of-war between the two 
camps rather than to guide and lead rational debates on this issue. The struggle went on for 
as long as 5 months without a conclusion. Citizen groups, professors of economics and the 
Federation of Financial Labour Unions all joined in the long-drawn struggle. When the 
bill was eventually put in the National Assembly, employees of BOK decided to have a 
sit-in protest in the Assembly. It took place on 14 November 1997. Comprehensive 
breakdown of the financial market was just around the corner by then. The two institutions 
responsible for the financial market were too pre-occupied with the tug-of-war to notice 
anything else. 
The IMF, which demanded opening up and de-regulation of financial and capital 
market, is also responsible for its failure to encourage public debate about possible 
impacts of such a policy. The IMF's Independent Evaluation Office recognised this 
belatedly in its `Evaluation Report of 2003 regarding Indonesia, Korea and Brazil' : 
In all three countries, the IMF's role as confidential advisor was not very effective in 
persuading countries to modify their policies even when key vulnerabilities were 
identified. The IMF was not provided with much sensitive information required for 
effective surveillance. ..., the IMF probably could have been more effective in 
influencing policy if it had made its analyses public so as to contribute to a wider 
policy debate (IEO 2003: 3). 
Reporting the Crisis: Bashing vs. Patriotism 
While the control tower of economic policy making was pre-occupied with long- 
term policy plans and departmental tug-of-war, and while even the press guided public 
gaze to these issues, the foreign exchange crisis was ravaging Thailand, Indonesia and 
moving toward northeast. On 23 October, share prices in Hong Kong fell by 14% in one 
day. The following day, the wave was felt in Korean stock market which plummeted. The 
crisis was in view. 
It is necessary to have a close look at the news reports in and out of Korea, 
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movements of financial market and the activities of news sources during the ensuing three 
weeks or more. In particular, there is a necessity to scrutinise the tripartite relationship 
among the press, the market and news sources. Foreign news reports during this period 
were unfavourable to Korean economy. Domestic news reports criticised the negative 
reports of the foreign media and attempted to defend the government's position. When the 
foreign exchange crisis actually hit, the domestic media had to be faced with severe blame. 
As mentioned earlier, JoongAng published an article entitled `Words of repentance' 
written by an economic news reporter (JoongAng, 1997). However, we need to reexamine 
more systematically who is to blame and how much to blame. 
When share prices in Korea plummeted on 24 October, credit rating agencies in the 
United States - Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's - downgraded the 
sovereign rating of Korea by one notch. Only then, did the MOFE and the BOK stopped 
their departmental tug-of-war and held a joint meeting to discuss the situation. 
Nevertheless, they could not agree upon the range of daily exchange rate fluctuation. On 
28 October, Morgan Stanley Securities sent out a dispatch urging investors all over the 
world to withdraw capital investment from Asian market. On 29 October, Peregrine 
Securities in Hong Kong prepared a report, `Get out Korea, Right Now! ' Stock market 
was free falling day after day and foreign exchange rate was rocketing. On 3 November, 
the whole world learned that Moody's and S&P downgraded the sovereign rating of Korea 
once again. 
However, one should take a moment to evaluate arguments about the reliability of 
credit rating agencies themselves. The Asian financial markets at the time were writhing at 
each stroke of credit rating announced by Moody's and S&P. Nevertheless, the question 
remains whether these agencies did maintain an objective standard worthy of their 
overwhelming influence. The announcement of the credit rating in itself has the self- 
fulfilling effect on the credit of the country or the company concerned. Once the Asian 
currency crisis subsided, Japan Center for International Finance (JCIF) published a report 
pointing out that Moody's, S&P and Fitch IBCA made the error of ignoring particularities 
of Asian markets. ' 35 
Regarding Korea, S&P twice downgraded the sovereign rating of Korea by 7 
135 JCIF also argued that these credit rating agencies failed to foresee the currency crisis in Asian countries 
and that when the crisis actually came, these agencies went ahead with sensationally abrupt downgrading. 
They therefore exacerbated the currency and economic crises in the area (JCIF 1998). 
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notches and, two months later, upgraded it by three notches. With Fitch IBCA, Korea's 
sovereign rating went down by 10 notches and then went up by 5 notches during the same 
period. The sudden and sensational fluctuations of credit rating may have been inevitable 
because of abrupt changes to the financial market situation. However, they were 
essentially due to the fact that credit rating agencies arrived at their conclusion by 
assessing the Korean financial market and the financing structure of Korean companies 
with reference to Western standards, such as those of the Wall Street or the City of 
London. Take, for example, the debt-equity ratio. In many Western countries, companies 
rely on stock market to raise funds. By contrast, as Korean companies rely on loans rather 
than on direct financial market, their debt-equity ratio is exceptionally high. The press in 
and out of Korea merely repeated the credit rating announcement of these agencies. Such a 
news coverage worsened the financial crisis because it intensified instability of the market. 
On 5 November, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and Bloomberg News Service ran a 
headline article expressing concerns about the foreign exchange reserve of Korea. This 
dealt a serious blow to the foreign exchange market of Korea because of the stature and 
prestige of these two companies. They sent a clear message that Korea would soon run out 
of the foreign exchange reserve. An article appearing in the Financial Times on the 
previous day, which criticised Korean government's inadequate measures to stabilize the 
financial market, was a slap on the wrist compared to the heavy blow dealt by the WSJ and 
Bloomberg. The headline article of the WSJ of 5 November claimed that the Bank of 
Korea had so far spent between 2-20 billion dollars to defend the Korean won. The 
intimation was that there would be little more left to the foreign exchange reserve of 
Korea. This is because, at the end of October, the BOK announced that it had 30.5 billion 
dollars as foreign exchange reserve. In other words, Korea would be left with as little as 
10.5 billion dollars to play with. Eventually, the article at the WSJ turned out to be based 
on a conjecture, seeing that there is a difference of 18 billion dollars between the 
minimum and the maximum suggested figures. The then Senior Secretary to the President 
for Economic Affairs, Kim Inho, wrote in his memoirs that `Korea had 29.2 billion dollars 
of reserve at that time. And 21 billion of them were immediately available' 
136 (JoongAng, 
27 Feb. 2002). 
136 Kim continued to say, `MOFE instantly made a statement refuting the article of WSJ. But exact figures 
could not be mentioned for fear of attracting foreign exchange raiders' (JoongAng, 27 Feb. 2002). 
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On the same day, however, Bloomberg ran an article asserting that `the real figure 
could run near 15 billion dollars'. Again, it was based on a conjecture. Bloomberg went on 
to say that `Korea's total debts are 110 billion dollars, of which 80 billion dollars will 
come due within a year. ' It concluded that `Korea will soon ask the IMF for bailout. ' 
However, no one in the government at that time was contemplating the possibility of a 
bailout by the IMF. According to Kim's memoirs, the first time that the possibility of a 
bailout was mentioned in the government circle was on 7 November. It was suggested as a 
remote possibility among many others (JoongAng, 7 Mar. 2002). However, on the basis of 
Bloomberg's report, the International Herald Tribune wrote on 6 November as if it was 
confirmed facts that Korea had foreign exchange reserve of 15 billion dollars and that it 
would ask the IMF for bailout. On its front page, the paper had the headline which read, 
`South Korea fears a financial crisis topping Thailand's. ' The Korean financial market 
rapidly entered into a state of panic. 
The Korean government claimed that these newspapers were reporting the situation 
of the Korean financial market in a hostile manner. The government distributed a press 
release and letters of protest. This was to no avail. For example, in a letter to the Wall 
Street Journal and the Asian Wall Street Journal, the government pointed out that the 
papers failed to present a due base for their allegations that in Korea bad debts had 
increased sharply to 20 trillion won and nine of the nation's 11 banks would probably go 
bankrupt (Korea Herald, 10 Nov. 1997). 
It was true that the Korean economy was badly suffering from overinvestment, yet 
some of the fundamentals were clearly better than those of the countries which already 
experienced currency crisis. For three consecutive months, the aggregate value of letters of 
credit was increasing and the monthly trade balance was about to turn positive (Munhwa, 
10 Nov. 1997). Michel Camdessus, managing director of the IMF, also made it clear in a 
press conference in Paris, on 6 November, that unlike Southeast Asian countries, there 
was no possibility that Korea would face a financial crisis, given its strong economic 
fundamentals (Korea Herald, 8 Nov. 1997). Certainly, the signs of recovery in economic 
fundamentals and the remarks of Camdessus could not be taken at their face value. The 
recovery was too little to provide any reliable basis for optimism and Camdessus had to 
guard against the possibility that his remarks might cause actual harm to the already 
troubled economy of Korea. Nevertheless, the reports of the foreign media, as we shall see, 
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were certainly not without exaggeration. 
These foreign papers published Korean government's response in the reader's letter 
section in a cursory manner. They then continued with their negative news reports about 
the Korean economic situation. The government and the press in Korea started to suspect 
their good faith. For example, Asian Wall Street Journal reported on 10 November that it 
was expected that Korea would eventually ask for emergency loans from the IMF and that 
the instability of the Korean won would spread to Taiwan and Japan. Munhwa strongly 
criticised this report as `Anti-Korea news coverage' (10 Nov. 1997). Other Korean papers 
also joined in (e. g. Chosun, 8; JoongAng, 10). On 10 November, DongA, Chosun and 
Hankook each published an editorial - `Korean economy under attack' (Chosun), `Shaking 
Korean economy' (DongA) and `Government should take a firm stance' (Hankook) - to 
criticise the foreign news coverage. 
The reason the domestic press and the foreign press had completely different 
attitudes in reporting the situation was that the news source and the press each had 
different interests in this matter. The Korean government wanted to avoid possible attacks 
from speculative funds, so it was reluctant to give out information. Credit rating agencies 
catering for all customers including speculative funds, downgraded the sovereign rating 
somewhat excessively. 
Korean government's secretive stance was resented by foreign reporters and led to 
news reports based partly on conjectures. Korea had the size of international trade which 
places it at the 11th place in the world (as of 1996). Nevertheless, it was not a country 
which attracted the attention of the world's media. Even those media specialising in 
economic news had correspondents stationed in Tokyo or Hong Kong to cover news in 
Korea. Because of this, foreign media had little or no adequate understanding of Korean 
economy. The reporter of Bloomberg who appears as the author of an article predicting 
that `there is going to be a large scale bankruptcy of financial institutions in Korea' told an 
official of the MOFE when the latter confronted him about the article, `the article I send to 
Hong Kong office is accurate. But the editorial staffs there seem to exaggerate the report 
adding some rumours floating about the market' (Chosun, 8 Nov. 1997). 
On the other hand, while Korean press poured out reports criticising the apparently 
exaggerated news reports of the foreign press, they failed to investigate the true situation 
of the financial market at the time. Looking back, the shortage of foreign exchange reserve 
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was due to excessive borrowings of merchant banking corporations and banks to fund 
overinvestment of the chaebol. As discussed in the case of Hanbo or Samsung Motors, 
most newspapers failed to point out the problems of overinvestment. Of course, there were 
news articles which warned the possibility of foreign exchange crisis in 1997: `Foreign 
exchange crisis: it could happen to us' (Hankyoreh, 5 Mar. ); `Is there really going to be 
foreign exchange crisis? ' (Chosun, 3 Apr. ); `Financial disaster: is it a possibility? ' 
(Kyunghyang, 24 May); `Credit rating undermined: more serious than we thought' 
(JoongAng, 22 Aug. ); `Visible symptoms of foreign exchange crisis' (Hankook Kyungjae, 
1 Sep. 1997). 
However, even reporters who wrote these news articles did not expect the foreign 
exchange crisis of 1997 to be of such magnitude (e. g. Sohn 1998). Moreover, even though 
reporters who are directly in contact with financial institutions may have an acute sense of 
impending crisis, their views are often toned down by editorial staff (personal 
communications, Nov. 1997). As there were periodic warnings about `economic crisis' for 
quite some time, reporters and policy makers, like ordinary audience, assumed that it 
would go away as this used to be the case. The reporter of the above-mentioned news 
article `Foreign exchange crisis: it could happen to us' told in an interview with the 
present researcher: 
Since the press had previously had periodic warnings about supposedly impending 
crisis, people appeared to treat it as a false alarm on this occasion as well. It was like 
the boy who cried the advent of wolf as in Aesop's fable' (interview, 28 Feb. 2004). 
In the past, the chaebol and the press often aired warnings about supposedly 
impending crisis in order to influence government policies to their liking. This time, they 
had to pay for it. 
Bias of patriotism played a role in producing columns and analyses emphasising 
that there was little likelihood of a foreign exchange crisis. Such reports diffused the 
perception of the urgency of the situation. Many of the authors of such reports were 
economists who were directly or indirectly associated with the government. In February 
1997, Chosun published a column `There will be no foreign exchange crisis' (7 Feb. ) 
contributed by the manager of the Japanese branch office of the Bank of Korea. In 
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November 1997, when the crisis was fast approaching, Chosun published a column `The 
economy: no cause for concern' (3 Nov. ) by a former Prime Minister Nam Dukwoo. 
Hankyoreh also had an article `No occasion to worry about foreign exchange crisis' 
(8 Sep. 1997) purporting to give guidance for investing in the stock market. Chosun even 
had an article `Long-term savings: merchant banking corporations offer better deals' on 1 
October 1997. Only 12 days later, merchant banking corporations had to ask for loans 
amounting to 1 trillion won because they ran out of money to repay savings. 
The groundless optimism made some of the governmental policies ineffective. For 
example, the government announced in May 1997 `Measures to restrict borrowings'. 
Federation of Korean Industries, however, objected to the policy. Newspapers supportive 
of FKI were also opposed (e. g. Macil Kyungjae, 2 June; Hankook Kyungjae, 2 June; Seoul 
Kyungjae, 3 June). The policy was quietly dropped. Eom Nakyong who was the Deputy 
Minister of Finance and Economy said in an interview undertaken for this research: 
The government planned to restrict borrowings for investment overseas. But the 
press was strongly against the policy and we had to back off. When the press 
determine to block a policy, the government officials have virtually no alternative 
but to back off' (interview, 19 Mar. 2004). 
It would surely be wrong to put all the blame on the press for the breakdown of a 
warning system at the time of the foreign exchange crisis. Even economists actively 
involved in policy formation hardly ever issued a warning about the possibility of a 
foreign exchange crisis. Professor Jeon Chulwhan, the newly appointed Chairman of the 
Bank of Korea in the next government, recalled: 
It is surprising to see that scholars who have no immediate personal interest in the 
matter showed no sensibility or understanding of the problem (Newsletter of the 
Bank of Korea, Jan. 1998). 
In retrospect, the then news reporting was characterised by a contrast between the 
exaggerated reports of the foreign press and the over-optimistic reports of the domestic 
press, and as a result, the objectivity of reports was largely lacking. However, due to its 
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greater `self-fulfilling' power, the reports of the foreign press were believed to be more 
accurate. In the international financial market where there is no longer state boundary, the 
world class financial news providers have influence and prestige incomparable to those of 
the domestic media. In this acute asymmetry of power regarding information, major 
investors including international speculative funds also had a dramatically different 
performance outcome compared to that of domestic individual investors. 
The Korean case shows that the opening of a domestic financial market also had its 
consequences for the press. Viewed from the influence of economic news, the state 
boundary was no longer significant. Economic news papers and financial news agencies in 
New York and London came to have the power to make or break the financial market of 
Seoul. In the past, the influence of economic news was limited to the country concerned. 
For example, `before the 1967 Wilson-Callaghan devaluation, the [British] press was a 
dog which did not bark' (Tunstall 1996: 369). In contrast, the 1987 financial market fall 
was greatly exacerbated by news reports which drew analogy to the Great Depression of 
1929 (Graber 1993). Whether it was `a conspiracy of silence' or a concerted outcry of 
`scare mongering', it was the British press which influenced British financial market. 
However, in the Korean case, the domestic press had significantly reduced influence 
because of the prestige of world class news providers. As a result, the range of policy 
alternatives open to the government became very narrow indeed. 
The Road to the IMF. - Crisis of Communication 
Proper functioning of communication channels is an essential prerequisite of good 
policy making. In a critical situation where swift judgment and decisions must be made, a 
reliable communication mechanism is all the more needed. It will, to some extent, prevent 
the decision making process from becoming dogmatic and one-sided. A close look at the 
process through which the Korean government reached the decision to request emergency 
loans from IMF shows that inter-departmental communication channels were blocked. As 
a result, dogmatic and over-confident decisions made by top ranking officials were left 
unchallenged. We shall also see that belated decisions made the currency crisis aggravated. 
Even when the currency crisis was imminent, DPM Kang maintained that the 
210 
Korean economy had strong fundamentals. He did little to explore immediate measures. 
He did not provide the President with accurate reports about the serious foreign exchange 
market situation. It also appears that he was very reluctant to request IMF bailout. 
According to his `Memorandum' dated 18 August, `Lee Yunjae137 reported to me that 
foreign exchange shows serious signs of trouble. I told him not to worry too much. ' In his 
`Memorandum' on 29 October - the crisis was imminent by then -, he wrote, `I reported to 
the President and gave him an assurance that it was a global phenomenon. ' Regarding the 
devaluation of the won, He had also been hesitant for too long even though there were 
repeated warnings from inside and outside the government. Only on 8 November, did he 
recognise that `we may probably be in a liquidity trap' and decide upon the devaluation of 
the won (Kang's Memorandum, 8 Nov. 1997). 
In particular, the delay in requesting IMF bailout significantly diminished the 
bargaining power of Korea in its negotiations with the IMF. The loans therefore came with 
extremely unfavourable conditions, which were to weigh heavily on Korean economy for 
years to come. Belated requests for IMF bailout did not even originate from DPM Kang. It 
was the President himself who made the decision after having informal meetings with a 
former DPM and some other advisers. This shows that there were serious defects in the 
decision making process of the government's economic team headed by Kang and Kim. 
It may also be due to problems of communication that on the day of his inauguration 
(19 Nov. 1997) the new DPM Lim Changryul made a surprising and unexpected 
announcement that `IMF bailout may not after all be necessary'. His announcement was 
mysterious given that the government had already agreed with the IMF that the 
announcement of the decision to ask for emergency loans from the IMF would be made on 
19 November. Anyway, Lim's surprise remark annihilated what little credit-worthiness 
Korea had by then. Foreign investors were rapidly pulling out and the financial market 
was completely out of control. Two days later, Lim surrendered after all, announcing the 
IMF bailout programme. By then, however, the IMF imposed far more stringent 
conditions. 
Why, then, was Kang so reluctant to ask for loans from the IMF? In one of his 
floppy diskettes subsequently seized by Public Prosecution Bureau, there is a file called, 
137 He was the Director General for Economic Policy of MOFE. 
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`Project for Presidential Election' which Kang prepared for himself. 138 When the public 
prosecutor questioned him whether it was due to his political ambitions that he attempted 
to cover up the foreign exchange crisis and avoided seeking emergency loans from the 
IMF, Kang replied, `Whether one has political ambitions or not is a personal issue' 
(Hankook, 19 May 1998). Kang's reluctance to ask for loans from the IMF cannot fully be 
explained by his personal political ambitions. However, his political ambitions were likely 
to have distorted the communication mechanism within the government. 
The press failed to uncover the breakdown of communication. Rather than re- 
establishing communication channels within the government, the press continued to side 
with long-term, pro-market political reforms even when the crisis was imminent. For 
example, JoongAng, Samsung's affiliate, published an interview entitled, `DPM Kang has 
enemy on every side amidst economic difficulties' and attempted to eagerly defend DPM 
Kang. 139 The interview article was interspersed with subtitles taken from Kang's remarks 
such as `The Government does not neglect the economy; it sticks to the principles'; `If the 
government intervenes simply because there are some difficulties, what it has 
painstakingly achieved thus far will be wiped away'; `The delay in resolving the problems 
of Kia Motors was not without substantial social costs but one cannot give up learning 
simply because it is costly to learn. ' The interview also reported Kang's extraordinary 
claims such as `Ever since I took office, not a single month passed without some warnings 
about financial crisis. The reason I conclude that there would be no financial crisis is that 
from early this year, the chaebol with a large amount of debt began to change their 
behaviour' (JoongAng, 20 Oct. 1997). The Public Prosecution Bureau also discovered that 
while DPM Kang was on a lecture tour across the country, a senior journalist of a major 
newspaper was acting as his adviser (Hankyoreh, 6 June 1998). 
138 He had a plan to form a moderate conservative reform party and obtain at least 25 seats in a general 
election and prepare for the presidential election on that basis. 
139 A corrupt connection between Samsung-JoongAng and DPM Kang was exposed in July 2005 through a 
tape recorded by a concealed microphone. According to the tape illegally eavesdropped by the Agency for 
National Security Planning in 1997, Samsung was alleged to have offered bribes (tens of thousand 
dollars) to DPM Kang through the Chairman of JoongAng, Hong Seokhyun. Moreover, the tape revealed 
that Samsung had been dealing with presidential candidates and many prosecutors to lead them to pro- 
Samsung, by offering a huge amount of bribes through Chairman Hong. 
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Conclusion 
As one of President Kim's campaign promises, the government strove to secure the 
membership of the OECD and secured it perhaps too early. The membership opened up 
the financial market and misguided people with fantasies about advanced countries. Most 
people simply thought that Korea was finally admitted to join `the club of advanced 
countries'. Few people realised that it could deal a serious blow to national economy and 
would eventually lead to financial crisis. Those few people's concerns and warnings were 
hardly audible because of the loud fanfare of major newspapers which were feverishly 
celebrating Korea's membership to the OECD. There was simply no forum for rational- 
critical debates. 
Financial institutions which mushroomed in the `favourable' climate of de- 
regulation were inevitably engaged in bleeding competition. As a result, the financial 
market had a very low rate of return. When the chaebol were allowed to enter into 
financial industry, the healthy tension between financial capitals and industrial capitals 
was replaced with a collusive connection between them. This ultimately undermined the 
chaebol as well as their financial institutions. In particular, merchant banking corporations 
used short-term foreign loans to offer long-term loans for domestic firms. This resulted in 
a massive scale mismatch of maturity for these loans. It was through this opening that the 
foreign currency crisis which started in the southeastern Asia arrived in Korea. The press 
had largely failed to make an issue out of the rapid de-regulation of financial market and 
potential dangers of market opening. Some of the newspapers were actually urging the 
government to quicken the pace of opening up the financial market. 
In 1993 and 1996, the press gave an exaggerated account of the possibility of an 
economic crisis. The pessimistic news reports led to short term measures to boost the 
economy. Also, the news reports singled out wage as the main culprit of economic slump. 
Because of the inaccurate analysis, other aspects of the economy were left out of the 
scrutiny. The economy as a whole thus became more susceptible to the financial crisis. 
When the crisis actually hit, the Korean press took patriotic stance. They faithfully 
reported the government's `explanations' and downplayed the imminence and magnitude 
of the crisis. In contrast, world class economic news providers based in New York or 
Hong Kong went ahead with scathing reports of the Korean situation. Because of these 
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self-fulfilling reports, the Korean government's attempt to stabilise its financial market 
was rendered powerless. These reports did play a decisive role in worsening the financial 
market situation. In an increasingly borderless free market world economy, the financial 
market of a country cannot protect itself from the influence of world class economic news 
providers. 
In making policy decisions regarding foreign exchange rates or whether to ask for 
emergency loans from the IMF, the breakdown of communication channels within the 
government led to undue delays in policy formulation and exacerbated the crisis. The 
press in Korea failed to uncover the true situation of financial market. The press also 
failed to present a variety of views and alternatives for discussion. Some newspapers 
attempted to turn blind eyes to the deteriorating market situation and went on to defend 
long-term pro-market policies while the whole economy was thrown into the whirlwind of 
crisis. The Korean press in 1997 appears to have been at a great distance from the 
`democratic media model'. 
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6 
From Currency Crisis to Chronic Crisis 
Introduction 
In order to identify true causes of the Korean economic crisis, one has to look not 
only at the period leading to the currency crisis of 1997 but also at how the crisis unfolded 
itself and how it was being dealt with. If the causes were wrongly diagnosed, wrong 
prescriptions would be offered and the crisis would become worse. The quest for true 
causes of the economic crisis thus requires a comprehensive approach which takes into 
account the dynamism between the crisis and the measures for dealing with it. 
For instance, even if a situation begins as a straightforward liquidity crunch caused 
by a momentary shortage of foreign currency reserve, wrong responses of the government 
could make it develop into financial or generalised economic crisis. On the contrary, even 
if the situation is bad enough to show signs of a financial panic, adequate and effective 
measures would minimise the number of bankruptcies and contain the situation as a short- 
lived liquidity crisis, which will eventually be overcome. By assessing the effectiveness of 
various measures employed to deal with the currency crisis of 1997, one can trace back to 
true causes of the crisis. 
As a condition for emergency bail-out loans, the IMF demanded harsh and ruthless 
financial measures and sharp rise of interest rate to tighten up the economy. Later on, 
economists in and out of Korea accused the IMF for having misjudged the nature of the 
Korean crisis and thus aggravated the crisis. In fact, unlike other countries who received 
emergency loans from the IMF, Korea had a very healthy budgetary position. However, 
the IMF should not take all the blame. One has to look not only at the negotiation process 
between the IMF and the Korean government, but also at informal involvement of the US 
and Japan which took place behind the curtain. These events must be analysed from the 
perspective of international politics. It is also necessary to study the impact of news 
coverage by the press in and out of Korea of the negotiation between Korea and the IMF. 
This topic has so far remained largely untouched by scholars. 
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The reform of the chaebol during the IMF bail-out is no doubt a topic for domestic 
political economy. However, it must also be studied from an international political 
perspective. The need for such comprehensive approaches is obvious from the fact that 
expansionist policies of the chaebol in Korea were threatening multinational 
conglomerates and also from the fact that the chaebol played important roles not only in 
domestic politics but also in the North-South problem of Korea. It is also necessary to 
study how the chaebol who were the targets of reform attempted to shape and lead the 
programmes for reform and how the press and economists in and out of Korea contributed 
to policy making. With these things in mind, we shall have a look at the process of decline 
of Daewoo and Hyundai. It will provide a suitable opportunity to study the inter- 
relationship among the chaebol, politics and the media. 
`Invisible Hands' under the Negotiation Table 
A closer look at the negotiation process for the IMF bail-out loan shows that Korea 
had to negotiate not so much with the IMF as with the United States. The United States 
dissuaded Korea from exploring alternative paths and Korea was forced into the 
straightjacket of the IMF bailout. The Korean government hoped until the last minute to 
avoid the path to the IMF by negotiating loans from Japan. 140 At that time, Japan was 
preparing for the launch of Asia Monetary Fund (AMF) which was to vie with the IMF. 
The government was seeking to make the best use of competition between the two 
economic giants of the world. Deputy Finance Minister Eom Nakyong was therefore 
discreetly sent to Japan on 11 November. However, he had to return empty handed. 
Japan's Deputy Finance Minister Sakakibara coldly declined Mr Eom's proposal. In an 
interview undertaken for this research, Mr Eom said: 
US Treasury Secretary Rubin had already sent a letter to the Finance Minister of Japan 
and made sure that nothing would come out of the meeting (interview, 19 Mar. 2004). 
140 Japan was not wholly free from the responsibility for the Korean crisis. When South East Asian currency 
crisis broke out, Japanese banks suddenly withdrew from Korean market. And this was one of the causes 
for currency crisis of Korea. 
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Rubin's letter expressed the US government's concerns about the Japanese reaction 
to Korean financial crisis and indicated that Japan should endeavour to reform its own 
financial system and take measures to boost its own economy. Earlier, at a dinner party 
held in the US Embassy in Japan, Mr Sakakibara had openly stated that Japan and China 
would work together and that it might be a hard time for the US. However, he had to 
throw in the towel under the pressure from the US 141 (Hankook Kyungjae, 17 Feb. 1998). 
The Asian financial crisis put a halt to the formation of a North East Asian financial 
block. President Jiang Zemin of China, during his visit to the US on 26 October 1997, 
agreed to purchase 3 billion dollars worth of aircrafts from Boeing and expressed his 
opposition to AMF. Japan was also alarmed by signs of crisis when several of its banks, 
security companies and insurance companies were struggling to avoid bankruptcy. Japan 
announced that it would sell US Treasury Bills worth 600 billion dollars. Secretary Rubin, 
however, was unmoved and said that such a move would not cause the value of US T-Bills 
to plummet. After the currency crisis was over, Hankook Kyungjae ran a series of feature 
articles entitled `True Records of Foreign Exchange Crisis'. An anonymous high ranking 
official of the MOFE is reported to have said that `Asian financial crisis was wholly 
orchestrated and executed by Secretary Rubin' 142 (Hankook Kyungjae, 17 Feb. 1998). 
DPM Kang, just before his resignation, also said, "It seems that we were caught in a huge 
net" (Hankook, 13, Feb. 1998). He suggested again in his Memorandum that 'US interests 
were reflected in the Asian financial crisis'. 143 
The Korean government, however, was not aware of any of these at that time. Mr 
Eom, upon his arrival in Japan, announced that Korea would support AMF. On 17 
November, Mr Eom went to Asian Deputy Finance Ministers Meeting held in Manila. He 
had a meeting with the US Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and with 
141 As late as mid-October 1997, Japan had detailed plans for AMF. If all went to plan, 100 billion dollars 
would have been raised, of which half was to come from Japan and the remaining half from China, Korea 
and Hong Kong. 
142 Rubin was working for Goldman, Sachs & Company, an investment management firm of Wall Street 
before he took office as the Treasury Secretary. He became a President of Citibank when he left his 
position in the government. Citibank took over Koram Bank in Korea under his leadership. 
143 He wrote: A sudden phone call from Stanley Fischer (First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF) was 
somewhat mysterious. Moreover, Fischer used to be opposed to removing restrictions on foreign exchange 
rate fluctuations... But he is now arguing that the market should be allowed to take control. This is not a 
classic IMF approach. It rather feels like a reflection of US interests... Whether the US did or did not start 
the fire, one can at least say that the US was not keen to put it out (Kang's Memorandum, 6 Feb. 1998). 
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Japanese Deputy Finance Minister Sakakibara. Mr Eom's plea for a two-party solution for 
the Korean financial crisis was met by an identical reply from both Japan and the US: `talk 
to the IMF'. 144 Mr Sakakibara used to be a staunch defender of the Yen (his nickname was 
Mr Yen). However he had to give up. Japan's plan for AMF was officially withdrawn 
(Hankook Kyungjae, 17 Feb. 1998). 145 
As mentioned earlier, when the newly appointed DPM Lim Changryul was delaying 
the announcement of the government's negotiation for emergency financial support from 
the IMF and seeking alternative solutions, Secretary Rubin made an official statement 
urging the Korean government to take `immediate measures'. Also, it was perhaps at the 
insistence of the US that the IMF demanded written confirmations from three leading 
candidates for presidential election. The blunt demand of the IMF reflected the concerns 
of financial institutions on Wall Street who had much involvement in the Korean market. 
It was also in the interests of big players in the US industries which wanted either to take 
over Korean industries or to have them downsized. 
Financial support from the IMF was in the nature of bridge loans. They are for the 
protection of creditor banks. Nevertheless, IMF insisted in its negotiation with the debtor 
country that the latter must change its financial market to provide improved business 
environment for international financial capital. Creditor banks were therefore rewarded 
twice. The US involvement in Korea's negotiation with IMF must be viewed as an 
American effort to maximise the interests of Wall Street. 146 
When the IMF's Asia-Pacific Director Herbert Neiss was negotiating with the 
Korean government, decisions reached through negotiation were often undone by the 
United States. 147 Radical de-regulation of financial and capital market, opening up of the 
accounting profession and other demands of Wall Street kept coming through Mr Neiss' 
negotiating team. It was initially agreed that 9 merchant banking corporations were to be 
closed down. After Mr Lipton's arrival, the agreement was changed to include 12 
144 They both already knew about the secret bilateral negotiation mission of Camdessus (Managing Director 
of the IMF) which took place in Seoul on the previous day. 
145 As DPM Kang wrote in his Diary about 6 months later, Korea did not then realise that `Japan was non- 
existent in international financial market'(Kang's Diary, 25 Apr. 1998). 
146 Of the last 10 Treasury Secretaries including Mr Rubin, 9 are from Wall Street firms. This symbolises the 
connection between the US financial policies and Wall Street's interests. 
14' The US Treasury Under-Secretary David Lipton secretly entered in Korea and stayed at Hilton Hotel in 
Seoul, where the IMF's negotiating team led by Mr Neiss was staying and conducting meetings with 
Korean officials. Neiss frequently left the negotiation held on the 19th floor and visited Lipton who was 
staying on the 10th floor. 
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merchant banking corporations and 2 high street banks. Vice Minister of Finance and 
Economy, Kang Mansoo, who led the Korean negotiating team at that time, later told the 
present researcher: 
Mr Neiss himself sought our understanding that he had to listen to the demands of 
the US because no conclusion would receive final approval without the consent of 
the US (interview, 19 Mar. 2004). 
On 28 November, President Bill Clinton telephoned from Camp David and urged 
President Kim Youngsam to conclude the negotiation with the IMF in a swift manner 
(Hankook Kyungjae, 20 Feb. 1998). Vice Minister Kang went on as follows: 
In fact, Secretary Rubin wanted to get more out of Korea even if it meant that the 
negotiation would be prolonged. But in a meeting of National Security Council, 
Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen took the view that 
Korea is important to the security of the US and that the Korean crisis should be 
quickly dealt with. This was how the negotiation with IMF could be concluded 
(interview, 19 Mar. 2004). 
In the Finance Ministers Meeting of ASEAN countries and 6 other nations, which 
was held in Malaysia on 1 December, Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury, Timothy 
Geithner, suggested to Vice Minster Kang Mansoo148 that Korea should advance the 
planned opening up of capital market which it pledged upon joining the OECD. Korean 
government's efforts to negotiate favourable conditions from the IMF came to nothing in 
the end. The negotiation was concluded on 3 December incorporating most of the IMF's 
initial proposals and additional demands from the US. 149 
One noteworthy thing about this process is that an important item of negotiation was 
148 In an interview undertaken for this research, Mr Kang disclosed further that when he met China's Vice 
Finance Minister Liu Jibin and asked for a loan, Liu declined by saying `how can a country whose per 
capita income is 600 dollars make loan to a country whose per capita income is over 10,000 dollars? ' 
(interview, 19 Mar. 2004). 
149 It was a wholly different story from what happened in 1987 in the US when the stock market collapsed 
and banks were left with bad debts. The US government was then prepared to inject as much as it takes to 
keep the market afloat. No talk of `restructuring' the US financial market rose to surface. 
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omitted from public announcement of the outcome of the negotiation. When the omitted 
item was subsequently leaked to the press, it caused serious disruption to the financial 
market. Three days after the negotiation was reportedly concluded, Chosun had an 
exclusive coverage of the full text of Memorandum of Understanding regarding the IMF's 
emergency loans (Chosun, 6 Dec. 1997). It emerged that contrary to the government's 
vehement denial, it was in fact agreed that `two high street banks' were to be merged or 
closed down. Both the IMF and the Korean government wanted to keep it a secret because 
they were fearful of the panic such news would bring about. To some extent, they surely 
had a point. 
However, the secretive decision cannot wholeheartedly be supported because an 
early announcement of closure of ailing banks could have reduced the uncertainty of the 
financial market. Moreover, such a secretive decision will result in `asymmetry of 
information' because those who do have good access to secret information will benefit 
from the loss of the general public who do not have access to the information. If the 
government treats the population as a mere object of its economic policy, rather than as 
active participants in policy implementation, much time and effort will often be wasted in 
the execution and implementation of the policy. Breakdown of communication channels 
can occur not only within the government (as we discussed earlier), but also between the 
government and the population. 
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF, in its Evaluation Report in 2003, 
referred to the above-mentioned leak and stated that `although this undermined the 
initially positive market response, it would have been better publicly to acknowledge these 
facts at the outset and to design the program accordingly' (IEO 2003: 44). The IEO also 
proposed that `a program for restoring confidence must include a strategy to communicate 
the logic of the program to the public and the markets (IEO 2003: 5). 
Belt-tightening Measures and Media Coverage 
The `renegotiation controversy' which occurred in the run up to the Presidential 
election of 18 December 1997 shows that political calculations and inadequate media 
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coverage could pose serious obstacles to formation of reasonable economic policies. As 
the IMF demanded severe belt-tightening measures and comprehensive opening up of 
capital and financial markets, public opinion began to show dissatisfaction about the loss 
of `economic sovereignty'. Some academics began to mention a possibility of 
`renegotiation' with the IMF. Kim Daejung, who was then a candidate, announced during 
a televised debate on 1 December that if he was elected, he would renegotiate with IMF 
and achieve 4-5% annual economic growth. 
The New York Times reported that Kim was attempting to use popular dissatisfaction 
to his benefit in the election. The paper raised some doubts as to whether Korea would 
indeed stick to the terms it negotiated with the IMF (6 Dec. 1997). The Washington Post 
said refusal to comply with the agreed terms of the rescue loans from the IMF could result 
in more major financial chaos in the Korean market (10 Dec. 1997). On the following day, 
the paper ran an article where it was asserted that even if Korea should enter in a default, 
its impacts on the world economy or on the US interests would be minimal. The article 
cites some specialists' argument that Korea should better be dropped and that the allocated 
fund should be used to support other countries (11 Dec. 1997). 
Among Korean papers, Chosun was most critical about `renegotiation'. It produced 
one headline article entitled `Talk of renegotiation aggravates foreign exchange crisis' (11 
Dec. ), two editorials (9,11 Dec. ) and many other articles highlighting the danger of 
renegotiation attempts. DongA ran a contributing article authored by Dr Yang Soo-kil, a 
proponent for opening up of domestic markets. In his article, `Talk of renegotiation could 
only undermine Korea's credibility', he argued that `the crucial point of the terms 
negotiated from IMF is that we will have the opportunity to address the problems of the 
financial market and the chaebol. He added that `we ourselves have for decades wanted to 
do precisely that' (11 Dec. ). 
Also, the Director of KDI, Cha Dongsei, explained in a public lecture that `there is 
no guarantee as to whether renegotiation could in any way be more advantageous to 
Korea'. Instead, he remarked, `When a lion attempts to hunt down a deer, perhaps the least 
bad solution is to hand over a fawn although we may mourn over its loss'. He argued that 
`there is no reason to be afraid of closures or mergers of domestic financial institutions' 
(Hankook, 12 Dec. ). A source who was in contact with the IMF's negotiation team told a 
reporter that Mr Camdessus' remark (the Korean government `disgraced' the IMF) or 
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Secretary Rubin's statement (Koreans are `ungrateful') is a reflection of the degree of the 
IMF's mistrust of Korea (Munhwa, 13 Dec. ). 
The ruling party's candidate, Lee Hoechang, ran a campaign advertisement entitled, 
`Talk of renegotiation is ruining the country'. He attempted to highlight the renegotiation 
controversy as the biggest election issue. Alarmed by deteriorating conditions of the 
foreign exchange market and unfavourable results from opinion polls, Kim Daejung 
withdrew his argument for renegotiation. In a video conference - with George Soros, pop 
singer Michael Jackson and a former US Secretary of Commerce Mickey Canter - which 
was staged as a publicity event nearing the election, Kim Daejung renewed his pledge that 
he would `fully support the IMF's program'. 
On 13 December, President Kim Youngsam had a breakfast meeting with three 
candidates and reconfirmed his and their promise to abide by the deal with IMF. After the 
meeting, he telephoned President Clinton to explain the meeting and reassured him that 
`there would no more debate in Korea regarding renegotiation with IMF' (Hankook, 15 
Dec. ). President Clinton was no doubt pleased. On 16 December, Prime Minister Goh Kun 
convened a special meeting and drew up a governmental plan `to restrain chauvinism and 
arguments hostile to the US and to the IMF'. 
In short, the possibility of renegotiation with the IMF was used by domestic 
political factions in their attempt to seize the power. The media treated this issue merely as 
one of the electioneering stunts. As a result, rational and dispassionate analysis of merits 
and demerits of renegotiation with the IMF were not explored. The few proponents for re- 
negotiation now found themselves accused of chauvinism. Their voice was lost. The 
wrongly devised support package of the IMF thus remained for some time in a safe-haven 
shielded from criticism. 
Kim Daejung won the election held on 18 December. As soon as he took office, 
however, he went even further than the IMF demanded. He adopted a comprehensive 
platform for deregulation and opening up of domestic markets. His decision to allow lay- 
off and hostile M&A and full scale amendment of the Foreign Exchange Management 
Act make one wonder the true meaning of `Democratic market economy' 150 which he had 
150 In fact, the words `Democratic market economy' themselves lie in the relationship of the oxymoron in 
which the democratic principle of `one man one vote' and the capitalistic principle of `one dollar one vote' 
comes into conflict with each other. The expression `Democratic' is perhaps added to dilute the resistance 
to market-driven economic policies 
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been advocating as a Presidential candidate. These measures were not included in the 
agreement with the IMF. With regard to lay-off, in particular, Kim Daejung himself had 
consistently argued during his candidacy that its introduction would be premature. 
The remarkable somersault was reported in a serialised feature article, `DJ-Nomics: 
Unfinished Reform' which appeared in JoongAng. An anecdote in this series shows the 
role played by American-Trained Korean Economists (ATKEs), Kim Kihwan and Ryu 
Jongkeun. They persuaded the President elect that in order to ensure prompt financial 
support from the US, Korea must do more than what was demanded by the IMF. Fully 
aware of what the US is capable of, Kim Daejung accepted their proposal. Kim Kihwan 
was thus sent to the US as a special ambassador for economic cooperation. Without 
seeking the Korean government's approval, Kim Kihwhan gave an undertaking to his US 
counterpart that an earlier support from the US would be reciprocated by the Korean 
government's reform efforts which go further than those required by the IMF. He returned 
to Korea on 22 December and explained his meetings to the President elect. Later on in 
the same day, Under Secretary Lipton arrived in Seoul to meet with the President elect. 
Lipton was given a clearly satisfactory answer in this meeting (JoongAng, 3 Jan. 2002). 
Ryu Jongkeun was in attendance at this meeting and he recalls: 
Mr Lipton cautiously broached the issue of flexibility of the labour market. The 
President elect responded immediately and unequivocally: `For me, what is 
important is competitiveness. In order to ensure competitiveness of the Korean 
economy, labour market flexibility is a must. ' Mr Lipton had a broad grin 
(JoongAng, 3 Jan. 2002). 
The outcome of the meeting was immediately reported back. Two days later, the 
IMF and the US announced an early installment of a loan amounting to 10 billion dollars. 
However, even if the foreign exchange reserve was running out, it is not free from 
criticism that Korea offered to undertake radical measures which are bound to have 
profound and far-reaching impacts. Proponents of the open market claim that without such 
a swift move, Korea was certain to face national default. If, however, Korea had been 
declared to be in default, its creditors could well have experienced greater inconveniences. 
The US therefore could not have pushed the situation to that extent. 
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According to Kim Kihwan's recollection, after he had explained the near default 
situation of Korea to the officials of the US Treasury department, Assistant Secretary 
Geithner stopped him and requested him to avoid using the word `default'. Mr Kim sensed 
that the US officials were having their share of worries (JoongAng, 3 Jan. 2002). Korea 
could have adopted the Russian approach. Russia declared a moratorium and was given a 
moment of respite. An editorial which appeared in the New York Times also mentioned 
moratorium as a viable option open to Korea. That option was indeed suggested by Fred 
Bergsten of the Institute of International Economics (12 Dec. 1997). 
In this connection, James Crotty argued that if Korea was prepared to declare a 
moratorium it could have negotiated a better deal from the IMF. He pointed out: 
Korea's negotiation with the IMF was quickly concluded simply because Korea 
accepted almost all the demands of the US creditors and the IMF. If the full list of 
agreed restructuring and de-regulatory measures are to be implemented, the Korean 
economy will be under the control of multinational capitals as is the case with South 
American countries. If that happens, it will be impossible for Korea to regain the 
dynamism and growth pattern it used to show (Crotty 1998). 
It is extremely difficult to surmise what would have happened if Korea had 
maintained a more independent stance in its negotiations with the IMF. Was it likely that 
Korea was going to declare a moratorium? What would have been the consequences of 
declaring a moratorium? However, there is little doubt that since the possibility of 
declaring a moratorium was ruled out too early in the negotiation process, Korea's 
bargaining leverage seriously weakened. Moreover, neo-liberalist scholars took this 
opportunity to squeeze in their policy proposals on the occasion of negotiation with the 
IMF. As a result, Korea became an `exemplary case' of the IMF bailout loan where the full 
list of Anglo-American capitalist measures were implemented as a condition for 
emergency loan. 
This is in striking contrast with the case of Malaysia that refused to follow the 
recipe of the IMF. Instead of receiving emergency rescue loans, then Prime Minister, 
Mahathir, decided to control the movements of speculative international capital. It proved 
successful. Veneroso pointed out that `Kim Daejung was following the US Treasury line 
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more closely than any other Asian leader' (Veneroso 1998). 
The media failed to offer an analysis of policy measures which were being 
demanded by the IMF. They treated those policy measures as un-alterable or un-negotiable. 
Severe belt-tightening measures and large scale lay-offs were accepted as un-avoidable. 
When the IMF bail-out was announced (21 Nov. 1997) or final, negotiated outcome was 
reported (3 Dec. 1997), the press poured out emotionally charged and sensational outcries: 
`A day of national shame' or `Economic trusteeship'. When it comes to concrete measures 
or methods to get out of the situation, the media failed to offer any meaningful discussion. 
They kept reiterating personal virtues of belt-tightening, frugality and hard work. 
One offshoot of such an approach is the massive scale citizens' movement for gold 
collecting. The movement was started by Hankook (newspaper) and MBC (broadcasting 
corporation). Fuelled by patriotic sentiment stirred up by humiliation of the IMF bailout, 
three and a half million households participated in this nation-wide effort to bring out gold 
from the bottom of wardrobes. A total of 225 tons of pure gold was collected. The export 
of the gold generated more than 2 billion dollars which greatly helped to ease foreign 
currency shortage of the time. 
Such popular movements did have a great impact. On the other hand, however, they 
prevented clear headed analyses of the situation and hampered meaningful discussion 
about the measures demanded by the IMF. The spread of `mea culpa' gave immunity to the 
chaebol. Serious instances of foreign interference with domestic economic autonomy were 
taken for granted. The Korean media contributed to this practice of `personalisation' by 
putting the blame on every citizen for structural and institutional problems. 
Although the US media during the financial crisis were loyal to Wall Street interests, 
they sometimes reported views which pointed out problems of the IMF's approach. For 
example, the Washington Post suggested that thanks to the belt-tightening measures forced 
upon South East Asian firms, Western countries were able to purchase them at a very low 
price. The paper predicted that these measures, in turn, would have the adverse 
consequence of spreading anti-Western sentiment in this area and that, as a result, the 
relationship between the US and Asia would be in danger of deterioration (18 Jan. 1998). 
The Time magazine and the Financial Times gave voice to Professor Jeffrey Sachs who 
was critical of the IMF's prescriptions for Asian countries. The Time had an article by 
Professor Sachs which was cynically entitled, `International Monetary Failure? ' (8 Dec. 
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1997). The Financial Times also had an article where he denounced severe belt-tightening 
measures as `overkill' (11 Dec. 1997). 
Other foreign media also gave voice to prominent economists such as Martin 
Feldstein, Joseph Stiglitz and Robert Wade. These scholars were largely critical of IMF's 
bail-out programmes. For example, Feldstein asked, `Why should Korea be required to 
raise taxes and cut spending... when its national savings rate is already one of the highest 
in the world' (Feldstein 1998). Veneroso quotes the argument of Joseph Stiglitz: `there is 
no empirical evidence that lower rates weaken a currency'. He then went on: `in the case 
of South East Asia, it is now clear that high real rates, by creating bankruptcies and 
depression, have caused foreign capital to flee the region, thereby weakening local 
currencies' (Veneroso 1998). Wade wrote in a column entitled, `Asian water torture' which 
appeared in the Financial Times: `unless the IMF allows the region's economies to reflate 
and lower interest rates, it will condemn them to a never-ending spiral of recession and 
bankruptcy' (23 June 1998). 
In Korea, however, few scholars were raising doubts as to the soundness of the 
IMF's approach to Korean crisis. Even if there were, they were largely ignored by the 
press. 15 1 The Korean media gave a low profile treatment of foreign news articles which 
were critical of the IMF. Instead, they kept arguing for severe tightening measures by and 
large until the summer of 1998. Their rationale was that tight fiscal policies would be 
necessary to achieve restructuring of industries (e. g. Chosun, editorial, 1 May 1998; 
Seoul-shinmun, editorial, 26 June 1998). 
However, their argument is not very convincing. As Kim and Park have 
demonstrated, although the theoretical expectation is that tight fiscal policies would 
eliminate inefficient firms, the reality is that those firms which somehow have the ability 
to finance would survive regardless of how efficient or inefficient they may be (Kim and 
Park, 1998: 380). In fact, during December 1997 and the first half of 1998, about 2000 
firms went bankrupt every month. Most of them were small or medium sized enterprises 
which had very few means of financing. The main target of restructuring was the chaebol. 
Nonetheless they remained intact from this wave of restructuring. If one wishes to 
preserve industrial foundations and would like to deal with problems related to the chaebol, 
151 Although there were a few articles such as Lee Chan-geun's contribution entitled, `Renegotiation with 
IMF is needed', which was carried in a miner newspaper (Segye, 11 May 1998). 
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indiscriminately tight fiscal measures may not be the answer. Instead, restructuring plans 
focused on the chaebol themselves could have had a greater chance of success. 
Because of severe belt-tightening measures, overnight call rate went up as high as 
25% and the Korean composite stock index went down from around 600 to around 300. 
Korean currency was seriously devalued too: 1 US dollar used to be approximately 900 
Korean won, but it was now as high as 2000 won. All these indices were suggesting that a 
worse financial crisis might be around the corner. The IMF were forced to recognise by 
July 1998 that their policies were wrong, and then lowered the interest rate and toned 
down some of the severest measures. By then, however, numerous companies had already 
gone bankrupt or were waiting to be sold to foreign purchasers. In July 1998, Mr Ahn 
Youngseop contributed a column entitled, `Criticising the IMF: is it a taboo? ' (DongA, 9 
July 1998). The title itself reveals that Korean media had largely been uninterested in 
criticising belt-tightening measures demanded by the IMF. 
Restructuring and the `Big Deal' 
With regard to the restructuring of the chaebol, which should take the largest share 
of blame for the crisis, newspapers adopted divergent stances depending on their character 
and affiliation. On 3 December 1997, when the IMF's emergency loan was finally decided, 
JoongAng (affiliate of Samsung) ran an article `Restructuring of chaebol sends shock 
wave'. It expressed its deep worries that `the forced intervention of the IMF might cause 
confusion and many undesirable side-effects. ' On the following day, JoongAng devoted an 
entire page to put forward the chaebol's arguments: `if cross payment guarantees between 
affiliates are no longer allowed, companies would have to face higher financing costs 
because they would no longer be able to borrow from their affiliates; and if consolidated 
accounting practice had to be adopted, trade between affiliates would no longer be allowed 
and it would result in diminished turnover' (4 Dec. 1997). Kyunghyang (affiliate of 
Hanhwa) kept silent about Mr Camdessus' remark that the chaebol might have to be 
dismantled. A few days later, however, it had an editorial, `Concluding the bargain under 
the influence of the US and Japan' and criticised Mr Camdessus' remark (5 Dec. ). 
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Munwha (affiliate of Hyundai) had an editorial, `Let's start again! ' and argued that the 
newly introduced requirement of external audit would divulge trade secrets and strategies 
of domestic corporations. Hankook Kyungjae, which is owned by KFI, published a column 
by a proponent of neo-liberalism, Gong Byungho. Mr Gong criticised Mr Camdessus by 
saying that foreigners `do not have an accurate understanding of the facts and yet assume 
that systems which they do not have are all wrong' (4 Dec. ). 
However, DongA had an editorial, `The IMF's case for dismantling the chaebol' and 
claimed that `the financial crisis facing the nation at the moment is brought about by the 
chaebol and the recovery of the national economy cannot be achieved unless structural 
problems and inefficiency of the chaebol are dealt with' (4 Dec. ). Chosun had an editorial, 
`Are the chaebol going to change? ' and advanced an argument that `the IMF was not far 
off the mark when it pointed out that the chaebol were left unchecked in their reckless 
borrowing practice and over-ambitious attempt to expand their business areas' (4 Dec. ). 
Hankyoreh joined in and proposed that `reform of the chaebol is our responsibility' (4 
Dec. ). 
Meanwhile, President elect Kim Daejung met with the heads of 4 chaebol on 13 
January and came to an agreement on `Five principles of restructuring'. 152 A few days 
later, the Chairman of the Committee for Emergency Economic Planning, Lee Hun jai, 
proposed `Three principles of implementation' : i) firms must take the initiative; ii) the 
government proposes guidelines only; iii) restructuring will be implemented through 
banking and financing. The emphasis was on the third point. Mr Lee believed that 
tightening the flow of money would be the most effective means of implementing the 
restructuring of the chaebol. 
However, the `Three principles' had limits although they did have some favourable 
results. The shortcomings of these principle themselves, the `wall of real politics' and the 
resistance of the chaebol made it difficult to stick to these principles. Most of all, the 
banks themselves were suffering from the same types of problems they were asked to fix. 
In the name of corporate autonomy, the chaebol planted their heels and refused to carry 
out restructuring. 
In the end, the government had to come to the fore. As proposing guidelines was not 
152 Five principle of restructuring: improvement of the corporate governance framework; enhancement of 
management transparency; elimination of cross-debt guarantees; improvement of the capital structure of 
firms; greater concentration in core businesses. 
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enough, the so-called `Big deal' was being contemplated. `Big deal' refer to restructuring 
plans to eliminate duplication and over-investment by business swap so that a company 
which has comparative advantage in a given business area would be asked to have the 
business operations of its less successful competitors. The successful company, on the 
other hand, would be asked to relinquish its less successful operations in other business 
areas. However, the chaebol as well as the KFI were opposed to the `Big deal'. The 
Chairman of the KFI, Choi Jonghyun, said in a meeting with journalists that discussions 
about a `Big deal' had no substance and that they would be unrealistic (Kyunghyang, 8 Jan. 
1998). 
The chaebol's apparent opposition to the proposed `Big deal', however, must not be 
taken at its face value. In reality, some of them were in favour of the proposed 
restructuring plans. Nevertheless they all put up an appearance that they were either 
uninterested or opposed. The reason is that they did not want to be perceived as 
welcoming the proposal as they feared that it would lower their bargaining position. All of 
them wanted to get the maximum out of the proposed restructuring deals. In particular, 
Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai had more serious problems of over-investment compared 
to LG or SK Group. The former groups of companies, therefore, hoped to be rid of their 
problems through `Big deals'. Contrary to the media-made popular notions that the 
proposal for `Big deal' came from the government and was forced entirely by the 
government, the idea in fact started from some of the chaebol themselves. 
Indications for this can be found in classified reports prepared by Samsung and 
Daewoo. Immediately upon the outbreak of the currency crisis, Samsung Economic 
Research Institute (SERI) started to prepare for plans to overcome it. At the beginning of 
December 1997, SERI's report was presented to the Secretariat of Samsung's chairman. 
The report contains the proposal that group heads must come to an agreement whereby 
they would swap business operations they experience difficulty with. According to a book 
entitled, The Game of Big Deal, a SERI researcher is reported to have said, `We wanted 
our proposal to remain classified because we did not want to give out the impression that 
the idea was to have Samsung Motors off our back' (Lee, Y. 1999). 
Samsung appears to have carefully planned to build up favourable opinions for 
business swap. In a booklet entitled, The IMF and the Korean Economy which was 
prepared by SERI and freely distributed to the media and to the government officials on 9 
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December (only 6 days after the bail-out by the IMF was decided), `business swap' was 
already being mentioned (SERI 1997: 100; 157). Two days later, SERI distributed a press 
release entitled `Financial support from the IMF and corporate responses' and proposed as 
a short-term measure that `companies must swiftly carry out business restructuring by 
selling off unsuccessful operations, business swaps, or out-sourcing' (Kookmin, 11 Dec. 
1997). As yet, however, `business swap' was presented merely as one among many 
alternative measures. It did not attract much attention and did not feature in a headline. 
As more detailed news articles were being written by reporters who had sources 
close to the chaebol's chairmen, `business swap' became a hot issue. On 15 December, 
Chosun and Hankyoreh both had articles dealing with corporate restructuring. Chosun's 
article was entitled `Unsound companies likely to be traded among the chaebol in a 
restructuring effort'. Hankyoreh's article, `Urgent need for restructuring among the 
chaebol and among business areas' reads more like an opinion. According to the article, 
`elimination of marginalised businesses' which was being pursued by the government was 
not likely to be enough to overcome the IMF crisis. In order to resolve the problems of 
over-investment, the article suggested business swaps: 
Businesses should be swapped among the chaebol.... Hyundai, for example, could 
concentrate on car manufacturing and heavy industry while Samsung could 
concentrate on finance and semi-conductor. And LG could concentrate on 
electronics and the petro-chemical industry. Unless the chaebol could work out such 
strategic concentration plans, it is unlikely that the economic crisis can be overcome 
in the near future' (Hankyoreh, 15 Dec. 1998). 
The reporter, Jeong Youngmoo, who was covering Samsung at the time said: 
The idea was not mine. I wrote it on the basis of what I heard from several chaebol 
sources (interview, 19 Mar. 2004). 
Economic newspapers joined in as well. On 15 December, Maeil Kyungjae 
published an article on its front page urging the chairmen of the chaebol to start 
negotiations for restructuring. On the following day, Hankook Kyungjae had an article 
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`Business swap among the chaebol -a possibility? ' Top ranking employees of Samsung 
and Hyundai were quoted in the article as having expressed their agreement to the 
business swap. The director of Samsung's planning team, Ji Seungrim, said, `Trimming 
down is no longer a viable method of corporate restructuring. Bartering business 
operations among the chaebol are necessary as it can concentrate resources to a company 
which has competitive advantage' (Hankook Kyungjae, 16 Dec. 1997). On 6 January, the 
Daewoo Economic Research Institute leaked a confidential report entitled, `A Preliminary 
Study for Big Deals' (DERI, 1998). It was the first report to use the expression `Big deal'. 
As the report was favouring Daewoo, other chaebol made strong protests. 
The Chairman of Policy Committee of the ruling party (Assemblyman), Kim 
Wonkil played an important role in having the government adopt the chaebol's idea of the 
`Big deal'. Upon Kim Daejung's election, Kim Wonkil, a former entrepreneur, suddenly 
became an important person in economic policy making. He met news reporters and high 
ranking government officials and tirelessly preached the virtues of the `Big deal'. In a 
personal communication with the present researcher, he asserted that the `Big deal' is the 
only way forward for us at the moment. When he was asked where he got his ideas from, 
he answered: 
I did meet with many experts and managers of corporate groups. But anyone who 
has some knowledge of the economy would come up with the same ideas (personal 
communication, Jan. 1998). 
President Kim Daejung was initially wary of having the government take the 
initiative for the `Big deal'. As the press increased the criticism about poor records of 
restructuring, he changed his course and energetically pursued the `Big deal'. His visit to 
the US in June and President Clinton's visit to Korea in November also provided an 
important driving force for the `Big deal'. Clinton was concerned about the increasing 
volume of Korean exports of semi-conductor and steel products to the US. He criticised 
the slow pace at which restructuring of the chaebol was being implemented. The US 
wanted to have production facilities in Korea downsized as a means to deal with the 
worldwide problem caused by the surplus of production facilities. 
With some difficulty and delay, production facilities in oil refinery, petro-chemical, 
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power plant, aircraft and train manufacturing were reduced. Formerly, 3 to 5 firms were 
competing in each of these areas of business. The number of firms then dropped to one or 
two. However, `Big deals' did not take place or `wrong deals' took place in car 
manufacturing and semi-conductor business. Partly because of this, Daewoo and Hyundai 
started to decline. 
There was a convincing argument that semi-conductor business should be taken 
over by LG which had the expertise and a relatively better financial position. Nevertheless, 
on the strength of market share, Hyundai was allowed to take over the semi-conductor 
business. Hyundai's financial position seriously deteriorated as a result. 153 The `Big deal' 
had many problems as it created a monopoly, but it was perhaps an unavoidable choice to 
eliminate problems of over-capacity in a given industry. The `wrong deal' in the semi- 
conductor industry, however, dealt a serious blow to the credibility of the `Big deal' as a 
policy for corporate restructuring. 
There were many factors contributing to the decision for Hyundai to take over the 
semi-conductor industry. Of those factors, politics and the media were of particular 
importance. The Kim Daejung administration was keen to have the credit rating restored 
by corporate restructuring. The government's hasty and aggressive drive to have Hyundai 
oligopolise the semi-conductor industry ('Super deal') was motivated by this. The media 
were also encouraging this move. Hyundai had close connections with the government 
because of its role in the North-South negotiation. It is rumoured that, in exchange for its 
commitment in inter-Korean deal, Hyundai was trying to win the semi-conductor industry. 
In October 1998, as the semi-conductor market began to show signs of recovery, the 
press had mixed views about the restructuring of semi-conductor industry. A group of 
newspapers advocated that the `Big deal' was largely useless. Chosun had an article, 
`Arguments against the semi-conductor Big deal are surfacing' (26 Oct. ) and DongA had 
`Semi-conductor market on the recovery: was Big deal necessary? ' (27 Oct. ). On the other 
hand, several papers showed frustration for the slow pace at which the Big deal was being 
implemented. Hankyoreh had an article, `Is the Big deal really going to take place? ' (28 
Oct. ) and Hankook had `Chaebol must keep their promise' (30 Oct. ). Many reporters at 
153 LG Semiconductor's debts together with the purchase price for the take over amounted to 600 billion 
won. By coincidence, the semi-conductor market entered into a slump. Hyundai's newly created semi- 
conductor manufacturer (Hynix) quickly went into court receivership and was being managed by its 
creditors. 
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that time were saying as follows: 
Depending on their personal sympathy and connections with individual chaebol, 
reporters were engaged in a battle as champions of different chaebol (personal 
communications, Oct. 1998). 
Under this climate, on 14 December, President Kim said in an interview with a 
Korean broadcasting corporation, CBS, `The restructuring agreement among five chaebol 
is faced with an obstacle in the semi-conductor industry because of the resistance of a 
company. The company which does not abide by the agreement will be subjected to 
sanctions imposed by banks. ' At about the same time, the credit rating agency Moody's 
announced that it noted with interest the delay in restructuring efforts in semi-conductor 
industry. Moody's accordingly decided to maintain `negative watch' status for Hyundai 
Semiconductor America which is a subsidiary of Hyundai electronics. 
On 6 January 1999, the Chairman of LCD Koo Bonmoo, was called in to the Office 
of the President. He announced to the President that LG would give up the semi-conductor 
industry. According to DongA's serialised coverage of this period, `Secret Records of Kim 
Daejung Government', as soon as he took seat with Chairman Koo, President Kim 
introduced an economic daily newspaper and said, `Have you read this? ' pointing to an 
article. The article contained assertions that because of the delay in restructuring the semi- 
conductor industry, the nation's credit rating was downgraded and foreign investors were 
reluctant to invest in Korea (DongA, 23 July 2003). This episode shows that President Kim 
used to take news reports seriously. 
`Big deals' did have some success in reducing surplus or redundant facilities. That 
was because there existed a shared understanding among those in the policy community 
that `Big deals' were necessary. However, the goals they wanted to achieve through `big 
deals' were different. The US, for example, wanted to see Korean companies shed their 
surplus capacity. The chaebol, on the other hand, wanted to get rid of unsuccessful 
operations and redundant employees. Some papers such as Hankook, Hankyoreh and 
Chosun put forward an argument that the chaebol owners should take personal 
responsibility for the crisis and that their personal wealth should be used for the `Big 
deals' (e. g. Hankook, editorial, 20 Jan. 1998). DongA and JoongAng were critical of this 
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argument. They claimed that the government should offer tax relief, allow lay-offs and 
take other measures to create a favourable environment for `Big deals' to go ahead. The 
argument for personal accountability was criticised as `Parading with a bandwagon with 
little understanding of the reality' (e. g. DongA, 23 Jan. 1998). In the end, the personal 
accountability argument died down without many concrete results although it started out 
with much publicity. The arguments supporting the chaebol were mostly implemented. 
The Chaebol, Politics and the Media 
Hyundai and Daewoo had contrasting corporate traditions and cultures. Many of the 
differences are derived from their founders' different characteristics and management 
styles. Chung Juyung of Hyundai lived a life which was a legendary success story for blue 
collar workers. Kim Woojoong of Daewoo, on the other hand, was an idol for white collar 
employees. Chung started in the manufacturing industry. Kim Woojoong started in trade 
and financing. Most of Hyundai's companies were started by Chung himself. Kim 
Woojoong relied on take-overs and mergers to build his business empire. 
There were similarities too. Using their remarkable industriousness and brilliant 
ideas, they were leading the development years of Korean economy. Both of them had a 
desire for power and tried to enter into connections with political rulers. In 1992, both of 
them expressed their interest in the Presidency. Chung actually ran for the Presidency. ' 54 
Their over-ambitious business structure revealed serious financial weaknesses during and 
after the IMF era. Rather than adapting to the changed business environment, they went 
ahead with reckless acquisitions and expansions often based upon their arbitrary decisions. 
They both attempted to cover up their financial weakness by mobilising the press and the 
politics. The two groups had different starting points and took different courses of 
development. However, their end was similar. Both of them were declined. 
154 Chung Juyung distinguished himself in inviting the 1988 Seoul Olympics by mobilising Hyundai's 
organisation and slush fund. He became a candidate for President in 1992 with these successes. His son, 
Chung Mongjoon also successfully hosted the 2002 FIFA World Cup in the same manner. He also ran for 
the Presidency after the Korean team became semi-finalists in that World Cup. 
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The Case of Daewoo 
Kim Woojoong's `Global Management' attracted a great deal of attention, even for 
a while after the outbreak of the currency crisis. His business style was hailed as a new 
alternative for Korean economy. However, Kim's overseas business operations started by 
making personal contacts with the rulers of East European countries, Vietnam and 
Cambodia who all wanted to have accelerated economic growth which is often regarded as 
the hallmark of South Korean economy. Kim built a politically favourable business 
environment through boldly investing in those countries. ' 55 It was a high risk, high return 
business model. However, it quickly raised Daewoo's market share. Just before the 
currency crisis of 1997, Daewoo had 320 overseas affiliates. 
UNCTAD described Daewoo as the biggest borderless corporation in the developing 
countries with 200,000 overseas employees and assets worth 11.9 billion dollars world- 
wide. Seoul-Shinmun had a serialised article entitled `Global Management of Daewoo' 
(Seoul, 12-24 Aug. 1996). Hankyoreh had an article for Daewoo, `The world has no border 
and there is no slump' (Hankyoreh, 30 Sep. 1996). The article was named after Kim's best 
seller, The World has No Border and There is No Limit to Businesses. 
Among government officials, however, there were voices of concern about 
Daewoo's foreign investment strategy which relied on foreign loans. Foreign economic 
journals such as The Economist and some other papers in and out of Korea also began to 
show signs of concern (e. g. Chosun, 24 Sep. 1996). However, Kim was quick to seize 
opportunities and turn the table around with sophisticated publicity measures. President 
Kim Youngsam was visiting South East Asian countries in November 1996. Kim 
Woojoong took the opportunity to invite President Kim to Daewoo's plant in Vietnam. 
President Kim was then preaching his `Globalisation' idea and he was duly impressed by 
Daewoo's achievement. At a reception held in Daewoo Hotel in Hanoi, President Kim 
heaped praises on Daewoo. Daewoo's `Global management' received a high-profile news 
coverage. Kim Woojoong could enjoy a very enthusiastic support from President Kim 
Youngsam and his government (e. g. Seoul-shinmun, 27 Nov. 1996). 
In the spring of 1997, Daewoo affiliates' share prices went up by 30% thanks to 
155 For example, Kim took over a bankrupt Polish car assembly plant, FSO, with loans from multinational 
financing firms. He exported half completed cars from Korea which were finished and marketed in Poland 
on a semi-knock-down basis. 
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several presentation and corporate promotion events held earlier in the year. Daewoo was 
envied by many other chaebol which were suffering from recession. A report purportedly 
prepared by the Secretariat of LG Group was being circulated at the time. The report 
predicted that by 2005, Daewoo would be at the top. Daewoo's `Global management' 
appeared to be working fine. 
However, the currency crisis of that winter put a halt to it. Nevertheless, Daewoo's 
business structure, which relied heavily on foreign loans, could not slow down. Like a 
bicycle which falls when it slows down, Daewoo kept borrowing in spite of the rocketing 
interest rate and exchange rate in order to serve debts which fall due. Most chaebol started 
to take belt-tightening measures. Yet Kim Woojoong remained defiant. As the chairman of 
KFI, Kim said that the crisis was not caused by the industry but by the weakness of 
financial institutions of Korea. Daewoo kept expanding. 
In order to secure financial support, some of Daewoo's affiliates exported goods to 
their overseas branches which received and kept them in warehouses. Daewoo Motors 
failed to repatriate 1.5 billion dollars which it received for exported cars and used the 
money to repay foreign loans. Daewoo's foreign debts amounted to 10 billion dollars in 
total. Since many of Daewoo's overseas investment projects were still at the initial stage 
and the plants were under construction, Daewoo had difficulty in paying the interests 
accrued to its loans. Daewoo's complicated overseas financing deals were supervised by a 
secretive unit, known as Codename BFC, which was located in a suburb of London. '56 
Chairman Kim made use of the media to hide the dire financial situation and 
approached politicians to resolve financial difficulties. He set up the `Daewoo 
Communications Centre' which oversaw all public relations activities of Daewoo. The 
Centre was headed by a vice-president. Kim also made good use of the public relations 
team of KFI. During his chairmanship, Kim Woojoong kept propagating his conviction 
that the economic crisis was not due to reckless expansion of the chaebol. Kim knew how 
to deal with the media. The following is an example which Kim himself told the reporters 
covering Daewoo: 
At one time, a newspaper kept publishing inaccurate reports on Daewoo. I asked the 
156 BFC stood for the British Finance Centre. A number of British trained finance experts, known as the 
`London School of Daewoo members', were using all sorts of financing techniques to keep afloat 
Daewoo's global management. 
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public relations team to keep track of all articles concerning Daewoo published in a 
certain paper. After a year, I looked at the collected articles on Daewoo. I could see 
that the paper was contradicting itself on many occasions. When I later had an 
opportunity to meet the president of the newspaper, I presented him the collected 
news articles. It made a difference; I could tell. Regarding the secret fund scandal 
which is raging at the moment, I also asked my public relations team to keep track 
of the news articles (cited in Kang Joonman 1997: 100). 
The `secret fund scandal' mentioned here refers to bribery charges against the 
chaebol which allegedly offered large sums of money to Chun Doohwan and Roh Taewoo 
while they were Presidents of Korea. In a roundabout way, Chairman Kim was attempting 
to have a chilling effect on the reporters. 
In his frequent overseas trips, he was often accompanied by famous professors, 
novelists, leaders of citizen groups who regularly contribute columns to newspapers. His 
overseas journeys were then publicised by writings of his `travel companions'. ' 57 In 1997, 
the dean of the Management School of Seoul National University, Professor Gwak Soo-il, 
contributed a column, `Global management by Columbus of our time' (DongA, 30 Apr. 
1997). A year later Professor Gwak and 8 other professors of management studies 
published a book: The World is Open, the Future is in Sight. It is a collection of case 
studies of `Global management' strategy (Seo Jaemyung et al. 1998). The book was 
advertised as a `New textbook to overcome the economic crisis'. At about the same time, 
Harvard Business School also published a collection of case studies about Daewoo's 
`Global management'. The publication of these studies was reported in the media under a 
glowing title, `Kim's new management strategy shines out in a turbulent period' (Segye, 
20 Mar. 1998). The ills of Kim's management, which relies on foreign loans, were not 
mentioned in the news. However, the disease took hold of Daewoo to the marrow. 
Daewoo's financial weakness was brought to the surface in the course of negotiation 
for a `Big deal' in the car industry. It was ironic because Daewoo participated in the deal 
in order to cover up its financial problems. Daewoo counted on receiving a huge amount 
of government subsidy in return for taking over the debts of Samsung Motors. Samsung, 
157 For example, an influential philosopher, Kim Yong-ok published a book based on the talks with Kim 
Woojoong during their trip (Kim Yong-ok 1991). 
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on the other hand, wanted to have Chairman Lee's misjudgment swept under the carpet by 
handing over Samsung Motors to Daewoo. At that time, Samsung was incurring loss of 
1.5 million won per car sold. Nevertheless the production had to continue. As mentioned 
earlier, Samsung made use of the regional sentiment of Busan (a South Eastern region of 
Korea) and put pressure on politicians to secure approval for Samsung Motors. If the plant 
were closed down now, there would be a serious outcry from people of the region who 
were particularly sensitive about the new government's close ties with the South Western 
region. Daewoo made use of this dilemma and asked for a huge compensation package as 
a condition to take over Samsung Motors. 
In the autumn of 1998, however, Samsung Capital, Samsung Investment and Trust, 
Samsung Life Insurance, and Samsung Fire Insurance took a concerted move to withdraw 
loans extended to Daewoo. Daewoo was under a great deal of pressure. When Samsung's 
move was known to other financial institutions, they also started to follow suit simply 
because `Samsung is doing it (and they must know what they are doing)'. It is said that the 
same happened in 1997 when Kia Motors went bankrupt and also in 2000 when the 
Hyundai Group was dismembered. According to Hankook Kyungjae, Chairman Kim's 
visit to Samsung's Lee Keunhee on 23 March 1999 was not so much about the pending 
`Big deal' regarding the car industry as to stop Samsung's withdrawal of loans from 
Daewoo's companies (Chung Gyujae et al. 2002: 69). 
Meanwhile, the negotiation for a `Big deal' stood still. Valuation and fierce publicity 
moves from both sides had the result of revealing that both Daewoo and Samsung Motors 
had debts which were far greater than expected. Samsung Motors' debts amounted to 4.3 
trillion won. A government official was quoted in Hankyoreh as having raised the 
possibility that Chairman Lee Keunhee might have to take personal responsibility for 
Samsung Motors' failure (Hankyoreh, 13 May 1999). When all things were brought to the 
surface, Samsung lost interest in the `Big deal' and entered into court receivership. 
Samsung announced that Chairman Lee would inject 4 million shares of Samsung Life 
Insurance to the ailing Samsung Motors. Chairman Kim of Daewoo thought that the 
failure of the `Big deal' was due to the failure of public relations. He complained that 
Samsung's unreasonable claims were received as truthful and the general public came to 
hold a view that the `Big deal' did not go ahead because of Daewoo' (Chung Gyujae et al. 
2002: 142). 
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On 29 October 1998, a warning sign appeared regarding Daewoo's financial 
difficulty which had thus far been kept away from the media coverage. The Seoul branch 
office of Nomura Securities distributed to selected non-Korean customers a confidential 
report entitled, `Alarm bell is ringing for the Daewoo Group'. The report suggested that 
since banks and financial institutions were not to be allowed to hold corporate bonds 
above the newly introduced limit, Daewoo might experience serious cash flow problems 
or even have to face the prospect of a `work-out' 158 in view of the fact that Daewoo relied 
very heavily on corporate bonds. The existence of the report was first made known by 
Hankyoreh, which got hold of a copy of the report 19 days later (Hankyoreh, 17 Nov. 
1998). Despite its news value, the article was not quoted in any other newspapers. Daewoo 
lobbied hard to ensure that the news was not going to appear in other papers. ' 59 A few 
days later, all newspapers published an article claiming that Daewoo had no problem in 
financing (Chosun, 21 Nov. 1998; among many others). The article was based on a news 
conference held by Daewoo. 
As a quick fix, Kim Woojoong resorted to politicians again. President Kim Daejung 
was visiting Vietnam in December 1998. Chairman Kim flew to Vietnam and invited the 
President to Daewoo Hotel. Chairman Kim explained that construction of plants in Eastern 
European countries was soon to be completed and that tight restrictions on trade loans 
should be relaxed so that Daewoo could meet the urgent financial needs. President Kim 
replied that he would positively consider the matter. According to an article entitled 
`Secrets of Kim Daejung Government' which was serialised in DongA after transfer of 
power, President Kim was not in a position to refuse Chairman Kim's request because he 
had secretly received a huge amount of election campaign fund (DongA, 2 July 2003). 
However, in spite of President Kim's positive response, Chairman Kim's suggestion was 
finally refused by the government economic team pursuing the restructuring by tightening 
financial means. Daewoo's request could not be granted unless the government was 
prepared to give up the restructuring. 
158 `Work-out' refers to the measure to revitalize bankrupt companies through rescheduling and adjusting 
their outstanding debts. The companies under `work-out' should take necessary measures to sell properties, 
reduce workforce and reduce capital. 
159 As the news was carried in the first edition of Hankyoreh, an executive director in charge of public 
relations for Daewoo threatened the Economic Editor (the present researcher), saying that `draw it out in 
the edition for Seoul, otherwise you will be sued for damages'. He also added, `we took every measure so 
that other newspapers couldn't reproduce the article'. 
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In April 1999, Daewoo invited news reporters covering Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) to Daewoo's Eastern European plants. It was planned to dispel worries 
about Daewoo's financial difficulty. Although the reporters covering FSC were all aware 
of Daewoo's difficulty, they simply did not write about it (Chung Gyujae et al. 2002: 19). 
Because of Daewoo's lobbying efforts and the favourable treatment of the press, 
Daewoo's financial difficulty remained unreported until Daewoo announced its plan to 
offer additional security for the pending loans. In order to get additional loans and to have 
the repayment dates for Daewoo's commercial papers postponed, Daewoo had to offer 
additional security worth 10 trillion won consisting of shares and real estate on 19 July. 
Ironically, this provided the occasion to report Daewoo's financial situation. 
Daewoo's creditors took steps for corporate work-out. It emerged that Daewoo's 
debts amounted to 50 billion dollars (62 trillion Korean won) 160 of which 10 billion 
dollars was borrowed from foreign lenders. 26 trillion won was paid to foreign payees 
through Daewoo. The government had to put in 29 trillion won from public funds to 
honour Daewoo's obligations. Chairman Kim was discreetly asked to remain in a foreign 
country for a while. He went abroad on 11 October and it turned out to be an exile. 161 
Daewoo's accounting statements turned out to hide 41 trillion won worth of debts. He was 
well known for his enthusiasm for work (known as a `workaholic') and he was not 
accused of personal greed. However, he made wrong decisions unchecked by anyone in 
the group and he attempted to get out of the difficulty by manipulating politicians and 
mobilising the media. Compared to Hyundai, which enjoyed unreserved support from the 
government, Daewoo might feel victimised. Anyway, that was the end of Chairman Kim's 
`Global management'. 
The Case of Hyundai 
As discussed in chapter 5, Hyundai was on the wrong side of the government during 
President Kim Youngsam's term. Hyundai thus was prevented from expanding its business 
areas. After Kim Daejung became the President, however, Hyundai started to develop a 
160 This is calculated at the exchange rate of the time. 
161 Chairman Kim evaded arrest by living in foreign countries for about six years until he gave himself up to 
the prosecutory authorities in 2005. 
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collusive relationship with the government. The government sought ways to improve the 
North-South relationship. Hyundai's ambitious business plans about developing Keum- 
kang San (mountain) area for tourism for 30 years and Kaesung Industrial Park were the 
connecting point between Hyundai and the government. Hyundai's proposal could win 
approval from only the most optimistic observers. However, no one could change the mind 
of Chung Juyung. ' 62 
The media was all in favour of Hyundai's North Korean projects as they were to 
advance the cause of improving the inter-Korean relationship. 163 Few attempts were made 
to investigate whether such ambitious investment plans were feasible while the Korean 
economy was in receipt of emergency loans from the IMF. Very little effort was made to 
analyse the true motives of Hyundai. For several years from then on, the press was busily 
engaged in reporting Hyundai's achievements in the Northern front. In June 1998, Chung 
Juyung crossed the DMZ with 500 cows to enter into the North Korea. In November, a 
luxurious cruise ship launched its voyage to the North Korea. Hyundai was hailed as the 
nation's most loved company for its contribution to dismantling the cold war system of 
confrontation between two Koreas. Moreover, Hyundai acted as a messenger between the 
two Korean governments so that the historic summit meeting of 15 June 2000 could take 
place. 
However, the Keum-kang San project could not go on for long. The agreed fee to be 
paid to the North Korean government for each tourist was set too high. Also, the demand 
died down as people's curiosity for North Korea was gradually dissipated. As the payment 
to North Korea diminished and North Korea showed signs of discontentment, the South 
Korean government offered subsidy for tourists. The inter-Korean relationship did not go 
smoothly partly because Hyundai did not keep the secret promise to make payment to 
North Korean government. 
The South Korean government was then engaged in a secret negotiation with the 
North Korean government. The government owned Industrial Bank was directed to extend 
loans amounting to 400 million dollars to Hyundai so that Hyundai could make payment 
162 In fact, Chung Monggu, Chung's eldest son, was opposed to Hyundai's North Korean projects. Because 
of that, he was removed from the control of Hyundai. Chung Mongheon, the 5th son of Chung Juyung, 
was supporting the North Korean projects. The Hyundai group was left in his hands when Chung Juyung 
died. 
163 Hankyoreh, a somewhat progressive newspaper, was one of the most enthusiastic newspapers in 
supporting the Hyundai's projects. 
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to North Korea. 164 The Chairman of Industrial Bank, Eom Nakyong, was opposed to the 
proposed loan. Two months later, he was removed from the post. The government also 
introduced simplified underwriting procedures for corporate bonds, which had the obvious 
purpose of easing Hyundai's financial burden. Hyundai's North Korean project had 
complex goals. 
The deterioration of the financial position of Hyundai Investment and Trust (HIT) 
was also a result of collusive connections between the government and the industry. 
Shortly after taking office, President Kim Daejung had a secret audience with Chung 
Juyung when Hannam Investment and Trust was experiencing financial trouble. Hannam 
Investment and Trust was a local financial firm in the South Western region which was the 
political base of President Kim. The following day, HIT announced that it would take over 
Hannam. Surprisingly, however, Hyundai offered an undertaking that those who invested 
in Hannam would be able to recover the principal amount of their investment. 
Two years later, when HIT met with financial trouble, Chairman Lee Ik-chi, who 
was responsible for the Hyundai Group's overall financing, made sure that people were 
reminded of Hyundai's rescue efforts for Hannam investors. According to him, since it 
was the government who had initially provided the cause for HIT's financial difficulty, the 
government had now to help out HIT. He himself was deeply involved in President Kim's 
diplomatic attempts with North Korea. He served as a secret messenger for President Kim 
during his negotiation with the leader of North Korea. Relying on his strong connection 
with the President, he often complained to the Office of the President that the 
government's economic team was putting too much pressure on Hyundai. The Minister of 
Finance and Economy and the Chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission were 
both attempting to have Lee Ik-chi removed. However, they were removed instead. The 
Chairman of the FSC, Lee Yong-geun, later recalled that he did not know that the chaebol 
were so strong and influential (JoongAng, 28 Aug. 2002). 
In fact, the media and the industry ought to take a considerable portion of the 
responsibility for the financial weakening of HIT as well as the near collapse of the stock 
market. When the composite stock market index was about 500, Mr Lee Ik-chi, in 
particular, started his unswerving claim that within three years, the index would become 
2000, and in five years, 6000. He was successful in boosting the stock market. He 
164 This was the biggest scandal in the inter-Korean relations. Many ex-cabinet members were imprisoned. 
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launched a public sale of beneficiary certificates called `Buy Korea'. He raised 11 trillion 
won from the sale of `Buy Korea'. He became a superstar of the Korean stock market. 
Most papers published glowing interviews and portrayed him as a darling of the 
stock market. These newspaper articles typically contained unadulterated and shameless 
flatteries such as `Mr Lee is nicknamed as Com-Dozer because his judgment is precise 
like that of a computer and his power to get things done is like that of a bulldozer' (DongA, 
30 July 1999). He was the most popular and most wanted presenter for the road-shows 
aimed at prospective investors. Munhwa, which is an affiliate of Hyundai, devoted full- 
page articles for Mr Lee's investment road-shows to stir up a favourable ambience for 
investment (Munhwa, 12 Apr. 1999). 165 Many newspaper companies themselves were 
organising many such road shows and offered huge fees for Mr Lee to attend (Pressian, 7 
Aug. 2003). 
In September, however, it emerged that HIT was implicated in a share price 
manipulation scandal. And in the following year, the stock market sharply went down as 
the bubble began to burst. A huge number of investors incurred loss and Hyundai 
Securities was facing the threat of bankruptcy. In fact, Hyundai had been actively engaged 
in market-boosting measures not only to sell more beneficiary certificates, but also to raise 
the share prices of its troubled affiliates, so that additional offerings could bring in more 
funds to stave off financial burden affecting those affiliates. Most newspapers appeared to 
have been aware of this when they accepted Hyundai's advertisement for `Buy Korea' 
beneficiary certificates. They kept quiet and Hyundai shouted out `Buy Korea' in full-page 
advertisements. Hankyoreh almost solely ran a critical article entitled `Why did the Buy 
Korea fund impound people in the stock market' (Hankyoreh, 9 Apr. 1999), ' 66 but they 
had to face Hyundai's tenacious lobbying. Kim Kyung-ai, who wrote that article, recalled: 
At that time, reporters in the press room at the Stock Exchange were aware of the 
risks related to the stock-market boosting strategy but nobody could dare to report 
about this. My article was very small, but Hyundai responded too sensitively. 
165 Munhwa covered these road shows in its article entitled `Big success of the road-show for women', 
describing that `the most moving moment of this show was Chairman Lee's call for investing in the `Buy 
Korea' fund to be a patriot for economic revival. ' 
166 This article pointed out that the stock market boosting strategy was being taken by Hyundai to secure 
funds for the Keum-kang San project and the `Big deal' of semiconductor, and to reduce the debt ratio 
below 200% (Hankyoreh, 9 Apr. 1999). 
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Pressures continued to come through the advertisement department of Hankyoreh, 
so I turned off my mobile phone and disappeared (interview, 15 Apr. 2005) 
Hyundai Construction and Hyundai Merchant Shipping Co. were the main 
companies of Hyundai which were under the control of Chung Mongheon. However, both 
these companies had to face bankruptcy because of their unsuccessful investment in the 
Keum-kang San project. They also resisted and postponed corporate restructuring as they 
counted on their close connection with the government. 
After the `Succession war' of 2000 among the late Chung Juyung's sons, who 
competed with each other for managerial control, Hyundai Motors and Hyundai Heavy 
Industry were separated from the rest of the Hyundai Group. Except for these two 
companies, most of the Hyundai companies were either sold to foreign purchasers or went 
into bankruptcy. An opposition member in the National Assembly claimed that the 
government had injected a total of 34 trillion won (about 34 billion dollars) into Hyundai, 
of which 24 trillion won became unrecoverable (Yonhap News, 24 Sep. 2002). In August 
2003, Chung Mongheon jumped off Hyundai's Headquarters and killed himself while he 
was being questioned in connection with his involvement in the government's decision to 
send money to North Korea. 
Dead-alive Korean Economy 
The restructuring of the financial sector was no less difficult than that of general 
industries, which was the topic of the previous section. To a great extent, the government 
and the press should be held responsible for the difficulty. The sales of Jaeil Bank and 
Seoul Bank show how much damage can be done to the national economy by the 
government which was too keen to recover sovereign credit rating and the press which lost 
the ability to provide the public with a sphere for debate. In September 1998, President 
Kim instructed in an economic ministers' meeting that at least one of the two banks must 
be sold by the end of the year. However, an official in charge of the negotiation for the sale 
recalled that the President's remark made in public was a blunder: 
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M&A negotiation inevitably involves a tug-of-war with prospective buyers. When 
the President sets a time limit for the sale, how do you expect us to have the 
bargaining power? (DongA, 27 Aug. 2003). 
In October, the American credit rating agency S&P announced that it would 
maintain the rating of below-investment grade (BB+) for Korea's sovereign credit. The 
agency added a remark that there were positive improvements such as improved political 
ability of the government. S&P's rating came with a rather unusual condition that `if the 
sale of Kia Motors, Seoul Bank and Jaeil Bank could go ahead before the end of the year, 
the credit rating of Korea might be upgraded'. An enticing piece of carrot was thus offered. 
If the rating could be raised by just one notch, Korea would have the investment grade 
(BBB-). 
The Korean press had been taking the position that `restructuring means selling 
Korean companies to foreign investors'. They repeated the same claim in a more sensation 
manner this time with news articles such as `Poor progress in restructuring of financial 
sector obstructs enhancement of sovereign rating' (DongA, 17 Oct. 1998). Eventually, a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was exchanged regarding the sale of Jaeil Bank 
to New Bridge Capital (American investment fund) on the last day of the year. The New 
York Times praised President Kim's achievement by saying that the `sale of the Jaeil Bank 
is the clearest vote of confidence which the Kim Daejung government has obtained from 
foreign investors' (DongA, 27 Aug. 2003). 
The MOU which the seller exchanged in a hurry, however, had a problematic clause 
inserted upon the buyer's insistence. The clause provides that the asset value of Jaeil Bank 
shall be assessed at the market value. The apparently innocuous clause turned out to have 
the power to conclude the take over at a very low price. It was not fully appreciated that 
once the buyer was determined, it was virtually impossible to assess the `market value'. 
When the Ministry of Finance and Economy opposed the take over at a low price, the 
President's Office directed that the take over be handled by the Financial Supervisory 
Commission. 
At the end of 1999, a 51% share of Jaeil Bank, into which 6.8 trillion won of public 
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fund had been injected, was sold to New Bridge Capital at only 0.5 trillion won. 167 
Moreover, the final contract even included a put back option whereby the seller would 
have to compensate the buyer for the loss which might come to light after the take over. 
All told, the total amount of public fund put into Jaeil Bank was 18 trillion won. If the 
Bank had gone into liquidation in the first place, it would have cost much less, although it 
might have had an impact on the financial market. 
That was not all. A huge amount of public funds were injected into a number of 
financial institutions to improve their financial position only to have them sold to foreign 
purchasers or to have them liquidated. In 1998, the government had to raise 64 trillion 
won through issuing government bonds. Former Senior Secretary to the President for 
Economic Affairs, Kang Bongkyun emphasised the drastic nature of the measure taken by 
the government, saying that Korea was the only country which decided to put in 15 % of 
GDP within six months to sort out troubles of financial institutions (JoongAng, 17 Sep. 
2002). In 1998 the current balance of Korea recorded a surplus of 40 billion dollars and 
the capital balance also showed a trend of improvement. In 1999 Korea's sovereign credit 
rating went up to the investment grade (BBB). On 15th August 1999, the Independence 
Day, President Kim declared, "We have fulfilled the promise that we will overcome the 
foreign exchange crisis within one and a half years. " Of course, this attracted considerable 
attention and was widely covered in the media. 
In fact, the improved indicators were hiding an increment of surplus due to global 
economic recovery and decrease of import, an influx of capital by foreign currency 
borrowing and sales of companies abroad. That was an example of repaying a loan by 
another loan and hoarding money by selling factories, but did not mean that the 
fundamentals of economy were getting stronger. Many such problems underlying the 
revised economic indicators were not addressed in the media. 
A report entitled, `The Pros and Cons of Management by Foreign Capital', issued by 
the Samsung Economic Research Institute in January 2001, pointed out properly the 
reality of the Korean economy gradually losing the growth potential. It was mentioned 
that the US consolidated their power on the Korean financial sector within two years of 
the foreign exchange crisis. In case of banks, foreign investors became the controlling 
167 New Bridge Capital managed to resell it to SCB (Standard Charted Bank) for 1.65 trillion won, thereby 
making the gain of more than I trillion won (I billion dollars) (DongA, 11 Jan. 2005). 
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shareholders of five banks. 168 The market shares of securities and insurance companies 
controlled by foreign capital are also growing rapidly. 
Compared to the financial industry, the manufacturing industry benefited less from 
the public fund. Accordingly, the manufacturing industry went into foreign hands much 
faster. The portion of foreign capital remarkably increased in each of the basic industries 
such as car, electronics, information & communication, oil refinery, petro-chemical 
engineering and heavy industry. Foreign capital also went into household goods, foods, 
newsprint and the agricultural seeds industry. In the case of three semiconductor 
companies such as Samsung, Hynix (former Hyundai) and Anam, shares of more than 
50 % were sold to foreigners. The controlling shareholders of 3 out of 4 oil refinery 
companies (Hyundai, LG and S-Oil) were foreign capitals. Besides, many buildings of big 
companies were sold to foreign purchasers at a cheap price because companies having 
difficulties in cash flow put up their buildings for sale in large numbers. 
The fact that foreign investors came to buy up companies in areas which are too 
many to list shows that the financial crisis of Korea created a golden opportunity for them. 
As share prices were halved while the foreign exchange rate was doubled, foreign buyers 
could effectively buy companies at one quarter of normal prices as it were. Under these 
circumstances, the Korean government completely opened up the capital market, allowing 
hostile M&A, to satisfy the demands of the U. S. Some chaebol had to sell some of their 
best businesses' 69 because of the pressure from the government was working under the 
so-called `self-imposed' deadline for the recovery from the financial crisis. Many 
companies were sold out for a miserable price. However, the government arguments that 
`the sale of companies to foreigners is not the outflow of national wealth but the inflow of 
capital' 170 were repeatedly disseminated through the media. 
Due to those efforts, of course, the foreign exchange reserves of Korea increased 
rapidly and reached 96 billion dollars by the end of 2000. In relation to this, a report from 
the IMF estimated that the adequate reserves for Korea were 51-56 billion dollars. The 
168 Jaeil Bank (New Bridge 51 %); KorAm Bank (J. P. Morgan & Carlyle 40.7 %, Bank of America 9.98 %); 
Kookmin Bank (Goldman Sachs 11.1 %); Korea Exchange Bank (Commerzbank 32.5 %); Hana Bank 
(Allianz 12.5 %) as of January of 2001. 
169 In fact, selling the best performing companies was against the principle of `greater concentration in core 
businesses', which the government proposed as one of the five principles for restructuring of the chaebol. 
170 A remark of Lee Keeho, Senior Secretary to the President for Economic Affairs, in an interview for 
Monthly Chosen (Oct. 1999). 
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report said, `Holding very large amounts of reserves.. . can be a considerable 
drain of a 
country's budget' (IMF 2001: 22,26). However, the Korean government continued with 
the policy of encouraging foreign investment by selling companies to foreign purchasers. 
In June 2002, Korea became a country to hold the fourth largest foreign reserves (112 
billion dollars) in the world. The drastic policy, as the IMF pointed out, `[taken] in the 
aftermath of the negative experience of the Asian crisis', `can turn out to be quite costly in 
the long run' (IMF 2001: 26). The Korean media's failure to recognise these problems 
much earlier is one of the sequelae of the economic crisis. 
As the takeover by foreign capitals and bankruptcy occurred in succession, the 
unemployment rate increased. Foreign capitals which acquired Korean companies adopted 
Western style labour practice and resorted to dismissal on the grounds of redundancy to 
improve the financial position of the company. In the summer of 1998, employees of 
Mando Machinery, Hyundai Motor Company and Korea Mint Corporation171 went on 
strikes against mass dismissal. As the labour movement was blamed as one reason for the 
currency crisis, the media put even more emphasis on law and order. In the case of Mando 
in particular, it was taken over by the Rothschild group in late 1997, and the government 
and the media were nervous to any reaction of big foreign shareholders. 
172 Major 
newspapers blamed the strikes of Mando and Hyundai as `illegal' (e. g. DongA, 26 Aug. 
1998), which provoked trade unionists to protest in the front of the building of DangA and 
burn its newspapers. These newspapers reported about the losses incurred in the strike, 
with sensational headlines such as `foreign capital flight in sight' (Chosun, 1 Sep. 1998). 
Two days later, the Kim Daejung administration sent in 14,000 riot police to 7 factories 
and quickly suppressed it. 
Both the Kim Youngsam government which adopted a slogan of `civilian 
government' and the Kim Daejung government which purported to be the `people's 
government', refrained from resorting to police forces to crack down on the labour 
movement for the initial 6 months only. Inevitably, they both relied on law and order as 
171 One year later a top prosecutor in charge of the Public Security Department made a slip of the tongue in 
a drinking party with reporters that "the strike in Korea Mint Corporation was an induced one" 
(Hankyoreh, 8 June 1999). It was revealed in the National Assembly hearing that the authorities of public 
security had adopted a tough internal guideline which was intended to oppress labour movements, and that 
induced a series of strikes through suspending wage negotiations, imposing severe restructuring, and 
prosecuting many union leaders. 
172 Wilbur Ross, the Managing Director of Rothschild, warned that `insofar as Korean companies are 
holding excessive workforce, no foreign investments would make investment' (Chosun, 1 Sep. 1998). 
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both of them were neo-conservative governments. 
Some scholars criticised the Kim Daejung government's method of corporate 
restructuring which required a substantial injection of public funds into the financial sector. 
Nevertheless, their criticism was largely ignored by the press. Professor Kim Soohaeng 
pointed out that in order to resuscitate the Korean economy, `there are tasks to be done to 
promote manufacturing industries which should be given precedence over injecting public 
funds into the financial sector'. He argued that industries with poor performance should be 
gradually phased out by depression cartels and available resources should be concentrated 
on the promising industries. This way, according to him, massive unemployment can be 
avoided. He went on: 
The government appears to believe that massive dismissal would lead to 
restructuring and recovery. The press as well as the broadcast media are uncritically 
reporting the government's belief. They go even further and emphasise the 
groundless thesis: restructuring means dismissal (Kim Soohaeng 2001). 
Former Deputy Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy (Minister as of 2003), 
Lee Heebeom, in an interview with the present researcher, assessed the industrial policies 
of the then government as follows: 
I have a feeling that the crisis started as a financial crisis but general industries 
ended up suffering more. Concentrating government's favours on financial 
institutions instead of general enterprises aggravated the crisis (interview, 25 Mar. 
2003). 
Former Deputy Minister for Planning and Management of the same Ministry, Kim 
Kyunseop also stated in an interview: 
It is said that the bankruptcies of Hanbo and Kia provided causes of the foreign 
exchange crisis. But those companies could have survived if the government had 
injected a few trillion won and took over the management. Compared to Jaeil Bank 
and Hyundai which benefited from tens of trillion won of public fund, these 
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industries were given a hard deal. Once a plant stops its operation, it is no more than 
a heap of steel scraps. It seems to me that the press and the society as a whole went 
ahead and killed those companies (interview, 25 Mar. 2003). 
One may disagree as to whether the crisis originated as a financial one or an 
industrial one. It is not a settled point whether the financial sector suffered more than the 
general industrial sector in the aftermath of the crisis. However, there can be no doubt that 
the crisis involved both sectors and yet the public funds injected into the financial sector 
did not trickle down to the industrial sector. The problematic nature of the government's 
policy choice can be explained by the fact that the rehabilitation programmes were led by 
the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Ministry of Finance and Economy which 
have authority over financial policy and supervision. The Ministry of Industry and Energy 
could not effectively participate in the policy making. In the implementation of 
rehabilitation programmes, there were also numerous problems caused by communication 
failures among Ministries. 
As more financial institutions and general companies continued to go bankrupt, the 
government kept injecting more public funds. The moral hazard of publicly assisted 
companies as well as the government contributed to the increased injection of public funds. 
As of the end of 2003, the total amount of public funds injected to private companies went 
above 161 trillion won (about 161 billion dollars). Accumulative interest on the public 
funds, which was raised by means of foreign loans and issuance of bonds, amounted to 32 
trillion won. So far, only 61 trillion won had been recovered through the sale of companies. 
It seems that around 100 trillion won will remain as a burden on the Korean people for the 
foreseeable future. As of the end of 2002, the government's debt was 236 trillion won, 
which is three times as much as the government's debts of 73 trillion won in 1997. 
Budgetary deficit is going to be a serious problem in the near future. 
Meanwhile, average household debt was increased to 31.6 million won per 
household as of the end of 2003 (BOK 2004). The high amount of household debt was 
largely due to the government's decision to resuscitate the economy by boosting the 
spending. As pointed out by Professor Lee Chan-geun, when the economy showed signs of 
a slump in the summer of 2000, `many economic research institutes put forward 
arguments emphasising the virtues of consumption and claimed that consumption-led 
250 
economic growth is truly the growth pattern of an advanced economy. The press cheered 
them up. ' (Ohmynews, 4 Dec. 2003). 
President Kim Daejung also emphasised: `Those who have money should spend it 
now. Increased spending will help the economy to recover' (Seoul-shinmun, 4 Dec. 2000). 
In the climate of deregulation, limits on the cash advance service of credit cards were 
abandoned. Credit card companies resorted to aggressive marketing strategy soliciting 
new members on the street without any credit inquiries. When the Financial Supervisory 
Commission attempted to ban the street marketing of credit cards in 2001, the Regulatory 
Reform Committee (Chairman: Kang Chulgyu) opposed. The attempt to ban reckless 
marketing practice was criticised as an `anti-market regulation'. Two years later, the 
country is now suffering from a `credit crisis' with about 4 million people registered as 
'persons of bad credit standing' who are unable to repay what they had spent with their 
credit cards. 
After the foreign exchange crisis, there appeared a widening gap between the rich 
and the poor as revealed by the Gini's coefficient (KDI 2004). 
173 The indicator of social 
integration174 ranked Korea as eighteenth among 20 OECD member countries (Hankyoreh, 
20 June 2003). Korea has a very poor social safety net and yet 2.5 million households 
without any income earner appeared. Even among those who are employed, as many as 5 
million are contract workers with no job security. In fact, in the annual policy talks with 
the Korean government, the IMF warned of the risk, pointing out that the portion of 
irregular workers as of the end of 2003 was 32.6 % (the highest among 30 OECD 
countries) (Pressian, 4 Mar. 2004). The Korean press and the chaebol have insisted until 
now that the flexibility of the Korean labour market should be enhanced, as it is too rigid. 
However, a report showed that the flexibility of Korea after the currency crisis went up to 
the highest level among developed countries. 175 
In Korea, labour unions accepted labour market flexibility through lay-off in an 
agreement hammered out by Tripartite Commission representing labour unions, employers 
173 The Gini's coefficient, the most well known indicator for income inequality, increased from 0.298 in 
1996 to 0.358 in 2000. This is the third highest among OECD countries. 
174 The social integration indicator was deduced from five sub-indictors including poverty index, 
unemployment rate by the Presidential Office. 
175 The Forbes, a specialized magazine in management, issued their research result that the flexibility index 
of Korea was the third among 17 upper countries of the OECD, lower than the U. S. and Canada but higher 
than 14 countries such as Japan and the U. K. (Forbes, 30 Jan. 2003). 
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and the government on the condition that radical reforms were undertaken to change the 
chaebol system. However, the condition was not met. The proposed donation of private 
property by chairmen of the chaebol, which was mentioned in the process of the `Big deal', 
did not materialise. Corporate reforms to enhance management transparency such as 
having outside directors did not go well either. Personal control of the whole group by the 
owner through the group chairman's secretariat continued unaltered. A correspondent of 
the Nihon Keizai in Seoul saw through the limits of the chaebol reform toward the end of 
1998 when the reform was apparently pursued most vigorously. He remarked: 
Following the government's instruction, the chaebol abolished chairman's 
secretariat. In reality, however, the secretariat continued to exist. Only its name was 
changed to `restructuring office'. In most cases, they used the same office, the same 
phone numbers. Abolition of group chairman's secretariat was prominently reported 
as `signs of dismantling of the chaebol'. Looking back now, I doubt whether it was 
so significant (Hashimoto, 1998). 
It can be said that the government's will to reform the chaebol quickly weakened as 
the economy was again in a slump in 2000 and the voice of the chaebol revived. At the 
beginning of 2001, Kim Daejung's government launched an attack against conservative 
newspapers hostile to the government. It turned out to be a grand tour de force where the 
government had to mobilize the National Tax Service, the Fair Trade Commission and the 
Public Prosecution Bureau. This meant that another frontline was formed and the chaebol 
reform was relegated to the lower rung of priority. The chaebol formed a discreet alliance 
with those conservative newspapers and strengthened their resistance against reform. They 
even rejected neo-liberal reforms of the chaebol and the market. 
Min Byungkyun, who is the Director of the Center for Free Enterprise founded by 
FKI, fired up a great deal of controversy with his column entitled `Market economy and 
its enemies' which was posted on the website of the Center. He claimed: 
The government is working together with citizen groups to suppress major 
shareholders of enterprises. They seek to increase the powers of outside directors 
and minority shareholders. ... The right wing groups should now arise 
from their 
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slumber to prevent the Left from monopolising state affairs' (CFE homepage, 2 May 
2001). 
He made a sweeping criticism of the policies for the chaebol reform such as 
restriction of mutual-payment guarantee, lowering of debt-equity ratio and the 
introduction of consolidated financial statements. In addition, regarding reforms of the 
press, he claimed that the government sought to persecute three major newspaper 
companies by restricting the distribution of free copies and putting a ceiling on the 
ownership ratio (CFE homepage, 2 May 2001). DongA cheered him up in an editorial: 
`Whether he is right or wrong, it is a matter which must not be glossed over. If most 
entrepreneurs regard the market as uncertain and feel uneasy about the future, the result 
will be more serious than a mere recession' (DongA, 8 May 2001). Chosun also wrote in 
an editorial entitled, `Businessmen now say what they have to say': `Quite apart from 
whether he is right or wrong, his arguments have a profound significance as they, for the 
first time, raised to the surface deep seated concerns about ideological leanings of the 
government policies' (Chosun, 9 May 2001). 
At the end of May, the government announced a set of deregulation measures for the 
corporate sector adopting 34 items among 72 items demanded mainly by the FKI. The 
tones of press comments were distinctly divided according to their financial background. 
Titles of their editorials make an interesting comparison. For example, JoongAng's 
editorial was entitled `Deregulation measures ended up in temporary compromise' (1 June 
2001) and Hankyoreh had `Chaebol reform in a shameful state' (1 June 2001). Chosun 
carried an external column entitled, `Government and chaebol in a closed-door 
compromise' (4 June 2001). 
The fact that JoongAng took the lead in criticizing the chaebol reform can be 
explained by two reasons: one is that JoongAng was a sister company of Samsung; the 
other is that it shared with the chaebol a sense of being persecuted together as JoongAng 
was also suffering from investigation on tax and unfair trade. A few months later, in a 
series of articles focused on the Fair Trade Commission (8-12 Oct. 2001) and an editorial 
(15 Oct. 2001), JoongAng attacked the Commission, arguing that there was no need for 
the policy to regulate large enterprises. At the end of 2001, a weekly journal analysing 
media reviewed the year and pointed out that the press played `a most significant role in 
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softening the tones of the chaebol reform' (Media Oneul, 27 Dec. ). 
A significant point was that after the currency crisis, the capital has increased its 
influence over the media while the government's influence has waned. Newspaper 
companies were trying to escape from the predicament by heavily relying on the chaebol 
rather than the government. They gave a lot of space to chaebol-friendly articles and many 
reporters were requested to invite advertisement. Many media companies dismissed a 
considerable number of journalists, making bad use of the newly introduced layoff. It 
became a decisive factor detrimental to journalists' autonomy. The fact that capital 
influence over the media has quickly enlarged is confirmed again in a survey (e. g. Korea 
Press Foundation 2001). The weekly media newspaper carried a special edition with the 
title of `Criticism of the chaebol disappeared' and stated more aggravated management 
circumstance as a main reason (Media Oneul, 21 Nov. 2002). 
Conclusion 
The debate as to the propriety of the IMF's prescriptions was effectively put to rest 
since the IMF itself admitted its mistakes as discussed earlier. The IMF demanded that 
Korea trimmed down the economy and went ahead with prohibitively high interest rates. 
These measures worsened the financial crisis and resulted in massive drainage of wealth 
out of the country. The wrong policy choices after all left irreparable losses to the Korean 
economy. 
After the foreign exchange crisis, the Korean economy seems to be caught in a 
chronic crisis. The recoveries are short-lived and incapable of raising the income of 
working classes and the employment rate. The Korean economy is suffering from the so- 
called `growth without income distribution' or `growth without employment'. Extreme 
belt-tightening measures, high interest rates, deregulation of capital market and 
accumulation of foreign currency reserve by selling companies to foreign purchasers all 
contributed to this result. It was more or less predictable that these policy choices would 
lead to a large scale bankruptcy, unemployment and draining of national wealth thus 
disabling the economy to make meaningful growth. The reason why the IMF nevertheless 
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went ahead with those policies was because the `invisible hand' of international financial 
capital located in the US played an influential role through the Treasury Department of the 
US Government. 
It would, however, be wrong to put all the blame on the W-T-I complex (Wall 
Street-Treasury-IMF). Like the case of Malaysia, Korea could have conducted corporate 
restructuring while maintaining a greater measure of `economic sovereignty'. However, 
the Kim Daejung government accepted all the IMF's demands and the press gave near 
complete support to the government. It meant that the Korean economy was going to be 
comprehensively Americanised without any adequate appraisal or consent of the people. 
The neo-liberalism which increased its influence since the Kim Youngsam 
government did in fact provide an environment for the foreign exchange crisis. 
Nevertheless, the same neo-liberal policy choices were adopted as a means to recover 
from the crisis. As a result, a more complete form of neo-liberal economic system was put 
in place. M&A, open market, privatisation, flexible labour market and `law and order' 
came to be the core concepts for the government policies and media coverage. 
Unlike the popular impression, the so-called `Big deal' was pursued at the initiative 
of the chaebol rather than the government. The press also played an important role. The 
deals were concluded in a way least damaging to the chaebol and that was largely due to 
the pro-chaebol press's brilliant performance. 
Daewoo and Hyundai were the best known cases where companies who were 
experiencing financial troubles attempted to get out of the trouble by using politics and the 
press. Hyundai relied on a collusive relationship with the Kim Daejung government which 
was keen to make a remarkable improvement in the North-South Korean relationship. 
Hyundai attempted to use its political connection to get more loans and public funds to 
plug up the gaping holes in its balance sheets. Daewoo relied on the press to cover up the 
failures of over-expansive and reckless business decisions. 
In the process, most newspaper companies were co-opted by the chaebol and turned 
a blind eye to serious financial troubles of the companies involved. In the UK and in the 
US too, news about financial difficulties of a company cannot easily be reported because 
the survival of the company is at stake (Parsons 1989; Manning 2001). The chaebol who 
have a strong network of influence in the Korean society had an even greater power to 
control the flow of such adverse information. 
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In particular, the press in Korea did not play a role in analysing the problems of 
policies prescribed by the IMF and encouraging rational and critical debate about those 
policy choices. Rather, Most of the press treated the IMF's policy prescriptions as `given' 
and inviolable. They claimed almost in one voice that the only way to survive is belt- 
tightening and selling companies to foreign purchasers. Economic recession brought about 
financial troubles for the newspaper companies themselves. The advertisers, as a result, 
came to exert an even greater influence on the newspaper companies during the recession. 
Commercial influence over the press rapidly grew. The press has the task of keeping a 
watch over the derailed practices of the chaebol and the derelict duty of the government. 
However, the financial troubles of newspaper companies made it more difficult to fulfill 
the task. Companies in a free market often suffer the `ill effects of unlimited competition', 
and the media industry cannot be an exception to this. 
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Conclusion 
The examination of news reports, as Max Weber pointed out, provides a clue to the 
understanding of the society. 176 However, it is not easy for ordinary people to understand 
the entire aspect of society and its future direction through the media. 
Amid the feverish atmosphere of `Globalisation', JoongAng had a feature article 
`Our life in 2005' written by an expert journalist177 in economic affairs at the very 
beginning of 1995, which was the beginning of the WTO era. In a wishful outburst of 
imagination, the article portrayed the lives of a former employee of a chaebol, scouted to 
head a section in the Ministry of Trade and Industries in his 40s; a farmer who used to till 
his land in the country side but now works as a director of a farming company exporting 
high yield rice to the US; a branch manager of a bank who, since Korea joined OECD 
member countries, is able to trade in shares and real estate in foreign countries; and a 
housewife who is ordering a mink coat from a Danish fur dealer through the internet! 
(JoongAng, 1 Jan. 1995). 
In less than three years, Korea met with the financial crisis rather than the utopian 
affluence and indulgence. More than 2 million people lost their jobs unexpectedly. The 
Korean economy, which is now celebrating the 10th anniversary of entry into the WTO and 
the OECD, 178 has not yet recovered its economic power of the past. As seen in chapter 6, 
even when a moderate growth in GDP was achieved, a considerable proportion of the 
growth tended to be taken by foreign capitals and could not translate into the increase of 
employment and income of the working classes. So, `Our life in 2005' is rather painful. 
However, most people do not understand where the disaster came from. When the 
wave of globalisation originating from neo-liberalism came to the shore of Korea, the 
country was praised as a good `student' who absorbed well the wave through institutions, 
176 From `Newspaper survey' (Zeitungsenquete) read in the first Conference of German Sociologists held in 
1910. 
77 This expert journalist, Kim Jeong-soo, was one of the scholars who were recruited to strengthen the so- 
called `expertise' 
178 Korea became a member of OECD in 1996, but the measures of opening-up and deregulations had been 
intensively introduced in 1995 to meet the qualifications for the membership. 
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but the outcome was miserable. Nonetheless, Korean people's support for globalization 
remains near the highest level in the world. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
`support for globalization is strongest in Nigeria (90%), South Korea (84%) and Kenya 
(82%)', followed by many African and Asian nations (Pew Research Center 2003: 85). 179 
This gap between reality and perception, as discussed in chapter 3, was created and 
largely extended by discourse practices of ruling groups and the media. The continuous 
and systematic distortion of language could lead the masses to consider `things distorted' 
as `common sense'. `Globalisation' was put forward to the masses as the only viable 
survival option in a borderless age, while ignoring its negative aspects. As a consequence, 
people take for granted the ruling discourse which has seeped through their lives so that it 
has become the frame of reference for their perception and actions. 
Given the `reactionary' nature of neo-liberalist ideology, the negative consequences 
of globalization are more or less expected. Whereas classical liberalism played a 
progressive role in emancipating human beings from the feudal society, neo-liberalism has 
displayed its very conservative orientations, serving the vested interests, especially 
capitals of industrialized countries, and shifting the burdens to people, especially workers 
in the third world. The international mobility of capital and commodity has been eagerly 
promoted in the name of `freedom', but labour mobility has been restricted within the 
national border in the name of `order'. As the national economies have been integrated to 
the WTO system under these circumstances, they have had to compete for foreign capitals 
by providing more favourable environments such as deregulation and labour oppression. 
There have been numerous debates on the causes of economic crisis in Korea, yet 
they have concentrated on economic factors, making it difficult to find a comprehensive 
approach which takes into account non-economic factors. Studies concerning media 
influences on economic changes have also been small in number within Korea and abroad. 
Even the existing studies tended to focus on changes in perceptions about economic reality 
and the media influences on audience. Very often, these studies offered the `advice' that 
professionalism or expertise should be enhanced in order to reduce the negative effects of 
economic news reporting. In light of the limitation of these studies, this thesis has 
179 This research was directed by the former US Secretary of State, Madlin Albright. The research shows: 
`In all of these countries, governments and business elites have advocated globalization as a means of 
rapidly improving the standard of living'; `Majorities in North America and Western Europe also have a 
positive view of globalization, but there also is significant opposition in these regions' (Pew 2003: 85). 
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examined how the media can contribute to deforming the public sphere and thereby affect 
the economy. 
Neo-liberalism has been used as the key word in explaining the Korean economy 
and media. As discussed in chapter 2, neo-liberalism was adopted as the mainstream 
ideology and accelerated the trend of `retreating state and expanding market'. This made it 
almost impossible to take democratic control over economic power such as the chaebol 
and the international financial capitals, which eventually caused financial crisis. The role 
of the media as `a warning system with sensors' (Habermas 1996: 359) was greatly needed, 
but in fact hard to expect in Korea, for the media was also preoccupied with neo- 
liberalism. Economic news reports in particular were dominated by `market 
fundamentalists' and were always under pressure from economic power. Liberal-pluralists 
expected that the deregulation of the media industry would increase its autonomy from the 
state, but the result was an increased influence of capital over the media. 
However, the media have been more than a passive `consumer' of neo-liberalism. 
As noted in chapter 3, the media have been active in disseminating neo-liberalist values 
and political symbols and often called for the government to accept them. It is shown that 
the anti-reform alliance between the chaebol and the media (especially the media) played a 
significant role in transforming the discourse of `New Korea' (the symbol of reform) to 
`Internationalisation' and eventually to `Globalisation'. Once the government's reform 
drive aiming at vested interests failed and the government was trapped into the straitjacket 
of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, there emerged a triple alliance among the chaebol, 
the media and the government. In conjunction with the advent of the so-called 
globalisation era, `Strengthening competitiveness' which used to be a subordinate theme, 
was promoted as the national agenda: an all-powerful catchphrase pushing through 
deregulation and opening-up. The discourse practices concerning `Globalisation' and 
`Strengthening competitiveness' were particularly strong in JoongAng (Samsung's 
affiliate), which can be largely explained by its inherent connection to capital. 
The development of ruling discourses toward consolidating vested interests can also 
be explained by the weakness of countervailing powers. Trade unions had not grown up to 
a political power, and some civil organisations even supported neo-liberal reform policies. 
Major media were dominated by neo-liberalists, while civic media and social media 
sectors remained under-developed. As a consequence, alternative voices challenging the 
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dominant arguments were hardly heard. Alternative voices, if any, were largely ignored by 
the media. Thus, neo-liberalism was literally declared as the dominant economic thought, 
which made it more difficult to criticise the chaebol's avarice and the government's policy 
drive toward `market fundamentalism'. Through its long-term influence on economic 
thought, the media can be appraised to have exerted considerable repercussions on 
economic changes. 
The case studies which concern new business entry by Samsung, Hyundai and 
Hanbo (chapter 4) and the failures of the Hyundai and Daewoo group (chapter 6) have 
shown why corporate failure continued to occur in the policy communities of Korea. The 
chaebol's duplicated overinvestment through borrowing is primarily related to 
communication problems. In the corporate governance system, which cultivated despotism 
and nepotism, internal democracy was hard to accomplish. In the so-called `system-world' 
where `money' and `power', rather than `language', are the means of communication 
(Habermas 1981: 476), professional managers could not properly voice their views. Other 
problems caused by the lack of democracy in decision making were that the undemocratic 
decisions could not be smoothly removed by market pressures and the costs incurred by 
the resulting wrong decisions would be shifted to those who were never involved in the 
decision-making process. 
PR has been utilised as the key tool in covering up these problems and manipulating 
public opinion. By capturing politics with `money', the chaebol were able to overcome the 
resistance of professional government officials and satisfy their expansion desire. To put it 
differently, the regulator (the state) was captured by the regulated (the chaebol). However, 
most newspapers failed to disclose these problems, and some of them criticised the 
government in favour of the chaebol, thereby paralysing industrial policies. This is largely 
because the greater influence of news sources over economic news has made it extremely 
difficult to undertake investigative reporting on the chaebol. Such influence of the chaebol 
arises mainly from their superior status as news sources and, at the same time, advertisers 
for the media. 
The chaebol might make wrong decisions in the local public spheres 
(Offentlichkeiten) within the chaebol. However, if the press could check them out when 
such decisions were floated around in the policy communities, the society would benefit 
from this safety mechanism. If, however, the forum for public debate is broken down, that 
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is, if the wider public sphere (Öffentlichkeit) where a country's policies should be 
discussed is paralysed, wrong decisions go unchecked and may be implemented to the 
great loss and detriment of society as a whole, not to mention the chaebol themselves. 
As demonstrated in chapter 5, the fact that the financial sector, which used to be the 
source of economic vitality, became one of the causes of economic crisis, is also closely 
related to the functional disorder of the public sphere. A good example is the process of 
the OECD accession which accelerated the liberalisation of financial and capital markets. 
The government who proposed the national agenda of `Internationalisation' promoted the 
OECD accession as a fast-track ticket to advanced countries. The media paid little 
attention to the obligations and problems associated with early accession, and some went 
further to call for the government to speed up deregulation and opening-up. 
Deregulation enabled the already almighty economic powers (the chaebol) to secure 
financial sources much more easily. ' 80 In particular, undisciplined loans of merchant 
banking corporations led to over-investment of the chaebol, which in turn resulted in poor 
rates of return and increased debt ratio. The escape route for the companies which were 
caught in this vicious circle was short-term foreign debts. In the end, the short-term debts 
were hidden as the long-term investment capital and this led to a large-scale mismatch of 
repayment terms. 
There was no mechanism to defend the national economy against foreign capitals, 
even though they were obviously speculative capitals with potentials of destabilising the 
financial market. The IMF also, as their Independent Evaluation Office confessed 
belatedly, failed adequately to recognize the vulnerabilities created by the uneven 
sequence of capital account liberalization and the risk that a change in investor sentiment 
could cause a severe drain on foreign exchange reserves (IEO 2003: 3). 
Even when South Asian countries fell into a foreign currency squeeze, serious 
precaution was hardly heard in Korea. This is partly because the media had often raised 
the possibility of `economic crisis' based on a shaky ground and, like a shepherd's boy, 
their warnings lost confidence. Another reason is that the government's economic policy 
group was dominated by market fundamentalists who had over-confidence in the self- 
adjusting power of the market. As the communication channel within the government also 
was considerably broken down, even the then President was apparently left in the dark. 
i80 Other non-chaebol enterprises with potentially more profitable projects had difficulty in borrowing. 
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When the crisis was imminent, the Korean media tended to keep a patriotic tone, 
while international economic news agencies and newspapers based in New York and Hong 
Kong often exaggerated the Korean economic situation. In any case, the crisis broke out, 
and international news providers were believed to be correct. Yet this should be 
approached with strong reservation, for their news reports had self-fulfilling effects in the 
sense that they affected investment sentiments among international financial organisations 
and investors and thereby encouraged them to take actions so as to realise what had been 
reported. 
In the case of IMF rescue package negotiations, as discussed in chapter 6, the media 
in Korea and abroad shared the same view that IMF policy prescriptions must be accepted 
to revitalise the Korean economy. As the IMF's prescriptions largely reflect the interests of 
international financial capitals, particularly those based in the US, through the US 
Treasury Department, they were not often compatible with the goal of a sound national 
economy. High-interest policy, for example, could put pressure on debtors and help 
financial capitals recover their outstanding loans, but caused even sound companies to go 
bankrupt. The policy mix of liberalising capital market and selling companies abroad was 
sought to accumulate foreign currency reserve, but that was no more than `Korean sale' 
for foreign capitals. 
The global financial institutions, credit rating agencies and the major press (mainly 
based in New York and London) exercised indeed considerable influence on the Korean 
government who was desperate to recover the country's credit rating. Korean media were 
also busy reproducing various reports and press releases of these institutions. Even more, 
Korean major newspapers considered IMF policy prescriptions as inviolable or sacred and 
hurried to criticise the `renegotiation' argument, warning that it would worsen the crisis. 
Workers' resistance to labour market flexibilisation received aggressive and negative 
response from these newspapers who argued that it would be simply an obstacle to 
attracting foreign capitals. 
It is rather obvious that the on-going globalization has provided an unprecedented 
opportunity for global financial capitals and the media to expand their influences, often at 
the expense of tensions and crises in national economies and the media. It is equally clear 
that, when global capitals, the media and international bodies are deeply involved in major 
policy decisions at a national level, it is hard to expect independent decisions which 
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appropriately take into account the different views and interests of national citizens. As 
there is no supranational institution capable of controlling these agents which do not have 
democratic delegation, such a task is also left to nation states. Yet, it is highly 
questionable how effective individual states are in controlling these ever-growing 
international agents. 
In the so-called globalisation era, economic opening-up could be accepted as 
inevitable if its speed is under control and safety mechanisms are in place. However, the 
Korean experience powerfully demonstrates that, when multi-national capitals (who 
influence national economy greatly but stay out of democratic control), international 
organisations and the media (who contribute to protecting the interests of these capitals) 
are all acting together in one single direction, the resulting outcome can be devastating. In 
a sense, we are now living in a period when confidence in economic policies is decided 
not by voters but by the powerful in world market. Obviously, the IMF acknowledged 
their mistakes and loosened extreme belt-tightening measures, but this came so late that 
the Korean economy had already lost its potentials of growth. 
The new government, which was elected after the outbreak of the currency crisis, 
accepted a long list of demands from `outsiders' without careful consideration, which 
greatly contributed to causing a chronic crisis afterwards. They had a notable intention for 
the chaebol reform but it did not last long. The government once again compromised and 
conceded to the demands of the chaebol in the name of `Rescue the economy'. The crisis 
came with a good opportunity to reform the Korean economic system, but became 
embedded within the system. 181 Neo-liberalism, which had fertilised the crisis, was again 
adopted as an ideological framework which guided the economic recovery progress. 
The critical problem in this regard is that many policy decisions, which could 
determine people's conditions of life, have often been taken irrespective of their views and 
opinions. As we have already seen, many of the decisions taken leading up to the crisis fall 
within this category. They were wrapped up under `public opinion' or `majority 
agreement', which in fact were `manufactured' by the powerful in the market (the chaebol 
or international capitals) and major press (domestic or foreign). 
As Habermas pointed out, if issues thus `start in, be managed from, the center, 
181 In the culture area of Chinese characters, crisis (I 'EA) is the compound word of risk and 
opportunity ( ). 
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rather than follow a spontaneous course originating in the periphery' (1996: 380), 
decisions made in such reversed processes are often faced with `legitimacy crisis' 182 
because they go against democratic procedure. He also pointed out that economic crisis in 
late capitalist state tends to shift to a legitimacy crisis due to state intervention. In this 
regard, however, we need to move our focus from the matter of state intervention itself to 
the guarantee of people's participation in the process of determining state intervention. 
The Asian economic crisis reminds us that we are of course not living in the era of 
Keynesian state intervention and that `the retreat of state' has gone too far. 
We can say that the Habermasian public sphere is the `arena of communication' to 
secure the `legitimacy' where people, even if they sometimes have a quarrel with each 
other, persuade, agree, and refuse while acknowledging the differences among them. If 
these attitudes are not maintained among the members of policy communities, the 
decisions taken are not likely to have solid grounds, and will remain controversial due to 
the lack of legitimacy. As the Korean crisis resulted, to a considerable degree, from 
communication and democracy crisis, it was extremely difficult for the government to 
cope with. 
From the perspective of `real' democracy, the media are expected to introduce 
critical issues to the public sphere and encourage rational decisions to be made. When the 
media abandon its obligation as a warning system, offer misleading views on socio- 
economic realities, eventually exclude politics and distort policies, the public sphere will 
be severely damaged. When the Korean media were subjected to a close scrutiny relying 
on the normative theories about the `public sphere' and the democratic (or public) media 
model, the degree of divergences turned out to be noticeable. 
As a result, many important issues were not discussed in the sphere of politics, and 
fell into the realm of the `non-decision' 1 83. Even when a decision was taken by necessity, it 
often lacked rationality and legitimacy. In a damaged `public sphere', it was very difficult 
for many important decisions such as company decisions, government policies and IMF 
prescriptions to secure rationality. Besides, as their legitimacy was being questioned in the 
182 Habermas proposed that `an institution would be legitimate, only if, were the institution to be openly 
discussed by everyone affected by it under conditions free from constraint, it would elicit their consent' 
(cited in Thompson, J. B. 1995). 
183 Bachrach & Baratz (1962; 1963) introduced situations of `non-issue and non-decision' in which issues 
do not arise for decision and explained that such situations are built up as a consequence of someone's 
capacity to ensure that they do not arise. 
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implementation process, these policies could not be successfully settled down. 
In short, the Korean case shows that the media can contribute to deforming the 
public sphere and thereby have negative influences on economy which may add up to 
create a crisis. From this viewpoint, two traditions of media studies - the public sphere 
and media influence - can be combined. The need for combining economics and media 
studies in understanding economic change is also essential - especially in Korea where 
the tradition of such interdisciplinary research is weak and the economic crisis continues - 
in that economic changes would not be properly explained without understanding media 
influence on economy. 
The enlargement of the media influence on economic change may not be unique to 
Korea, but may be to a varying degree the case in many other countries. There are good 
reasons to believe that such influence of the media will be significantly increasing. Above 
all, the media industry which was once considered as a `public good' is now increasingly 
an important place of profit creation thanks to technological developments, deregulation 
and privatisation. In addition, while capitals have increased their power under the 
protection of neo-liberalism, the media and the state who are supposed to control capitals 
are being captured by them. Moreover, global alliances among economic powers and 
major media are being expanded and strengthened, but it is more and more difficult for 
nation state to act upon their sovereignty. 
Given such prospect, the norm of `non-state, non-market' concerning the 
positioning of the media system needs to be emphasised but with some adjustments: there 
is an increasing need for recognising a greater role of the state in the context of the 
market's growing power over the state. The media certainly should secure autonomy from 
both the state and the market, but what can help it happen is the state under democratic 
control, not the market. If circumstances require, it is time to seek cooperation between 
the state and the media to check the over-growing economic powers. 
The existing studies on media effects tend to favour a rather limited model of 
influence. This is partly because those studies concentrate on short-term effects and pay 
little attention to the influences on economic policies, and even when long-term effects are 
considered, the influences on economic thoughts are hardly examined. This is to some 
degree a result of the fact that studies concerning the world major media's influence on 
national economy have not yet been accumulated sufficiently. 
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Given that the deformation of the public sphere is one form of media influence, 
however, the limitation of the limited model is clear. Once the media do not function 
properly so that the public sphere is damaged, a country's economy and even its 
democracy can be in crisis. The rapidly changing media environment in the so-called `age 
of globalisation' reminds us of the importance of the economy as a subject of media 
studies. 
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Appendix: The Media used for Textual and Content Analyses 
* Korean Media 
Daily newspapers: Chosun-ilbo, DongA-ilbo, JoongAng-ilbo, Hankyoreh-shinmun, Hankook-ilbo, 
Kyunghyang-shinmun, Segye-ilbo, Seoul-shinmun (Daehan-maeil), Kookmin-ilbo, Munhwa-ilbo, 
Korea Herald (English), Korea Times (English). 
Economic newspapers: Hankook Kyungjae (Korea Economic Daily), Maeil Kyungjae (Maeil 
Business Newspaper), Seoul Kyungjae (Seoul Economic Daily). 
Weekly magazines: Sisa Journal, Media Oneul (Media Today). 
Monthly magazines: Monthly Chosun, Monthly Mal, Ininul-gwa Sasang (People and Thoughts). 
Internet newspapers: Ohmynews, Pressian. 
Bulletins: Journalists Association Newsletter (Journalists Magazine), Weekly Administration 
Affairs, Weekly Gazette of the FKI. 
News agencies: Yonhap News. 
Broadcasting: Korea Broadcasting System (KBS), Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), 
Pyunghwa Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), Christian Broadcasting System (CBS). 
* Foreign Media 
Daily Newspapers: New York Times, Washington Post, International Herald Tribune. 
Economic newspapers: Wall Street Journal, Asian Wall Street Journal, Financial Times. 
Magazines: Economist, Forbes, Manager, Time. 
News Agencies: Bloomberg News Service. 
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